NASA Headquarters Oral
History Project
Edited Oral History Transcript
Sumara
Thompson-King
Interviewed by Rebecca Wright
Houston, TX – 24 April 2015
Wright: Today is April 24, 2015. This oral history is being conducted
with Sumara Thompson-King in Houston, Texas, for the NASA Headquarters
Oral History Project. Interviewer is Rebecca Wright, assisted by Sandra
Johnson. Ms. Sumara Thompson-King serves as the NASA General Counsel,
appointed to this position in June 2014, and this is part two of an
oral history session. The first one was conducted on March 4, earlier
this year. Thank you for stopping in to see us in Houston.
We would like to start today with when you went to NASA Headquarters
[Washington, DC], and you were responsible for litigating protests
before the General Services Administration [GSA] Board of Contract
Appeals. About four years later in 1995, you became Deputy Associate
General Counsel. If you would, give us an overview of the range of
work that you were doing in those positions.
Thompson-King:
One of the reasons I was excited about going to NASA Headquarters
from Goddard [Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, Maryland] was that I
was going to learn how to be a litigator. At the Center, I was focused
on giving advice to programs, and fortunately, we didn’t have
much litigation. Contractors were not suing us. There weren’t
disputes. Having the opportunity to go to Headquarters meant that
I would learn, and be trained by senior attorneys there who handled
claims.
For instance, if NASA had a government contract with a company, and
there was a disagreement, the company would file a claim against us.
That claim would be resolved in one of three ways. The parties would
settle that dispute themselves or go to court or go to one of the
administrative boards. Also, when an agency in the federal government
made a contract award and someone thought that it was an improper
award, one of the competitors might file a protest.
Bid protests were another type of litigation. Bid protests were different
from contract claims. Bid protests challenged an agency decision to
award a contract to a company, while a contract claim was filed by
the contractor who had been awarded a contract and during the performance
of that contract, a dispute arose. When I started work on litigation
matters, the bid protest litigation was a very busy practice area
at the time.
In 1991, the reason I was handling cases before the General Services
Administration Board of Contract Appeals was because of a statute
called the Brooks Act. The Brooks Act had a broad definition, in those
days, of items called ADPE, automatic data processing equipment which
we now call IT, information technology. A protest involving anything
that fit within the broad definition of ADPE in the Brooks Act, was
filed with and decided by the General Services Board of Contract Appeals
[GSBCA].
Think about NASA. Everything we bought had ADPE in it. It was really
a challenge for the Agency, because all of a sudden, decisions that
resulted in a contract being awarded to one company rather than to
another company, were now being challenged before the administrative
contract board at GSA, the GSBCA. The GSBCA heard all protests involving
ADPE.
So, because ADPE was an essential aspect of most of the NASA acquisitions
for satellites and exploration programs activities, many bid protests
of NASA contract award decisions were within the jurisdiction of the
GSBCA. This was a very different experience for NASA. Until the GSBCA
had this new bid protest authority, on the GAO, now known as the Government
Accountability Office, had statutory authority to decide bid protests.
NASA was accustomed to the GAO process but NASA was not accustomed
to this new process that the GSBCA was using. The GSBCA process was
more like a court trial than an administrative review. To some agency
officials, it seemed that this new authority encouraged more protests.
Of course the folks at GSA will tell you that what was happening then
was that government agencies were using more ADPE, or what we now
call IT, information technology. The GSBCA was really on the cutting
edge of dealing with all kinds of issues across the government regarding
the acquisition of information technology that was used by government
agencies to carry out government programs.
You might remember that there was a big brouhaha about the Department
of Treasury trying to upgrade and install an IT system, and the contract
award was protested by a company that wasn’t selected. The GSBCA
handled that protest. Also, at that time cell phone usage was starting
to become more popular. Remember the government used to have the FTS,
Federal Telephone System, and then the federal government began to
contract with commercial companies for both landline and cell phone
services. I can’t remember now all of the companies that we
were contracting with, but back then Sprint, AT&T, because it
was pre-Verizon, were competing to get federal contracts to provide
telecommunication services. We were really engaged in a lot of acquisitions
for this new technology, and the awarded contracts were lucrative
for companies. If a company was not selected for a contract award
that meant that they had no contract, which meant no profits for the
unsuccessful company. Many of such unsuccessful companies believed
that filing a bid protest at the GSBCA was a vital opportunity to
have a second chance to be awarded a contract. It was an interesting
time.
Those bid protests filed at the GSBCA had to be litigated and resolved
quickly. From the date the case was filed to the date of decision
was 45 days. What happened in that 45-day period was an extremely
streamlined trial court process. The parties could actually conduct
depositions and request documents, which was something that parties
could not do when a protest was filed at and decided by the GAO. That
was significant, because it meant that you had senior leaders in the
Agency who could be called by the other side to testify before the
GSBCA. GAO did not have authority to hold hearings, so it did not
have authority to require senior Agency officials to testify. GAO
made all of its decisions based on a paper record only. Think about
how this new ability of an unsuccessful company to hire a law firm,
and have that law firm file a petition to have the GSBCA require a
senior Agency leader to testify. Think about how this new ability
affected the operational activities of the Agency.
Attorneys representing the protester were requesting that source selection
official be available so that those attorneys could depose source
selection officials. That meant that attorney could ask them questions
about the decisions they made and use that testimony in preparation
for trial. Then, the selection officials would have to appear at trial
and provide testimony and be subject to cross-examination. All of
the depositions, the hearing and the submission of documents, pleadings
and briefs had to be completed because the decision of the board had
to occur before that 45-day period ended. This was a high-octane process.
The reason that it was 45 days was because when Congress established
and authorized this process the members responded to the complaint
they heard from Agencies that, “You’re going to slow down
our operations if we have to stop for these protests.” That’s
the key thing with all big protests. Bid protest statutes require
that all performance on that particular awarded contract has to stop
when a protest is filed. Stopping for 45 days, Congress said, “Is
not too much of a delay to ensure fairness in the contract award process.”
It also was meant to incentivize the agencies to do it right—run
a fair competition or risk a bid protest.
Many Agencies believed that they were doing it right, but Congress
was giving unsuccessful companies the opportunity to stop everything
for 45 days, even if the case seemed frivolous. The filing of a frivolous
protest was the big concern for most agencies, and for the companies
that won the award.
I came to Headquarters to learn how to handle those cases protests,
as well as contractor claims. There was a senior attorney at Headquarters
at that time who handled all of the GSBCA protests. I was going to
be working with him, and the plan was for him to train me, and both
he and I would handle the protests. Well, and I’m being candid
here, he came into my office one day and informed me that he would
no longer be doing any of the GSBCA protests, and they were all mine,
and good luck. He closed the door and left.
I was stunned, because I hadn’t been there a year. I think maybe
I’d been there six months. I don’t even know if I had
been there six months. I said to myself, “Gee, can people do
that? He can just decide he’s not going to handle cases anymore?”
My supervisor at the time didn’t exactly say that I was going
to be the only one handling protests. I don’t remember how he
characterized it, but I got the message I was going to be the only
one doing it.
If you look at all of the NASA GSBCA protests from around 1991 until
I don’t know when, my name was on every single one of the cases.
It actually turned out to be a huge benefit for me. First of all,
I didn’t know what I was doing, but I learned. I handled every
GSBCA protest across the Agency, which meant I had to travel to Centers
and meet with people at the Centers, learn what the case was about,
and work with the attorney there who had supported the source evaluation
board that conducted the competition. I met the contracting officers
at each Center, I met the source selection official at each Center.
In those days, the source selection official on some of the major
acquisitions—because these were major activities where we were
getting protests— was the Center Director. I received a [NASA]
Exceptional Achievement Medal because of the protests that I worked
at Glenn Research Center [Cleveland, Ohio, formerly Lewis Research
Center]. We had three or four contract awards that came right behind
each other, and each was protested. At that time, the Center Director
was Larry [Lawrence J.] Ross. Here’s what I learned from Larry
Ross.
