NASA Johnson Space Center
Oral History Project
Edited Oral History Transcript
Joseph
W. Cuzzupoli
Interviewed by Summer Chick Bergen
Kirkland,
Washington –
19 January 1999
Bergen: Today is January 19, 1999. This is an oral
history with Joseph Cuzzupoli in the offices of the Kistler [Aerospace]
Corporation in [Kirkland,] Washington. The interviewer is Summer Chick
Bergen, assisted by Carol Butler.
Thank you so much for allowing us to do your oral history.
Cuzzupoli:
Well, I'm very honored, very honored to be part of giving you some
history of what happened here as far as my career and my involvement
with NASA and how I look at things from the contractor aspects of
the program.
Many years ago—and this is going back to the early parts of
1960—I was in the United States Navy and I was launching Regulus
missiles, and I started in the missile business. I joined General
Dynamics [Corporation], and at General Dynamics I was assigned to
Vandenberg Air Force Base, instructing the Air Force on how to launch
Atlas missiles.
When [John F.] Kennedy, our President, announced in the sixties that
we were going to go to the Moon, there wasn't much experience out
there for engineers. We'd been recruited by North American Aviation
[Inc.] to come down to California to be interviewed to work on the
Apollo Program. At that time, I believe it was 1962, I joined North
American Aviation and had a wonderful career for about eighteen years,
which I enjoyed tremendously.
In the early parts of the program, there was a tremendous amount of
chaos, because the hiring of engineers, young engineers, old engineers,
about 36,000 of us were formulated in one facility in Downey, California.
At that time North American Aviation had two major contracts. One
was the Apollo Program, which was building the command and the service
module [CSM], which I was assigned to, and then the Saturn II Program,
which was located in Seal Beach, California.
At that time the president of the company was Harrison [A.] Storms.
"Stormy" was the greatest person that I've ever worked for.
I know there's a lot of controversy about Stormy and his relationship
with the NASA people, management, at the time, but I can tell you
he was a dedicated American trying to do the job. Let's put it this
way: at that point in time, I think we had a lot on our plate, trying
with both of those programs, 36,000 people coming, trying to get off
the ground, changes in the system by both NASA and North American
Aviation at that time, caused a lot of confusion.
As a test engineer, I started working, checking out the Apollo Program,
and did the earlier boilerplates. I had a wonderful experience. The
program was sort of broken into where we did boilerplates which we
had, that we sent to White Sands [Missile Range, New Mexico]. It's
called the Little Joe Project, which checked out the escape system
on Apollo. And we had the boilerplates that were sent to the Cape
[Canaveral, Florida], and they were used for the verification on the
Saturn Program. Well, we just had a lot of difficulties in building
those vehicles, and it took us considerable more time than the scheduled
allowed us to.
As I progressed in that program, I went up Management Row, and I guess
the fellow that really helped me through that process in becoming
all the way up to a vice president was Charlie [Charles H.] Feltz
and also George [W.] Jeffs. Those two individuals, with the help of
Harrison Storms, and at that time he turned over the reins to a fellow
named Joe McNamara, who became president, and finally then George
Jeffs became president.
In the Apollo Program, I was the assistant program manager on about
four vehicles. The first one would be Apollo 6, which was an unmanned
vehicle. The fellow that I dealt with in NASA at that time, my counterpart,
was a fellow named Kenny [Kenneth S.] Kleinknecht, and Kenny Kleinknecht
worked for George [M.] Low. Now, I would be visited by George Low,
Kenny Kleinknecht, and George [W. S.] Abbey. As far as what the status
was, they wouldn't believe anybody but myself, and I would tell them,
"Here's where we are." They felt like it got filtered in
the system about the real status of the program. Also, the program
manager at that time was Dale [D.] Myers. Dale Myers was program manager,
Charlie Feltz was the deputy program manager.
Finally, NASA, in their way, said, "We need a focus, have management
focus on each one of these vehicles." So they came up with this
concept of system program manager, which worked directly for Dale
Myers. Again, I was on Apollo 6 and being opposite of Kenny Kleinknecht.
He was a very excited person, but he was really down to earth. I mean,
he was a very direct person. He got his message across very clear.
It was obvious the direction he gave me was, "Get this done and
get it done right, and as quickly as you can and within cost."
Well, we successfully launched Apollo 6, and that was basically the
step necessary to go forward with Apollo 7.
I want to go back a little bit and tell you a little bit about Apollo
1. Apollo 1, I was in charge of checking it out prior to shipping
it to the field. It was a tough job, again, because of the changes
in the system, and we had a considerable amount of rework that we
had to do to the vehicle. And we had a lot of pressure on this schedule,
but it did not get us away from the fact that we didn't do a good
quality job. But when the vehicle left Downey, California, it was
not complete at all, and we shipped it under the understanding that
it will be complete in the field. There was considerable amount of
changes yet to be done.
When the incidents occurred, I was put on a committee on procedures
and how we did things, how we checked it out, and I was assigned to
the Cape for about two or three months, being part of the committees
that worked for the board that was evaluating exactly what caused
the fire.
After that, we got into a redesign. Of course, there was a lot of
rumors at that time that they were going to take the contract away
from North American and give it to some other contractor. We worked
on the redesign in Houston for about three months, and at that time
I became very, very close with George Low and George Abbey, who, as
of today, probably can quote you every change that was made on that
vehicle. And he had a memory that would not quit. I mean, we would
talk to him on a day-to-day basis and have a change control board,
and he had a record of everything that was discussed. If it wasn't
written down, he had it in his head. We used to go to him as a library
and say, "Hey, George, what did we really decide in that meeting?"
So that's where my relationship with George Low and George Abbey became
very, very close.
Then we were all saddened by what happened, and it wasn't North American
Aviation anymore; it was "We're a member of a team to get the
job done to get to the Moon." And badges became academic; there
were not any badges anymore, as far as I was concerned.
So we finished with this what I called the Block I, which was the
old spacecraft version. We'd now gone into Block II, which started
with Spacecraft 17 and Spacecraft 20, which, in turn, were Apollo
5 and Apollo 6, Spacecraft 20 being Apollo 6. Very successful on those
two flights. Then we started to work with Apollo 7.
At that time, our assistant program manager on Apollo 7 was John [P.]
Healey, and John worked very close with Wally [Walter M.] Schirra
[Jr.], Donn [F.] Eisele, and Walt [R. Walter] Cunningham, who were
the astronauts. We had a very difficult time at that point because
the astronauts pretty much wanted what they wanted in the vehicle
and we had to give them what they wanted. I mean, if they wanted the
procedures written a certain way, we had to write them a certain way.
It was a very tough time arguing with the astronauts on a daily basis
about, you know, where should things be stowed in the crew module.
Wally made himself known all the way through, and it was real tough.
George Low intervened many times and tried to get that sorted out.
Now, prior to George Low coming in the act—I'm going a little
bit back—we had two other fellows: Dr. Joe [Joseph F.] Shea
and a fellow named Dr. [Rolf W.] Lanzkron. I don't know if you all
have been—but Joe Shea was a great program manager as well.
Whatever happened happened, and he no longer was there, but George
Low stepped in and we had a transition. We were kind of rocky getting
our directions from NASA. It started smoothing out with George Low.
He was a manager, manager over managers.
So my involvement, again, on Apollo 7 was to help the first vehicle
get through the process. It's sort of like the first olive getting
out of a jar. It's very difficult to pull out. The rest will come
out after that. So we focused a lot on Apollo 7. Then I became the
man in charge of Apollo 8, working for Dale Myers and Charlie Feltz.
My interface again was with NASA. I also had Apollo 9, which was—Apollo
8 at that time was a rendezvous, and that's all we were going to do
is Earth rendezvous process. Apollo 9 was, again, going to be the
first lunar module rendezvous.
