NASA Johnson
Space Center Oral History Project
Edited Oral History Transcript
Grady
E. McCright
Interviewed
by Carol Butler
Las Cruces, New Mexico – 7 March 2000
Butler:
Today is March 7, 2000. This oral history with Grady McCright is being
conducted at his home in Las Cruces, New Mexico, for the Johnson Space
Center Oral History Project. Carol Butler is the interviewer and is
assisted by Kevin Rusnak.
Thank you so much for allowing us to come and talk with you today.
McCright:
Well, you're more than welcome. I will enjoy doing it, I'm sure.
Butler:
Thank you. To begin with, if maybe you could tell us a little bit
about your background and how you became interested in engineering
and even the possibilities of becoming involved with the space program.
McCright:
Well, I think that from the time I was probably eight or nine years
old, I knew I wanted to be an engineer. Some of the time I wanted
to be an aeronautical engineer, and some of the time I wanted to be
a mechanical engineer, and sometimes I wanted to be a civil engineer.
When I was in the eighth grade, I had an uncle who was a ham radio
operator and he sent me what was called a progressive education kit.
You could build eight different electronic Morse code senders and
one-tube receivers, and things like that. I went through that entire
eight-project progressive education kit, and decided at that time
I wanted to be an electrical engineer. So that was my goal from then
on.
Then when I struggled through college, as I was going to college,
the space program was just being born. By the time I got out we were
in the middle of the Gemini Program, when I got out of college. By
that time, I had decided that if I could, I'd like to be a part of
the space program.
So my senior year in college, early in my senior year in college,
I started sending applications to—I sent one to Marshall [Space
Flight Center, Huntsville, Alabama], one to KSC [Kennedy Space Center,
Cape Canaveral, Florida], and one to Johnson Space Center [JSC, Houston,
Texas]. I also sent some to the Civil Service Commission in the region
of Dallas, and I think in New Orleans I sent one.
In the spring of the year I got out of college, I received an offer
from Marshall and one from JSC. The JSC office was for a duty station
at White Sands [Test Facility, White Sands, New Mexico]. I got an
offer from the Department of Agriculture in New Orleans and several
other offers. I had an offer from the phone company, from Southwestern
Bell.
I suppose I choose the JSC job because it kept me in Texas, and I
was in Texas at the time, although that's the home office, was in
Texas, although this would be out in New Mexico. I had been out here,
not to Las Cruces, but into this area, while I was in college, and
kind of liked it. From the description of the job they had out here,
which would be a hands-on rocket engine test facility, data acquisition
and control systems kind of a job, I just thought it was the best
offer that I had of all of those. I never really seriously considered
anything except the Marshall job and the JSC White Sands job, because
they were NASA jobs and that's what I really wanted to do.
So I accepted the JSC appointment to a duty station at White Sands
in March of 1966, and I reported for duty on the 12th of September
1966 at White Sands. I got out of college in August and got here in
September.
For the first three years that I was here, three and a half years
that I was at White Sands, it amazed me how quickly I was trusted
to do things and to make configuration changes to the systems and
to make—we did a lot of troubleshooting. It was a development
job. The job had never been done before. I was working principally
on the control systems for the lunar module [LM], ascent and descent
engines, and some on the RCS [Reaction Control System] engines, reaction
control engines for both the LM and the command service module. I
spent about two and a half years of that three and a half years working
on the altitude simulation control system.
The Apollo engines, which were designed to fire only in space, never
in the atmosphere, so we tested them at a reduced pressure. We'd test
them at altitude, in other words, at about 150,000 feet equivalent.
We had—and it still exists, it's a huge chemical steam generator
that produces super saturated steam, super heated steam, at about
300 psi [pounds per square inch]. It's the equivalent of about a million
horsepower and it's three modified X-15 rocket engines that burn alcohol
and LOX [liquid oxygen]. You quench that rocket engine flame with
large, large quantities of water which is converted to steam, and
use the steam to be able to evacuate these large test chambers where
the engines were, engine systems were. Then we could fire those engines
in a vacuum.
The chemical steam generator was built by Thiokol [Chemical Corporation]
and delivered to NASA in a pretty sad state of completion, so we spent
a lot of time perfecting that steam generator. The control systems
on it were probably as complex as they were on the lunar module, if
not more so, because if you happened to lose this steam while the
gate valve, a big nine-foot gate valve, was open, you'd get a supersonic
shockwave coming up the ejector and when it hit the nozzle of these
little light spacecrafts, it'd just scattered them all over the test
stand.
So we had a nine-foot shutter valve, which is like a Venetian blind,
that set in the ejector of that steam system, and if we sensed a loss
of steam pressure at 270 psi decreasing pressure, we triggered this
shutter valve, and the shutter valve was then fired with squibs and
a fike-valve which opened about an eight-inch valve, it just ruptured
the valve is what it did, and opened about 3,000 psi to an actuator
that slammed that shutter valve closed and prevent that shockwave
from getting to the vehicle. We had to use it several times.
It was a very complicated control system for the altitude simulation
system and these shutter valve, and I spent hours and hours and hours
and days on end trying to calibrate the shutter valve. We finally
redesigned the control circuitry and it finally became very reliable,
but it took us probably most of the Apollo era to get that perfected.
So that's principally what I did during Apollo. I spent a lot of time
working on engine control systems and facility control, electrical
control systems, and the control system for the altitude simulation
system.
But the office at White Sands at that time, which was the peak employment
at White Sands Test Facility, was about 1,600 people. There were only
six electrical engineers in the NASA office, so I worked some power
distribution. I worked a lot of engine control systems on lunar module,
a little bit on the command service module, which was at the 300 Test
Area, and the lunar module was at the 400 Test Area.
Because it was such a small office, it's probably the best thing that
ever happened to my career, because I came fresh out of college, green
as a gourd, came into White Sands where you had to be able, because
of the small number of people in the office, you had to be able to
be reasonably competent on power distribution systems, electronic
control systems for the facility, and engine control systems, engine
system control for the lunar module. So in three and a half years,
almost four years that I was here during Apollo, I got a lot of knowledge
about a lot of varied activity. I would consider myself at that time
an expert at nothing, but a Jack-of-all-trades in the electrical business.
I could do a little bit of this, a little bit of that, because that's
the way we had to operate out here.
So it probably proved to be the best thing that ever happened in my
career, because it forced me to be independent and I got a lot of
exposure in a broad variety of subjects very quickly. Of course, you
say that sounds a lot for three and a half years. They weren't short
days. We were working a lot of long days. When we were trying to calibrate
the shutter valve, for example, I can remember one time when I was
pretty young, that I would go out and work twelve hours and I'd get
relieved by another engineer, and twelve hours later I'd come back
and relieve him. That went on for probably the better part of a week
before we got it calibrated. Ultimately we wound up changing the design
where it was easier to do, and today it's a reliable device, but it
wasn't for a long time.
So that's my background and how I got to the Apollo Program.
Butler:
That's a good background, good review. While you were working with,
during the Apollo Program, and in this area, what were some of the
biggest challenges, I guess, on each specific system? You said you
worked a lot with the LM and the ascent and descent engines. Were
there some primary areas that were problematical?
McCright:
Well, the altitude simulation system controls was probably my biggest
challenge during Apollo. However, we made a number of changes. I can
think of a zener [phonetic] diode that we had to change in the LM
control systems, it was on board the spacecraft, because it kept shorting
out on us. We had to change the design of the circuitry that controlled
that valve to prevent that.
So I would say the research and development involved in refining those
engine system control. It wasn't just the engine, but it was the entire
engine system, the pressurization system, the propellant, both fuel
and oxidizer systems, the super critical helium systems, and a number
of different systems that make an engine work. So it was the research
and development and perfecting the controls for the lunar module engines,
principally ascent and descent engines.
On the facility side, we had some great challenges there, too, because
this million-horsepower steam generator, chemical steam generator,
is a very complex beast. So it probably provided personally the biggest
challenge was on the facility side of that system.
Now, I can remember what we called the fire-in-the-hole test that
we did. Fire-in-the-hole test was when we built a simulator for the
descent stage that from an engine pressurization system it looked
like a descent stage, and we put the ascent stage on top of that.
Then what we were trying to determine is if we went through an abort,
if we ever had to abort while the descent stage was attached to the
ascent stage, the way you abort is fire explosive bolts and fire the
ascent engine and push the ascent stage, which had the two astronauts
in it, away from the descent stage. When that engine first fired,
it would be firing right against the descent stage, so the exit pressure
at the nozzle would be higher than normal.
We were worried about a rough combustion cutoff, that the engine would
cut off because of rough combustion. So we built a mylar diaphragm
over the diffuser in Test Stand 403, and put the ascent stage on top
of that where the nozzle was probably two inches from that mylar diaphragm.
Then we evacuated the chamber mechanically with the pumps. This mylar
diaphragm then was the vacuum seal between the chamber and the ejectors.
Then we fired up the steam generator and brought it up to pressure
and temperature and then we had a vacuum on both sides of that mylar
diaphragm. We opened the gate valve and evacuated all of that ejector.
We're pulling against this mylar diaphragm and then we fired the lunar
module.
I was responsible for the design and operating the console. We fired
the shape charge that ruptured that mylar diaphragm. Because what
we had to do is simulate that as the ascent engine fired and the chamber
exit nozzle pressure was high, which made the chamber pressure high,
and then in a few milliseconds later I had to rupture the mylar diaphragm.
We had an X cut in it, we had a shape charge and an X-shape on top
of it, and we fired them with squibs and ruptured that diaphragm,
because as soon as you start a fire in that ascent engine, we wanted
to simulate that it was moving away from the descent engine.
The other problem we had was that the pressure inside the chamber
was going up rapidly because of the exhaust products from the ascent
engine. So we had to get the chemical steam generator to start pumping
the chamber. So we did that test about probably four or five times,
and it was a pretty exciting test to get all that to come together
in a few milliseconds and make it happen right without doing any damage
to the engine. What we proved is that the engine is that the engine
would continue to run and be able to get the astronauts away from
the descent stage.
Another highlight, which I didn't know was going to be a highlight,
none of us did, but in about 1968 we ran a lunar module descent engine
firing profile which simulated the LM having to act as the service
module because something's wrong with the service module. What if
we get out in translunar injection and we have a problem with the
service module engine, SPS engine? SPS engine is a 22,000-pound engine
that did mid-course corrections between the Earth and the Moon, also
put the astronauts into orbit around the Moon, and then it fired again
to get them out of orbit, headed back to Earth, and did mid-course
corrections coming back. If you didn't have it, you wouldn't go into
orbit around the Moon. If you were in orbit around the Moon, you couldn't
fire it, you couldn't get home, and you needed it for mid-course correction.
So about 1968 we decided we really ought to figure out what would
do if we couldn't fire the SPS engine. Well, we'd have to use the
LM as a lifeboat. So we ran a firing profile of how would we get around
the Moon and get home and make the mid-course correction with the
lunar module engine. If you watched the movie Apollo 13,
[Eugene F.] Gene Kranz calls the Grumman [Aircraft Engineering Corporation]
engine representative in, and the Grumman engine representative says,
"We've never done this before." That's not true. We did
it about 1968.
So we had proved that would work, not necessarily that the astronauts—and
they did fire it manually—not that they could do it manually,
but that the engine system would work. So that Apollo 13 catastrophe
which turned out to be one of the high points of NASA, getting them
home safely, everybody was working awful hard to make that happen.