First, to many people I believe that I still looked young and inexperienced,
and I could look in people’s eyes and see that look of concern
that said, “Are we sure she knows what she’s doing?”
I don’t remember him having that look of concern when he looked
at me, but I had that concern about him. Here’s why. We went
through the trial preparation process, and I clearly remember getting
him ready for his deposition. I cringed because he couldn’t
remember anything. I thought to myself, “He’s the source
selection official; this was a major IT acquisition. He doesn’t
remember why he selected this company, or what the other companies
did?” His recall just wasn’t there.
I went away very nervous about that. I was nervous because I was thinking
he’s not going to be able to do what he’s supposed to
do on that witness stand, and then they’re going to blame me
because I’m going to lose this case. The Center attorney and
I worked with him a little bit more, but he just didn’t have
a lot of time to talk to us because he was the Center Director and
he had a full schedule each day. But we prepped him so that he knew
the kind of questions we were going to ask him and that the other
side would ask him when we got to the trial.
I learned something from Larry Ross. He was a Center Director. He
was a very busy man. He didn’t have instant recall of everything
that came across his desk and everything he worked on. But, when we
got to that hearing, he was stupendous. He remembered everything that
he couldn’t remember the first time I met with him, or I thought
he couldn’t remember. He was articulate and he clearly and in
detail explained his analysis of the offers. He remembered facts and
details about the case. Once he had had a chance to go back and look
at the file, refresh his recollection, he was just a fabulous witness,
and we won both of the protests where he was the selection official.
It also taught me a lot about the workload and the ability of the
leaders of the Agency, how much they have to do each day. Maybe they
don’t recall things immediately, but if you give them time,
and they sit down and they have some time to prepare, they are remarkable
people, who because of the type of things, the variety of things that
come across their desk that they have to have recall on, are able
to explain why they did certain things. I also learned through this
process that there are some leaders in the Agency who have much more
of a business sense than other leaders, while other leaders are more
technical in their approach to things than others.
Larry Ross was interesting to me because he not only had a technical
knowledge, but he also had a business savvy. He was very good at explaining
to the GSBCA official both technical and cost matters. There was no
jury, it was just the GSBCA judge who really wasn’t familiar
with NASA programs. In 45 days, GSBCA judges had to become familiar
with NASA’s acquisition practice and culture, how we did things,
and how this selection official thought, and how he weighed his determination.
Larry was very good at explaining all of this to someone outside the
Agency. He was quite memorable for me, and taught me, okay, don’t
underestimate your source selection officials. He also set the bar
high, because there were some people who really did have a tough time
when they got into a GSBCA hearing.
I had a very negative experience, very sad experience, involving the
head at White Sands Test Facility [New Mexico], who made a contract
selection. He flew into Washington, because all of the hearings were
held at the GSBCA in Washington, DC. He was very troubled because
he thought his integrity was being questioned in his selection decision.
The attorneys on the other side were challenging him and they said
things like, “Did you treat this other company the same way
as you treated the company you selected? We know you have a relationship
with people that work with the selected company. We found this evidence
of your longstanding relationship with people in that company, that’s
really why you selected this company, not because they presented a
better proposal or more cost-effective proposal. It’s because
of your relationship with them that clouded your judgment.”
He was listening to them and he had been very concerned during the
depositions when the attorneys asked him these questions, and his
concern did not subside when we got to trial.
That day he was having a very difficult day, physically. During the
lunch break, he had a heart attack. He died at GW [George Washington
University Hospital]. I learned from that experience to take care
of our witnesses a little more, really talk to them and make sure
that they understand this is not about them personally, this is about
people wanting to get a contract. I learned that I needed to repeatedly
tell the NASA witnesses that the attorneys on the other side are going
to say things in a particular way that may not be the way things happened,
but that’s how they need to present the case, and I have to
refute it, and together we will do that. It was a very difficult time
for all of us. The case was postponed for about a month, and then
we proceeded. It’s interesting, that’s one of the cases
I don’t remember what the outcome was when we finally got a
decision, because it was devastating for all of us to lose our NASA
colleague.
The leader of White Sands passed away, so the whole operation was
affected—they had never had a protest like this, and then they
lost the leader of the organization. It was a very difficult time
for all of us, and as a matter of fact the attorney from the Center,
it was actually at Johnson Space Center [Houston, Texas] who worked
on the case, left the Agency shortly after that. It really broke him
up, really bothered him. I stayed in litigation. It taught me something.
I regret that I had to learn it that way, but learned to take care
of my folks better. Understand and be more aware of the stress that
they may be under, and work at addressing it more effectively.
Because I was the lead attorney on all of NASA’s GSBCA protest
cases, I worked across the Agency, had cases in California, and had
cases in Cleveland, Houston, and Florida at KSC [Kennedy Space Center].
[Robert L.] Bob Crippen was a source selection official, and I was
his lawyer, and I work for NASA. I worked at Headquarters, and okay,
it seemed that astronauts and former astronauts are always around
Headquarters serving in some position or coming to Headquarters for
meetings. That was my NASA world. Not that it wasn’t a big deal
for me, to meet astronauts. But, to be an effective attorney in this
Agency, you cannot be awestruck because of the astronauts you advise,
work with and talk to frequently.
That’s not the world outside – most people do not get
to meet NASA astronauts and when they do, it’s a big deal. One
of my cases reminded me of that. We had been working on a protest
involving this base operations contract down at Kennedy Space Center.
The longstanding contractor had not received the award, along with
some other folks, other companies, that submitted proposals. We had
three companies to protest the decision that Bob Crippen made. Bob
was comfortable with his decision, he was relaxed. He was prepared.
He’s just very laid-back. I guess you have to be when you’ve
been a [Space] Shuttle commander, nothing’s going to ruffle
you too much. His deposition preparation sessions went fine, he was
ready.
Usually, when a law firm is representing a protestor, the senior partners
don’t handle the depositions. Generally, it’s the associates
or a lower level partner that had been working on the cases that are
assigned to work the protest conduct the depositions. On the day that
Bob Crippen was to be deposed, I gave him the advice that I usually
give: “They’re going to really come at you, they’re
going to ask you these hard questions. Remember what we talked about.
Respond truthfully. Don’t let them lead you to answer. Answer
only the question they ask you.”
Bob and I walked into the room, everybody else was already there.
When I walked into the room, I paused, I really did; I paused, because
the room was full. Attorneys were there who I had never seen. These
attorneys were all men who are about Bob’s age or older, in
their best suits. Senior partners, the name partners from the law
firms were there. There were attorneys present from four law firms,
representing each contractor that was a party to the protest.
The thing to remember about protests is that whenever a company decides
to file a protest, they hire a law firm and the company officials
don’t get to see the documentation that is provided to the law
firm. Company officials don’t get to see this information, because
that would give them insight into the competitor’s information.
That’s why they have to hire outside law firms, and they have
to truly rely on those outside law firms to represent them and to
understand their business. When any source selection official is being
deposed or testifies at trial, he or she is only talking to the attorneys
who are outside counsel, who are from a law firm typically, who are
representing the companies. No company officials are present.
If, for instance, Bob Crippen had made an award and it involved ABC
Company, he likely would have known the president of ABC Company.
It is likely they would have met on several previous occasions, and
would be familiar with each other. Bob was not familiar with any of
the attorneys in the room he entered and none of them had ever met
him or had the opportunity to meet him. When Bob Crippen walked into
the room, the attorneys stood up. Bob and I were on one side of the
deposition table, directly across from the attorneys. I said, “We’re
ready to begin, and I’d like to introduce”—before
I could even say, “I’d like to introduce Commander Robert
Crippen,” somebody tore across the room to come and shake his
hand. I was nearly knocked over.
I’m standing there—and I just moved out of the way. I
had to sit back and wait for 20 minutes because everybody wanted to
shake his hand—and this was before—can you imagine if
they could have taken selfies? Every attorney got a chance to shake
his hand, introduce himself to Bob Crippen and identify their client
and their law firm. Finally, all the introductions were done, people
sat down, and his deposition was twenty minutes. Twenty minutes. Twenty
minutes.
