NASA Shuttle-Mir Oral
History Project
Edited Oral History Transcript
William
D. Reeves
Interviewed by Mark Davison
Houston, Texas – 22 June 1998
Davison:
Today is June 22 [1998], and today's interview is with Bill Reeves
from the flight director's office. I'm Mark Davison, and Rebecca Wright
and Carol Butler are assisting in the interview.
Good afternoon.
Reeves: Afternoon.
Davison: Bill, we'd like to get you to talk to us a little bit about
your first encounters with the Shuttle-Mir Program on your early flights
that you did from the flight director's office.
Reeves: Okay. You just want me to ramble on?
Davison: If you want to talk about [STS] 63, the “Near Mir.”
Reeves: Okay. I got involved with the Phase One Program at the very
beginning. There was a group of people out of our office in the nucleus
of the Phase One Program office that had done a lot of work a year
or so ahead of time, and they were beginning to set up the Phase One
Program. A lot of negotiations were going on. But then I got assigned
to the Houston consultant group for STS-63, which was the first mission
of the Phase One Program, which, you know, was where we flew up to
the Mir, but we didn't dock with it. We flew within thirty feet of
it.
They assigned me to head up the first consultant group that went over
to Russia, to their Control Center, to support from their Control
Center, real time. At the same time, there was a group of Russians
that came over here, Russian flight controllers, that formed a consultant
group that was in our Control Center. So we had come up with that
concept in the planning to have a resident team in each other's Control
Center, just in case something came up, you'd have this on-site face-to-face,
you know, sit across the table, over the drawings, kinds of discussions,
because we recognized early on that the language problem between the
two countries was going to be a unique problem that we had to deal
with in both Phase One and in International Space Station, and which
was why it was so beneficial to do this in Phase One, is to get our
arms around this problem.
So we had to set down all the groundwork, pick a type of expertise
we wanted on the consultant group, the size of the consultant group,
the number of interpreters we needed, what kind of resources we needed
when we were over there. So we started all the early negotiations
on office space over there, what equipment we needed, what access
to voice loops and what access to data, if any, that we wanted from
their Control Center, and worked all of the preliminary details, put
all that stuff in place.
Then we had some early simulations that we set up, where we actually
physically exchanged consultant groups and set up simulations like
we always do for Shuttle flights, but we involved the two Control
Centers through the interpreters, and we went through an exercise
or two before we actually got to the actual mission, all of which
turned out to be exactly the right thing to do. It was a wonderful
exercise.
I remember my first trip over there. I can't remember the exact date.
I'm not very good with dates, but I remember going over there for
the very first trip. We were all kind of feeling each other out, because,
you know, there was this we didn't know what to think of each other,
or there were all the perceptions everybody grew up with. I, especially,
had a unique problem in the sense that, you know, I'm a child of the
fifties and sixties, and grew up back when the Russians and the Americans
weren't exactly on speaking terms, and so it was really fascinating
to be able to go over there and meet the people and get to know them,
and get to see all of the things you'd always read about.
So we got over there, and this was in an era when they were still
having shortages. There were some local economy problems and whatever,
but it was nothing we couldn't deal with. As far as the space agency
folks were concerned, or the people at Control Center, at their Control
Center, they provided for us any way they could. I mean, anything
we wanted, they would give us. Very helpful, and set it up.
We did the simulations, as I said, and then when the actual mission
came, I took a consultant group of four people besides myself. Actually,
there were five, counting there was a safety person, we took one rendezvous
expert from the flight control world here, we took a timeliner from
here, and a communications expert. Then there was the safety person,
and then there was a Phase One Program office rep, and then I was
the lead of the flight control consultant group. We just picked that
kind of expertise by just trying to think of, "Well, what kind
of problems might we think we'll run into?" I mean, obviously,
we couldn't take a whole flight control team over there, just from
a pure economics standpoint.
So we settled on that group of people because we thought, if we're
going to have any problems, they're going to be in communications
or they're going to be with the rendezvous in the fly-by of the Mir,
or they're going to be timeline problems, just getting everything
synced up timeline-wise. So that's the expertise we settled on, which
turned out to be exactly the right thing to do.
In my background as a flight director, we have a working knowledge
of all of the systems on the Shuttle, so I figured what we didn't
have with us, I could accommodate, plus being able to call back over
here for support. We positioned ourselves in their Control Center
about a day or two before launch was scheduled, to get everything
in order, and then I believe, if I remember right, the launch got
scrubbed for one day. I can't remember what the reason was, whether
it was the weather or some minor problem, but they did scrub the launch
one day, so we had an extra day to get ready. And we launched. I don't
know how much detail you want me to go in on each flight.
Davison: No, that's great. Go ahead.