Some of the people you ought to talk to that I can tell you who were
actively involved in Houston in Apollo 13, you really ought to interview,
if you haven't. But we had done that engine firing profile out here
about two years before that event occurred. I had no idea that it
would ever be a high point in my career, but it turned out to be.
Butler:
And it's interesting that you did that in 1968, because at the end
of the year Apollo 8 went to the Moon with just the command module,
just the service propulsion system.
McCright:
That's right. If they'd had a problem, they wouldn't have got back.
Butler:
At the time did you think about that in conjunction with this test
that you had completed, or did it even cross your mind?
McCright:
No, because they didn't have a lunar module with them, so they would
not have been able to use it as a lifeboat. It was just the command
service module. I do remember thinking during Apollo 8—and Frank
Borman lives here in town, by the way—I do remember during Apollo
8 thinking that this is the first time man's ever been outside of
the gravitational pull of the Earth, and he does not have a free ride
home. Now, they were in a slingshot orbit, so they would have come
back toward Earth, but once they went in orbit around the Moon, which
they did, they had to be able to fire the SPS engine to get out. I
do remember thinking that if it doesn't fire, they're lost in lunar
orbit.
I do remember that night when they fired that engine behind the Moon
and we couldn't talk to them, and we didn't know for sure if it was
successful until they—we knew what time we'd be able to talk
to them if it was and what time we'd be able to talk to them if it
wasn't. We could talk to them first if it was successful because of
where they were behind the Moon. So they put in a call to them just
about the time they should show up around the edge of the Moon and
they responded. So it was a good feeling.
Butler:
I'm sure it was, understandably. Where were you typically during the
missions? How did you follow them?
McCright:
Well, out here we followed them on commercial television mostly. Today
we have NASA Select out here that we could see, but in those days
it was mostly commercial television and radio. We had some audio links
with Houston that we could hear, one way. We could just hear, we couldn't
respond.
What we principally at White Sands did during the missions, early
missions, we would load the vehicles and leave them at pad pressure.
We wouldn't put pressure on the tank. We'd load the fuel oxidizer
in both ascent and descent engines. We would make sure we had a load
of LOX and a load of alcohol for altitude simulation system and we
would be in standby. And we would just be standing by in case they
had a problem with an engine and they wanted us to see if we could
simulate the problem and maybe tell them what was wrong with it. White
Sands still does that for Shuttle. Now, they don't tank the engines
every time, but they used to. In the very early days we did, but now
we don't.
But when an Orbiter is up and they have a problem with—on the
last flight they had a problem with the RCS engine. I would not be
surprised if after they got back, White Sands tried to duplicate that
failure. I'm not involved anymore, but I suspect they did. That's
generally what happens. When they have an engine problem on the Orbiter,
once they get back, if they aren't sure what happened to it, White
Sands tries to duplicate it. The engines are in standby here for those
kinds of problems. During Apollo we were really in standby. We were
tanked and loaded then.
A little sidelight to Apollo [13]. I moved to Houston in May of 1970,
from here. I had been in Houston probably two weeks, when I went to
Eckard's Drugstore one afternoon in Nassau Bay, right across from
the center, and just as I came down a parking lot there, Jim [James
A.] Lovell [Jr.] came zipping around the corner in his Corvette and
went into the parking place that I was headed for. And I thought,
you know, just a few weeks ago he was in a crippled spacecraft coming
back from the Moon and he successfully got home, and I almost hit
him in the parking lot of Eckerd's Drug. [Laughter]
Butler:
I guess sometimes being on Earth is a little bit more hazardous. [Laughter]
McCright:
That's right.
Butler:
Well, luckily you both avoided any incident there.
McCright:
We're both still alive, yes.
Butler:
Did you tell him to watch out next time?
McCright:
No, I didn't say anything to him. I just went on to another parking
place.
Butler:
You worked at White Sands here initially for a few years, as you mentioned,
on these various projects. How then did the opportunity arise for
you to go to the Johnson Space Center?
McCright:
Well, I suppose it was an opportunity to serve the nation and the
space program in another capacity. At the time I did not look at it
as an opportunity at all. You have to understand that the White Sands
Test Facility was built for one specific purpose, and that was to
do the research and development of the SPS engine, the lunar module
ascent/descent engine, and the RCS engines on both the lunar module
and the command service module.
Once that job was done, White Sands was expendable. We knew all along
that NASA's intention was, once Apollo was over, they would no longer
need White Sands Test Facility, and that White Sands Test Facility
would be offered to the United States Army, because they're over at
White Sands Missile Range. If they took it, then the Army would own
it. If they didn't, NASA would likely abandon it.
So in 1970, [Philip] Whitbeck, who was the director of administration
at JSC at the time, came out here and told all of us, got all of us
together, all of us civil service people—we had already started
sending Grumman and North American [Aviation] home. They were essentially
gone by then. There was a few of them left, but not very many. So
the population of the site went from about 1,600 down to, the middle
of 1970 it was probably down to 600 or so. So when he came out here
he told us that, "NASA's intention is to close it, and close
it during the summer of 1970. Don't worry, you're all going to be
offered jobs in Houston." Most of us weren't very excited about
moving to Houston.
People come to this part of the country, there's only two kinds of
people that come: they love it or they hate it. Those that hate it
don't stay long, and those that love it don't ever want to leave.
The vast majority of people are those that don't want to leave. At
that time, Las Cruces was a town of about 28,000. It was a nice, comfortable
place to live, raise your kids. The job out here was hands-on hardware.
It was exciting. We'd been in the mainstream of Apollo, and none of
us really wanted to leave, but 1970 was no time to be on the street.
The aerospace industry was in really bad shape by 1970. It was in
its heyday from '65 to '69 or so, and once we landed on the Moon with
Apollo 11, it started downhill rapidly.
So I had one child at the time, and I looked at the situation and
said, "Man, I don't want to be on the street, because there are
no engineering jobs out there. So I'd better take the job in Houston,"
even though I didn't want to go to Houston. I'm from a small town
in northeast Texas of 2,800 people, and I never wanted to live in
a big town, but the situation was that if you wanted a job, you probably
should take it, so I did. I took an appointment in Houston.
Let me continue on with White Sands just for a second. What happened
at that time is about half of the NASA staff moved to Houston. Probably
more than half. There were also a bunch of quality people that we
had borrowed from the U.S. Army for the Apollo Program and we gave
them back to the Army, back at White Sands. So another twenty-five
or so people went back to White Sands Missile Range. The principal,
the primary engine contractors and spacecraft contractors, Grumman,
Aerojet [General Corporation], Rocketdyne [Division of], North American,
all went home. The only thing we had left was the facilities contractor
and a labs contractor, LTV [Ling Temco Vought/ Aerospace Corporation]
and Zia [phonetic]. The NASA people got down to about twenty-five
people.
Shortly after I left, White Sands dribbled on down to a total of 200
people, NASA and contractors, what we call today our core base. The
core base at White Sands has been identified in 1970 as being 200
people. About twenty-five of them were NASA people and 175 or so were
contractors. They consolidated the LTV and the Zia contract and Zia
won that competition and Zia became the only contractor at White Sands.
Let me take that back. That's not true. When they consolidated those
two contracts, Dyna Corp won that contract. So there was Dyna Corp
175 or so people and then 25 or so NASA people. That's still known
as the WSTF core base.
So I accepted the appointment to Houston and went down there in 1970.
The other twenty-five or so were scheduled to come later, and a couple
of groups did after I left. I left in the first group, because the
better jobs at Houston are probably now than they will be in three
months. I took a job in Environmental Test Division in Houston. A
couple of groups came after I did. Then by that time, four or five
months later, they had decided, well, let's keep that core base of
200 out there for a little while and see what happens to Shuttle.
The Shuttle was in the thought process at that time. Let's see what
happens to Shuttle. So it never went below the 200. So a few of those
NASA people never went to Houston, but most of us did, went to Houston
or found another job. A few of them found another job.
So I went to Houston in May of 1970 and stayed down there for about
three and a half years. I got the opportunity to come back here in
1973 and did. So when I went to Houston working in Space Environmental
Test Division, it was working in the largest vacuum chamber in the
free world, over in Building 32 in Houston. That's chamber A. There's
also chamber B. Then at that time Building 33, next door, had some
small, real small, seven-foot chambers and stuff in them. I worked
in those two buildings for the next three and a half years.
For the first six months I was down there, I was assigned to an operations
branch which was kind of Facility Operations Branch, and I stayed
in there about six months. Then I transferred up to the Data Systems
Branch, I believe it was called, and I worked for Dave [David G.]
Billingsley, who was a branch chief. What we did there, we were responsible
for data acquisition off of the test articles and the facility systems
in chamber A and chamber B, and did a little work over at 33 in the
small chambers.
I guess probably in late '71, early '72, maybe, I was assigned the
task of moving an ACE [Apollo Checkout Equipment] control system from
Bethpage, New York, to Houston. Bethpage, New York, is where the Grumman
Corporation was and they had a NASA-owned system. There were several
ace systems. There was two in Building 32 already, and then there
was in California and there was one in Bethpage and probably some
others.
But we were phasing out of Bethpage, so the government property up
there we wanted to move to Houston, so I got the task of moving that
system from Bethpage, New York, to Houston. I was representing the
government. GE was doing a lot of the work. General Electric [Corporation]
was the contractor that was going to move it, but I was doing the
interface for the government.
ACE stands for Apollo Checkout Equipment, and so we used that. It
was a 160G, control data system 160G, which was the first—I
believe it was the first solid-state computer. It was the first—yes,
I'm sure it was. It was the first solid-state discrete components,
solid-state computer. And NASA owned most of them that they ever built,
I think.
But anyway, I spent probably eighteen months moving that system from
Bethpage, New York, installing it in Building 32A, which was an annex
to Building 32 on the second floor. After we moved it down here, Apollo
released it, so we brought it into Houston to do facility controls
with. So we did facility controls and data acquisition through that
former ace station that we called Data Acquisition and Control System
DACS for the Space Environment Test Division. So I worked on that
eighteen months or so, and we got it up and running and it was running
pretty well by the spring of 1973.
You're going to ask me how I got back to White Sands, probably. There
were several factors in that. My daughter was five years old at the
time, my oldest daughter. By then I had a second one, second daughter,
and she was six months old. I wanted my children to be raised in a
smaller town, if possible. I was living in Friendswood. I was raised
in an environment in Texas similar to the Houston environment, a small
town, but similar to that environment. But I had discovered there
was another way of life in the desert, and I just fell in love with
the desert when I came out here. The work at White Sands was closer
to an engineer's dream, because you had your hands on it, you were
really responsible for it, and you were a Jack-of-all-trades, not
an expert in anything. In Houston you tend to get pigeon-holed and
be an expert in one subject, and I preferred the other life like you
had at White Sands.
I enjoyed my job at the Space Environment Test Division. Bringing
that DACS down from Bethpage was a great experience. Doing the vacuum
testing on the Apollo telescope mount for the Skylab was very exciting.
When we put Skylab up and the two solar panels did not unfold and
we had to figure out a way to go up and put an umbrella over it to
keep the sun off, that was done in the high bay. Figured out how to
deploy that thing in the high bay of Building 32. That was fun to
watch. I wasn't really involved in it, but I was around there when
they were doing it. So those were some fun things to do.