Around Christmas—no, it was later than that. I think it was
February of the year that we went to the Moon with Apollo, I think
that was 1966 or '67.
Bergen:
Apollo 8?
Cuzzupoli:
Apollo 8.
Bergen:
'68.
Cuzzupoli:
'68. The decision was to go to the Moon, and the fellow that made
that decision, the recommendation came from Dr. [Christopher C.] Kraft
[Jr.] and Dr. [Robert R.] Gilruth. I was part of that process only
from the standpoint of what will it take to modify the vehicle. The
decision-maker was George [E.] Mueller. There was some other politics
in it about trying to beat the Russians and all that, but at my level
I was just only interested in what it would take to modify the vehicle.
There was a considerable amount of changes we had to make, but we
said we could do it in a reasonable time and we can get it going.
Well, again we got only certain of the modifications done in Downey,
California. The rest had to be done at the Cape. I left with a group
of fellows from California and we went to the Cape and we finished
building that vehicle in the Cape.
My interface down there with NASA was very interesting, because I
now dealt with a Dr. [Rocco A.] Petrone, who was a pretty strong individual
as far as a manager whose demands were into a very detailed level
about what was going on. I can tell you, frankly, there was a lot
of problems with Dr. Petrone versus what was happening at Johnson
Space Center as far as their management and [Marshall Space Flight
Center] Huntsville [Alabama]. Sometimes you get thrown in the middle
of that, you know. The politics between NASA dribbles down to the
next level and it dribbles down to everybody knows that when you've
got some problems on the interfaces. It wasn't easy, but we got through
that. I became a friend of Dr. Petrone in one way or another. He may
not have liked the decisions we made, but I'm sure that if he would
be interviewed today, he will tell you that it wasn't an easy job,
but we got it done.
Apollo 8 gets launched, and, of course, the success of it was great.
My first thrill on that was Frank Borman calling me up and thanking
me. The second is telegrams that I received from the crew.
We had some problems during those days. Again at North American Aviation,
I recall one of the events that we had is a baseball game between
the astronauts and the North American people, contractor. Played hardball.
The story goes, and history, that Dick [Richard F.] Gordon and Pete
[Charles C.] Conrad [Jr.] were the ringleaders of the baseball team.
Both of them played college baseball. Now, I go to the field and I'm
going to watch these guys practice. The astronauts are in good physical
condition. They're out there running every day, you know. They're
in great shape, and here we are, a bunch of engineer and not very
good shape.
So I said, "We're going to get beat." Now, they're going
to have a stadium filled with about 10,000 people in Southern California.
This is hardball. There's going to be a party. At that time the president
[of North American Aviation, Inc.] was Bill [William B.] Bergen, who
replaced Harrison Storms, and Bill was trying to keep motivation within
our troops, so he supported this baseball game. We have pictures of
this game like you wouldn't believe, and little kids autographing—the
astronauts autographing the kids' hats and balls and everything.
Now, I said to myself, "I'm not a very good loser. I don't have
good fielders. I don't have good hitters. How could I win this game?
Because I'm not going to make them win." Well, we recruited a
pitcher from Puerto Rico, and I hired him as a quality control fellow,
and he had some quality control background, but not much. He can throw
a ball, make a screw ball go one way, a fast ball going the other
way, and a drop going the other way. I hid him from practice so nobody
knew. The astronauts knew nothing about what was going on.
Well, the game starts, and they are expecting me to get up there and
pitch. Right? And they're all dressed up in uniform. And here comes
out Julio, and Julio starts throwing these balls at them, and it was
a riot, because they're missing the ball and they're yelling across
the field that I cheated and all that. Meantime, we've got 10,000
people in the stands. [Laughter] Well, of course we won the game,
and afterwards at dinner or at the banquet that we had that Bill Bergen
sponsored, we had a lot of laughs and had a lot of beer.
Again, it was the morale that we were trying to motivate there, because
here we are, a lot of people saddened by what's happened, trying to
recuperate. A lot of bad press still going on in the paper. The astronauts
realize that their life depended on us to do a great job on the vehicle.
There were other things that we did as far as motivation, but that
one there sticks in my mind as one that we had a good time.
Well, the next thing on Apollo 8, of course, is the landing. Everything
went well on that, and we went further with Apollo 9. I left the Cape
and went back to Downey, California. Meantime, we had Apollo 10, and
you all know the history of [Thomas P.] Stafford. I became very friendly
with General Stafford, and I worked on his vehicle as well, in Downey.
As of today, I'm a very good friend of General Stafford and am on
his committee on the Shuttle-Mir. We talk regularly, and he's, again,
a great NASA friend, trying to help during the tough times, either
political or with Russia. He has a relationship with Russia that you
won't believe, and does a good job on keeping us out of trouble there.
After we landed on the Moon, I went into the Shuttle proposal program,
and I was the vice president of all operations. What I mean by operations,
it was all the manufacturing, all the field sites—White Sands,
Mississippi Test Facility [now John C. Stennis Space Center], and
Edwards Air Force Base, Palmdale facility—and we won the Shuttle
Program. The day before the announcement on the Shuttle Program, we
were told that word got out that Grumman [Aircraft Engineering Corporation]
had won it. Of course, we were all upset, but it turned out that was
a major rumor.
At that time within NASA, being in a proposal stage was very difficult
for us hardware people, I mean, to transfer over to hardware, but
we figured that NASA would not give us the contract unless they had
people who had done the job before. So a lot of us got into the writing
business, and that's difficult when you sit there in a proposal and
fight over words rather than—it's a different ball game than
designing hardware and building hardware. It's very, very stressful.
Counterparts that I had within NASA at that time was a fellow named
Andy [Andrew] Hobokan, who, again, worked from the NASA side, was
the fellow who was going to evaluate our proposal from the standpoint
of operations. Again, a gentleman that came from—I knew I had
to win him over because he came from Grumman. He was the NASA [representative]
in charge at Grumman, and I had to win him over from our side, and
that was not an easy job, but I heard afterwards in the orals, or
the debriefing, that we got like 100 points for 100 points, so he
really gave us a good mark.
At that time there was Aaron Cohen that was put on the Shuttle Program,
and Aaron was mostly a project engineer on Apollo and had all that
experience, so making him the Shuttle Program manager at that time
was a great move on NASA's part. Our counterpart to him at the time
was George Jeffs.
NASA, in the seventies, really controlled and really said what they
wanted as far as management. If they didn't want somebody, they would
just say to the president of, at that time, North American-Rockwell
[Corporation], "I want that guy. I don't want that guy, so get
rid of him." The first guy that they managed to move out was
right after we won the proposal, was the program manager, Buzz [unclear],
and replaced him with George Jeffs. George came from Apollo. They
want the Apollo people put on the program, that they were used to
working with on a daily basis. Any new faces, they were sort of reluctant
to have on board.
So we went through a transition again, you know, satisfying NASA's
requirements of who's going to be there. I don't think they do that
much now. Okay? They may move one or two people, but they were really—you
know, they went down to manager level and they said exactly what they
wanted. And that, again, is a tough situation when you think somebody
else is doing a good job. So, off we go on the Shuttle Program.
Meantime, the Apollo Program is winding down, and as we can, we were
pulling the Apollo people off and putting them on the Shuttle, but
you had to be very careful because you still have these flights, like
Apollo 16 and Apollo 17, that were still going through the manufacturing
process and checkout process. So we built our team again and went
on the Shuttle Program, and struggled for months and months on preliminary
design, what we're going to have.
The fellows at that time who really helped Rockwell were Dr. [Christopher
C.] Kraft [Jr.] and Aaron Cohen and his engineers. Another fellow
that we had an interface with at Johnson Space, who really was a chief
engineer at that time, was Max [Maxime A.] Faget, and Max would be
one that you could not predict, from meeting to meeting, what he would
have to say or what he would come up with, but he was a dominant player
in getting the Shuttle configuration to where it is today.