Reeves: We launched, and, lo and behold, on the very first one, on
the launch, we had a leaking jet. One of the thrusters on the Shuttle
was leaking propellant. And right off the bat, that was a problem,
and the Russians didn't know what to think of it. They were very concerned
about their vehicle and contamination on their vehicle, and if we
couldn't arrest the leak, they didn't want the Shuttle coming too
close to the Mir, because they were concerned about horizon centers
on their return spacecraft, that if it gets contaminated, they have
problems. Not to mention other corrosive effects it might have on
the Mir itself.
So they were obviously extremely concerned about it, so right off
the bat, the consultant group got immediately involved, on both sides
of the ocean, in trying to explain to all of their experts and managers
over there exactly what was going on. I sent back over here for detailed
drawings of thrusters and valves and tank systems and the plumbing
and all that. I sat down with their managers and their experts and
went over the drawings and went over the explanation of how we were
going to stop the leak, and that by the time we got to the Mir, there
wouldn't be anything leaking.
They were very, very sharp and astute, and started talking about,
"Well, okay, if you close off a propellant manifold , which means
you isolate the jets so they don't leak anymore, what kind of control
have you given up? What kind of exposure to the next failure have
you caused? Is there a chance the Shuttle could get in close to the
Mir and one more failure could cause it to go out of control, and
there could be a collision, or whatever?" So they asked all the
right questions, and they made us go through all the right wickets
and we explained all that stuff. It was just a daily grind to show
up at work and to go find the right guys and sit down and talk to
them, and just beat on it and pound it flat, and to make sure that
all their questions got answered. We were constantly on the phone
back over here and on the voice loops back over here, talking to the
experts, getting information and relaying to them. So we were intimately
involved in the decision process.
There was another lesson we learned in all of that exercise that was
invaluable for the rest of the program, in that by being face to face,
you could be in an explanation with them on something and you can
tell when you are not communicating, just by the expression on their
face, that something is still not right. Whenever you would get to
one of those points where you knew you weren't communicating and you
knew you weren't getting the message across, you'd just start backing
up. Of course, we're dealing with all of this through interpreters.
And you know what the problem is, is that there's a single word somewhere
that's not coming across in the translation correctly. What it means
to us means something entirely different to them. So you'd have to
start banging away on the translation and the interpretation until
you found out what this problem is.
Of course, throughout this entire process, the other experience that
was taking place was this relationship that was forming, this mutual
respect and trust of each other, and you know, "Are you just
feeding me a bunch of stuff, or do you really know what you're talking
about?" kind of thing, you know. And if you kept proving, with
data, hard data, everything you were saying, you could just see the
trust building up and the confidence level go up. Then you'd solve
the translation problem and you'd get it down to where you'd realize
that now they understand. They understand me and I understand them,
I understand what their concern is. It was as much a communication
problem the other direction, too, is trying to get them to communicate
what their concern was, and exactly and very specifically what it
is.
So we did that, and we did it daily, and I remember, I mean, right
up until the very end, before the decision was made to allow us to
come to thirty feet from the Mir, we had established a time, a go/no-go
time. We were going to have a big conference between the flight directors,
between the two Control Centers, where they would have a conference
on the loops and make the final go/no-go, and we knew when that time
was.
I remember going down to Vladimir Soloviev's office, and several hours
before that, I said, "I want to set up a meeting with them and
go down and make sure that there isn't some question that hasn't got
answered." Because it was still obvious to me that they had not
made the decision at that point in time to allow us to come on in,
that there was still some concern, whatever it was.
So we went down there. They had all their experts in the room, Vladimir
Soloviev, Victor Blagov, Uri Antoshishkin, who's an Energia expert
that was there, and all of their systems experts and safety people
were there, and we went through the whole thing one more time. And
it was interesting, in that one session, they all sat there and they
looked at me and they said, "We understand what you're saying,
but what about the 180-gram snowball?" And I'm sitting there
with this blank look on my face, and I said, "What are you talking
about?" And that was their exact words. They said, "What
about this 180-gram snowball?" I said, "I don't know what
you're talking about." And they said, "Well, the 180-gram
snowball in your fax." I said, "What fax?"
We had set up a system of fax messages back and forth to relay transmissions,
and all of the faxes that came in were supposed to come through us
before they went to anybody. This one fax had been sent from the U.S.
side over there, where they had done a worst-case analysis to say,
even if everything didn't stop the leak and it kept leaking, and you
took an engine bell of an RCS jet and packed it completely full of
ice, you know, the propellant built up and froze it, and it got completely
full, it would only weight 180 grams, which is roughly a half a pound,
or a little less. It was a ridiculous worst-case analysis, but somehow
that fax got through the system and it went directly to them, and
I never saw it, and I'm sitting there caught cold here two hours before
the decision, you know, with this thing. They said, "Well, you
know, this piece of ice could form in the jet and it could come loose
and all of a sudden this big chunk of ice could hit the Mir."