Chamber A and chamber B are man-rated chambers, so I was involved
in several manned tests in those chambers, where you actually have
a person in there in a spacesuit. Anytime you've got a manned system,
you've got to have a way to get them out of there in a hurry. So the
emergency repress system, I was involved in some redesign on that
and some testing of that. If you emergency repress, that big chamber
is a very, very volatile activity to repressurize it as fast as you
can, because you got a guy dying in there. We actually had one—I
believe in chamber B we actually had to go in and get a guy while
I was there. Those were exciting things to be involved in, but my
heart was still at White Sands, and I wanted, if possible, to have
my children out of there by the time they started public school.
So all that to tell you that in March of 1973, the Chief of the Engineering
Office [Gene Lundgren] at White Sands Test Facility called me and
said, "Hey, Grady, would you like to come back to White Sands?"
I said, "Yes, sir."
He said, "When do you think you could be here?"
I said, "Tomorrow morning."
He said, "Okay. I'll see if I can make it happen."
It took me till September of '73 to get released from JSC, but I did
get back out in September of '73. Although I really enjoyed my job
in Houston, I was influenced by my children's age and getting them
out here. They went to school out here all their public school life.
So I came back out here and accepted a position of being responsible
for the data reduction system at White Sands for the build-up of the
Shuttle hardware when we were doing Shuttle engine testing.
In those days we acquired the data with a Beckman 210 system at the
test stands and put it on tape, put the data on tape. Then we took
the tape, the magnetic tape, down to the 200 Area where a Control
Data [Corporation, CDC] system 3200 computer was, and we played those
tapes back through a Beckman 210 system and reduced the data using
that [CDC] computer. So when I came back to White Sands, I was responsible
for the data reduction of the engine and facility data off the 400
and 300 Area where we were testing the Shuttle engines.
I also was responsible, when I came back in '73, for the electronic
calibration labs and for electrical fabrication, a small shop where
we put together prototype electrical control circuits, designed and
put them together. One of the biggest challenges I had during that
period of time was that computer system, although it will surprise
you youngsters, that computer system took up a room nearly as large
as this house, and it took 50 tons of air-conditioning to keep it
cool. And it had 32,000 words of memory.
In about 1974, we acquired a second CDC [Control Data Corporation]
3200 from another government agency in California, and I went out
and looked at that computer. They were ready to excess it, so we picked
that up off of excess, brought it to White Sands, so then we had a
backup computer. That's what we were really after, so we'd have two
computers to be able to reduce this data in case we lost one. At the
same time we added magnetic disk to the computer, three of them, I
believe, and we doubled the memory. I said 30, didn't I? It was 32,
32,000 words of memory. We doubled that to 64,000 words of memory
and installed that second computer we got from another agency, put
a magnetic disk on it, and did some other things to enhance it, to
get ready for the research and development on the Shuttle engines,
because we were going to be acquiring high-speed data, more of it.
By that time CDC 3200s were obsolete, and so we could never find the
money to upgrade to a new computer system, so we started picking up
excess hardware from other government agencies to keep this one running.
We also put into place an agreement with Point Magu, naval installation
at Point Magu, who also had a Beckman 210 so if we lost our Beckman
210 we could take those tapes to Point Magu, have them play them back
and demodulate them for us.
Then we went to Arden Hills, Minnesota, where Control Data Corporation
had a 3200 still working. We cut an agreement with them that if we
ever lost these systems catastrophically, we would demodulate the
tapes at Point Magu, we'd take them to Arden Hills, Minnesota, and
take our software up there and run it on that computer.
So that was one of the early things that we did, is to put into place
some backup if Houston no longer had any. The agency didn't have any,
the only ones left, CDC had one in Point Magu, the Navy had a Beckman
210. So we tested those and we went to Point Magu, made sure that
worked, went and took that tape to Arden Hills, Minnesota, to CDC
Corporation, and spent one long night up there making sure we could
reduce that data. We took a programmer and an analyst up there with
me and we spent all night running on their computer and proved it
would work.
We never had to use the Arden Hills backup. We did use Point Magu.
We used it a couple of times because we had little hiccups in our
Beckman 210, but we principally used it because they were taking data
so fast on the test stand, we couldn't reduce it twenty-four hours
a day, so we were getting some of it demodulated at Point Magu and
bring it back here and do the rest of the work on it. So those were
two of the highlights, I guess, of that period of time.
Before I left that job in 1979, we were also beginning to upgrade
the cal lab to automated calibration hardware. We made the first step
toward automation about 1979, '78, maybe, late '78. The Shuttle engine
R&D [research and development] was much like Apollo, but it was
not quite as hectic as Apollo, because we didn't have the national
mandate we did on Apollo of getting a man on the Moon and safely returned
by the end of the decade. So it was little less demanding, maybe,
than Apollo, but it was still a fun program.
While I was doing these, I did several other things, such as I installed
some large junction boxes for the data systems up in [test stand]
301. So that was just kind of a side job that I did getting ready
for the Shuttle engine testing up there.
So I was relatively happy doing that. I spent six years doing that,
from '73 to '79, and in January of '79 I became the Chief of Electrical
Data Systems Branch at White Sands. That was my first official supervisor
job, although I'd been project engineer and systems engineer on various
tasks prior, which is kind of like a supervisor, except you don't
have to sign a time card and you don't have to do disciplinary things.
I first became a supervisor in January of '79, and once I became supervisor
of that Electrical and Data Systems Branch, I was responsible for
all the data acquisition in all of the 300 Area and all of the 400
Area, all the calibration, not just electrical, mechanical calibration
as well, electrical fabrication, the data reduction facility, all
the power distribution systems, all the facility control systems,
all the engine control systems. So I spent only two years doing that.
I spent about two years, roughly two years, doing that.
Then was selected for Chief of the Technical Support Office, which
was essentially the Chief of Engineering at White Sands. At that time
I was responsible for everything I just mentioned, plus all the mechanical
systems, altitude simulation system, roads, grounds, utilities, and
all of the engineering design work on the test stands and on the facility
itself. Essentially I was responsible on a much smaller scale, but
essentially responsible for everything that plant engineering is responsible
for in Houston and Facility Design Division is responsible for, and
most of what engineering directorate was responsible for in Houston,
but on a much smaller scale. I did that until I went to Houston in
1984.
At that time, some of the highlights of that was building up Northrup
Strip, which is now called White Sands Space Harbor. When we first
started going over there to train astronauts, there was nothing over
there but two graded runways. I don't remember how long they were,
but they were very short. We went over there and put—I remember
a big job of putting electrical distribution system into the tower
area. We ran on generators for a long time, and we finally put electrical
power into the tower area. We put a communications, portable building
over there with a communications rack in it, so we could talk to the
airplanes and we could interface with the ground radio systems, intercom
systems and whatnot.
We put a medical trailer over there so that in case of an emergency
we'd have some medical attention, because when the astronauts were
training over there with the STAs [Shuttle Training Aircraft] and
T-38s, we had to have paramedics over there in case of an accident.
They came from Holloman [Air Force Base, New Mexico]. We contracted
with the Air Force to provide them from Holloman.
Then we continued to expand the runways until we had two Shuttle-certified
runways, which we load-tested them to certify them for Shuttle, make
sure they could take the impact of the nose gears. The nose gears
were the smallest footprint and the highest density load is on the
Shuttle on the ground. So we certified them to be able to take the
nose gear loads, and they were 35,000 feet long, which is seven miles.
There's two of them in an X over there, two runways 35,000 feet long,
300 feet wide, and they still exist today. Since that time they have
added a 15,000-foot runway off to one side, which can reconfigure
to simulate various TAL landing sites. So a transatlantic abort landing
sites, they'll configure it to look like Dakar, Senegal, or Rota,
Spain, or whatever they want it to look like, so the astronauts can
practice landing on a runway that's got the same markings on it as
they'd see if they had to go into TAL abort. But this was a big effort
over a large number of years. We started that actually when I was
Chief of the Electrical Branch, but we got it finished while I was
Chief of Tech Support Office.
Then in 1982, March of 1982, I believe that's something you can talk
to about with Rob [R. Tillett], but I think it was on March 17th,
Rob and I and one other guy went out early, early one morning and
listened to a telecon between General Abramson, who was the AA [Associate
Administrator] for Office of Space Flight, and his minions, and Dr.
[Christopher C.] Kraft [Jr.] and the JSC people and some people at
the Cape, because they were ready to launch STS-3. A Shuttle had never
landed on concrete. They'd always landed at Edwards [Air Force Base,
Edwards, California] on a lakebed, [STS] 1 and 2 had.
They wanted to land on a lakebed, because the first three flights
were research flights and they didn't want to land on concrete. This
is a gypsum lakebed out here. It's hardpacked gypsum like the sheetrock's
made out of, except it's in granular form, but when you compact it,
it's almost as hard as concrete. So the lakebed at Edwards was wet.
They had standing water on it, so they couldn't land out there. So
the decision had to be made, "We go ahead and launch and land
at White Sands or we wait until the lakebed's dry and land at Edwards."
Most people did not want to wait. They wanted to get on with the flight
program, the development program, and they did not want to go to the
Cape because they had not at that time landed on concrete. They'd
never tested the brakes. They just let it roll to a stop. So they
did not feel comfortable doing that.
So the decision was made that morning to land at White Sands, launch
and land at White Sands. I remember Rob Tillett looking at me when
Kraft recommended to go ahead and launch and Abramson agreed, somewhat
reluctantly he agreed. Dr. Kraft asked Tillett, who was the manager
at the time, said, "Are you ready, Rob?"
And Rob looked at me and I said, "Well, yes, we've got a few
days. We'll be ready."
So Rob responded, "Yes, we're ready, Dr. Kraft."
And He said, "Okay, we're going to launch."
As soon as that telecon was over, Mr. Tillett told me, he said, "You
go to Holloman and get"—we had ready looked at this equipment.
There are some air bases in boxes at Holloman, landing mat and tent
hangars and latrines and kitchens and barracks, just anything you
need. They can deploy those air bases anywhere in the world and in
a few days they can have an operational air base.
So we had gone over and looked at that stuff. There's generators and
there's water bladders and fuel bladders and everything. We had made
arrangements with Holloman that if we ever had to take an Orbiter,
we needed some help, because all we had, as I said, is a tower and
a little probably 20-by-20 foot communications building, portable,
and a trailer, medical trailer. That's all we had out there. It's
about 68 miles from where we sit, and there was nothing between here
and there in those days. There was nothing there.
So I went to Holloman and met with Colonel Chuck [Charles A.] Horner,
who was a brigadier general-elect, but didn't have the star yet, but
he acted like he did. Anyway, I went over to General Horner and I
had to convince him to let me borrow those air bases, and then we
had to get approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to use them because
they're strategic equipment.
So I went over there and met with General-elect Colonel Horner and
he gave me a hard time, but he eventually said okay. Then he and NASA
Headquarters [Washington, DC] went to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
got permission to use one of them, or part of one of them. We didn't
need all, but part of it. So I detailed what I thought we needed and
I told him we'd get back to him later with what else we might need,
and left Holloman and came back this way.
At the same time, Mr. Tillett was at White Sands Missile Range talking
to the general of the Army over there, because we needed a lot of
Army help, too. He told me when I got back from Holloman to call Houston
and get some money. I said, "Okay."