We started off the Shuttle Program with Dr. Mueller's goals to making
it totally reusable, both the first and the second stage. We were
teamed with General Dynamics, who were to build the booster, and the
orbiter was built by Rockwell. Turns out the cost of that was just
fantastic, and NASA at that time did not have the funds to support
a fully reusable [spacecraft], and Max Faget and, I believe, with
some study program with Northrup-Grumman, came up with a design of
solid rocket motors with the external tank.
But the dream to have a fully reusable vehicle is what we're working
on here, and if NASA really had their way today, they would prefer
fully reusable. As you know, they're moving ahead with the Venture
Star Program, which is supposed to be a fully reusable vehicle.
So, Shuttle started, and our first vehicle was the Enterprise, and
it was going to be used for practicing the landing system at Edwards
Air Force Base, piggyback on a 747. That's again another interesting
situation where none of us believed that that was the right thing
to do because we were worried about hitting tails and how that whole
separation system would work. So we worked our way through that process.
No one believed that we would meet the schedule on that program.
At that time I was the vice president of operations and worked with
a fellow named Ed Smith, who was both program manager and the chief
engineer on that program. Aaron and Dr. Kraft, like I say, were the
NASA counterparts. Dr. Kraft, even though he was the director, was
involved on hands on, on the program, and knew the status at all times.
We got into the development and building of that. Like I said before,
the schedule was very critical. No one believed that we could meet
that schedule. History will say that that was one of the most successful
program to get that first vehicle in the air and successfully separate
and land three times without any big glitch. I was very proud of that
program. I was also the flight director for the Shuttle and gave the
"go" from Palmdale [California]. That "go" went
to Houston, and Houston gave the final "go" for separation.
Then the episode on the next vehicle to put all the tiles on and get
the tiles off, and I became now the program manager on that program
and went through some very hard working days on tiles. At that time
NASA, from Washington, took over pretty much what was going on, and
that was under [John F.] Yardley.
We couldn't get all the tiles built in time out of Lockheed, out of
Sunnyvale [California]. The real story of this goes this way. So they
wanted to schedule—we proved that we could get in orbit quicker
if we put the tiles on at the Cape, that Lockheed would machine them
and get them done quicker, and it could be done parallel to the other
activities that they're doing at the Cape. So I had maybe one third
of the tiles on. So you can't go fly with one third of the tiles on,
not on top of a 747. So we had to add foam tiles. They were actually
fake tiles. We had to get them painted, because from the rollout that
was coming out of Air Force Plant 42 down there, with the bands playing,
you can't have them brown, you've got to have them white, because
people are going to ask questions why they're brown and white. You
can imagine asking that question, answering that question.
So we did that. We transport that vehicle after a big ceremony. Transport
that vehicle out of Palmdale, went to Edwards Air Force Base, and
we loaded on top of the 747. It was on a Saturday morning, and I'm
out there with a crew of guys from Rockwell and NASA. A decision was
made a couple of weeks before that I participated in, that we ought
to have sort of a trial flight before it goes on its way to the Cape,
make just one trial, one turn over the field and come back down. Well,
we're at the end of the runway and the 747 ramps up and starts rolling
down the field. I was looking out of binoculars. I'm saying, "What
is all that white stuff coming off? What's on the ground?"
The vehicle gets in the air and it comes right back down, and there
on the runway lied all the good tiles, but all the fake tiles are
still on. Now, at that time I call in and I'm calling in to Houston
and to Aaron Cohen, and I'm giving Aaron a rundown exactly what happened
here. At that time John Yardley gets on the line. It's now a major
mishap. Someone asked—I believe it was John Yardley asked me
how many tiles I think came off, and I said, "Well, I'll answer
it this way. There are more tiles on the ground than there are on
that vehicle."
So that got into the major problem of tiles. Seeing that we were there
already at Edwards [AFB] and we could not solve the problem on tiles
just that fast, we had two choices: either go back to Palmdale or
continue back to the Cape, go to the Cape. Well, to go to the Cape,
I had to put on more fake tiles. So we still had a case, a mixed case
of good tiles and bad tiles. Not all of them came off, though quite
a few.
We got it to the Cape that way and then went through a major review
and investigation of exactly what happened, went into a redesign,
and that made the Shuttle as late as it was on that program. Finally
got all the tiles on, finally got the flight, and it's probably, as
of today, the most conservative system that we have, because we really
swung the pendulum all the way over to the right, and those tiles
will never come off again. The weight of the vehicle is probably pretty
high because of those tiles.
Then, of course, the first flight, the success of the first flight,
and then I left. I felt that that was enough, and joined a real estate
firm in sort of semi-retirement in Orange County. And in 1988 I got
a call from George [W. S.] Abbey. I left in '81 or '82, whatever it
is. In '88, I got a call from George Abbey asking me to—that
they had just had a major explosion on a plant in Las Vegas [Nevada]
that builds ammonium perchlorate, which is the oxidizer used for solid
rocket motors, and when the plant blew up, it actually hit about 4.0
on the Richter Scale, and those casinos down there, glass broke in
some of the casinos, a lot of damage to property, two people died
and about 100-some-odd people got injured from that blast.
Well, that only left one manufacturer of ammonia perchlorate, and
that was Kerr-McGee [Corporation]. That was not good for both DoD
[Department of Defense] and NASA. You know, most of these missiles,
these defense missiles, have ammonia perchlorate, and our Shuttle
uses ammonia perchlorate, uses about, oh, close to a million and a
half pounds of this per booster. So without any drawings, because
those drawings blew up, and the people in Las Vegas didn't want that
building there, NASA, with the support of that company, bought a piece
of property in Cedar City, Utah, where I went down there for a six-month
period of time to come back out of retirement and help out, and was
a program manager and did that. Cost us 100 million dollars, NASA
money.
Then after that, I stayed with the company and built a couple more
chemical plants. Then Aaron Cohen and George Mueller asked me to come
up here [Kistler Aerospace Corporation] about two years ago, and that's
about all I have to say about my career.
Bergen:
Great. Nice overview. If it's okay, I've got some specific questions
to ask you.
Cuzzupoli:
Sure.
Bergen:
We'll start back when you worked at General Dynamics, because I think
you did some interesting things while you were down there that really
helped lead up to the manned space program. You worked on the Atlas,
is that right?
Cuzzupoli:
Atlas.
Bergen:
What exactly did you do?
Cuzzupoli:
Atlas had what they called Atlas D, E, and F, D being a concept of
just the vehicle in a horizontal position—vertical launching.
E was what we call a coffin; it rised up this way out of a great big
block wall, block doors up on top, opened up. And F came out of a
silo. On the Es and F, I worked in the maintenance facility and helped
them check out everything prior to going out to the launch pad. What
we were doing for General Dynamics is instructing the Air Force, to
teach them how to launch the vehicle as well as check it out.
After we checked out, we went to the field site and actually launched
them, and then we turned the whole facility over to the Air Force
after we had a successful flight. So we instructed them and we activated
the site, and then we sold the site to the Air Force. At that point
in time, I was in charge of both hydraulics and pneumatics, and that
was my specialty there.
Bergen:
Were you aware at that time that a form of the Atlas was going to
be used for manned space flight?
Cuzzupoli:
Well, back in Kerney Mesa in San Diego was the Mercury Program, and,
yes, I was aware. I did work on some of them, too. I was sent down
specially to check out a couple of the boosters. I remember the Mercury
decals we used to have to put. Anytime we checked anything out or
anytime we opened anything, after it's been perfectly checked out
and ready to go, we had to lock it up and seal it with the Mercury
decals so that if anybody got into it, those seals had to be broken.
Yes, I worked on those. I don't recall which ones were John Glenn's
or whoever, but, yes, I did.