And I said, "Oh, no, it's not going to happen." And I said,
"You've got to give me time to go figure out what's going on
here and explain this."
So we broke up the meeting and I got on the phone with everybody and
found out where the thing came from and what was behind it and everything
else. So I remembered grabbing my interpreter, who, by the way, is
another story, and a very important part of Phase One. His name was
Boris Goncharov. I grabbed him, and I said, "Boris, we've got
to go back down to Victor Blagov's office and convince them that there's
no such thing as a 180-gram snowball."
So I went down to Victor Blagov's office, which is a very small office,
and I went in there with Boris, and I told Victor, I said, "Victor,"
and Victor and me, by then, had already established a rapport. I said,
"Victor, we're not leaving this office until you're convinced
that there's no such thing as a 180-gram snowball." He said,
"Okay." So we went through the whole thing.
By the time I got started in on the explanation, Valeri Ryumin opened
the door and he came in, and I said, "Good. Got both of you right
here at once." And so I pushed the door to, and I said, "We're
going to have this discussion here and we're going to be convinced."
And so we went through it one more time, and they looked at me and
they said, "Well, okay. We're convinced." And that it's
a non-issue. And so I went away and went upstairs.
Of course, all this is happening in their Control Center, and I called
back over to the management console here and told them about the conversation
that just happened, and they said, "Well, we're still coming
up on the go/no-go decision here pretty soon." Then later I was
just walking down the hall, by myself, in their Control Center, just
took a walk and I walked past the shift flight director room, which
is an office that they have for their flight directors when they're
not on console, to work. Victor Blagov, who was their head ops guy
that we dealt with, came out of the office, and he told me, he grabbed
me and he speaks fairly good English. Between my broken Russian and
his broken English, we can carry on a conversation. And he says, "You
know, we're getting very close to making a decision, and we're going
to allow you all to come to thirty feet." And then he just grinned
at me.
So I went back upstairs and he went into the Control Center. So I
called back over and told them what he had just said, and then right
after that, they made the agreement and everything was agreed to,
and they went on. And so we flew up to thirty feet, and it was a total
success.
But with that particular problem, we couldn't have picked a better
scenario to start the Phase One Program, because it was the whole
process of both flight control teams, all of the managers, all of
the technical people, all of the program people, that really got exercised
and really came together on a problem that proved that we could work
together and that we were all shooting straight. It was a wonderful,
wonderful exercise that set the stage for the rest of the program.
I mentioned this, and I'd like to mention Boris Goncharov, because
he was such a key element in all this stuff. My very, very first trip
over there, you know, we had a company that we arranged all of our
interpreters through, and they had some interpreters resident in Russia
that they hired. Boris Goncharov was a Sneemosh employee. Sneemosh
is the company that runs the Control Center. He's a research scientist
for Sneemosh, who spoke good English, and he was moonlighting with
this interpreter company.
So, my first trip over there, he was assigned as my interpreter. Well,
when I got over there, I mean, an unbelievable friendship formed.
Our personalities just meshed. We became best of friends just in a
matter of hours. He was an invaluable asset, because he was an employee
of Sneemosh, he had access to anything over there. He had no qualms
about he knew everybody, everybody knew him. He was a real popular
person, both with the Americans and the Russians. And it was the right
personality, the right intelligence, at the right time. Unfortunately,
he got cancer and died about a year or two later. So I think we got
through two flights, two or three flights, before he died. It was
a big loss to the program. He was a major asset to the whole exercise.
I mean, he opened doors that would not have been opened to us otherwise,
I don't think. Maybe they would have, maybe somebody else would have
done the same job, but it made it so much easier, and so it was a
good deal.
So, anyway, we got through STS-63, and the one thing that we learned
by 63 was that we had done the right thing with the consultant group.
The consultant group had cemented its place in history and it was
going to happen from then on, and that was the right thing to do.
We might vary the mix of it, depending on what the mission is, you
know, but we were going to do that from then on. So I went back over
with STS-71, as lead of the consultant group again, for the first
docking mission, and I took that group over.
Davison: Was it the same group, the same group of people?
Reeves: No, it was a different group of people. I was the only one
that was the same group. We did some other planning where we found
out that one of the most valuable people on the consultant group was
a timeliner. And so after we came back and debriefed from STS-63,
we realized that it would be very beneficial to take the lead timeliner
on the next Phase One flight and have them go over with the consultant
group on the flight before, because that way they would learn how
the timelining was done with the Russians, they would actually meet
with the people that they would be talking with over the loops and
over the fax machines and working with in subsequent flights, and
so it was a training ground for our timeliners, or our FAOs, flight
activity officers, and it worked extremely well.