Wright:
It’s nice to be in awe of an American hero, isn’t it?
Thompson-King:
I’m like, “Oh my goodness, where are the hard questions?”
You talk about softball questions, well that’s what they asked,
and I know Bob’s wondering what all that preparation was for
—but he never batted an eyelash. I think he was used to it.
He didn’t say to me, “Sumara, this happens,” but
I’m sure it happened frequently.
Another lesson learned. When you have an American hero as a client,
people treat American heroes differently. We ended up losing that
case, because they went after everybody else with full force. We ended
up losing, but they did not go after Bob Crippen, they did not attack
him. Not at all.
Yes. I had some very interesting experiences. As time has gone on,
now, where I am, I see how folks treat Gerst [William H. Gerstenmaier,
Associate Administrator for Human Exploration and Operations (HEO)]
and how folks treat Charlie [NASA Administrator Charles F. Bolden].
Since I’ve been at Headquarters, Charlie hasn’t been a
selection official, but Gerst has, and, yes, your status in the Agency
does make a difference. Even in court. Judges, respond to Gerstenmaier
very differently than they might respond and react to a program manager
who might be a source selection official.
One of the things we have learned when we are dealing with HEO programs
that are the subject of a court case is how effective even the mere
presence of Mr. Gerstenmaier is to the judge. In one case, we had
to ask Gerst, “We need you to just sit in the courtroom. We
don’t need you to say anything, but they need to see you’re
there.” The NASA attorney told me later, that at times Gerst
would nod his head, and they would see the judge looking over at Gerst
nodding his agreement. Those nods were important “testimony.”
I had the opportunity to work with a lot of Center Directors. I got
to work with procurement officers on major acquisitions at the Centers
in the Agency. People got to know me. James [E.] Hattaway was a contract
specialist on that case where Bob Crippen was the selection official.
Jim Hattaway became the Associate Center Director years later, worked
his way up, became Procurement Officer, and then eventually became
the Associate Center Director. I’ve known him since he and I
were both junior level colleagues, him working in procurement, me
as the attorney. People have asked me, “How do people across
NASA know you?” It’s because of the GSBA protests I worked
in my career. How fortunate that assignment became.
In working every one of those cases, I had the opportunity to meet
and develop relationships with folks. They had the opportunity to
meet me, and I think it developed some trust, because I am the lawyer
representing the Agency. You have to gain that trust with folks. So
if you know somebody at the Center who everybody else knows, that
was also a way to develop relationships. I knew Jim, so newer people
who were coming along might at first say, “Why is a lawyer coming
from Headquarters?” And raise their eyebrows. When Jim would
come into the room and give me a hug, I had credibility. Those relationships
helped me over the years to do my job, to offer advice, which was
accepted by folks that might have been a little leery, but having
someone at the Center who would give me credibility helped as time
went on. Those GSBCA days were very important.
Also I hate to write. I really don’t like writing. I learned
to do it pretty well, I’m pretty good at it, but I don’t
like doing it. At GSBCA we had to write and prepare numerous documents
for every one of those cases—had to write the legal briefs,
help the contracting officers write their statements. I did a lot
of writing. Folks knew I could write. That helped.
One of the things I tell young attorneys is you need to be able to
write. Competence means something, because you never know who’s
going to read what you’re writing. The source selection officials
would read the legal arguments that I wrote, and I had to be accurate
and truthful, but I also had to have them feel that I was explaining
their decision making, and why they did certain things, so that when
they read it, they wouldn’t say, “She doesn’t understand,”
or, “That’s not true.”
I became pretty skilled at capturing the thoughts of our source selection
officials and the source evaluation boards, and skilled in presenting
their case to the GSBCA. That helped me to understand how we conduct
our operations, how the engineers and scientists analyze and interpret
things as they’re going through their decision making. I had
to gain their confidence in knowing that I could effectively express
their thoughts well to someone outside NASA, so that my work would
result in a successful win for us at the GSBCA. All of that helped
me get credibility across the Agency, learn about the Agency, and
just improve my skills.
As time went on, we had to have other folks, other than just me, handling
GSBCA protests. We hired two attorneys. One of them was [Bernard J.]
Bernie Roan, who’s now the Chief Counsel at Johnson Space Center,
and Vincent [A.] Salgado. The three of us really became the protest
attorneys at Headquarters, and every protest in the agency was handled
was handled by one of us. Eventually, GSBCA’s authority over
bid protests went away, and that authority was given to the—used
to be the General Accounting Office, now it’s the Government
Accountability Office, GAO. All bid protests go before GAO now. We
continued, the three of us, Bernie, Vincent, and I continued to handle
those protests before the GAO.
The way that protests are handled at NASA is that the Headquarters
attorneys represent the Agency. The Center attorneys work with the
assigned Headquarters attorney. The Headquarters attorney would be
what’s called the “first chair” attorney. HQ was
lead in the case, but we always worked with the Center attorney, because
they had been working on the competition since it started. Representing
the Agency gave us great training and great experience with working
with folks across the Agency, and working with different programs.
When I became Deputy in the contracts division of OGC, I spent more
time managing those protest activities than actually handling cases
myself. We hired another attorney who was also handling the protests,
so I wasn’t sitting first chair, I managed the protest process,
and managed how we worked with the Centers in litigating contract
claims. Claims are adjudicated before what’s known as the Armed
Services Board of Contract Appeals.
A short footnote here. NASA used to have its own Board of Contract
Appeals. We didn’t generate enough work for the Board. The General
Counsel then, who was [Edward A.] Ed Frankle, reached an agreement
with the head of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, so
we abolished the NASA Board, and all of NASA cases were to be heard
by the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals [ASBCA]. NASA employed
two attorneys to serve on its Board that was being abolished. One
of them had accepted a position as an ASBCA judge, while the General
Counsel decided to still keep the other attorney on the rolls as a
NASA employee, but that other attorney would work as an ASBCA judge.
Eventually as time went on that individual retired.
Today, we don’t have a NASA position on the ASBCA, but we provide
funding to the ASBCA, so that we can support their activities, because
they serve as the administrative forum for addressing claims filed
against NASA. As Deputy in the contracts division I was responsible
for managing the claims activities and our relationship with the Armed
Services Board of Contract Appeals. The other thing that I did, once
I became Deputy, was really managing the office and working on the
program activities, and how we provided legal advice and support to
the program activities. The attorneys in OGC’s contracts division
offered assistance to the Centers in how they provided legal advice
to the source evaluation boards on issues that would arise during
a competition. NASA was conducting more complex acquisitions, so there
were more complex issues in these new competitive acquisitions that
the Centers hadn’t seen in previous competitions.
We also wanted to establish consistency across the Agency, so we would
have attorneys at Headquarters who would offer their senior level
advice to the attorneys at the Centers. Sometimes that advice was
welcomed and sought, other times it was, “Why are you calling
us? We’ve got this.” We walked a careful line, because
we know what our role is as Headquarters. We were there to assist,
and there were times when some folks might have thought, “We
really don’t need your help.” At Headquarters, we understood
that some felt that way, but we had to explain why we were providing
assistance. That took having diplomatic but firm conversations with
folks. That was one of the responsibilities I had. Because I’d
worked protests, I had some credibility. Because I also had worked
with other program officials, we used those relationships to start
building more credibility so that when we would offer our assistance
it was more readily accepted. There would still be some pushback from
some folks, but most program officials were accepting of our help.
We were very busy with a number of major acquisitions that were going
on in the Agency. We were also very busy providing input on the Federal
Acquisition Regulation [FAR] that were being developed and updated.
The Federal Acquisition Regulation is authorized by three agencies,
NASA, General Services Administration, and DoD [Department of Defense].
NASA is a key player in developing those rules that everyone in the
government must follow. Therefore, we had an attorney who was the
legal support to one of the teams that was helping to develop those
regulations, and that team included someone from the Policy Division
in the Office of Procurement.