Just an aside about Colonel Horner. When I last saw him in 1982, he
was a colonel general-elect at Holloman Air Force Base, tactical wing
commander. The next time I heard of General Horner, he was a three-star
general running the air operations in the [Persian] Gulf War. And
the next time I heard from him I was in his office at Peterson Air
Force Base where he was the Chief of Space Command, four-star general
by then. Now he's retired like me. Anyway, Horner went up fast from
that point.
Anyway, when I got back from Holloman, probably noonish or so that
day, I called Houston and called [Henry E.] Pete Clements, who was
the associate director of the center. When he answered the phone,
when he got on the phone, he said, "Well, I've been expecting
you guys to call me. What can I do for you, Dr. McCright?" He
like to call us—he'd call you that when he was joking.
I said, "Pete, we need some money."
He said, "How much?"
I said, "God only knows how much. I do not know."
He said, "Well, I'll tell you what I'll do, I'll have the comptroller
put 3 million dollars in your till and I'll check it every few days
until this is over and I'll keep the balance at three million."
He says, "You don't worry about it. You just go do what you got
to do and I'll keep the money flowing."
To this day I can't tell you how much millions of dollars we spent
in the next few days, and I doubt if anybody else can. I'm sure they
have an official number, but I doubt if it's right, because in the
next few days, two dedicated trains, large trains, came from Dryden
[Flight Research Center, Edwards, California] to Holloman Air Force
Base, where we offloaded trucks and blowers and air-conditioning units
and materials and just many, many, many—whatever you'd need
to recover an Orbiter all came from Dryden. And about 2,000 people
came from the Cape and Dryden.
So in just a few days, here I was in the middle of the desert and
we had something like 1,200 or so people on that piece of gypsum lakebed
out there. The Air Force was putting up—we had them put up some
hangars and we had them put up some barracks buildings we used as
offices, and we had them put up a lot of latrines scattered around
the place.
The media was coming in here by the droves. They had earth stations
they were bringing in so they could record the landing and get it
out. We were building an area for PAO [Public Affairs Office] so that
we could have visitors out there, VIP visitors, to watch the landing.
And it was hectic.
We had about two weeks before the launch, and in that two weeks we
built a city out of tents and trailers and trucks. It was an amazing
time from the standpoint of the public support we had. These things
really happened. We had truck drivers show up at our gate at White
Sands Test Facility and say, "I've got a truck and I'll go wherever
you want me to and get whatever you want. I'll haul whatever you need."
Now, you say, sure they would for money, but they were just volunteering
hoping that we'd get around to paying them, that we could keep it
all straight. I don't know that anybody ever said "for so much
money." They just said, "We'll do it."
We were working around the clock for these two weeks. I had some people
that stayed out there for days on end. I left here every morning about
4:30 or 5:00 and went out there and got home at 10:00 at night, most
nights. But it was an exciting time.
I got called here one night at my house, not this house, but another
house I had, from an engineer out there and he said, "One of
our trucks is broken." It was a 1965 International or something
like that, I don't remember, but it was a pretty old truck. He said,
"We need a fuel pump and we don't have one."
I said, "Well, I don't know what I'm going to do about this,
but I'll see if I can find one."
I called the Las Cruces Police Department and told them who I was
and that I was involved in the Northrup Strip, we called it in those
days, and I worked for NASA and I needed an International fuel pump.
I said, "I know you can't tell me who you've got to call this
list of to who you call an emergency with an International dealer.
Would you call them? I need it now."
They said, "Well, no, we can't tell you who it is, but we'll
call them and see if they'll do anything for you."
They called, called me back and said, "He'll meet you down there."
So in the middle of the night, we went down and opened up the International
Harvester place and got a fuel pump for that truck and got it out
there to get it fixed. Those were the kinds of things that were happening
around here. We had to get a High Ranger, which is a man-lift out
of Minnesota. It's the only one we could find that was tall enough
to reach the tail of the Orbiter when it was stacked on the 747. So
it was an exciting time. I mean, it really was. It was as close as
I've ever come to the logistics that would be necessary to fight a
war in the middle of nowhere, and it was demanding, not just for me,
more so for the people that worked for me, probably, because they
were out there around the clock.
On the day of landing, the scheduled day of landing, this was in March,
you're at my house in March and you can see how the wind's blowing.
This is a calm day. It blows badly here in March and April, and we
really had very nice weather for those two weeks. It had been unusually
good, but on the day of landing, they were going to land about mid-morning,
and John [W.] Young was in the STA making approaches to Northrup when
the wind started getting up. I mean, it got up. It got so bad, you
could not see from here to that fence. John said, "We're not
going to be able to land today." So we postponed it a day.
By the time that wind blew that afternoon, all afternoon, it blew
some of our tents down. We had drifts blow sand in the PAO area and
some areas up against some buildings and stuff, it was probably eighteen
inches deep. The runway got eroded, wind erosion. So we had people,
Army people, NASA people, even one of my engineers was driving a road
grader most of the night that night. We had to grade it, compact it
and get ready for the landing the next morning. The wind didn't quit
blowing until probably dark that night, I don't remember, but very
late. Usually around dark it lays down.
We were ready the next day. We landed. Some of the guys were shoveling
drift sand out of the PAO areas as the buses bringing the visitors
that were coming in for a landing. So I guess the highlight of my
tenure as the Chief of the Technical Support Office was recovery of
STS-3. It just put the area on the map. It put Las Cruces on the map,
and that's the only Orbiter that's never landed either at Edwards
or KSC. It was Columbia that landed here. It took us about
ten days to get it out of here, de-service it. We had a de-service
pad we'd already built, because in case it ever came in, we had to
pour yards and yards, hundreds of yards of concrete for that, and
you couldn't do that after it landed. You had to do it before that.
So we had already built a de-service pad.
The Orbiter made a great landing the next day, and we towed it that
afternoon to the de-service pad. The wind got up again after it landed,
and we didn't get the engine plugs in fast enough. Gypsum can get
anywhere. I had in that communications building, I mentioned that
was probably a 20-by-20 building, in the middle of that building I
had a communications rack there that we had double-wrapped in plastic.
We weren't using it, so while we were not using it, we had it double-wrapped
in plastic. When we got ready for the STS-3 they went over and unwrapped
it, I happened to be there when they unwrapped it, and there was gypsum
in it. It just gets everywhere.
So we could have never kept it out of the Orbiter if the wind blew.
We're a lot smarter now and they've since built a de-service pad on
the west side of the lakebed, so that the wind blows away from it,
not to it. So if you had to de-service another one, you could do it
without that problem, but we weren't that smart in 1982. But it was
a great effort by lots of people.
Butler:
It certainly took a lot to pull all that together.
McCright:
One other thing I want to mention to you is, the 747 had never landed
on that lakebed. Of course, neither had an Orbiter. But a few days
after it landed, A.J. Roy flew the 747 up to El Paso, and he came
up in a car. He said, "I want to go out on that lakebed, on the
runway. Before we bring the 747 up here, I want to drive it."
I said, "Okay." So I got permission to go out on the runway
in a car, and I took A.J. and his co-pilot. I don't remember his co-pilot's
name. But A.J. was sitting in the front seat with me and we started
down the runway and he said, "I want you to go fast. I want you
to get up 90 miles an hour or so to see how rough this is."
So in a government car I did, I got up around 85 or 90 miles an hour.
A.J. said, "Oh, this will be okay. We can get in on this."
While we were doing that, his co-pilot said, "Hey, A.J., our
flights rules say if we take off with the Orbiter and have an engine
failure, lose one of the four engines on the 747, at takeoff after
they rotate and lose an engine, we have to go around." They go
on up around and come back and land immediately. He said, "What
are we going to do here? They've got seven miles of runway."
A.J. said, "If we lose an engine on takeoff here, we're just
going to set it back down, because we've got seven miles of runway.
We're not going around."
So the morning they took off, I went out there and stood about—I
don't remember where I stood, probably less than 5,000 feet from where
they started rolling, and they were airborne by the time they got
to me. So they still had [30,000] foot of runway.
So it really was a great time. It really was. It's one of those experiences
that I wouldn't take anything for and I don't want to do it again.
[Laughter]
Butler:
One of those unique experiences everybody should have.
McCright:
It was a unique experience. I might mention, one of the questions
you had asked me earlier is about what we did about the cost reductions
that the agency's been involved in for close to twenty years now.
One of the things I might mention to you that White Sands did, is
prior to the recovery of STS-3, about 1981, it was right after I became
chief of the office, we contracted with the U.S. Army, White Sands
Missile Range Army, to build the fluid systems for them at the high-energy
laser test facility, which is about 50 miles east of where we sit
right now. So we spent about a year and a half building that, year
and a half, maybe two years, building that fluid system for them.
They contracted for the design of it. We were not satisfied with the
design and went in to their design contractor and made them do a much
more detailed design of it.
This was a real hazardous fluid system, because fluorine was one of
the constituents that we had to handle over there. Fluorine is bad,
bad news. The reason the Army contracted with NASA to do it is because
we do a lot of stainless steel work out here. We've got toxic propellants
out here N2O4 and hydrazine, aerozine 50 and that type of propellants.
So we had experience doing that. White Sands Missile Range did not.
So they contracted with us to do that. So my office was responsible
for reviewing the design and constructing and proof-testing and so
forth that facility. So we spent fourteen and a half million dollars
of the Army money in about two years, less than two years, to construct
and perfect and turn over to them that fluid system.
What that bought for us is we were able to hang onto those skills
that we needed but had no job for right now. So we hung onto probably
200 people that we would have had to lay off about 1980 because the
testing for Shuttle by then was on the downturn, because we're getting
ready to launch in '81. So it bought us a year and a half or probably
two years of time to keep those critical skills.
What we did with the Army is they had to pay actual costs plus a burden.
That burden helped us maintain the facility over here, to keep the
machine shop up to support that effort and all those kinds of things.
We had started doing that at White Sands back in the mid seventies,
probably '76 or so. We had started doing a little work for a lot of
different agencies and charging them actuals plus a burden. The burden
was for those many facility support items, welding rods, toilet paper,
chem wipes, and alcohol and stuff that you could not charge them actuals
for, because you bought it in bulk and you used a pint for them and
you used a gallon for NASA.
So what we did is made an estimate as to what facility support services
and photographic services and some other things that you couldn't
charge. At that time, at least, you could not charge the actuals.
You still can't. I mean, how do you charge for part of a bottle of
WD-40 to different projects? So we charged them a burden. We got JSC
to agree to that, that we could do that. And today that's about 50
percent of White Sands' business, so it's grown and grown and grown
over the years and it's allowed White Sands to stay competitive with
other agencies. It's allowed us to keep critical skills that NASA
needs part time and use them, divert them to other agency jobs. Now
we're even doing some private industry jobs. We are allowed to do
that if there is no private industry anywhere in the United States
that can do that.
Some of the unique things we can do because of 94 square miles of
property that we have out here, large deployment areas. We've got
a buffer zone so people can't live very close to us. Where Houston
is encroached on real badly, we're not out here. So that allows us
to do many, many things that Houston couldn't do, that Marshall couldn't
do, that other facilities couldn't do. So they allow us to do commercial
work if we're not competing with private industry. In many things
we're not, because private industry doesn't do those things.
So White Sands' forte is hazardous experimental work, and virtually
everything we've done for thirty-plus years has been hazardous work
and remotely controlled work and hazardous toxic propellants and high
explosives. We can actually detonate high explosives out there and
we have. We did some tests just a year before I retired for Japan,
for the government of Japan.