So we started doing that, and then we would vary the mix of other
experts, depending on what we were doing. Obviously, on the second
mission, we had done a successful rendezvous. The rendezvous didn't
appear to be that much of a problem, so since we were physically docking
on the next mission and we were going to be exchanging atmospheres,
you know, we said, well, if you try to predict problems, that could
be a big problem the atmospheres, or leaks with the docking mechanisms
or the mechanical systems. So we took those kind of experts over there
and we didn't take the rendezvous people, because we thought we had
our arms around that pretty well.
So I went back over with STS-71, and, of course, we did a successful
docking on 71, and all that went well. In the meantime, I had gotten
assigned as lead flight director for STS-74, and so I was already
doing what lead flight directors do to get ready for a flight. And
74 was the one where we took the docking module up. I had made several
other trips to Russia as the docking module was being readied and
built it was a piece of Russian hardware and had seen the hardware,
and so during that mission I was here in this Control Center, but
talking with all the people that I had gotten to know so well over
the previous two missions. We carried the docking module up and put
it on the Mir. A very successful flight.
I worked every Phase One flight except for this last one. I was supposed
to go to Russia for this last one, but didn't get the visas and things.
We didn't get all the documentation that we needed, and so I didn't
go and I wound up getting sick and getting this cold, and I didn't
even get to work it from over here, so I missed the whole thing. But
that was the only flight I had nothing to do with on the Phase One
Program.
I was lead flight director on STS-81 as well, which was another flight
to the Mir. I was a Phase One representative on STS-87, I think it
was, where I went back over and represented the Phase One Program
over there. So I got my share of it, and wouldn't have missed it for
the world. It was a great program, absolutely the right thing to do
to get ready for International Space Station.
You've heard Frank Culbertson and myself and many other people in
other interviews say over and over and over that you can't imagine
going into the Space Station with the Russian involvement we have
without having gone through the Phase One Program. It's going to make
it go a whole lot smoother. We're taking all of the lessons learned
from Phase One Program and applying them to Space Station.
We're building different facilities over in their Control Center now
to support what we call the "Houston support group" now,
as opposed "Houston consultant group." And that's because
it's on a more permanent basis now than in Phase One, the space station
we were docking to was a Russian space station. We had no ownership
in it. Our only involvement in Phase One was while the Shuttle was
actively involved in going up there. International Space Station,
we'll be involved in all aspects, including the station itself, so
we have continuous ownership in the station, and so we'll have a continuous
presence in Moscow.
Davison: Let's back up a little bit. You talked about, early on, when
you went over for the first flight on STS-63, that you did some simulations.
Were those prior to that flight that you did the sims?
Reeves: Yes. The simulations, as we know simulations, was a totally
foreign concept to them. They don't do simulations the way we do simulations.
They don't have a simulator for the crew to get into that is coupled
to the Control Center and transmits data and they have real-time exchange
between the flight control team and the crews during their training,
getting ready to go. They don't do that.
They have simulators, but all of their simulators are out at Star
City, where they train their crews, and it's between the crew trainers
and the crew that go through the simulations out there to learn the
vehicles and the procedures. Flight control team, the ops people,
are at their Control Center, which is in Korolev, which is some thirty
miles away from Star City, and they are busy day to day supporting
a space station that flies 365 days a year, for twelve years, so they
don't have to simulate anything. They already know what to do. I mean,
they've been doing it for twelve years, and they've been launching
Soyuzes and Progresses and things, and docking them to the Mir, and
so they all know it.
So they get their training of their new people through OJT, or on-the-job
training. They just bring them in, they learn, you know, and they
weren't really getting that many new people anyway. It was mostly
the same people that had been involved in the program for twelve years.
So when we came in with the way we do business, which is the crew
training and Control Center and everything is at this one facility
here in Houston, we couple the simulations to the Control Center,
and there's an exchange, a real-time exchange, between the flight
control team and the crews, and that's all part of the training process.
Well, we wanted to do the same thing with them. Well, they didn't
understand it. Number one, there wasn't any way to hook the Mir simulators
into the process, and this whole thing of scripting a simulation and
going through a rehearsal of what we were about to do was just something
they didn't do. So there was a learning process that took place on
both sides, and we had a lot of struggles with that, but we got through
it, and it proved to be very beneficial. Once they got into it and
everything, they really liked the idea, and it helped iron out a lot
of the integration problems we'd have between us and them.
Davison: You make it sound like it was a compromise, that you had
different ideas. Can you talk about what the final product ended up
being? You talked about some of the communication links between the
centers.
Reeves: It was a compromise process. In fact, everything we did with
them was a compromise process, and you always found the middle ground.
What we did was, we'd set up a script for a segment of the flight,
like rendezvous and docking, an important part of the flight, and
we would put our crew in the simulator, in the Shuttle simulator,
and we would crank up the Shuttle simulator and couple it into the
Control Center, and then we would connect the two Control Centers
via communication loops and voice loops. They would have a flight
control team in their Control Center, and their training people on
that side had met with our training people ahead of time and set up
these scripts that we would follow. Of course, the rendezvous and
docking was per the flight plan, the way we were going to fly the
flight. But then they would script the sim to talk about what failures
the training people were going to put in to exercise the flight control
teams on both sides, and the management teams. Of course, only the
training people know what those are, but their training people knew
about it, our training people knew about it, that they'd throw a failure
in, and then both sides of the ocean would make the process work to
figure out how you'd go through it.