We were busy doing that because the Competition in Contracting Act
had passed in 1984. Now I haven’t done this in so long, I can’t
believe I’m almost forgetting specific legislative history because
I’ve been out of procurement for a while subsequently. Clinger-Cohen
[Act] was passed, different acts were passed that were modifying the
Competition in Contracting Act. Whenever there was a legislative change,
we would have to go in and make changes to the FAR. Our Office and
the Office of Procurement was very busy in those days, and that was
when—and I can see his face, he’s no longer in Congress
right now—from Virginia, and I’ll think of his name—Tom
Davis was very active. There are very few people now – very
few people on the Hill – who are very knowledgeable and active
in developing federal procurement legislation. You don’t see
much activity, not as much as in the ‘80s and ’90s, particularly
when Chairman [Jack] Brooks and others were in Congress. These days
you’ll see slight changes from time to time included in the
DoD authorization bill, which may include language about how NASA
must conduct acquisitions.
This was the reason we paid attention to the DOD authorization bill,
and this is another story, a little footnote here, NASA is covered
by Title 10, which is the Armed Services Procurement Act, whereas
other civilian agencies are covered by Title 41, which is the Federal
Property and Administrative Services Act. The reason we are covered
under Title 10, there are multiple reasons, but when the Space Act
was passed, one of the things it did was to abolish NACA [National
Advisory Committee for Aeronautics]. This is the year, 2015, that
we’re celebrating the 100th anniversary of the NACA. When NACA
was abolished as part of the authorization of the Space Act, its authority
was transferred to NASA. Remember, NACA was started on the DoD side,
so all of their procurement activities were conducted under the armed
services statute, and then NASA continued its procurement activities
under the armed services statute, even though we were very clearly
a civilian agency.
Frankly, it’s where we want to be, because NASA work is more
akin to the type of work DoD does, than it is akin to the acquisitions
made by other civilian agencies. That has raised some interesting
issues over time, because some members of Congress don’t realize
NASA is covered under Title 10, so we would see changes in Title 10
that referred to, “DoD, the Secretary of DoD,” and no
mention of NASA. We’re out in limbo, because it doesn’t
cover us. It would cover the Coast Guard and it would cover DoD, but
not NASA.
Those were the breadth of things that I worked on when I was Deputy
Associate General Counsel for Contracts. Probably a lot more detail
than you were looking for.
Wright:
And, I’m sure you left a lot out. It’s an amazing span.
Like you mentioned, what a great opportunity to learn a lot in a short
amount of time about the Agency as a whole, to give you that background
that each Center is the same but each Center is different, to help
you do that. Share with us, as you moved, how you took that information
and how you built upon it in the next years, and some of the adventures
you went on as well. One of the things we started to talk about in
March was NASA exercising its Other Transactions Authority [OTA] to
enable partnerships with commercial businesses. Although NASA had
had partnerships of different ways, this was the new way of doing
business, or NASA was looking at it as doing business in a different
way.
Thompson-King:
Yes, it was very interesting. We did develop an additional way of
doing business. I say additional because we still conduct much of
our business through contracts that we award, but when we started
with COTS [Commercial Orbital Transportation Services], that’s
when NASA branched out into a new direction, interpreting our “other
transactions” authority, or actually using it in a way we had
not previously used it. That Language, we learned, was inserted into
the bill as it was being written, by Paul [G.] Dembling. He came and
talked with the NASA attorneys at one of our meetings. We asked him,
“What were you thinking when you added this language to the
bill?” He responded, “I just put it in to give us flexibility.
Didn’t know how we would use it, what we would use it for, but
we put it in there.”
No one else, no other agency in 1958, had that kind of language. For
the longest time, because lawyers can be conservative and careful,
NASA used this authority sparingly. There was a concern that if we
used it, and if we used it wrong, Congress would take it away from
us, so let’s not use it. So we didn’t use it, I think,
mostly because lawyers were giving very cautious advice about it.
NASA did start using it, but it was for things that were really under
the radar. I thought that meant that NASA only used the authority
a few times, then what I found out was that NASA had lots of what
are called Space Act Agreements. I remember asking another NASA attorney,
“What’s a Space Act Agreement? What is that? I’ve
never heard of that.” “Shhh” was the response.
At Goddard, the only person who saw the Space Act Agreements [SAA]
was the Center Chief Counsel. There were lots of them, but all of
them had to come to the Center Chief Counsel for drafting and concurrence.
SAAs could be used for any purpose that wasn’t an acquisition
of services or supplies needed for NASA operations. Mostly, NASA entered
into a SAA with a company, college, or university doing research so
that it could be a research partner. NASA and its partner would provide
their own resources to perform the research, but they would share
research data. But there was clearly no exchange of funds. No exchange
of funds.
When Administrator [Michael D.] Griffin came in, he basically said,
“We need to do something different, because I’m hearing
from people outside the Agency that NASA is not supporting commercial
industry. Find a way to support commercial industry.” We started
looking at NASA’s “Other Transactions” Authority,
and figuring out a way to use it. I know we’ve talked about
this before, but the challenge was how to get everybody to understand,
number one, NASA can’t just do anything it wants, under the
authority. There were NASA folks who believed that we could use OTA
to do anything NASA wanted to do. Everything’s okay, nobody
will look at what we’re doing, and nobody can stop us from what
we’re doing. There were really individuals in the Agency who
looked at the use of NASA’s OTA as a new way to get out from
under the Federal Acquisition Regulation. They would say, “Hey,
NASA wants to build this rocket, and I want to buy it from that company,
and I want to buy bearings or wheels from this company. I’m
going to use the money in NASA’s budget, and I have a plan and
I’ll share it with people in the Agency, but I don’t have
to tell anybody else about it because I know what I’m doing
and I’m going to move forward with this plan using NASA’s
OTA.”
I, and other NASA attorneys had the task to calm everybody down and
explain that NASA didn’t and doesn’t have authority to
operate like that. But truly there were people who felt that because
we’re NASA and because we are exploring space, we can operate
that way. That may have been what we could have done with the Apollo
Program and the Gemini Program, but we’re a long way from Apollo
and Gemini, so we can’t do those things now. We are getting
scrutiny over every dollar we spend and over every decision we make.
Also, I had to remind folks that there is this thing called bid protests.
NASA folks would tell the NASA lawyers, “Oh, we’re not
using the FAR, so protests don’t matter. This can’t be
litigated.” The lawyers respond by saying, “There are
people over on K Street, the K Street lawyers would be excited to
have the opportunity to test that view through a lawsuit in court.”
The NASA lawyers struggled to educate the programs and get some officials
to understand that use of OTA was not an unfettered opportunity. The
lawyers advised, “We have to develop some type of process for
using OTA, it has to be rational, and it has to be fair. It doesn’t
have to be under the FAR, we don’t want to make it under the
FAR. But NASA had to create some type of fair process that had credibility
that showed we were not making arbitrary and capricious decisions.”
That was the huge challenge every step of the way at every level in
the program chain, with folks who were involved in developing COTS.
I won’t say every person had that point of view, but even the
folks who didn’t, even the folks who understood would say, “We
understand we’ve got to have some rules, but we don’t
like that rule, we like this one.” The lawyers would have to
explain why some rules applied to use of OTA and others did not.
We were constantly trying to explain how we thought we could effectively
let them do what they wanted to do operate the program the way they
wanted to, but to do it so in a way that NASA would not don’t
get a legal challenge in court. The NASA lawyers knew the GAO did
not have jurisdiction over activities conducted using OTA—we
believed this. But NASA had never done this before, used OTA in this
way. The lawyers recognized that a court would welcome an opportunity
to review NASA’s new use of OTA. We knew what legal arguments
we could make successfully, and we also knew what legal arguments
wouldn’t be successful in explaining what we did. And we said,
“No, the program can’t take that approach. We will lose
on that point. We will lose.” “You don’t know that
we will lose,” would be the response from a program official,
and we would respond, “You’re right. But here’s
what we do know. Based on our knowledge of how courts operate and
interpret law, this is why we have a strong belief and indication
that NASA will lose in court if we do certain things.”