Bergen:
Since you did work on missiles early in the development of missiles,
you had a unique perspective, and in 1960 President Kennedy, in the
election campaign, talked about the "missile gap." At the
time, what did you think about his concept of the missile gap that
we had with Russia, or supposedly had with Russia?
Cuzzupoli:
Well, that was there. I mean, we knew we were far behind on the Russians.
The Sputnik Program really threw us for a loop, you know, and at that
time—oh, I'll tell you, we were blowing them up all over the
place. The way I got involved, of course, at General Dynamics you
would hear it all the time, and we were doing our share of blowing
them up at Vandenberg [Air Force Base]. Oh, we were—I would
say maybe one out of three were successful.
I mean, they either—as a matter of fact, my children—my
wife would come out and say, when I was launching sometime, "Maybe
Dad would give us some fireworks tonight," because we would do
night launching. Living in Santa Maria, California, being dark, you
can see we were launching out of Lompoc, out of Vandenberg, you can
see the contrails and you can see the vehicle go up. You also can
see it blow up. There was many times when those things blew up.
So we knew at that time we were far behind, plus the Navy wasn't doing
good and the Air Force wasn't doing—the Vanguard and all that.
We were wondering if we were ever going to catch up. But I'll tell
you what happened. Hearing history about World War II and all that,
I knew that we would overcome that, only because I saw all of us working
the extra hours. I mean, I don't think anybody was working for overtime
money; they were working just to see if they could close that gap.
Their little piece of closing that gap was very, very important.
Down in the floor where I was, on the board, working the details,
my counterparts were always understanding that we had a race going
on, and we were motivated to win that race. We didn't know how we
were going to win it. We didn't have a picture, the big picture in
our mind how we were going to get there, but we knew that the resources
of funds would be supported to it. But it took a while for us to really
move as rapidly as we did.
But after we got through, I would say going around the Moon was the
turning point. At that point in time in Apollo 8, I knew we had them,
because you're not hearing much what was going on in Russia. I didn't
know what was going on. We said at that time, "We got 'em."
But not until then, because, you know, you never knew what they were
going to pull next in Russia, and we had no [unclear] to what's going
on, nor did we really want to know what's going on, because we're
scared that they were going to beat us. So it's just like sort of
looking over our shoulders. We didn't know where the hell they were.
So it was exciting.
I'll tell you one thing that's very important. Our families, when
our kids were growing up, and our wives are the ones that are the
heroes during those days, because we really did not spend any time
at home. I'm very surprised. I mean, when someone asks me how these
kids turned out so well, I say, "Well, I tell you what. You'd
better talk to the wife, because I had nothing to do with it."
And that's a true statement.
It's different now. It's different now as things go by. What I do
today, if I try to tell an engineer that we've got to do this and
we're racing this way and racing that, I get some response out of
some of them, but most of them—if you want to say—and
if I try to live with myself and say the family came first or the
program came first, I've got to say that it was even. It was an even
thing. And I'm not proud of that now that I look at it, but that's
the way we—and I think there were a lot of us that did that.
We were always thinking of how we're going to get there from here,
because we thought it was so damn important for our children that
we get there.
And I think this program is another thing. I'm not waving the United
States flag, but what we're doing here, yes, sure, it's commercial.
Sure, it's all that. But again you're doing this and we'll benefit.
We'll all benefit. Our children will benefit, the government will
benefit, and hopefully I benefit, too.
Bergen:
I think that's an important point to make. Sometimes I think the part
that the wives played in making the space program a success is probably
overlooked.
Cuzzupoli:
Definitely, because it's a fact. They're the ones that are the heroes.
Bergen:
It's nice to hear that. If we can go back again, you mentioned just
briefly how you went from General Dynamics to North American, but
did you go interview for a position? How did that come about?
Cuzzupoli:
Well, first of all, the system was very close. I think what happened
is, I received a phone call from a fellow from North American Aviation
who was either a supervisor or a manager at that time, who used to
work for General Dynamics, and placed a call and said—well,
actually, they were trying to get about a handful of us up there that
had been checking out missiles, working on missiles, and I think there
were about twenty of us, and they went out and tried to recruit and
offered quite a bit of money to go join North American.
And also there was a couple of other things. Getting out of the wind
in Santa Maria, California, where there was sand all over the place,
it's 110 degrees normally, and going to work in Los Angeles or in
Southern California was one hell of an advantage for us, intriguing
and all that. So that, coupled with the fact that we're going to work
on the moon project, was going to be—now, what on the moon project?
I didn't even have a clue at that time. What did the command module
look like? What did the service module look like? I had no idea. We
were building boosters, you know. Concepts were in magazines and that's
all the knowledge we had. But I think the challenge to do this, to
work on the moon project, and the fact that the location and all those,
money, the whole thing.
Bergen:
So when you joined North American, how far along were they in the
process?
Cuzzupoli:
The process was in real preliminary design. There are basically two
big reviews in normal program. One is called Preliminary Design Review
and one is called Critical Design Review. They did not even complete
the Preliminary Design Review when I joined. So they were in the process
of getting that. There was no hardware being built. Everything was
strictly on the drawing boards.
I've got to tell you, 35,000 people in this area, there were trailers.
This facility could not hold 35,000 people. That was both facilities.
I don't know how many were in Downey of the 35,000, how many were
Seal Beach, but there were trailers. There would be people in trailers,
bosses that wouldn't know that they had people in those trailers to
work for them. See, there were incentives of how many people you can
hire in a month, because they would look at the schedule, NASA would
look at the schedule and say, "You're slipping schedule because
you don't have enough engineers on board." So you were motivated
to hire engineers. So a lot of engineers were—I mean, we were
trying to get them from all places.
And we would get lost in this facility. They would have red lines,
green lines, yellow lines painted on the asphalt or on the sidewalk,
and you would know where you were going. Red lines would say you're
going to the cafeteria; yellow lines says you had to go over here
to medical; green lines, you went—I mean, it was just chaos,
total chaos. I'm not proud of that, of course, but I'm giving you
history of what it was down below, to say that we had a difficult
time of rapid growth of the rate that we had, were forced to get into,
because it was tied to the schedule and, therefore, a lot inefficiency
was going on in the early days.
But to answer your question, very preliminary.
Bergen:
You talked about working on the boilerplate command and service modules.
You said that you had some problems. What type of problems did you
have with those boilerplates?
Cuzzupoli:
Well, most of the problems we had was wiring and getting requirements—well,
first of all, getting requirements really hardened. Requirements would
move around which would cause changes to electrical wiring, and again,
processes, internal processes when in North American of learning how
to get proper people trained, how to handle wiring. So, design changes,
manufacturing skills, checking out the vehicle and not knowing exactly
how you're going to check it out, and process of learning.
So, the first two boilerplates, they had them number one through whatever,
but they got deleted as you went. The first boilerplate we built was
Boilerplate 6, and then went to Little Joe, then went to White Sands
[New Mexico]. That checked out the launch escape system when the Apollo—to
pull the capsule away. Then we had Boilerplate 12, which again was
another verification of the launch escape system. It got better as
you went, you know. Boilerplate 12 was sort of a little better than
Boilerplate 6, and had a little bit more capability.
The fellows at the Cape, the NASA fellows at the Cape actually went
to White Sands and did all that, so they got some experience before
they went to the Cape. A fellow named Wally [Walter C.] Williams and
Ted Sascine [phonetic] and Gordon Turner. I remember a lot of these
names, fellows that are no longer with NASA, but were in the early
days.
Then finally Boilerplate 13, which went to the Cape, got better in
15. But their problems, again, were requirements, getting the requirements
hardened, because changes really messed up the vehicle, and then learning
how to build the vehicle.
Bergen:
You mentioned the NASA people who were at Downey. Those were the resident
Apollo Spacecraft Program managers?