The only difference was, their flight control team wasn't sitting
there looking at data from the vehicle like our flight control team
was sitting here looking at data from the simulator. It was what we
call a "paper sim" on their side. And we do some of those.
We do some paper sims, too. It's a desktop sim where you mentally
walk through it. You're not looking at real data, but you know what's
supposed to happen next, and you what-if, and say, "Well, if
this doesn't happen now, what would you do?" So it was done kind
of verbally, but it was a very good exercise.
Davison: You mentioned the communication loops. I've heard different
stories about the reliability of the phone systems. Were you all using
the phone system, or something else that you had set up independent
for this?
Reeves: We put in our own network between here and there.
Davison: That was [unclear]?
Reeves: Yes, we put in a phone system that we could rely on and use
and we put in a set of voice loops, which is just voice circuits between
the Control Centers, and we had a certain number of those and then
you allocate each one for a certain function. But in addition to that,
we had these phones, regular phone lines, that we had certain ones
in certain places over there. Plus we had a fax, our own fax system
in, dedicated fax line, for reliability reasons. It was one of our
main links to their Control Center. And now we've expanded that to
e-mail capability and Ethernet and all that for Space Station, that
we're putting in for that.
Davison: Did the training team anticipate simming the leak for the
RCS jet, or did you do anything after that?
Reeves: No, that one wasn't simulated. There was another leak simulated,
though, but it was an insignificant thing. In fact, it was done on
one of the sims when I was over there. The Shuttle has APUs, or auxiliary
power units, for hydraulic system power to control the air surfaces
on the Shuttle when it's flying like an airplane. We only use them
for ascent and entry, and there was some little catch bottle in one
of the systems that catches fluid when it's sitting in a 1-G environment
on the ground. Sometimes you get leakage into the system and it catches
in a little catch bottle, and that bottle was leaking hydraulic fluid
once we got into the vacuum of space, so we dealt with that problem,
and it was a leak.
But that was after the 63 problem, so they were attuned to leaks,
and they were interested from the standpoint of what all can leak
on this vehicle, you know, and what all we should be worried about.
You know, we have water dumps and we have waste dumps and we have
all the propellants and the hydraulic fluid, and then all of the tanks
for oxygen and nitrogen that can leak overboard. You know, it's possible
to leak overboard. So we had to go through what the effects of all
that would be if we had any of those leaks.
Davison: You mentioned the Houston consultant group. Did that team
or group stay together through each one of the flights and then transition
to the Houston support team, so they were always there every time
we had a Shuttle docking mission?
Reeves: Well, there were two facets to the support team in Moscow.
You're talking about in Moscow?
Davison: Yes.
Reeves: There was the Houston consultant group, which was the flight
controllers that went over to support the Shuttle flight to the Mir
whenever the Shuttle was coming up there. In addition to that, there
was a support group in Moscow that was mostly made up of life sciences-type
people, but some systems people and ops people there, that their role
in life was to support the astronaut-on-Mir program, which was the
whole reason for the Phase One Program, was putting a person up there
to do science. And so that was a permanent presence in Moscow.
Well, that was in the early days, STS-63, obviously, since we weren't
putting an astronaut on Mir, they weren't there yet. They were getting
involved, they were setting up their way of operating as well. So
we were trying to pull both processes together, and as we evolved
throughout the Phase One Program, we learned how to deal with that
and how to combine the two objectives into one team, called the Houston
support team, or support group. So it's an evolutionary process. We
went from that support group and the Houston consultant group to merging
them into a Houston support group for Space Station.
Davison: We've talked to some of the different individuals that were
part of the ops team.
Reeves: They did a great job. I mean, they were invaluable supporting
astronaut-on-Mir and in keeping things going. They're really kind
of the unsung heroes of this whole thing. You never heard much about
them, but they were there working crazy hours and always there, and
made great personal sacrifices to be away from home for longs periods
of time. A really unique group of people.
Davison: You mentioned earlier that you were the lead flight director
for STS-74, which was the docking module flight. Can you talk a little
bit about the mechanism itself? You said you got a little Russian
[unclear]. [Would you tell us] stories about how that was accomplished
in such a short period of time.
Reeves: Yes. When we first docked to the Mir on STS-71, we already
knew we had some very close tolerances between the Shuttle and some
of the Mir appendages, the solar arrays and whatever, and it created
some unique problems. Plus, we wanted to dock to the Mir differently
than the way we were doing it, to get more clearance and to make it
more useful.