We are exploding hydrogen and oxygen tanks, which make a big boom,
and we can do that because we've got more buffer zone around that
facility than they do their launch facility. That's the reason they
wanted to see, how big's the bang going to be if we lose a vehicle
on the launch pad? We proved they're going to be in trouble if they
did. There would be some private property that would probably be damaged,
that they were that close.
White Sands got into that reimbursable business long before we did
the HELSTF [High Energy Laser Test Facility] job, but that's probably
the biggest single job we've ever done is that fourteen and a half
million dollars.
We consider a reimbursable job anything that is not in JSC's White
Sands' budget. Not the JSC budget, but the budget we get from JSC.
So if we took a job for Marshall—and we do some work for Marshall—if
we take a job for Marshall that's not in JSC's White Sands' test facility
budget, it's reimbursable work to us, because it wasn't budgeted for
us. It's offline budgeting. I don't know exactly today what they're
doing, but when I left, it was the reimbursable work, offline non-JSC
budgeted items was probably 50 percent.
Now, you need to understand when I said JSC White Sands' budget, if
we do something at White Sands for Leonard [S.] Nicholson that was
not budgeted for White Sands, Leonard has to give us the money, because
it wasn't in our budget, it's in his budget. So if he gives us that,
that's reimbursable, because it wasn't in our forecasted budget.
Butler:
It certainly seems like while the initial goals for the test facility
have remained the same, it has evolved over time to many different
areas that hadn't been anticipated.
McCright:
That's right. One area I didn't mention that I really should. The
basic goals for White Sands, as far as Johnson Space Center is concerned,
are much the same as they were originally: engine testing, engine
development, off-nominal testing. However, in 1967, on January 28,
1967, the Apollo 1 fire. Once the dust settled after that fire, the
agency realized that we were putting materials into the inhabited
area, the cockpit area, that had not been tested in an oxygen environment.
We were putting payloads on the vehicles that had not been tested
in a vacuum, and many, many materials and flammability-related issues.
White Sands immediately got in that business in about '67, in mid
'67 or so. We started testing materials. That has grown into a huge
business, a huge part of the business. It's accepted that JSC funds
a lot of it, but we also get funded by Marshall and many others. We
do it for a lot of agencies now, not just NASA. We do it a lot for
the Navy submarine people, because it's very much like a spacecraft;
you can't get out of it just real quick if you have a fire. So we
do a lot of naval testing.
That evolved because of that fire in 1967 and it has grown to probably—it's
probably, at certain times in White Sands' history it's been much
larger than the propulsion testing. During the buildup of Shuttle,
it probably wasn't near as big as Shuttle testing. Today it's probably
larger than propulsion testing, because we're just kind of in a maintenance
mode out there.
Another big, big job that came along just before I came back here
as manager, and we really, really went after that business while I
was the manager, was the engine repair business. So all of the RCS
engines, all of the orbital maneuvering engines that are repaired
for the fleet are done at White Sands now. When I came back, we'd
done a few RCS engines. We were recovering a lot of engines, too,
that the vendor would say, "Scrap engine. We need to build you
a new one." We're recovering a lot of those engines and putting
them back in the fleet. So that has grown to be a big business now,
and that's, I'm sure, larger than—well, it's probably as large
as the propulsion testing.
Butler:
Certainly those are some pretty vital areas there for the agency and
long term and maintaining. Like materials testing, I'm sure is pretty
vital with the Space Station work going on there.
McCright:
Right. And as long as Space Station flies, it will be an ongoing business,
because new materials show up on the Space Station, testing for outgassing,
testing for flammability, testing for point of ignition in various
environments and that sort of thing.
I chronologically kind of out of sequence, because I jumped from when
I came back here in 1973 through my tenure in '84 and jumped to when
I was a manager in '94 about White Sands.
Butler:
That's all right.
McCright:
I do have some things to talk about at Houston, too.
Butler:
Yes.
McCright:
In 1984, [Kenneth B.] Ken Gilbreath, who was the Director of Center
Operations, called me and said, "I've got a division down here
that I need to make some changes in." He said, "I would
like for you to consider coming back to Houston and taking a division."
Mr. Gilbreath was my first supervisor when I came to NASA. He was
Chief of the Electrical Branch when I came here in 1966. He, about
two years later, was the manager of a site. Then in '74, I believe,
he transferred to Houston as Deputy Director of Center Operations.
By 1984 he was the Director of Center Operations.
So when he called me in the fall of '83, actually, in the fall of
'83, I was very, very reluctant to go back to Houston, but by then
my children were not out on their own, but they were out of public
school. So I considered it for a few days, and thought, "Well,
I'm probably as high as I will ever go at White Sands," because
the equivalent of a division chief in Houston, and there's only one
job higher than that and that's the manager. So the likelihood of
JSC ever appointing me to manager of White Sands is probably pretty
remote.
So I thought about it for a month or so, and talked to Mr. Gilbreath
several times in the interim, talked to him, and finally I called
him and said, "Okay, I'll take the job. If you've really got
a division that you think I can help, that whatever I bring to the
table will be of benefit to that division, I'll take the job."
So in February 1984, I moved to Houston and became the Chief of Plant
Engineering [Division]. Plant engineering was responsible for all
of the construction monitoring, being any modifications made to the
facilities at JSC, whether it be new construction or modifying facilities,
all of it, the construction activity was monitored and the oversight
was from Plant Engineering Division, responsible for roads and grounds,
janitorial services, plant operations, meaning the central plant,
the chillers and the boilers, the emergency backup power, and chillers
for the Mission Control Center, electrical power distribution, all
the utilities.
I equivalently, when I went from White Sands to Chief of Plant of
Engineering Division, had a budget larger than White Sands' budget
and had about twice as many contractor and NASA employees as the whole
of White Sands did at the time. So although I was equivalent of division
chief here, it's a much smaller in comparison to that division chief
job in Houston.
So I went to Houston in the Plant Engineering Division. I guess I
was successful in doing what they wanted me to do with that division,
because in 1986 they asked me to apply for a NASA fellowship program.
And I resisted. They said, "No, you really need to do this."
I said, "I don't want to do this. I don't want to be gone for
three months," and this and that.
They said, "No, you really need to."
So they kind of put a little pressure on me. So the agency only chose
one person for this fellowship from the agency. I went home and told
my wife, I said, "Hey, they're putting pressure on me to apply
for this fellowship and I don't want to, but the chances of me being
selected are between slim and none, so I'm going to satisfy them,
I'm going to go ahead and apply for this program."
She said, "Yes, you're going to get selected."
I said, "No, I'm not." I said, "I won't even get out
of JSC. I won't be the candidate for JSC because there will be ten
or fifteen candidates and then they'll chose one."
So when the selection process at JSC decided who they were going to
send forward to Headquarters, sure enough, I was the name. So I told
my wife at that time, I said, "Don't worry about it. Don't worry
about it. All the centers are going to send a name in. They're only
going to pick one and it's not going to be me."
And she again said, "Yes, it's going to be you."
"Nah, don't worry about it."
Well, it was, and so I wound up at Harvard [University] for three
months, and I went there in February of '86 and came back to Houston
on the 5th of May '86. I truly was concerned that—I was a division
chief at the time, and I was truly concerned that by the time I got
back, after the division had run well for three months, they would
forget about me and it'd be the end of my career. I really was concerned
about that.
Harvard was another one of those experiences, after I'd been out of
school twenty-five years or so, went off to Harvard, went to school
five and a half days a week, and long, long hours trying to read all
the case studies and stuff and get ready for the next day, it was
a real, real physical and emotional burden to go there and be away
from home and be away from the job and all for three months. But anyway,
I survived Harvard and came back to Houston on the 5th of May, I believe,
of 1986. I think it was on the 6th of June, Mr. Gilbreath called me
over to his office.
While I was gone to Harvard, the Deputy Director of Center Operations
retired. He called me up at Harvard. His name was [William A.] Bill
Stransky. Great guy. Bill called me at Harvard and said, "Hey,
I'm going to retire."
I said, "You're going to what?"
He said, "I'm going to retire."
I said, "Oh, man, Bill, I hate to see you do that."
He said, "Well, don't worry about it. They won't fill this position
until you get back."
And I thought, "You don't think so?"
I said, "No, I don't think so."
He said, "It'll take them a long time to fill it. Don't worry
about it."
I said, "Well, I sure hate to see you go anyway."
Anyway, he left and he retired. I got back on the 5th of May, the
thing was on the 6th of June, Mr. Gilbreath called me over to his
office and said, "I want you to be my new deputy."
So I said, "Well, I haven't really finished all the things you
wanted me to do in plant engineering."
He said, "Yes, I know, but we'll just leave you acting over there."
So I became the Deputy Director of Center Operations and was Acting
Plant Engineering Division Chief for about six months. After six months
we finally selected a new division chief and I then became the deputy
director. Of course, at that time, Center Operations had seven divisions:
Plant Engineering Division, Facility Design Division, Tech Services
Division, Management Services, Logistics, and Security. Is that six
or seven? There was seven of them total. Photo and TV was the seventh
one. So we had a large organization there, seven divisions, including
the history office at that time.
So I was Mr. Gilbreath's deputy for seven years, and then he retired
in April of '93. He announced his retirement on a Wednesday and he
was going to retire on Friday. I knew it before that, but the center
didn't. He announced it on a Wednesday and retired on a Friday, and
Thursday about one o'clock the director called me up to his office
and said, "Come Friday when Mr. Gilbreath leaves, you're the
Director of Center Operations." So I knew before he left that
I was going to be the Director of Center Operations.
The seven years that I was deputy director were certainly the most
management challenge seven years that I had. The center budget was
getting reduced, we were struggling every year about how can we maintain
the services that the center expects from us with less budget. There
were heated, heated budget arguments between all of us. I mean, everybody
was going through the same kind of thing, and the institution was
just getting whittled down every year.
We reorganized a few times. We reorganized the Facility Design Division
and I acted as division chief over there twice for about six months
during that seven years. We took all the economies that we could find.
One of the things we did is when the budget got so bad that we could
not maintain the services that the center had expected of us, we went
to those using organizations, engineering directorate, mission operations,
those two in particular, and ISD [Information Services Division] as
a smaller one, but we just told them, "Look. We can't do it anymore.
If you want some of these services, you're going to have to pay for
them, because we do not have the money to buy the material and just
issue it to you."
ISD had to do a similar thing when PCs became a big thing and we were
buying so many every year, they had to do the same thing. COD [Center
Operations Directorate] had to start paying for theirs and other people
had to pay for theirs, because ISD's budget just wouldn't support
it. In the early days with NASA, you just called on those services
from the provider and the provider fought for his own budget and provided
those things to you, but in the mid to late eighties and early nineties,
even, it got so bad you couldn't do that.
So that was one of the ways we fought the budget problems in COD.
COD was in a little bit of a unique situation in that if somebody
wanted services from us, like Technical Services Division, which was
the manufacturing arm of COD at the time, and I now work for engineering
directorate, if engineering wanted us to build them a widget, it might
cost $100,000 to build it. We didn't have in our budget the $100,000,
and it was a piece of flight test hardware, so it engineering or MOD
[Mission Operations Directorate] or somebody's going to have to pay
for it, because we don't have the budget to do it. That's the way
we survived in COD. A tough way to live. Tough way to live, you're
the bad guy on the block most of the time. Those directors understood
it, because they were under budget crunches, too. They didn't like
it, but they understood it. So it was a miserable time from a budget
standpoint.