Cuzzupoli:
No, there was a resident Apollo, but what we had was, NASA instituted
a process where they send the fellows from the Cape to the manufacturing
facility, to assist in the check-in and out and learning how the spacecraft
works before it went to the field, and then they took the vehicle
to the field and did their checkout prior to launch. So those were
those NASA fellows.
We had some good thinking going on at that time to try to get as much
learning upstream as possible and not wait for the vehicle just to
show up at the field site and turn out—"Well, what does
this look like?" You know. "I didn't know this." Trying
to make sure that they had lessons learned in the manufacturing process
and adapting it to the launch operations.
Bergen:
Talking about lessons learned, were you involved, or was North American
involved much in talking to McDonnell [Aircraft Corporation] about
lessons they might have learned through Mercury and Gemini?
Cuzzupoli:
There was none that I know of. There was more animosity there than
there was trying to learn from what they did on Gemini. That's sad,
too. But, you know, if there was, it was a passing remark that we
did some of that. But the Gemini Program and Apollo, switching over
to Apollo, where the lessons learned were mostly within the NASA organization,
and they got some benefits out of that.
As far as the contractors concerned with Rockwell, I mean, we had
a difficult time of talking to McDonnell-Douglas. I was trying to
get some of that lessons learned, and the only way I could get it
was through NASA. NASA would tell us, "This is the way it is."
McDonnell-Douglas was not going to help us. They wanted us to fall
flat on our face so they can get the contract back. When you look
at it, you've got to think how in the world did NASA make that decision
to go from Mercury Program, to go with McDonnell-Douglas, Gemini Program
going to McDonnell-Douglas, and all of a sudden bring an outsider
in, like North American Aviation? That was something that they never
expected, because it would have been a given to give them the Apollo
Program because they had all that experience. And I don't know why
that decision was made, but that was made. And I'm glad they made
that decision.
Bergen:
I wanted to talk a little bit more about the Apollo 1 fire, if we
can. After that was over, North American received a lot of criticism.
Did you feel most of that was warranted or did you feel that some
of it maybe you didn't deserve?
Cuzzupoli:
Well, let's say at the time where I was, at the level I was at, we
were totally aware of the discussions and arguments that were going
on between top management, both North American Aviation and NASA,
but we at North American Aviation were partially responsible for what
took place here. Did we deserve all of it? No. But the system doesn't
work that way.
Bergen:
Sure.
Cuzzupoli:
We are the contractor. NASA is the government and the customer. It's
been on any program I've ever had or any involvement I've had, that
the contractor is the one that's in blame, so we are used to accepting
it, taking your blows, and go with the flow. Otherwise, if you sit
and argue about it all the way through it, you're not going to get
anywhere. So what we tried to do down in our level—and that's
what I'm talking about, middle management and down below—we
kept our heads down and kept saying, "Okay, lessons learned.
Now what are we going to do different?"
I've got to tell you, at that point in time we were learning better.
We had a lot of things that were in the system that were much better
than what we did on Spacecraft 1 in the manufacturing process and
in engineering directorates. But, again, it was a little bit too late.
Bergen:
You talked about the efforts that were made to improve morale at North
American. Do you feel that those efforts that Bill [William B.] Bergen
made or other people in management were effective? How do you think
North American did as far as changing morale?
Cuzzupoli:
It was a tough one to turn the company around. All the motivations
that were done in either customer relations relative to posters on
the wall or speeches that were given or putting together management
clubs, it all worked. The quality improvement programs, communications
with all the employees, stand-up sessions, most of them all worked.
I think we would have been in trouble without them, because communications
really was very important at that time. You'd read the newspaper and
you'd get one angle of it; it was always the bad things. So you were
subject to that.
So, yes, it did, and I say NASA participated in that, too, big time.
They came in and the astronauts would go around and give speeches,
you know, go to elementary schools within our Downey area, participate
in all events. Then the NASA people came out and helped us, NASA engineers.
So it was pulling together at that time. "Let's get out of this
hole that we're in," and it was jointly NASA and contractor.
Now, that had to be done—not only at North American Aviation,
but it had to be done at the other contractors as well that were working
on the program, because the problem we had did also wander through
the rest of the contractors. So there was a big effort to get the
morale up, and NASA played a big role in doing that.
Again, the Challenger and what happened there and what happened afterwards
with the motivation programs, you know, with everybody shutting down,
people out of jobs, worrying about what's going to happen in the quality
of work, losing vendors, changing vendors, that's a very serious thing
when we have an incident of how we recover from an incident, and one
has to say that there always should be a contingency plan. You just
never know when something's going to happen. You should have a plan
in place, get you right back on your feet.
Bergen:
And North American did recover. Really, I guess a triumph for North
American was Apollo 8, because that was your part getting to the Moon,
right?
Cuzzupoli:
Right. That was the turning point. If you walked through the halls,
after every flight, by the way, we used to have the astronauts show
up at the helicopter port, and we had an emblem of their logo painted,
a big one, painted on the helicopter pad. They would arrive and we
would have everyone out in the parking lot when that helicopter landed.
We had a podium and some speeches were made, but the astronauts would
return from quarantine, or whatever they went through, and immediately
showed up in Downey and thanked the people. And that started—well,
started with Apollo 7 with Wally [Walter M.] Schirra [Jr.] and that
group. And it continued throughout the program. That was the first.
Then, of course, they had to make two stops after the lunar module,
so they would not only stop at North American or Rockwell at that
time; they would also stop at Northrup-Grumman in Bethpage [New York]
and thank the people. They felt like they wouldn't be there unless
for what they had done. So we had those motivation things that were
very helpful.
Bergen:
Do you remember watching the Apollo 8 mission and your memories of
the mission as it actually occurred?
Cuzzupoli:
Yes, I was at the Cape. I was in the blockhouse at the launch. Then
after the launch was up and going, I was transported by NASA to Clear
Lake, to Houston, and I was in Houston until the landing. It was in
the back room. Then, finally, for the actual—let's see. When
we went around the Moon, I think I watched that from my hotel room
in Clear Lake, but the landing I watched from the glass-enclosed area
behind the old control room, and we sat in there with General [Samuel
C.] Phillips and George [M.] Low and, of course, Dr. [Christopher
C.] Kraft [Jr.] was on the console. We sat there. We all smoked our
cigars. Then after that, there was a ball that was held in Washington,
D.C., a black-tie affair that General Phillips sponsored at that time.
But going around the Moon and listening to Frank Borman and the speech
and reading from the Bible was something that I saw from my hotel
room.
Bergen:
Still a memory.
Cuzzupoli:
Oh, yes, absolutely.
Bergen:
A significant memory.
Cuzzupoli:
But I remember his phone call afterwards. "Thank you very much."
We got some very nice—oh, and the astronauts, when they came
back, they always brought back either some coins for us or an autographed
large picture, specially, and then I tried to trickle that down to
the employees down below. We gave awards all the way down to some
of the key fellows and ladies that worked on the program, and that
got some more motivation.
Bergen:
Did you work on the spacecraft for Apollo 12? Was that one of the
ones you worked on?
Cuzzupoli:
Right.
Bergen:
I was wondering how you felt about that mission after the spacecraft
got hit by lightening and if you had any specific concerns.
Cuzzupoli:
Well, I think the words that came out of my mouth were not those I
want to put on this recorder, but it was worse than what Pete [Charles
C. Conrad, Jr.] had to say. You know, when you lose everything off
those buses—actually, what happened is, I believe the two buses
were dropped off and they were on what they call the essential bus
when that happened. What was going through my mind is, oh, no, we're
going to abort, we're not going to go all the way. But, again, the
flight crew, the flight controllers, what they did on the vehicle,
recovered quickly and away we went.