So, mutually, between the Russians and the Americans, it became obvious
that we needed this docking compartment or docking module, a new module,
to put on their docking node, which is where we were docking, and
give us more clearance between where the Shuttle docked to the Mir
and their appendages. So the programs got together, and all the engineers,
and they designed, mutually, this docking module and what they needed,
and it was built in Russia by the Russians with the docking mechanisms
adapted for our needs.
They took the Russian docking mechanism design that they had been
using and then they modified it for the Shuttle, and put one of those
on both ends of this module, and so what we had to do on 74 was fly
this module up in the cargo bay of the Shuttle, and it's a module
that has to be pressurized so that the crews can crawl through it
and transfer logistics back and forth between the two vehicles.
We carried it up in the payload bay of the Shuttle, and then right
after the Shuttle got on orbit, before we docked to the Mir, we had
to figure out some way to get this thing on there. Well, you can't
dock to the Mir on the port where you want to put this thing, obviously.
So we said, "Well, how are we going to do this?" Well, we
finally figured out that we'd just take the robotic arm on the Shuttle
and we'd pick up the module out of the bay and stick it on the docking
module of the Shuttle, so you made one interface and then you'd fly
this goofy configuration to the Mir, something that had never been
done before. You're flying the Shuttle with this big module sticking
out of the side of it. So the commander is actually flying a point
out away from the Shuttle to the docking.
So with all the engineers and the integration folks and the ops folks
and everybody got together and figured out what we needed in the way
of targets and unique targets to be able to provide the feedback information
the pilot needed to be able to fly to it with this module on there.
So that was a big exercise we had to go through. We had to develop
all the operations and procedures for putting the module on there,
and hooking up a camera inside the module, so you had a camera looking
out through a window in the hatch, looking at the Mir, so the commander's
actually flying by looking at a camera that's bore-sighted to where
he's wanting to go.
A lot of little problems like that you had to solve and figure out
how to do, and then write them all up in procedures, and then look
at all the failure modes, and what you'd do if you had any problem
with any of it. Did a lot of simulations, a lot of testing, to figure
out how to fly the orbiter with this thing on there, and flying a
point out away from the orbiter. It all came together, and worked
just fine.
Another benefit of the Phase One Program is that that is the very
technique we're going to do on Space Station with the first node that
we take up. It's almost a repeat of the flight, but it's a little
different configuration, but the principles are the same. We now know
how to do it. We had all kinds of problems figuring out how in the
world to attach this thing when the robotic arm on the Shuttle doesn't
have enough force to make the latches match up, and guarantee they'll
latch. How do you do that when normally you're flying the Shuttle
into the Mir and you've got this huge mass of the two vehicles that
are coming together and make the latches work?
Here you've got a real lightweight module that you're just putting
on with a fairly week arm, and we couldn't get the latches to work.
Well, we held it up into place and got it just right, and then we
fired the jets on the orbiter, and actually banged the two modules
together and that latched them. We developed that technique, and it's
the same technique we'll use with Space Station.
Davison: I have actually only skipped over probably the most historic
flight of the Shuttle-Mir program, the first docking. You said you
were in Moscow at the time. I wonder if you could share with us the
emotion you felt, and maybe the atmosphere in the Control Center in
Russia.
Reeves: Yes, it was obviously a very emotional event on both sides.
It was something a lot of us had worked on for a long time, trying
to make happen. It's like a lot of things I've experienced in this
program: when you finally do it after working so hard on it for so
long, you almost can't believe it. You've worked on it so hard, and
you've thought about everything that could go wrong, and tried to
guess at everything that could go wrong, and be ready to react to
it, and then all of a sudden it's over. You know, and you think, "Holy
smokes, we really did this."
Reeves: And extremely emotional. You know, I don't know how to describe
the emotions. They were euphoric. The Russians, I felt, felt the same
way, and I know we did on both sides of the pond, and I know their
group over here felt the same way.
Davison: Did they see this as kind of a new beginning for their space
program? They had been working so independently on the Mir station.
Reeves: They were very anxious, I thought, to do this program together,
and I can't speculate on how important to their program it was or
not. I mean, I could, but I don't have any data to back it up. I think
they were very excited about doing this, and I know the individuals
that I dealt with were extremely excited about it. As I mentioned
earlier, when we first got over there, the efforts that they went
to accommodate us and to learn and to work together were just amazing
to me.
You know, after growing up in the fifties, sixties, like I said I
did, with the fears and everything else and all of the movies you'd
seen and all the stereotypes you'd been exposed to your whole life,
you know, I expected to go over there and see a lot of closed doors
and restricted access to everything else, and it was just quite the
opposite. I couldn't believe it. It was just whatever you want. And
we opened up to them and they opened to us and it was great, really
great.
By the way, the people, the individuals, that we've worked with so
closely over the years have had those discussions about the historical
problems we've had in the past and the fear of each other, and now
working so closely together, we have those discussions a lot socially.