That's still going on. When I retired two years ago, it was still
going on. I'm sure it is today. There has been some short periods
of time where we get a little relief from the budget, but it was pretty
tough. There was a time when I was deputy director of COD when we
had over 100 million dollars' worth of budget, and one year had a
90-million-dollar construction budget. So I mean, we had a lot of
money when I first became [Deputy] Director of Center Operations,
but it went downhill from there on. And the whole agency's gone through
that process.
Butler:
If we could take a quick break here, and we need to change out our
tape.
McCright:
Sure.
Butler:
You were talking about some of the difficulties in dealing with the
budget challenges and keeping things running, and that the other people
at the center would understand, they wouldn't necessarily like it,
but they'd understand. Were there ever times where it just, I mean,
as it kept becoming more and more of a problem, or that you would
just question whether it was possible to keep it all going?
McCright:
There were many, many times I questioned whether it was possible to
keep it going or not. One of the things that we never did, we all
recognized we couldn't sacrifice was mission support. Whatever you
have to do for mission support, you've got to do. But things like
PAO handed out lithographs like they were going out of style. A school
kid would write in and say, "Can I have a picture of Shuttle?"
and they'd send them fifteen. I do not deny that that was good for
the space program. I don't deny it was good for kids, and one of the
obligations we have is to keep this thing going in future generations,
not just NASA, but the scientific technological advances in many aspects
of life.
I think it was a good thing to do, but it got to the point where we
just could no longer afford it. I was having to provide the lithographs,
get them made, and they're not very expensive apiece, but we started
having to cut down on them. We finally cut a deal with PAO, said,
"Look, if they ask for a picture of the Orbiter, send them one,
and maybe send them a picture of a crew, but don't send them a whole
selection of things," because we just could no longer afford
it.
So those are the kind of things you hate to do, but you have to. Taxis.
You probably don't even remember when we had taxis running all over
the center, but we had probably a staff of about twelve to, depending
on the time frame, twelve to twenty drivers of taxis. You could call,
anybody could call logistics, or transportation, and say I need a
taxi at Building 1 to go to Building 45. And they would pick you up
at the front door of Building 1 and take you to 45. You and two or
three other people, maybe, but they would, you know, take them on.
Then we got to the point where the first economy move we made is we
said, "We're no longer taking you in the mall area. If it's anywhere
in the mall area, you walk. If you need to go out to the 400 Area
or out to the 200 Area, we'll take you, but we're not taking you in
the central mall area." That was not met with great popularity.
But we just no longer could afford it, so we had to. We cut the number
of drivers down to five or six, maybe eight, I don't remember exactly.
Because we'd run taxis up to Ellington [Air Force Base, Houston, Texas]
and places like that.
Then for a while we were picking VIPs up at the airport if they requested
a taxi in the middle of the night, and we'd get a government taxi
up there and pick them up and bring them back. Finally, I said, "No,
no more of that. If you want to do that, if you want a taxi, you ride
a taxi and let your travel pay for it. We're not going to send a government
taxi."
Then we got to the point where—and I was a party to this—we're
going to have to go to buses. We're going to have to run some bus
routes. If people want to ride them, it will give people on the mall
an opportunity to ride a bus, which they didn't have at that point
in time. We'll run over to the contractor facilities and we'll do
all this. It turned out we could lay off about three drivers and then
we could run the buses.
Now the buses were never totally, and aren't today, I'm sure, totally
satisfactory to everybody, but it was one of those economy measures
that we had to do. It is not impossible for you to get from Building
1 to the Rockwell [Corporation] buildings over on Gemini. It's not
pleasant, but you can do it. Used to we ran taxis, and we just could
not afford to do that any longer. So now we run buses, whether we
need them or not.
If you have to go over to the Rockwell building and the government
doesn't provide a way to do it, and you can't get a government car,
then you can theoretically charge mileage on your car. Not if there's
a bus running, because you could have ridden a bus. So that's the
reason we had to do those things and nobody liked it. I didn't either,
but it was a survival technique. So there's just thousands of those
examples of things we did.
You asked if I ever thought it was impossible to keep it together.
I once made a budget presentation to the deputy director of the center
and the associate director of the center, and it's the worst one I
ever had to make. I went in and made a budget presentation. I said,
"These are the services COD is no longer going to provide."
And they were some severe cuts. The response I got from those two
gentlemen—and they're both very good friends of mine, I like
them very much—they were caught with, "What are we going
to do?" too, and they said, "But we can't do that. The center
cannot survive if you make those cuts."
I said, "Okay." I put another chart up, and I said, "All
right, how about these?" I had developed these slides, and I
went in there, "All right, how about these cuts?"
They said, "No, those are just unacceptable cuts."
I put another slide up and I said, "All right, how about these?"
They said, "No, they're not acceptable reductions in the services
that you provide us."
"Okay, what do you want me to do? You tell me what you want to
do," and I got no response. It was that bad. They didn't know
what to do either.
So that's when we increased the demands on other organizations, that
if they wanted services from us they're going to have to pay for them.
You cannot get blood out of a turnip. I mean, there are many economies
you can make, there really are. I believe that in good faith we made
most of those between '88 and '91 or '92. I think we made many of
those. I'm sure they've made some since. But I know that after I left
JSC, they took a lot of reductions in grounds maintenance. The reason
that did not occur on my watch was the powers-to-be at the center
were not willing to do it at that time. It was proposed, but they
weren't willing to do it. The leadership at the center changed and
now they are. So be it.
But that's the kind of problems we went through. As the budget got
worse and worse, I probably was spending 50 percent of my time on
budget matters at its peak, maybe. Before I left, I think it had tapered
off to some extent. I truly believe nobody holds that against me personally.
They all knew. It was just a fact of life. They were all facing that.
But on the upside, it was probably the biggest management challenge
I ever had, but it was some of the most fun I had, too. I really had
a good time as Deputy Director of Center Operations. Most of it was
a lot of fun, even the heated budget arguments. I mean, some of those
budget arguments I would not even want to relate to you is how bad
they got, the emotional confrontations that happened between deputy
directors and directors, and deputy directors and me and the comptroller.
It was just a bad time. But I don't think any of those people feel
badly about it. They knew why it was happening. They weren't blind
to that.
But on the upside, some of the highlights I had, let's see, I was
still plant engineer and division chief when we had the President
[Ronald] Reagan memorial service for the Challenger accident. Now,
that was another challenge because I was the division chief at the
time, in charge of all the facilities and most of the preparations
and stuff for the President coming.
The accident occurred on a Tuesday, and on Wednesday afternoon I got
a call to be in the director's conference room at ten o'clock that
night, on Wednesday night, because Reagan was going to come down.
We knew during the day Wednesday that that was going to happen. So
we had started thinking about what, gee, what are we going to do?
How are we going to pull this off? Thinking about where would we do
it. We decided to do it in front of Building 16 on the mall and outdoors.
So I went to this meeting at ten o'clock on Wednesday night in the
director's conference room, and the White House staff was there and
the Secret Service was there, and two or three of my people and PAO
people and the associate director, I think, was there. So we started
talking about what we thought of how we might do this and so, of course,
the Secret Service had many, many concerns. White House staff had
concerns. So I finally went home on that Wednesday night about 2:00
or 2:30 or so in the morning. I don't remember exactly what time.
But I went home, and got up and went back to work at 7:30 or so the
next morning, and worked all through that day. We had another meeting
Thursday night at ten o'clock with all those White—we'd been
working with them all day, during the days. I went home on Friday
morning shortly before sun-up and took a shower and changed suits,
and went back to work at eight something, I guess, I went back to
work. As I recall, that memorial service happened about eleven o'clock
in the morning.
So I got back out there just shortly after sun-up, early, before six
o'clock or so, and by then we'd roped off the big area and we had
metal detectors that the White House had brought down. There was a
planeload of White House uniformed security that came. There were
sheriffs and constables and Secret Service everywhere. I was given
a Secret Service pin to wear on my lapel so I could cross the barrier
wherever I needed to. I would not have been successful without that,
because the Secret Service will run you through a metal detector,
and if you're of a person involved in their support, they'll give
you this little pin you can wear. It allowed me to cross the barriers
and whatnot and move around.
I remember telling a contractor project manager up in the middle of
the night on Thursday night, or I guess it was early night on Thursday
night, to go get some more plywood. He said, "I don't have any
more plywood." It was after ten o'clock, because the Home Depot
and stuff was closed.
I said, "Look, go get—" how many sheets of plywood,
I don't remember how many it was.
He looked at me and he said, "All right, I'm going to get the
plywood, but don't you ever ask me where I got it."
I said, "Done."
At his retirement party about seven or eight years later, I told that
story. I said, "And to this day I have not asked him where he
got the plywood." [Laughter] I'm sure he stole it from another
project somewhere, but anyway.
Butler:
He didn't tell you after the party, either, did he?
McCright:
No, he didn't tell me after the party. What we were using it for is
building a podium he was going to speak from. We didn't have enough
plywood, so get some more, and he did. But those are the kind of things
in a crisis. STS-3 recovery was a crisis. Reagan's memorial service
in 1986 was a crisis. People will do way above and beyond the call
of duty to make those things happen. I have been firmly convinced
over my career, you can ask people to provide services and time that's
well outside the realm of reason for a short period of time, if you've
got a good reason to do it. You can't continue it very long, but you
can get people to do amazing things on a short term.
That was a highlight of my years in Houston, one of them. When Reagan
came back in '88 or '89, when we launched STS-26 he came back again.
I was deputy director at the time, but I was involved a little bit
more remotely than I was the first time, but in that visit, too. That
was another highlight. I mean, it took a lot of work on a short period
of time dealing with it.
I remember on that second visit I got in an argument at one of those
meetings with Secret Service and the White House staff. The Secret
Service was insisting that we put handrails around the platform that
Reagan was going to speak from. Both the White House staff and Secret
Service were deathly afraid he was going to fall. They were absolutely
petrified that he would fall. So we had to make everything as smooth
as possible and all. I said, "Okay, we'll put the rails up."
The White House staff said, "No, we don't want any rails up there,
because it blocks part of the view of the public and the TV cameras
and all." So, okay, we won't put the rails up there.
The Secret Service said, "No, we demand that you put the rails
up there to protect him."
I said, "Wait a minute." I said, "I can't satisfy both
of you. You (this was a lady from the White House staff) and you,
Mr. Secret Service man, you go out of the room and y'all sort it out,
and when you come back here and tell me, I'll do what y'all decide,
but I can't satisfy both of you. So y'all sort it out." They
did and we didn't put the handrails up. [Laughter]
Then JSC safety got in the issue, and they decided we were going to
have the handrails up about two hours before Reagan showed up. I told
the director of safety, I said, "There's not going to be any
handrails."
And he said, "You're violating OSHA [Occupational Safety and
Health Administration]."
I said, "That's right, and that's Mr. OSHA that's going to stand
right up there and talk to us." [Laughter] I said, "They're
not going up there, and if you don't like it, go talk to the White
House staff. Don't talk to me." He didn't, and we didn't put
any handrails up.
But it was a fun time. It really was. I have fond memories of those
two visits of President Reagan. I have another memory of [President]
George [H. W.] Bush visiting when he was the President one time, and
we painted a stairwell, because he was going to go down it, and couldn't
get the paint to dry. It was still tacky when he went down the stairway,
and this is embarrassing, but we had to hang "Wet Paint"
signs on the stairway. I believe the President of the United States
thinks everything in the world smells like fresh paint, because we
painted everything when they showed up. But it was a fun time.