Establishing parameters and getting agreement within the Agency was
the constant struggle, the daily struggle, defining the appropriate
use of NASA’s Other Transactions Authority. One of the things
I remember when we drafted the language for the Announcement for Proposals,
even things like calling it an Announcement for Proposals was important.
I told them, “This is not a procurement, you can’t use
procurement terminology. We have to make sure we are keeping this
separate from the procurement process.” We didn’t call
the solicitation an RFP, Request for Proposals, we called it an Announcement
for Proposals, AFP. We were trying to make that distinction. Also,
don’t call them contracting officers, they’re agreements
officers. What the heck is an agreements officer? It’s not a
contracting officer. It is a person who worked on this particular
activity to reach this agreement using OTA and procedures NASA created
by using OTA. That’s all I can tell you an agreements officer
is at this point. We haven’t done this previously, here’s
what we’re doing now. The program folks would ask, “Why
are you making us use a different term? Like that’s really going
to make a difference.” We responded, “It is going to make
a difference. Please use this term.”
I spent a lot of time convincing folks that NASA attorneys weren’t
just making life difficult for them, because there were folks who
really believed that was what we were doing. They would say, “You’re
just creating rules.” I responded, “Well, you’re
creating a space transportation approach that no one else has created.
We have belief and confidence in you. We also know there are things
you haven’t done, there’s technology that hasn’t
been developed. You have seen what’s worked, so you know how
to use certain information. We’re the same way as lawyers, and
we’re giving you our best advice. Rely on us the way that we’re
relying on you to allow another company to build a vehicle that will
go into low-Earth orbit, so that we can buy services from that company.”
That became the other interesting thing that happened to me during
COTS – I realized that people started to think I had some influence.
Within the Agency, there were people who did not believe that a party
other than NASA—maybe the Air Force – could or should
build a rocket that would take cargo or human beings to low-Earth
orbit. It just shouldn’t be done. Not that it couldn’t
be done, it just shouldn’t be done, and therefore, it couldn’t
be done. There was the belief by some that the American people did
not want a privately owned spaceship to transport cargo and astronauts
to the ISS. NASA cargo and astronauts should only fly on vehicles
owned, designed, and built under a NASA contract and operated and
controlled by NASA. As NASA lawyers, we knew that there were two camps
within NASA. I think if you go back and look at some of the history
and the conversations, I don’t know how much folks will talk
about it now, but there were two camps in the Agency. There was a
lot of concern about having private companies conduct this operation.
Some folks, I think, will be very honest about it and talk about their
concerns. Bryan [D.] O’Connor, when he was head of [Office of]
Safety and Mission Assurance [OSMA], was concerned about this new
approach. He was vocal. There were others who weren’t so vocal.
They’re under the radar, engaged in conversations and activities
that might not have supported the COTS effort. The NASA lawyers were
in the middle of these competing camps. There was a team of NASA lawyers
working on the COTS effort. But you also have these other people coming
and talking to you, a NASA lawyer, about how COTS may not be the best
thing for the Agency, and why are you supporting this activity, and
that they need you, the lawyer, to tell the COTS team that they shouldn’t
be doing this.
It was very interesting, because I did not think of myself as having
influence on whether to do COTS or not. I viewed my influence as how
to conduct a competition for COTS in a fair and effective way. Yet,
during the development of COTS, some NASA folks would button-holed
me to talk about and share their concerns about COTS. I wondered,
“Why are you talking to me?” I realized that they were
talking to me because they had been talking to the program and technical
leaders, and weren’t convincing them. Apparently, their next
thought was – Let’s try to talk to the lawyers and get
the lawyers to go in and tell the technical folks that this really
won’t work, and this is not a viable approach. Get the lawyers
to talk some sense into them. Stunning, I thought to myself.
Wright:
Yes, revealing.
Thompson-King:
Yes. That was the time we were living in, because there was an individual
who didn’t talk to me. I don’t think he thought very highly
of me. As time went on, I think he began to realize that there were
people who were listening to me, and that I was helping to develop
the competition model that we used in COTS, and this activity was
going forward. We were going to spend a lot of money on COTS, and
then subsequently we had the CRS, Commercial Resupply Services contract,
and we were spending a lot of money on that also. I was sitting in
an auditorium, trying to listen to the presenter, when an individual
sat next to me and begins saying these things like, “Why are
you supporting NASA spending money on that? NASA could be spending
money on some other things that the Agency really needs to spend money
on, something that’s going to be successful.” I was told
that CRS and COTS were not going to be successful, and we were just
spending a lot of NASA money on that activity, and it was going to
embarrass the Agency. I thought, “Why are you telling me this?”
But I knew then answer, he wanted me to influence other NASA officials
to stop COTS. I didn’t know any more than anybody else.
Did we know COTS was going to work? Probably Alan [J.] Lindenmoyer
had more faith than anybody else. Did we know Commercial Resupply
was going to work? Don’t know that Gerst was 100 percent convinced,
but he was the expert and he determined that both NASA and the contractors
had a credible plan. We had capable engineers who were reviewing what
the outside parties were doing. We had our Safety and Mission Assurance
and our [Chief] Engineer—they weren’t getting the total
insight that they wanted, but they were pushing to get enough information
to make the best decision possible.
First, Gerst made the decision to award two agreements for COTS to
SpaceX (Space Exploration) and Rocketplane Kistler. When Kistler couldn’t
continue, Gerst selected Orbital [Sciences Corporation] as the other
COTS partner. Then NASA got to a place where we awarded the CRS contracts
to provide commercial cargo transportation to ISS before we even knew
that either vehicle could fly. Oh, people on the Hill, even people
in the Agency, even some of the lawyers were concerned about that.
Some folks thought that we were—really, I guess the expression
is, “betting on the come” on this one. But as Gerst thought
about it, and as we helped him to articulate, we all thought about
this, we needed a plan to have something available to us when Shuttle
is no longer available. We were going to shut down Shuttle, and of
course there were people, even on the [Capitol] Hill, who did not
want us to stop operating Shuttle.
All of this was going on, and the lawyers were caught in the middle
at times, because people would come to us with their different agendas
and want us to take positions that would support their particular
agenda. The lawyers understood that our job was to provide reliable
and credible advice about what the Agency leaders made a decision
to do. We would tell our agency leaders to tell us your goal and how
you want to move forward, and we gave them the legal parameters for
what they decided to do. That’s how we advised them. It was
a very interesting time. Very interesting time.
Wright:
There was a lot of movement, a lot of research, a lot of a lot in
a very short amount of time, because whereas Mike Griffin had said,
“Step forward and let’s see how we’re going to do
this,” then it became accelerated with the cancellation of Constellation.
You were moving to get things in place and to protect the Agency from
a future protest, but I remember you had said before, you and your
team were working to make sure that it wasn’t just good for
today, it was going to be good for tomorrow and a year from now when
people started asking questions.
Thompson-King:
Yes. So far, it’s worked pretty well.
Wright:
You have defended it against a couple of protests, right?
Thompson-King:
Yes. We do apply our lessons learned. There were some things that
we did on COTS, which I learned recently we hadn’t done on some
subsequent OTA competitions, and that was to identify an ombudsman.
We created an ombudsman for COTS, and folks were asked, “Why
do we need an ombudsman?” I responded, “Understand this.
With COTS, a disgruntled proposer can’t go to GAO to challenge
NASA’s actions, or to a contracting officer, because there are
no protest procedures applicable to OTA. If somebody feels something’s
wrong, who do they go and talk to? If we don’t give them someone
in the Agency or a process to use to voice their concerns and discuss
them, they’re going to take us right into court. I’m not
ready for us to go into court yet. We don’t want that to be
on that path, because that will clearly slow down the Agency.”
So we created an ombudsman process that was set forth in the COTS
solicitation. It basically said if you, as a proposer, have a concern,
you can take it to this individual. We thought long and hard who that
should be. The lawyers knew that we had to identify someone credible.