Lightening protection—I don't think we had really a system for
lightening protection. Obviously we didn't. … But it's something
that we worry about. What we have learned from that is that you need
to protect yourself from lightening, protection. Airplanes get hit
with lightening every day. Actually, I was on an airplane where it
got hit on the nose, but you actually can see the discharge of it
come out on the end of the wing. You just hear the bump. But it happens.
But on Apollo 12, I guess the only thing is, I was so happy when they
got back on the line and said everything was—but I was at that
time in Downey, California, and we used to have our own Mission Control
in case the problem in Houston, they wanted to know some details of
what was happening on something, they would ask us because we had
all the drawings. They'd have all the drawings. They were sort of
backup. I was in the room when that happened.
Bergen:
Speaking of being in the back room and dealing with problems, did
you have any involvement with Apollo 13?
Cuzzupoli:
Yes, I did. I ended up going to Beechcraft [Beech Aircraft Corporation].
I think at that time it was called Beech Aircraft. No, it was Beech
something. I went to Boulder, Colorado, and worked with a fellow named
Carl Bowman, and both of us worked on the redesign of that tank. I
was sent out by George Jeffs to make sure that redesign happened.
Now, what took place on that failure is not widely known. Fellows
like Dr. Kraft knows what happened. What was reported is different
than really what happened there, and it's a combination of—I'm
not doing a—let me just say it was a poor job of systems engineering
and a mess-up or screw-up in the ground prior to launch. And that's
all I'll say about that, but there are some people who know all the
details. But it just wasn't a thermocouple problem; it was more than
that.
But, yes, I worked on the redesign because we fixed the thermocouple
somewhat to withstand an increase of voltage.
Bergen:
Were there any other events in later Apollo missions or preparations
for those missions that stand out in your mind?
Cuzzupoli:
No. You know, it became routine. It became routine, routine from the
standpoint of success in program. I mean, we had constantly requirements
that changed and different crew equipment and different experiments
and things of that nature, but it was pretty stable. There was nothing
else that I recall from 15, 16, and 17. I know Dave [David R.] Scott,
Al [Alfred M.] Worden, and I know [unclear] real well, and we had
Gene [Eugene A.] Cernan. They always came in and always participated
in Downey, in checking out before it left, but it was basically routine.
But I think after Apollo 13—and George Mueller will tell you
that it didn't happen on his watch because Apollo 13 happened on Dale
[D.] Myers' watch. So I don't know if Dale has told you about that.
And I won't talk about the failure. But I'm sure when you talk to
Chris Kraft, he'll tell you really what happened there. [Laughter]
Bergen:
How did you feel, and maybe the people you worked with at North American,
as Apollo came to an end?
Cuzzupoli:
Well, you see, what happened is before it came to an end, we won the
Shuttle Program. So it would have been different if we didn't. It
was a look-forward program. All this talent, we lost a lot of talent.
We were very concerned, like every other contractor is, that there
will be no program after Apollo. The Shuttle that came by was good,
so we went through a nice transition. Okay? The only thing that wasn't
there was that there wasn't a major goal objective that we were trying
to do. "What's a Shuttle? What's a transportation system?"
And everybody said, "Oh, wow. I mean, you just came off the moon
program. You went to the Moon and now you're transporting?" At
that time it was like, "Well, that's great. What is all this?"
We were looking forward to going to Mars. If they would have spent
the money that they're doing on the Space Station right now, millions
and millions of dollars, and put it going to Mars, they would have
been better shape, including the technology that you get. NASA should
be in the business for technology. They should be pushing the frontier
for everything. Their spinoffs are tremendous. I can't explain everything
that I've gotten out of the spinoffs.
But I'll tell you, not going to Mars was a major mistake on our government,
and I think that it was not NASA, really. I'm sure NASA would have
loved to have gone to Mars, but the government just said, "You
know, we're going to cut back." And when you think about only
one penny of your dollar going to the space program, at least when
I remember it was only a penny, maybe two pennies now, I don't know
what it is, let's just say it's a penny and all the other money going
to welfare and everything else, you've got to sit and wonder what's
wrong with this system here. I think the fact that we only had X amount
of money so, therefore, they came up with the Space Station. Got to
come up with different ways of getting with the Space Station. Why
it's changing and changing and changing is beyond my means of understanding
what's going on, but going to Mars was—and something that will
happen. It will happen in your lifetime, but not probably mine. It
should have happened. We'll pay for that, because it's going to cost
more in the long run.
Bergen:
When you began your work on the Shuttle, the Shuttle's gone through
lots of different design changes. Was North American involved in some
of the changes in the design through development, or was that mostly
done by NASA people?
Cuzzupoli:
No, that was done jointly. That was done jointly. When you talk about
design changes, there are two kinds of design changes that we have.
One is "make work." I mean, it just won't work unless you
make that change. Definitely I was involved with those. And then those
that were mission oriented for some reason, they were made by NASA,
and we just implemented those.
But all those changes go through a normal Change Control Board that's
headed up by NASA and then is headed up by Rockwell, sort of like
two Change Control Boards. They would make a decision to make a change.
We had to take that and evaluate and see what the impact was to make
that change. Then we made our own changes because we had to make something
work. We notified them and told them that we had to make that change.
Bergen:
What were some of the differences, or if you could compare North American
as it worked on Apollo versus North American as it worked on Shuttle?
And even NASA, because I'm sure NASA changed during that time, too.
Cuzzupoli:
That's a very good question. Tremendous question. Because there was
a difference, a big difference. The difference was the fact that the
attitude of the fellows that I believe on Apollo were more to get
it done and get it done fast, in Shuttle it was get it done, but get
it done cheap. And that was a major difference. That was one level.
The second was, I think the Apollo Program was—and I'm not speaking
for myself; I'm speaking for the people who used to work for me—were
so oriented for the good of the country on Apollo, on Shuttle it was
sort of like, "Well, I've got a job." So there was a big
switch there. So, getting people motivated, even though they had a
job, you would think that that would be enough to motivate anybody.
But there was an attitude change, a big attitude change. I could motivate
easily on Apollo. On Shuttle it was very difficult. "What could
you do for me? Are you going to pay me overtime?" Overtime was
never discussed on Apollo. "You want me to work, I'll work."
And again, I think from above down, there was not a major objective,
you know, and if you went to a fighter plane program right now or
any other program, it was basically the same thing. People are there
saying, "I've got a job." I don't know how—it was
a different tempo. It was more relaxed on Shuttle on at least the
people end of it. Some of the management, of course, we didn't miss
a step. We just went from one to the other. To get people motivated
was a tough job on Shuttle.
Bergen:
What were some things that you learned from Apollo that you were able
to apply to Shuttle?
Cuzzupoli:
Well, a lot of things. Learning to look at both ends, the good and
the bad. I think on Apollo we tended to—well, if we were going
to make that change, we just went and made that change. We found out
that when we made that change, we may affect something else. So I
would say on Shuttle we got better systems engineering and integration.
We did a better job than on Apollo. On Apollo we were focused on just—"They
want that? Boom! We'll do that." Then we learned that that was
making a mistake. Looking at changing a relay to get something done
here or changing something here and now looking at a relay and saying,
"Well, it not only changes here, but it changes something here,
here, and here, you know, all the way around." So I think we
learned to do better systems engineering that was applied both to
Apollo to Shuttle.
I think on the manufacturing end of it, okay, we learned how to do
better work planning, so the work planning was much better. In mean,
on Apollo it was a capsule. You went inside. You only put four guys
in there, five guys in there, and there are certain areas. Shuttle
was a bigger aircraft, okay, and you plan things out. We learned that
in planning out activities, you can do more things parallel, so we
learned a lot of things in the manufacturing.
On the quality end of it, I think we learned to put more responsibility
on the manufacturing people rather than have somebody look over their
shoulders. I think for every manufacturing person, could you imagine,
for one person doing a job, writing his name on a piece of paper,
there was a quality guy from Rockwell, a NASA guy from NASA signing
off, and probably three more signatures.