Certainly the biggest job that I ever had in NASA was Director of
Center Operations. White Sands manager is an equivalent grade and
it's a hazardous testing, and it's more technical than the Director
of Center Operations, but Center Operations was certainly probably
the highlight of my career. Anybody looking at my career would say
it was. Probably self-satisfying maybe was White Sands manager, because
I started out here as a GS-7 and wound up as the manager, so that
was kind of a pleasant experience.
But when I was Deputy Director of Center Operations, in August of
1986, I was appointed charter board member for Space Center Houston,
and it was added to my job description to give me the protection of
the government from lawsuits and whatnot, and allow me to use special
time to do that. So I served as a charter member for ten years along
with John [W.] O'Neill, Harvey [L.] Hartman, Carolyn [L.] Huntoon,
Charlie [Charles F.] Bolden [Jr.] part of the time, P. J. Weitz part
of the time, Sue [Susan] Garman part of the time.
That was a thoroughly enjoyable time. It was a stressful time, certainly
in the early days of that, because nothing had ever been financed
in the government that way before, and the government does not own
that facility. The Manned Space Flight Educational Foundation, Incorporated,
owns it, of which I was a board member. We publicly financed 64 million
dollars. So 64,400,0000 we acquired from NASA Headquarters; actually,
Congress. Congress edicted that NASA Headquarters provide us 10 million
dollars for infrastructure support, being able to get back on JSC
and tie onto the water lines and the sewer lines and all of that.
So the Congress actually paid for that. It just flowed through Headquarters
to the Manned Space Flight Foundation.
I wrote the technical specifications for the design competition over
the Christmas holidays of 1987, probably. I can remember, on leaves
at the kitchen table, writing specifications for the design competition
and also specifications, the first brush at the specifications for
the building, this building and structure and whatnot.
We contracted with Walt Disney to do the preliminary design, Walt
Disney Imagineering. That was an experience that I'll be forever grateful
for. We were out there in Glendale, California, at their facility.
Bill [William R.] Kelly was chairman of the board. I forgot. Hal Stall
was the president at that time, too. Chuck [Charles A.] Biggs was
the vice-president. Norma Kersman was the assistant secretary, I believe,
and Wayne [L.] Draper became the treasurer. I guess Hal and Bill Kelly
and Chuck Biggs and I, I guess, were out at Glendale, California,
talking to Disney about the preliminary design. Those folks are absolutely
amazing. They know their business. They know it very well.
We had a working lunch out there the first time we visited. A guy
named George, who was on the original design team with Walt Disney
when they conceived Disneyland in 1955, was in this meeting. He was
chief architect there at the time. I remember we got to talking about
what the facility might look like and what we might do, and he took
his salad bowl and turned it up in the middle of the table, and took
some salt and pepper shakers and spoons and forks and stuff like that,
and almost did the preliminary design for what the structure might
look like right there at the table. And it almost turned out that
way. It had a dome all the way across the top then. It's now flat
across the top. That was a wind loading and a cost issue, but it looks
very much like he had in mind at that time.
Then I was in a conference room out there that we met in a number
of times. I was sitting at the end of this long conference table,
and it had high walls and little windows around the top, maybe twelve-inches
tall windows, all the way around the top. There were drawings pasted
all over the walls of Disneyland and Disney World and Epcot Center
and the one in Paris. They were just opening the one in Paris at that
time. So there were just drawings all over the place. Somebody made
the comment, I don't remember, maybe Hall Stall made the comment,
because they would refer to Walt Disney quite often. They would say,
"Well, Walt felt like this was necessary to handle the public,"
and Walt this and Walt that. Somebody made the comment to them, said,
"How long has Walt Disney been dead?"
They said at that time he'd been dead twenty years. This guy said,
"Well, it is very, very evident that Walt Disney's influence,
his ideas still have a great influence on where this company's going."
They said, "Oh, yeah. Oh, yeah." Said, "He was very
powerful in what he believed, and he was right in most cases."
Not all. As kind of an aside, they said, "We're in the room,
we're sitting in the conference room where they originally conceived
Disneyland."
We said, "Really?"
They said, "Yes." They pointed at me at the end of the table,
and they said, "And that's where Walt always sat." And this
just gives you a little warm and fuzzy feeling to be in an environment
like that. But it was a pleasure to work with them. They had thousands
of concepts and ideas. And if we didn't like this one, here's another
one, you know.
During the early design phases of this, we traveled quite a bit. Went
to Huntsville, we went to the Cape, went to Disney World. The Land
Pavilion at Epcot, if you walked into it and stopped and looked around
and thought about Space Center Houston, that's almost the same design
of the structure. Very similar design. That was where they took us
to say, "This is what we've got in mind."
So that was a very pleasant experience. It was exciting, trying to
get it open and doing the design and doing the construction. I was
responsible for monitoring the construction from the board's viewpoint.
I was chairman of the operations oversight committee while it was
being built, after it got opened and operating. It was a very rewarding
experience, because it was the most fun—I've been involved in
a lot of construction in my day, and it was the most fun construction
I've ever been involved in, because I was doing it like the private
sector, not like the government and I didn't have to worry with the
competitive requirements of the government, and we could go to who
we wanted to.
It was a cost savings-type contract, cost-incentive contract, where
they can make money by saving us money. So they just had a jillion
ideas about how to improve the construction and the design while we
were building it. Many, many of them were approved by us, because
they saved us money and we shared that savings with the contractor.
The government's now doing a little of that, but they weren't in those
days. So it was a lot of fun for me. I think if you talk to any of
the board members, I think they would all tell you that it was unique.
I was one of the principals that helped get through Headquarters a
fifty-year lease on that property. I mean, boy, I don't know how many
times I went to Washington before we got that signed. Sue Garman helped
me a lot in some of that. General Billie [J.] McGarvey was the chief
of NASA facilities at the time in Headquarters and he helped a lot
with that. We had to get Congressional approval. Normally the government
signs contracts for five years or ten, and this is fifty. So it was
a great challenge for me, but a great deal of fun, too.
I will be forever thankful that I was on the board, and it only became
not so much fun when we started having problems paying off the bonds
that we [sold]. We had to restructure our debt. That was a painful
process. I went through the first debt restructuring. I don't know
if they've done it again or not, but the first one we went through
was a very painful process. But other than that, it was a pleasant
experience.
Butler:
It certainly must have been nice to see it all come together and see
the public response to it.
McCright:
Yes. As a matter of fact, I was in Houston three weeks ago and took
two of my granddaughters through Space Center Houston for the first
time since they were old enough to remember it, at least, and they
were just absolutely enthralled with the whole thing, so it made me
feel really good that they were.
I believe that Space Center Houston now, although I haven't been a
board member now for about three years—yes, about three years—it
appears to me from what I've heard that they're on better financial
footing than they were when I left. I was in there twice while I was
in Houston, and there was a big crowd there both times. So I hope
they're doing well, and it seems that they are.
Butler:
They always seem to have a crowd when we go by.
McCright:
Yes, I was glad to see that.
Butler:
It did come up that you ended up going back to White Sands as manager,
as we talked about a little bit before. But you had also mentioned
that when you came back to JSC that you were thinking, "Well,
there's not really any further up I can go at White Sands," that
you hadn't even thought about really getting the manager's job.
McCright:
Well, I would have been eligible for it if it had been vacant, but
I always felt before I went to JSC and spent the last ten years down
there, which, by the way, the last ten years in Houston I really thoroughly
enjoyed it. I really did. But I had a different attitude. I wasn't
worried about children then, and it was much easier to go live in
the big city.
But while I would have been eligible for the manager of White Sands,
I did not believe that the director of the Johnson Space Center would
appoint someone at White Sands as the manager because he didn't know
us well enough to feel comfortable doing that. I felt even stronger
about that after I got to Houston, looking back at White Sands, and
got at the senior staff level in Houston, I said, man, I guess I can
understand that. I wouldn't either. If I was a director, I would feel
very reluctant to appoint somebody that's an office chief at White
Sands to be the manager, because we just don't get enough exposure
to them to know them that well and feel comfortable, because the manager
out here is 850 miles from his boss. The director of the center has
to feel confident with whoever he puts out here that he can leave
him alone and let him do it, because he's too far away to influence
him very much, certainly not on a daily basis. When I was the manager,
I talked to the director of the center almost every other week regularly,
and occasionally in between, but you don't even talk to him very much.
You just go on and do your business.
So I think that I probably would not have been appointed the manager
had I stayed out here. Maybe I would have. Maybe they would have by
then known me well enough to feel comfortable doing it, but I wouldn't
be too sure.
But the ten years I spent in Houston as a division chief, as a deputy
director, and as Director of Center Operations, in all the committees
that I was on in Washington, and all the time I spent in Washington,
and one year I went to Washington twenty-six times from JSC, so I
got a lot of exposure at Headquarters level, too, the knowledge that
I had of the agency was many times as broad when I came back in 1994
than it was when I left in '84, because when I was here in '84, I
did very little work with Washington. When I went to headquarters,
I went to Houston. And when I was in Houston when I went to Headquarters,
I went to Washington. So I got a much, much broader understanding
of the agency and certainly was known much more widely than I would
have if I'd stayed at White Sands, within the agency. So I think that
that's one of the reasons that they sent me back out here.
The other reason that they sent me out here is, I had no intentions
of ever being able to come back to White Sands after I became deputy
director, really. I never had any thought that I would get back to
White Sands, and certainly not after I became Director of Center Operations.
But in December of 19[93], the manager of White Sands died suddenly
of a heart attack, so for about six months there was no permanent
manager of White Sands. The deputy manager here was acting for those
six months. He certainly was a capable guy. He is now the manager
of White Sands, because they are now comfortable—when I retired,
they were comfortable enough to send him back here, because he had
transferred to Houston in the interim and gotten on in Houston. But
he was my deputy, and he's a great guy, and I think he's doing a good
job for White Sands today.
But at the time that the manager died, I suspect there was not that
confidence in Houston of making the deputy manager the manager, because
deputies in Houston work with center senior staff and the director
and the deputy director all the time, but the deputy out here does
not. So when they had to find somebody to put back out here, I think
they looked around and knew I had hypergolic propellant experience
and rocket engine testing experience, and knew me well enough to feel
comfortable sending me back out here. So I came back out here in July
of '94, and I continued to be the manager for four years.
In '97, my deputy transferred down to Houston and became the Deputy
Director of Center Operations. He stayed down there for about a year,
and when I announced my retirement, they sent him back out here as
the director of the facility. I think that was a good thing for everybody.
Butler:
Sounds like Center Operations at JSC might be the training ground
maybe for the White Sands managers.
McCright:
Has been for the last two times.
Butler:
Certainly there's a lot that applies.
McCright:
Yes. Well, all the managers at White Sands, after the first one, first
manager at White Sands came from the Army when we just built place.
The second one came from White Sands, that was Ken Gilbreath. But
he only stayed manager for about two years and transferred to Houston
as Deputy Director of Center Operations. The third one came from TTA
[Thermochemical Test Area] in Houston to be the manager out here.
The fourth one, Rob Tillett, was an incumbent here, but had worked
in Houston earlier, many years earlier, but he had worked in Houston,
knew a lot of people there. Then Dick [Richard A.] Colonna came out
here as the fifth manager from Shuttle Program Office. After he had
left it and been the NASA liaison in Australia for a year, then he
came to White Sands as the manager, and I was the next one. So three
of the Deputy Directors of Center Operations have been the manager
at White Sands.