We needed to have somebody who was not involved in the competition,
but somebody within the Agency who would understand the issues. We
identified an individual in the announcement for proposals in the
ombudsman section. At some point along the way we had to rely on that
language, because there was a proposers who had concerns and the ombudsman
heard concerns and responded. Having an ombudsman kept proposers from
thinking that we can only go into court to discuss a problem.
The lawyer knew that any court action would be a dive into unchartered
waters. It was going to be a question of whether a complaint was filed
in a district court or to the Court of Federal Claims, and, the NASA
lawyers, frankly, didn’t have a clear view of which court would
have jurisdiction. We even talked about it with the Justice Department,
and they know because by law, they would have to represent us in federal
court. This was one of the things we said to the COTS program officials,
“If we have a NASA ombudsman, the agency controls the resolution
of concerns, and the NASA lawyers provide advice. But when you put
things in the federal court, it’s in the hands of the Department
of Justice, not NASA.”
Little bit of a scare tactic, yes, but it was true. At that time,
depending upon where a case was assigned in the Justice Department,
an agency get a person three years out of law school representing
its case in court. I asked the program, “Is that what you want
for your program?” We got that ombudsman language included in
the COTS AFP. The lawyers said, “We’ll try this,”
and it helped us. I found out in some later competitions, that language
was not included in the AFP. Then, we had an issue even though the
ombudsman language wasn’t in the AFP, we informed the parties
that an ombudsman had been assigned to hear their concerns. I’m
now reminding people that language needs to be in every Space Act
Agreement competition proposal, so that proposers know who they can
go to in the Agency.
Wright:
I was reading something the other day, someone had talked about Gerstenmaier,
asking about the differences of the public-private partnerships, and
he made the remark, “When asked to compare the costs of using
a public-private partnership to NASA’s traditional procurement
methods, Gerstenmaier said he could not offer a specific number, but
the partnership is extremely more efficient.” Have you found
that remark as well, from other people? That not only did you create
a way to use the OTA, but it’s more of an efficient process
compared to the FAR? Or do they just continue to serve different purposes
for different reasons?
Thompson-King:
I think they serve different purposes for different reasons. I don’t
know what Gerst is basing his assessment on, because from where I
sit, I think both are efficient. They’re meant to accomplish
different purposes, and from where I sit as an attorney for the Agency,
there must be some type of fair process, when using either approach.
You can make your process as efficient as you want, but the more information
an agency wants to receive in a proposal, and the more certainty an
agency wants to have, it means the more complex the competition is
going to be. If it’s more complex, I’m not sure how efficient
you can make it.
When I look at some of the things we did with the Space Act Agreements
that we awarded to Blue Origin and Boeing and Sierra Nevada, that
whole OTA competitive process, was an efficient process. It was a
process that was needed to achieve what the Agency wanted to achieve
and to achieve it through a competition. Did that make the OTA competition
more efficient than what we could have done under FAR? I don’t
know. It was different. But there was still a process.
Wright:
It’s good to have a choice now. It must be somewhat rewarding
knowing you put all those things in place, because a few years ago,
and now even more so, you’re entirely responsible for the legal
umbrella as General Counsel. Share with us about those responsibilities.
How are you hoping in this leadership position that you can continue
to enlighten and educate more people into moving the Agency forward
in the way that you would like for it to go?
Thompson-King:
Charlie [Bolden] reminds us that our job is to lead our people. As
the Agency goes forward, we are going to continue to do these type
of competitions, so, it’s important that we educate and train
our attorneys to understand what the difference is between our public
partnership type competitions where we want to use our Other Transactions
Authority, and when it’s appropriate to use our contracts authority
under the Competition in Contracting Act, or when we can use other
things like CRADAs [Cooperative Research and Development Agreements],
grants, cooperative agreements—there are a number of tools that
we can use.
We always start off saying to a program official – tell us what
you want to do, what you want to accomplish. Don’t come in and
tell us how you want to do it. We’ll tell you how. Come in and
tell us what your goal is, what you want to do, and we will help you
get where you need to be. We’ll help you to define the process
that would best benefit the goal you’re trying to reach.
Training attorneys, making them knowledgeable, making them comfortable
with those tools is my job. I do it through the Associate General
Counsels, through the Chief Counsels, just observing and talking with
them, seeing who’s working on particular issues. How are they
doing? Are we getting consistency across the Agency when we do these
things? What discussions are we having? How are Centers feeling? I
hear from the Center Directors or from, for instance, [Robert D.]
Bob Cabana, they’re doing a lot of non-FAR type activities at
KSC. Bob has the goal to create a multiuse spaceport facility. He’s
got a lot of activities going on. Are we giving him consistent advice?
Are we helping his attorneys and his program officials, his procurement
and non-procurement folks who are working on this?
We have to all make sure that we’re all on the same page, and
we’re communicating with each other. That’s a big thing
that I’m talking about with everyone. We must communicate, we
must coordinate, we must collaborate within our own organization at
Headquarters, and then with the Chief Counsel offices, and with the
Centers, and with our Mission Directorates. I’m happy to see
that other people, other than me, are working this and learning it,
but that’s our responsibility as lawyers and leaders, to guide
them as the Agency uses OTA more, so that they’re comfortable
with it. Sometimes, lawyers have to stand up and say, “Hey,
this may not be the right direction, or the right use of this authority,”
and I want our early and mid-career attorneys to have enough knowledge
that they are able to stand up to some of the senior officials and
say, “This is not quite the way that we can use this authority,
but here is a different way that we think we can use it and accomplish
the purpose you’re desiring.”
Wright:
The legal department—so many times people think it’s always
litigations—but you have to work with just about every branch
with those who that take care of the real estate, and the people that
do the procurement. You’re very widespread in what you do. What
are some of the challenges, getting all those people to communicate,
cooperate, and collaborate?
Thompson-King:
One challenge is that NASA officials don’t think they need legal
support. “Nothing we’re doing involves anything legal,
so why would we need to talk to you?” Talking with NASA officials
and getting them to understand that attorneys not only give advice
on laws and statutes, but we also have a counsel function. That means,
that if a NASA official is thinking about policy, there may be some
things that she or he hasn’t thought of that we may point out
as a benefit or a problem, and offer recommendations to consider or
directions to move in. Having people view NASA lawyers in that way
and to reach out to us to support them when they’re thinking
about things and developing ideas is a challenge, because NASA officials
sometimes don’t think about getting the legal office involved
until there is an obvious legal issue.
I tell program officials, “Well, when you’re thinking
about things, you may be creating legal issues unbeknownst to you.”
For example, a NASA official may say, “Hey, I need more cargo
going up to the [International] Space Station, so we’ll just
issue another Space Act Agreement.” The lawyers would remind
the official that we have a contract to transport cargo to ISS, the
CRS contract. If a lawyer has not been consulted, and the NASA official
is thinking that the use of a Space Act Agreement is permitted, when
really the more appropriate thing is a contract, then there could
be a legal problem. The official had all of these discussions back
here with other program officials, where they were brainstorming,
thinking about things. So, as Robert [M.] Lightfoot says, “It’s
all potted, ready to go.”
The NASA official is ready to move out, and the lawyers come in and
advise her to use CRS. This upsets the NASA official and the lawyers
are viewed as the log jam. If the official had brought us in when
she was having that brainstorming session, we could have provided
the appropriate advice then. Getting folks to bring the NASA lawyers
in early is still a challenge. Getting program officials to think
of us and our counsel function is something we work on every day.
When you have a change in leadership, you have to introduce yourself
to the new leaders and say, “We’re the lawyers, and we’re
here to support you, not just giving you legal advice on statutes,
but we are your counsel. We’re here to support you and talk
with you, discuss issues with you, and identify solutions.”