I mean, paperwork on Shuttle, for an example, right now is tremendous.
And I don't understand that. I think if you do away with the paper,
you probably can get the job done in much less time, which we're applying
on this program. We just don't have all that paperwork. The paperwork
I do have, I have a hard time with George Mueller already. I mean,
he argues with me. I say, "Geez, I think we've got to tell them
what to do." "Don't tell them what to do, Joe, just give
them the requirements. Let them figure out how to do it." Well,
that attitude, that drives the cost of all these programs. What I'm
trying to tell you is, on the Shuttle Program, we got into trying
to do away with the paperwork.
Bergen:
How was the relationship between NASA and Rockwell during the Shuttle
development?
Cuzzupoli:
It was a joint team. The relationship was very close. I had a job
of being a program manager. I spoke to Aaron Cohen, my counterpart,
on an average of seven to ten times a day. All the way up until about
ten o'clock his time till eleven o'clock his time at home, he knew
exactly where we were at all times, and I knew exactly where he was
at all times, as far as planning process. We communicated on a monthly
basis on what we call an OMAR, which stands for Orbiter Management
and Review, and we went through the whole program review, and Dr.
Kraft would visit us on that, and Yardley would come to these reviews.
Communications was extremely good and tight, and relationships were
good.
A little area that I would say there was tension on was award fees.
When the time came to give you a grade and some money for award fees,
that's when things became a little sensitive. When you were graded
somewheres lower than what you expected, and therefore it affected
the money tree, then tension would get into the system.
The other points were any of the IG [Inspector General] investigations
relative to travel or something happening where you're spending money
where the IG is thinking you're ripping them off. False cards, because
you got multi-businesses in your factory and somebody put the wrong
number on the time card, that would cause an investigation of some
type. Now, our NASA fellows would not touch that, would not get involved
in that, because the Inspector General or the NASA investigator was
always—so you had these people looking over your shoulders all
the time. You're trying to get the job done, hoping that you've got
the best controls, but you know people are people and they tend to
make mistakes.
But on the overall, I would say that our NASA and North American—or
at that time, Rockwell—relationship was very, very good, and
if it wasn't, we would have never gotten through that process as well
as we did. I think it's changed. It's not as probably as good as it
was before. I think it's more business oriented, probably. I'm not
too sure how George Abbey would respond on that question from the
standpoint of how it is to get along with Boeing. I'm not too sure
whoever the program manager is on the Shuttle, how he would respond
to that from the contractor side of it.
The difference in the things that are happening now, you've got USA
[United Space Alliance], which is a different ball game. I don't know
how it is today. I'm not in contact with that, but I imagine it's
changed more into a business. At that time we really did not—it
only came about during the award fee, that's when the business thing
maybe had gone off track a couple—a few times.
Bergen:
The Shuttle Program differed one significant way from Apollo, because
it seemed like Congress was always cutting back the amount of money
that they would give NASA to work on this. How did this affect North
American as a contractor?
Cuzzupoli:
It affected us. You know, it trickled down right to us. One day our
plans would be totally redone and we would have to go to our contractors
and make changes to him. It affected morale. You know, laying off
people, hiring people up and down, it's very costly.
Getting back to building the Shuttle a little bit, I can tell you
that one of the methods that was used by NASA and Rockwell that was
very, very effective, and if I would ever have to do that again I
would do it the same way, you can't do it today. You can't do this
today, and I'll tell you why in a minute. But what would happen is,
Dr. Kraft and Aaron Cohen and a few others would get on an airplane
with Rockwell people, and we would fly a Rockwell airplane and we
would do maybe three contractors in one day. And we would fly in places
that were really tough to get into. You wonder how the hell, landing
here, why you're here. But upstate New York and different places.
We would hit maybe twenty contractors in one week, go to the vendors,
touch and feel the hardware, see exactly what they're doing, just
penetrate the whole system. And Chris would do this with George Jeffs,
and we would have to go along because they were my contractors, because
I was responsible. And you never know what the hell they're going
to say, you know, but you know it's the truth that's going to come
out somewheres in the system. But that was probably a management tool
that really, really paid dividends. There's some people like Sam Michabelis
[phonetic], who ran the B-1 program, and a few others will tell you
that if you're going to get burnt on a program, it's only because
of your subcontractors. It isn't because the major contractor is doing
something; it's something down below that you're not paying attention
to.
So I guess one of the things I would have to say, if I ever had a
major program like the Shuttle again, if they can find a way to get
an aircraft, whoever is funding that aircraft, and take the trips
around to the contractors, it's important. Now, what we do here, because
we don't have an aircraft, we're a start-up company, I'm out there
all the time. Okay. But when you start going commercial, you get one
contractor, you're lucky. Right? Because if they had an airplane here,
it's [unclear]. But NASA really instituted that and it really worked.
Bergen:
You talked about one of the technical problems on the Shuttle was
the tiles. What other technical challenges did you encounter when
you were building the Shuttle?
Cuzzupoli:
Showstoppers of any type, I've got to say that that aircraft, that
vehicle came together pretty smooth. Avionics was complicated, but
I would say the software development was a challenge. That would stick
in my mind. Tiles, like we mentioned, is a second thing. And then
propulsion. The fact of the SSME [Space Shuttle Main Engines] engines
that Rockedyne built, with those turbines and the high-speed blades
in there were a big challenge, developing those engines. I had nothing
to do with that. That was done by Rockedyne. But those are the three
things. I think the external tank and the SRBs [Solid Rocket Boosters],
or what it was, but on the Shuttle itself, the orbiter itself, I would
think avionics and tiles were two challenges that we had.
Bergen:
You completed the Shuttle and it's been used for many, many, many
years. What's your overall view of the Shuttle?
Cuzzupoli:
It should go another twenty years, and NASA would be crazy to do anything
else and try to put another transportation system, so you get the
benefit of these 100 missions per vehicle. It's designed to do that.
Probably designed to do 200. Should use that program and Shuttle forever
and ever and ever and not try to—I think anything about going
single-stage to orbit is a dream that won't happen in our decade,
and that the Shuttle—you may improve it by having flyback boosters
and things like that, but that concept that they have in that Shuttle
orbiter is good for many more years than what they're planning. You
spent the money; you need to get the return on your investment. And
the taxpayers ought to get the return on their investment.
Now, if NASA is interested in going to Mars, then they ought to go
to Mars. And that may be another way. But you're going to need a transportation
system to resupply the Space Station, microgravity experiments. There
are a lot of things to better the Earth resources. Space Station is
there. Why make a change when it's working good?
Bergen:
Great. Before we close, I want to see if Carol has some questions
for you.
Butler:
I do. You mentioned that you've been working with General Stafford
on the Shuttle-Mir. We have done some interviews for the Shuttle-Mir
Program. I was wondering if you would share with us some of what you've
been doing with that or have previously done.
Cuzzupoli:
Okay. I've been on the Stafford Committee for, I guess, three years
now, right from the beginning, and I went to Russia twice. And I don't
want to go to Russia again. What we do, and right now we're doing
an International Space Station, we went from the Mir to the Space
Station, but what we did was give it the okay for our crew to go fly
on Mir.
So what we looked at is the status of the Mir before each flight,
before we put somebody up there. Of course, our source of information
was twofold: one from Russia, one from our own NASA people. We would
evaluate what the failures were, what the effects would be. We looked
at the leaks of the Mir and all the problems they were having with
their computers, the damage because of the incident, of the Progress.
All those things we looked at and made a call and had to write a letter
to [Daniel S.] Goldin to say that, "This independent evaluation
has been done and we feel that it's safe—safe—to send
our astronaut up there." And that is the purpose of the Stafford
Committee. There's another committee called the Young Committee, and
they do almost the same thing. I'm not sure what they do. But that's
what we do.