We sit down and talk about it, and it's as awesome and mind-boggling
to them as it is to us.
Davison: We've come so far in a short period of time.
Reeves: Oh, yes. Yes.
Davison: You made numerous trips over to Russia. Do you have any stories
you'd like to share with us, some special ones?
Reeves: Probably some of them I can't share with you, but -
Davison: You don't have to talk about any Halloween parties.
Reeves: [Laughter] Well, I mentioned that on my very first trip over
there, it was still in a time of shortages. Communism had collapsed
not too many years before that, and they were in the recovery process,
and trying to get their economy going, and you saw on the news all
the shortages and things like that, and that was all very true and
we were exposed to all of that. But it was just amazing to me how
much improvement and how fast that country is coming along, at least
in Moscow, where we were. I don't know about the rest of the country,
and I'm sure Moscow may be a little different story, but the progress
is just amazing.
I've said it many times, and it's just my own personal opinion, that
Moscow is going to truly be one of the major cities and tourist attractions
and industrial hubs of the world in ten, fifteen years. The way they're
developing now and the way they're recovering is pretty amazing. There
are no shortages now. The problem over there now is just employment
and money, from what we gather and what we see. Not too unlike what
the United States has been through in its history. But just a wonderful,
wonderful city. Moscow is one of the greatest cities I've ever been
in my life. The history is amazing.
Davison: Let's talk a little bit about the working relationships with
working with the same people and building up these relationships.
I noticed that the flight director's office seemed to have almost
a constant team of four or five directors that stayed with the Shuttle-Mir
Program, and I know that the Russians tend to do that as well. Was
that vital to what you're working?
Reeves: Oh, absolutely. That's kind of the crux of space flight operations
in general. As a flight director here, just working with flight control
teams and going through the training we go through and the training
we go through with the crews, developing the rapport, the working
rapport, and the working relationships with the people is one of the
major objectives and things you're trying to achieve. Yes, you want
to get knowledgeable of all the technical aspects of what we're doing
and the operational aspects of what we're doing, but a big part of
it is getting to know the people.
A flight director on a flight control team needs to know the people
and be able to know the people on their team so that they can interface
with them, and in a contingency you can work together and solve whatever
the problem is. We had the same problem in Phase One, and now we're
just trying to develop this rapport and this understanding of the
people that we are going to be required to operate with, especially
in a contingency. You have to understand the personalities. You have
to understand where the people are coming from.
The fact that we were able to come to grips with this interpretation
problem, the language barrier, and the fact that we weren't so far
apart in terms of what we're thinking. Our problem is communication,
and you only resolve that through relationships and through personal
relationships and getting to know each other. That was just vital
to the whole process.
Davison: Now that we've built up this trust in the Shuttle-Mir Program
and move on to phase two for the International Space Station, do you
think the Russians are going to have a hard time using English as
the primary language for their Control Center?
Reeves: Well, they'll have a hard time, but they understand the need
to do this. I mean, there are other international partners besides
the Russians, so we had to settle on a language, and that was worked
out very carefully by all the managers involving all the international
partners, and it was settled on to go to English. Most of the Russians,
in their school systems, they study English as required courses in
their schooling, so most of them have had exposure to English, and
it probably will be a little easier for them to learn English than
it would for us to learn Russian, but I don't know.
I know that the Russians that I know and deal with are working very
hard to learn English, and doing a very good job of it. I don't think
we will ever get to a point where we won't need interpreters and translators
as a key part of the program. I think that's foolishness. I mean,
it's like I've learned enough Russian just through my exposure over
there and some personal study and a couple of courses, and this, that,
and the other, to be able to communicate, but I can never get to the
point on a technical level that I could deal with technical issues,
I don't think. There's not enough time to do what you have to do in
your job and your daily responsibilities, and take that on, too. I
can't do it. Maybe some of these geniuses around here can do it, but
I sure can't do it. So I would never get to a point where I wouldn't
rely on or want an interpreter or translator around. But they've accepted
that and they're going in that direction.
Davison: You talked earlier about a Russian consulting team that came
over to Houston while the Shuttle-Mir flights were going on. Can you
tell us a little bit about how the team operated? Did you get to work
with them?
Reeves: Well, they operated very similar to the way we operated over
there. They were at the ready and they were in the Control Center
and had a room right in the same area as the flight control room.
They were involved in the planning process, they were involved in
any kind of problems that came up, any kind of negotiations that took
place, and they would be involved over here. So we used them the same
way that we were used over there.
Davison: Were you able to have any Russians in your home when they
came over to visit here in the United States?
Reeves: Yes, we've socialized a lot, taking them to our homes and
been invited to theirs over there, and we've shared the cultural experiences
and all.
Davison: Now that you're working International Space Station, are
there lessons learned that you're bringing to the program that other
people weren't able to because of your first-hand experience?