That’s one of the reasons why we have our program called the
DLC Program, Directorate Lead Counsels, where we have attorneys embedded
in the Mission Directorates, so that they can be there as issues come
up to be a sounding board, to talk with the leaders or the folks in
that particular organization, and bring back to the legal office issues
to address early. Having that person embedded in an organization means
building the relationships and gaining credibility. For instance,
a program official might be nervous if I make a phone call and say,
“Hey, I hear you are doing XYZ.” But if the embedded attorney,
the DLC, makes the same call, then there usually is more willingness
on the part of the program official to discuss an issue. When they
hear from the embedded attorney, they’re a little bit more receptive,
because in a way, they begin to feel, “Oh, that’s our
attorney.” Well, he’s the Agency’s attorney, but
that attorney had developed a level of trust with the program official.
That’s what we try and work on every day.
Wright:
What about the groups that you work with outside the Agency? Like
NOAA [National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration], DoD, the list
goes on and on. I was thinking too of the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration],
because of all of the new Space Act Agreements. How are you able to
work those relationships, when all of you have different agendas,
but still at the same time, you’re all trying to work together
for the same goal?
Thompson-King:
This is where you push the activity down. With the FAA, one of the
attorneys who works in the Commercial Law Group said, “Hey,
why don’t we get a team together, and not just lawyers, but
technical folks also? When we say technical folks, let’s have
somebody from OSMA, let’s have somebody from the Chief Engineer’s
Office, have somebody from HEO, and then we’re going to have
somebody from Johnson Space Center.” So the NASA team is broad.
Then she said, “Let’s ask the FAA to come in and have
their counterparts with each of these people also be on the team.”
We had this huge team of NASA people working with the FAA, and that’s
one of the attorneys in our group who’s managing that day-to-day
activity. She sends me messages and updates through her Associate
General Counsel, keeping her supervisor, the Commercial and Intellectual
Property Associate General Counsel, aware of what’s going on.
That attorney also sets up meetings with me to keep me abreast of
what’s going on, and about a month ago, we went to meet the
Chief Counsel of FAA, to whom the FAA members of the team report.
We met, and it wasn’t a decisional meeting, but just to acknowledge
that we’re all working on this together, get to know each other.
We take it in stages, both the FAA Chief Counsel and I have pushed
it down to the appropriate level of attorneys to work on this issue.
The team forwards issues as they get close to finality, or when they
need input from me or from the Chief Counsel over at FAA. That’s
just one example of how we do it. This is how you build a team, how
you ensure continuity and understanding and knowledge. It’s
not just me, it’s not just the Commercial Law Associate General
Counsel who knows what’s going on or how to do things, or focus
on the issues. We have other folks in the legal office and across
the Agency who are working on these issues, so that we have an understanding
that will carry us into the future.
Wright:
I wanted to ask you a couple of questions that lead into finishing
this session out, but as you move into completing your first year
in this new leadership role, what do you expect to be some of your
significant challenges as you move into the next years? What are some
of the goals that you would like to do to make your time at NASA one
that will benefit the years after you leave?
Thompson-King:
Back to the people, making sure that we have some programs in place
for developing our attorneys across the Agency so that there’s
more of an interdisciplinary approach to us providing legal support
as issues come up. What I mean by that is, for instance, when the
Orbital [Sciences Corporation rocket] accident occurred at Wallops
[Flight Facility (WFF), Wallops Island, Virginia], lawyers in our
Office asked, “If there are legal issues that come up, who is
going to be involved?”
Well, we have a Space Act Agreement with one entity. We have a contract
with another entity. Those are two different groups of attorneys.
It’s a service being provided to NASA, but it’s not a
NASA operation. We also had to remind folks it’s not a NASA
activity because NASA did not operate or control the launch. Because
of that, there were certain things that we don’t get to go in
and ask questions about and get to review and make decisions on, so
everybody understands their role and communicates that to the program
officials. If an accident happens, everybody thinks NASA is going
to go in and investigate.
NASA attorneys had to explain to the folks on the Hill, “No,
this was an FAA-licensed activity. NASA is supporting the FAA.”
NASA wants to know what the FAA is doing, so we have folks in our
legal office who communicate with the FAA. NASA learning to function
in this “support” role has been a challenge, shall I say,
or a reminder.
We have to learn how to do things differently. Attorneys also have
to remind our clients that we are doing things differently when an
activity is controlled by a non-NASA party. No, we’re not going
to go out and do the investigation of the launch mishap at WFF. It’s
a commercial activity. When we look at who is going to pay for what,
we’re still having that conversation. Within our Office, we
had to make sure that all of the right people were involved, and sometimes
it’s not just one group. Its several groups.
You never know when a particular issue is going to come up that you
didn’t expect, and you may need to include another group of
people. For example, NASA people forget, some folks don’t realize
that we have international partners down at Wallops. I think it’s
the Ukrainians who are there. I asked the contracts attorneys and
commercial law attorney to make sure that we don’t have any
international law issues that were raised by the mishap. There were
none, but if there had been, that’s where our International
Law Group would get involved. For instance, if any export control
issues might come up as a result of something we do down the line,
our International Law Group would need to involved, because they handle
our export control and our ITAR [International Traffic in Arms Regulations]
issues.
It’s always interesting to work legal issues at NASA because
we never know when an issue is going to present itself. When it presents
itself, we need to get the attorneys with the right expertise involved.
That’s why I monitor, and keep abreast of what’s going
on, and make sure that an assembled team brings the right people in
at the right time. We’re not perfect at it, because we’ve
had e-mails in our Office saying, “Hey, I’ve been working
on this for so many months, how come nobody told me about this?”
We’ve had that happen. We’re not perfect. At least we’re
having the conversation, we’re circulating things so that eventually,
if somebody else had been working on it and we didn’t include
them, they’re going to raise their hand and say, “Hey,
I have some knowledge about this. Here’s what I’ve been
doing. Bring me in the loop, or really, I need to have the lead on
this.”
There was an e-mail that was sent to me about a particular matter.
I sent it to the Associate GC [General Counsel] and a team lead who
I thought had cognizance over the matter. It turned out it was someone
in that Associate GC’s office, but I identified the wrong person.
They got my e-mail to the right person in the group, and that’s
how we’re working it. Sometimes there’s a little bit of
a ruffled feather, where an attorney said to me, “You didn’t
send it to me, I’m the one who’s working this.”
I responded, “I didn’t get it to you, but somebody in
the office got it to you.” But there’s a sensitivity when
the General Counsel doesn’t remember who is working on a matter.
I don’t remember everything, but I know enough usually to get
an issue to the right legal practice group.
Wright:
Yes, the whole international part, too—at least your days are
never dull, that’s for sure.
Thompson-King:
No, they are not.
Wright:
What is it that you’ve enjoyed so much about your NASA career,
and the profession and working at so many different levels or different
aspects of NASA? What continues to propel you to keep going back and
doing more?
Thompson-King:
Agency has let me do what I want to do. I’ve been able to do
what I want to do. I have two children who are grown now, but for
a long time, I was the only woman in the Office of the General Counsel
who worked full-time and had children, and still my career progressed.
This Agency afforded me that opportunity. There are other agencies
or other workplaces where I would not become General Counsel, because
many agencies did not have a workplace that embraced work-life balance.
I had children, and I worked in litigation, handling all those GSBCA
protests, while I had small children. That experience benefitted my
career growth. NASA and the supervisors that I had here, and the work
life-family balance I experienced over the years enabled me to stay
at NASA and feel comfortable and feel excited about my job. I don’t
know many other places that were giving any employee, much less women,
that opportunity.
So I’ve been very fortunate. There were times in my career,
when my oldest daughter said to me—she wanted me to be like
Annie’s mom, who met her at the bus and took her home every
day. My children went to aftercare, but I reminded them what I was
able to do for them because I had a job. At one point in their lives,
when they took ballet lessons, I was getting to work at seven o’clock,
so that I could leave about two o’clock on Tuesdays and Thursdays,
drive to pick them up from school, to take them to ballet; first we’d
get McDonald’s or whatever they wanted, they’d go into
ballet and I would walk for an hour and a half because they’d
be in ballet lessons. I became a better mommy, they thought I was
cool then.