If I was to take this book, The Dragonfly, and read it from end to
end, there were a lot of things in this book that did not come to
the attention of our committee, and I voiced a concern about that,
that maybe the information we were getting to make evaluations were
somehow not given to us. I don't want to open that discussion up.
I think that discussion probably will be opened up by General Stafford.
But I think we were successful. We've had great—no major incidents.
And I think we have learned a lot that will be able to be applied
to the Space Station.
There's over hundreds and hundreds of these lessons learned that will
help in the operations end, and I think an independent evaluation
of what's going on is good and bad. There's a good side and bad side.
One is, I wouldn't like to have anybody looking over my shoulder all
the time. On the good side, maybe another way of getting another opinion.
But that's what goes on.
There's about, I think, twelve or fifteen of us that are on that committee.
General Stafford is a great man whose relationship with Russia is
unbelievable. I went to go see a Russian launch. I went to Baikonur
in Kazakhstan, and it was minus twenty degrees and I couldn't see
the launch pad. I'm standing there with some Russian Army guys, and
I'm wanting to know where this thing is going to lift off from. The
wind is blowing, snow all over the place. And all of a sudden this
thing lights up and goes, and I said, "My God! Why am I so close
to this thing?" Because now the heat is hitting us from the flame
bucket.
But, oh, it's a different world over there. I mean, the poor people
are really taken back. But I've got to tell you, they do great work.
Great work. And you know they were heading to the Moon. I have their
hardware here now that was built in 1964, I'm using all their engines
that were going to their moon. They were actually putting thirty-six
engines on their first stage and going off. We have gotten those engines
over here. We have bought those engines. Those are the engines that
Kistler is going to be using for their program.
Bergen:
I didn't know that.
Butler:
Are you continuing on the committee now, on the International Space
Station?
Cuzzupoli:
Yes, we are.
Butler:
I think that will be a good follow-on, from everything we've heard.
Looking back over your career, especially at your time with North
American, what, to you, was your most significant happening, and what
was your biggest challenge?
Cuzzupoli:
Well, I would say going from being a technical person to being a manager.
I mean, that's a difficult process, where now you're managing—I
mean, you manage yourself and the job, and then all of a sudden you've
got 5,000 people working for you, and your experience there, you've
got a whole different set of problems. You're now dealing with not
just how things are working. You'd like to go back to working that
valve or working that electrical problem. Now you're working these
personal problems. Adapting to management was my biggest problem,
and that's a big question. I mean, that deals with day to day, how
do you deal with their family problems. I mean, you think you're sitting
up there and you've got all sorts of things. Not only that, budgets.
Laying off people. I mean, you sit there and you're dealing with a
human life. To sit there and just play numbers, boy, you're going
to lay off twenty here and thirty there, or forty, and every time
you're writing these numbers down, you're affecting people's lives.
You go home and you think about that, and you say, "How in the
hell could I do that?"
So I think that was my biggest challenge, was to work that, and I
don't think I was successful, because I never could make the hard
decisions that we're going to cut all these people. So sometimes it
got me in big trouble. But that's the way it is.
I think my biggest success story, the biggest thing that happened
to me, was getting, believe it or not, the Shuttle in the air, because
there I controlled many things and I made more decisions. I wasn't
just in the process, you know. In the Apollo Program, I had a boss
and a boss and a boss. On Shuttle, it was me and the boss, so I made
more decisions. Happy to get that program.
Butler:
And that definitely was a success.
Cuzzupoli:
Yes.
Butler:
That's all I have.
Bergen:
Before we end, can you tell us what you're currently doing with Kistler
and what your goals are?
Cuzzupoli:
Well, here I'm the vice president and deputy program manager. I'm
responsible to making sure the contractors get the job done. I'm responsible
for the engineering. I have been blessed with Dick [Richard H.] Kohrs,
who works for me. He's my chief engineer. And then I'm blessed with
a good boss. Two good bosses. One is Dan [Daniel C.] Brandenstein,
who is a very understanding man, very good, leaves me alone. And then
the second one is George Mueller, who doesn't leave me alone. So I'm
very pleased with that. I don't think I would be here if I had a problem.
I've been retired a couple of times. I don't need to—you know,
what I'm here for, again, is the challenge. Of course, they're going
to financially pay us well if we are successful. If we're not successful,
we're not going to get paid well.
But I have all the contractors. I have all the what we call here is
LRU personnel who work for me, like the propulsion, the avionics,
the structure. I'm responsible for all the cost and all the schedule.
Now, the real program manager is George Mueller, and he really calls
the shots. I'm sort of maybe one of the lieutenants who go off and
do things, but he calls all the shots. I'm the one that knows what's
going on in all the contractors. I run all the program review meetings.
He runs the Change Control Board, I don't. But all the program review
meetings are mine. I have a good cost manager system with Jack Kennedy.
He has nothing to do with Apollo or Shuttle. But Dick has been very
helpful—Kohrs—as our chief engineer.
Now, there's only about thirty of us up here. We had 1,400 people
working for us under the contractor role. We're doing things different.
I have a tendency to do it the NASA way, and George lets me know about
it. So we're not doing as much testing as we did on Apollo, but we
try to understand the rationale why we're not doing it. If this program
happens—and we're constrained by funding. I mean, I have stopped
and go, stopped and go twice already, and funding is a problem. Now
they're clearing that. They're telling me they're clearing that. But
it's a problem with us here.
We're building five of these vehicles. We're going to be launching
out of Australia and eventually launch out of Nevada. This program
is very good for NASA. You will probably hear within a very short
period of time that this vehicle will be used for NASA. It's got its
advantages. There are many start-up companies like us in the system,
but we're way ahead of everybody else with hardware. We have hardware
all over the place. It was just like the Shuttle. I mean, we've got
things all over. It's just a matter of pulling it together and they
ran out of money. Hopefully money will come in here soon so we can
finish it off. We're shooting to get this thing in the air by January
of next year, and if they do what they said by April 1st.
Now, so that you know, I brought a majority of my North American Aviation
fellows up here, the ones who worked on Apollo and Shuttle. We have
twenty of them, and they're all key guys and they're all consultants.
We call them the "gray beards," and we mix them up with
the young guys. So that's another thing that George says, is that
we really call ourselves Rockwell North. But there's about twenty,
and right now they're working on many parts of the vehicle. It's working
wonderful with these younger fellows. They're getting so much experience,
and our older guys are picking up on these computer stuff and saying,
"Geez, wish we had this technique back there."
You know, another thing, for an example, I'm used to seeing drawings,
work off drawings. We're not working off drawings; we work off the
computer. You want to see a three-dimensional thing? You want to look
at this side of the part, that side of the part? My God, what's happening
to us. It's amazing. It's great. It's great, great for us. But sometimes
it isn't. Sometimes you say, "I wish I had a drawing to really
understand what this is all about." So what George Mueller has
done is taken some of the older, some of the younger, mix them together,
got a blend, and we done that with the contractors, too.
Bergen:
Great.
Cuzzupoli:
We will have the Apollo and Shuttle up here. There's fellows here
today that will tell you what they done on the Shuttle Program or
what they done on the Apollo Program.
Bergen:
Wonderful. Is there anything that maybe I didn't ask you about that
you wanted to be sure and mention? I don't want to overlook anything.
Cuzzupoli:
If I didn't say NASA was the best of the government agencies around
and with intelligent people, and without NASA this country wouldn't
be anywheres, let me say it now. NASA is the top, top of the line,
and they do things—you know, they may make their mistakes, but
generally speaking, thank God to heaven NASA's in our system, and
if anybody's thinking of doing away with NASA, they ought to be shot.
Okay?
Bergen:
Thank you. It's been wonderful talking to you.
Cuzzupoli:
Well, good. I'm glad you stopped by.
[End
of interview]