Reeves: Well, you know, I think we all had unique experiences and
we're all throwing our two cents into the process of what we learned.
Everybody that went over there learned something new that we're putting
into the process. All of us that worked Phase One are heavily involved
in Phase Two. I'm lead flight director on flight 4-A, which is the
fourth American assembly flight, fourth Shuttle flight to the station,
and so it's all applicable, yes, and we're contributing.
Davison: Could you discuss with us the most significant or memorable
story or experience that you had during the Shuttle-Mir Program?
Reeves: Well, the most significant experience is the one I've already
alluded to, and that is just being given the opportunity to go to
Russia and to interface with the Russians and to get to know the Russian
people. We've talked about this amongst ourselves; I have never gotten
as close to anybody in my whole life as I have the Russian people,
as fast as I did. Just love them to death. We have a great relationship.
But in terms of the events, when I look back at the whole Phase One
Program, obviously the work that went into STS-63, with the leaking
jet and the problems I went through, that was operations, flight control
at its peak. I mean, that's the kind of thing we train and work for
our whole careers here, and we get involved in, and it's a very rewarding
thing to participate in. I've had several flights where I've been
involved in things like that, and you always look back at them as
the highlights. Of course, the first docking was just a really emotional
experience.
I think that what you're looking for are some unique stories or sidelights,
but I don't, I can't think of any right off the top of my head.
Davison: Let me ask a follow-on to the example you gave for STS-63.
Did you ever think that the press or the politics of that situation
would cancel the rendezvous? Because there was a lot of talk that
was going on. You were certainly working it from inside and trying
to resolve it, but from the outside it sounded like the press was
trying to say, "Well, the Russians are really concerned. They
don't want us to be around their vehicle."
Reeves: Like you said, I was seeing it from the inside, and I was
dealing, face to face, with the people that were making the decision,
and there was no doubt in my mind that they had legitimate technical
concerns, and there's no doubt in my mind they were very concerned,
and there is no doubt in my mind that up until two hours before the
decision was made, they still had not made up their mind.
There were some people running around saying they were really all
along going to let us come in and the decision had already been made;
the whole thing was just a drama. It's just nonsense, total nonsense.
We were working it just like we would any problem. We were trying
to understand the implications of it, trying to cover all bets, and
the decision was not going to be made any sooner than it had to be,
until all the facts were in and on the table. So, no doubt in my mind.
Davison: Okay. Rebecca, do you have any questions you want to ask?
Wright: You were talking about your perceptions, and I'm sure a lot
of your family and friends, because of our ages, feel the same way.
Did you have a hard time convincing them of how wonderful the Russians
were and the hospitality that they showed you?
Reeves: No, as a matter of fact, I took my wife over there, and didn't
have to convince her. She's met the Russians that have come over here,
and so that hasn't been much of a problem doing that.
I remember one event where I was socializing with some of their key
ops people that I've gotten to know so well, and I had told them how
unique it was to be able to work with them after what I'd grown up
with and I said, "I can remember going through drills in junior
high school where we'd go through bomb drills and hide under a desk
and worry about a nuclear attack or something," and they'd laugh
and just, "Oh, yeah, you know, the funny thing is, we were doing
the same thing."
The common theme that we've all expressed after going through Phase
One is one of the biggest learning experiences that we had was not
our differences, but our similarities. That was just amazing. When
I first saw their Control Center and first got exposed to their operations
and the way they ran their operations, it was just amazing, the similarities.
There are unique wrinkles here and there because of the uniqueness
of the politics and the uniqueness of the vehicle and this, that,
and the other, but the general theme or the general process was very
similar.
We all talked about it and thought, well, you know, why is that? And
I guess our best explanation is, if you take a technical problem and
you lay it on the table with a bunch of engineers, I don't care what
part of the world they come from, sooner or later you're going to
get to pretty much the right answer, and the right answer always kind
of looks the same, no matter where you're coming at it. I would like
to believe that that's what happened. That's the way we got to where
we are.
Wright: You've been doing your job for so many years, and, of course,
the evolution of manned space flight continues. Have you, regarding
the Shuttle-Mir part, ever taken yourself out of your current and
present self and thought about what part of this historical partnership
that you played in it? I mean, this is not routine compared to anything
else you have ever done.
Reeves: Yes, you know, you think about that. You think, well, everybody
likes to go through life and think you contributed something along
the way, you know, and I'm proud of my contribution to Phase One,
from just a personal level. I think we all contributed something.
I've got my personal contributions. Like you say, I go way back. I
got here in 1967 in the Apollo Program, and have experiences through
Apollo and Skylab and in Shuttle and now this one. Yes, I reflect
on those contributions quite a bit. Makes you feel good.
Davison: Thanks for sharing all these stories and your time with us.
Reeves: My pleasure.
[End of interview]