It was just two days a week. I had a job and I had a supportive supervisor,
and I had credibility in the Agency so that I could leave on Tuesdays
and Thursdays at two o’clock to go spend time with my children.
That culture of family and support is something I couldn’t find
other agency legal offices or private law firms. I did look for career
opportunities outside of NASA but always came back to NASA because
I had the opportunity to raise my children, to be a mother, and to
work full-time in this agency. That doesn’t mean that it was
perfect, because I do talk about years where I felt like I was in
the wilderness, where I just didn’t see my career progressing,
didn’t know where I was going to go, because I was the Deputy
Associate General Counsel for Contracts for many years. When you’re
a deputy in a division level, you’re thinking, “Okay,
my boss is probably not going anywhere any time soon, I don’t
see that happening. I’m not really sure if I should compete
for one of the other positions now vacant in the agency or at another
agency.”
I felt stagnant. I did look at other agencies, looked to move, but
ultimately I found that the type of work that I was doing at NASA
was my best opportunity. The other thing that was key—we may
complain about our IT services in the Agency, but there are other
agencies that are worse. Truly, that was one reason why I didn’t
go to one agency that offered me an opportunity. When I looked at
their hardware and their software, they were about five years behind
us. The agency didn’t have e-mail. I thought to myself, “What
do you mean, you don’t have e-mail?” They were still communicating
with hard paper, walking information around to other offices, and
sending things in pouch mail to other offices across the country,
because they didn’t have an email system. I decided to stay
at NASA.
NASA may have been frustrating, and I was not sure not sure where
my career was going, but I wasn’t moving to that agency with
an outdated IT system. Also, while the litigation was exciting, after
a while it gets old. I know how to do that work, but I’m not
doing anything that seems different or interesting. Then I was assigned
to a new role within OGC, and I started doing different and interesting
work. I persevered, and that’s a lesson learned. Sometimes you
have to persevere and figure out how to do the best with the situation
you’re in. Things are going to change. I didn’t know how
things were going to change, I didn’t know when things were
going to change, but change is going to come. Sometimes you just have
to be patient and wait for that change to come, do other things to
keep up your skills, improve your skills, and advance your skills
during that period while you’re waiting. I think I did that,
and that helped me to get through that period, and then be ready when
an opportunity presented itself.
Wright:
You described your career with NASA as innovative, because you were
able to use skills and do them in a different way. Do you have some
examples of how that innovation has maybe paid off? Or maybe didn’t
pay off?
Thompson-King:
The General Counsel got to a place where he was not available to go
on certain speaking engagements. The Associate General Counsel for
Contracts couldn’t go either. Send it to the Deputy. I was very
nervous, because I was going to go speak at a NASA Center. I would
be speaking on behalf of NASA OGC. I was very nervous, but I was also
excited about it. That’s how I started speaking at the Federal
Bar Association annual government contracts symposium in Huntsville,
Alabama. They didn’t know me, I was third person down on the
list, but they were happy to have somebody from NASA Headquarters
OGC be a speaker. I think I did pretty well, because they have invited
me back every year since that presentation.
That’s what gave me a new opportunity. I had spoken in front
of judges, administrative judges, all the time in litigation. Now,
I have to make presentations speaking to an audience on a particular
subject requires skills that were not part of my regular skill set.
I had to develop the ability to present information in an interesting
manner, and be very knowledgeable and present accurate facts. And
what I learned from doing that is I had to really learn what the Agency
was doing, because I didn’t know what people were going to ask
me. So if I talked about a competition, and I planned to talk about
a contract that was awarded, but I also had to be prepared to talk
about the program and why that program was important, and how that
program fit into the NASA mission.
When I have those speaking engagements, it also helped me to think
about what the Agency does, understand what the Agency does, and communicate
that so that people outside of our environment know what I’m
talking about. I had to learn to not talk “lawyerese,”
like I’m in a litigation activity, but be interesting. Be interesting
and give people information that they can remember and understand,
so I worked on that skill.
The other change in my career in OGC was how we operated and interacted
as an office. Sometimes, we tend to stovepipe ourselves in the Agency,
and I had the opportunity to break down some of those stovepipes within
OGC, and within the Agency. For example, the Office of Procurement
and the Office of the General Counsel have done joint training assignments
between the two offices. There had not been any Agency organization
that worked together in that way. It seemed natural to me, to have
a joint training because the attorneys who worked on procurement matters
and then the contracting officers worked hand in glove all the time.
We really thought that it would be beneficial for us to share with
each other our thought processes about how we approached the same
issue.
Within OGC, we learned to take a more interdisciplinary approach to
working on a legal issue, which meant that we had to learn to share
information across the legal practices so that we could effectively
provide legal services. That’s how we work today, but that wasn’t
how we behaved in the past.
I’m
going to add one more thing about something else I’m thinking
about. The Agency has been talking a lot about diversity and inclusion.
I sat on the recent SESCDP [Senior Executive Service Candidate Development
Program] panel to review the applicants. One of the things that I
observed, and I’ve shared this with others, is that I think
that Charlie’s message supporting diversity and inclusion, encouraging
the leaders of the Agency to think about it and make it a part of
their workforce considerations, is being heard by senior leaders.
I’m not sure we’re doing a good job of sending that message
to the next levels of leaders and managers, and then down into the
employee ranks, because some of the responses to our diversity and
inclusion question during the SESCDP were not impressive. It’s
something we as an Agency need to work on, and I put myself in that
“we.” That’s something that I’ve been talking
about with the folks in my Office, and getting them to stretch when
they consider hiring candidates, and then stretch when we have hired
someone, so that they are included in our planning and execution of
legal services. It’s also important to have attorneys, and other
employees, expand and diversify their skills and experience. One of
the funniest things that happened years ago, when I was Associate
General Counsel for Contracts was when I said to an attorney, “I
want you to work on this HEO activity.” He looked at me and
responded, “I don’t do HEO.” This was before it
was called HEO, Human Exploration; he said, “Because I don’t
do human spaceflight.” I said, “Precisely. That’s
the problem. You are so wrapped up in activities related to the Science
Mission Directorate and Aeronautics, you don’t know about operations
on the human spaceflight side of the house. You need to broaden your
experience base.” He was concerned, because that was not his
area of expertise, so the assignment was beyond his comfort zone.
Guiding employees to new opportunities is part of diversity and inclusion.
If someone wants to be a leader in this Agency, he or she needs to
have a breadth of experience, not just a depth. We have people who
have great depth within a particular subject matter, but they don’t
have knowledge that demonstrates a broader experience they don’t
have a breadth of dealing with different types of people. OGC just
had a training with Human Resources, and they came in and taught us
something about various styles of interaction and influence. I had
a conversation with one of our OGC leaders about hiring people who
are just like everybody else in the group. This would create a practice
group where everyone would interact with others and use their influence
in the same way.
When we talk about diversity and inclusion, we do talk about race,
ethnicity, but it’s also other things, like the fact when we
hire, we gravitate to people who are like us. Then you get groupthink,
because everybody wants to address a problem the same way. Who in
your group is the gregarious person? When I came to Headquarters,
there was a group of attorneys who they kept their doors closed. It
made them seem very closed, and nobody, other attorneys or clients,
wanted to talk with them. Nowadays, I encourage folks in OGC to interact
with others, but also recognizing that alone time is also important.
I encourage attorneys and administrative support to put themselves
in different positions and identify different opportunities.
All of this will help, I think, to develop leaders who are going to
lead the legal office across the Agency. That’s really what
I’m thinking about right now, as I finish up this first year,
we move into my second year.
Wright:
It’s gone by fast, hasn’t it?
Thompson-King:
Yes.
Wright:
We wish you the best of luck.
Thompson-King:
Thank you.
Wright:
Is there anything else you want to add before we finish?
Thompson-King:
No. I think I’ve talked a lot.
Wright:
That’s okay. We learned a lot. Thank you for sharing.
Thompson-King:
Thank you for talking with me.
[End
of interview]