Butler:
While you were manager at White Sands, what was your biggest challenge
at that point in time, and what were some of the projects that you
were involved with?
McCright:
We were certainly faced with—at that time we were still in the
budget reduction process. It was ongoing. White Sands had done many,
many things to offset some of those budget reductions, such as going
out after a lot of reimbursable work. They had just started, and weren't
even certified yet, to rebuild RCS engines. When I got back out here
and took a look at that I said, "Gee, I agreed, that is a service
we can offer to this agency much cheaper than getting it done with
the original equipment manufacturer." The original equipment
manufacturer was reducing that staff all the time and just about to
lose most of the expertise to actually do it, because the engines
are so old.
So we really went after that engine rebuild work. About a year or
so after I came out here, we became certified to do the OMS [Orbital
Maneuvering System] engine repair work. So now White Sands is the
depot for engine repair—repair, refurb, and recertifying, and
put them back in the fleet. We do that work for the NSLD at Florida.
We do that for the logistics people in Florida. So that has increased
our reimbursable work by a pretty large percentage, just doing that
engine rebuild work. There are always RCS engines going through there,
and occasionally an OMS engine goes through to be refurbished and
recertify. We have to fire them and recertify them.
So my goals when I came back, the director of the center at JSC told
me the week I left the center, I went up to see him and said, "Well,
I'm headed to White Sands now. Have you got any last-minute instructions
for me?"
He said, "No." He said, "I'm comfortable with you going
out there or I wouldn't have sent you out there." He said, "I
would just tell you to go after all the reimbursable work you can
handle because it's good for JSC. It offsets the cost of White Sands."
So I did, and I think over my four years we increased the reimbursable
work over 20 percent. We even got into the flight hardware building
with ORCA. We just got started in the ORCA business. That was the
first flight hardware White Sands ever designed and built, tested
and delivered. It was not even built when I retired, but we had been
involved in the project for several months at that time, so we were
beginning to get into that business. I think White Sands is in a unique
position to offer design, build, test, qualify and deliver flight
hardware that's hazardous fluids-associated: liquid oxygen, gaseous
oxygen, hydrazine, nitrogen tetroxide, that sort of thing. So increasing
reimbursable work was one of my big goals, and fighting the budget
reductions and finding more efficient ways to do the business.
Another big thing that we did that turned out to be, I think, a good
decision. When I came out here in '94, they had recompeted the contract
in '93. It was not awarded until June of '94, and I got back in July.
I came back the 11th of July '94. In that contract it stated that
the contractor would become certified to ISO 9001 [International Standards
Organization] within eighteen months. The deputy manager at White
Sands elected to not do anything, because he knew I was coming, and
he elected not to do anything till I got here. It was only a month,
but when I got here in a month, he said, "I haven't let them
get started on that, because I feel very strongly that if you don't
sign up to it and if you don't support it, we should not do it."
I said, "Well, what's ISO 9000?" because I did not know.
So over the next few weeks they educated me on what it was, and I
went over to Fluid Systems Division of Allied Signal in Tempe, Arizona,
who had just become certified in ISO. I spent two and a half days,
grueling days, over there going through what they had done, why they
did it, what their lessons learned were, how expensive is it and all
of that. I convinced myself in those two and a half days that for
White Sands Test Facility, being in the hazardous testing business,
it was the right thing to do, because ISO 9000 does not ensure that
you will have a high-quality product. In and of itself it doesn't.
What it ensures is that if you follow the rules that you lay down,
you will have a consistent product. Not necessarily a good one, but
it will be consistent. It'll either be consistently good or consistently
bad, but you'll do it the same way every time. In a hazardous-test
business you have to have testing and engineering discipline rigor
into the system or somebody's going to get hurt, or you're going to
blow up an engine, or somebody's going to killed.
So I came back, and in consultation with my deputy, the deputy program
manager, and the program manager for the contractor, and a few other
people, we decided that, yes, it's the right thing to do, and, yes,
we ought to go for it, and, yes, we ought to go for it in twelve months
instead of eighteen. Because we'd already lost by that time about
three months. I was convinced that if I give you eighteen months,
you'll take nineteen. If I give you twenty-four months, you'll take
twenty-five, and if I give you thirty-six months, you'll take thirty-six
or thirty-seven months, but you'll do most of the work in the last
twelve months. And I said, "We can't afford to drag this thing
out. If we're going to do it, we have to do it now."
So everybody signed up to that twelve months, some very reluctantly,
but they signed up for it. To make a long story short, after a lot
of management intervention and a lot of gnashing of the teeth, and
a lot of long hours, I couldn't give them a lot of budget relief.
I told them, "You're going to have to do this and meet the commitments
that you've made to your customers. We could go back and if I could
negotiate with the customer and he could slip it, fine. But if he
can't, you're going to have to meet the date you committed to."
So it was a very rigorous, tough twelve months. We exposed everybody
at the facility to what is ISO 9000, even the machinists and the carpenters
and the janitors. Everybody went to a four-hour class about what it
is. Then there were a smaller number of people that were actually
involved in implementing it.
But to give you an example of why I thought it was a good thing to
do—this is 1994 I'm talking about—during the process,
where we had to go review all of the procedures and the processes
that we used to do the work out there, and many of them hazardous,
during that process, one of the guys brought a procedure into a meeting
and laid it down in front of me and said, "Hey, look at that
procedure that we're reviewing." I thumbed through it and I had
signed it in 1976.
And I said, "You haven't revised this since 1976?"
And he said, "No," and he kind of laughed.
And I said, "Are you still doing it this way?"
"Well, not exactly like that."
And I said, "That's the reason we need to do ISO 9000."
It forced us to go review all those things and revise them. We didn't
have to revise them, but what you have to do to qualify for ISO 9000
is say, "This is what I'm going to do. This is what I did, and
I can prove that I did it that way. I have some substantial evidence
that says that's the way I did it." And the certifying people
don't really care what you do, as long as you do it like you said
you're going to do it, you write it down, and you do like you said
you're going to do it, and you can prove it. It's not up to them to
ensure you have a quality product. It's up to them to ensure you did
it like you said you're going to do it.
But that whole process cost—I hope it didn't cause any divorces,
but it cost an awful lot of long hours and tough time, and the final
result was that we got certified on the first certification inspection.
We were the first NASA facility to be certified. We were the first
government facility to be certified, because we certified all of it.
There were some isolated organizations that had been certified within
the government and within NASA, but nobody had done an entire facility,
an entire installation. We were recognized by the agency for doing
that. We were submitted for and awarded a Hammer Award from Vice President
[Albert] Gore [Jr.] for being the first government installation to
be certified ISO 9000.
I went to almost every center and Headquarters, after we became certified,
over the last year that I worked, by invitation, because I went to
Headquarters and made a presentation to Dan [Daniel S.] Goldin, and
he said that day, "This agency's going to be certified to ISO
9000." So I got the opportunity to go to almost every center
invited me to come and said, "What'd you do and how'd you do
it? Because Goldin says we're going to have to do it." So I did
that. And each and every time I did that, I said, "I want the
record to reflect that the day I was in Headquarters and made this
presentation to Goldin, he said before my presentation, 'The agency's
going to do this,' not after." [Laughter]
But, anyway, White Sands got a very—I believe it was the right
thing to do. They're still certified.
The other unique thing about this is we did not—normally what
you certify is a company. We didn't certify the contractor and we
didn't certify NASA. We made an agreement with the ISO Certification
Board that in our particular case we can't certify NASA and we can't
certify the contractor, we should certify the facility, so that whoever
the contractor is, we take these same procedures and say, "Now
you execute them." And no matter what the changes are in the
facility management staff or the employee staff, it's still the facility
that's certified, not the companies. And this is the first time that
was ever done.
So it was a good experience. I'm glad we did it. It cost us a lot
of money, but I firmly believe that probably by now it has paid for
itself. As a matter of fact, it was not but about a year after we
got certified that a customer came to us and said, "Could you
do this job for us?" and we looked at it, a commercial customer.
And we said, "Yes, we believe we're unique enough in our facilities
and capabilities that we can do this job for you and not compete with
industry."
Normally when a new customer shows up, they want to come in, they
want to look at some of your processes and your procedures and all
this kind of stuff. They had given us the specification of what testing
requirements they had, and we said, "Yes, we can meet those."
And we said, "What else do you want to look at?"
Somewhere along the way they said, "Aren't you ISO 9000-certified?"
We said, "Yes, 9001-certified." We said, "Yes, we are."
They said, "We don't need to look at anything else." So
it's been a good thing for White Sands.
Butler:
It certainly sounds like it's paid off.
McCright:
Yes. I might close by saying for the record that I had a fantastic
career. I wouldn't take a minute for any of it. I wouldn't take $1,000
for a minute of it. I worked for the agency for over thirty-two years
and I am thankful to NASA and the federal government and the space
program that I got the opportunity to be involved in many of the things
that I was. I will be forever grateful.
Butler:
You certainly have had some very exciting times.
McCright:
Yes, I sure have.
Butler:
If I could ask you jut a couple final questions.
McCright:
Absolutely.
Butler:
Looking back over this unique career, what would you say over all
of that would have been your greatest challenge? You've certainly
had a lot that you've talked about.
McCright:
Well, STS-3 recovery will always be in my mind as one of the biggest
engineering challenges, to get the facilities and the capabilities
and the support mechanisms in place in just the few days we had before
the Orbiter landed. That was a big challenge. It was a big challenge
for the agency, for me personally, for the people that worked for
me. I'm very proud of that. So that certainly was one highlight of
my career.
Apollo 11, Apollo 8, Apollo 13, they're all highlights of my career.
One of the things, when you talk to people of my vintage is, that
we have to say that probably one of the biggest highlights of our
career was Apollo 11, successfully getting Apollo 11 home. I was twenty-six
years old. If I really say that was the highlight of my career, it's
been downhill for the rest of the time.
It was a very exciting and self-satisfying thing for me. Apollo in
total was a lot of hard work, a lot of long hours, but greatly rewarding.
It will never happen again, certainly not in my lifetime. Probably
not in the space program. We've missed too many opportunities for
that to happen again, because the nation's not seen fit to sign up
to go to Mars. If they sign up and say, "Yes, let's go to Mars,"
but they don't say by a certain year, it will not be the same.
The one thing that happened in Apollo is when President [John F.]
Kennedy challenged us to do it by the end of the decade. He made the
money available to do it, and it took a lot of money. I don't believe
that's going to happen again.
So everything, including Space Station and Shuttle, has been drawn
out and drawn out and drawn out and drawn out, and I believe that
that will continue to happen, and I'm sorry for that. Anybody that
worked with Apollo would probably tell you the same thing, that they're
sorry that happened.
But there's been so many other delightful things that have happened
in my career I am proud of. The Challenger will be a low point in
my career forever. Apollo 1 fire a low point in my career and everyone
else's. But because the Challenger happened, I'm sorry, but since
it did, one of the highlights of my career was the memorial service,
getting ready for it and supporting it in Houston in January of 19[86].
Certainly, ISO 9000 at White Sands is, I believe, one of the things
I did right. It was the right thing at the right time. I think it's
made White Sands more efficient, safer, more consistent, and so I
think it will pay off in years to come.
Space Center Houston will always be—it was in my job description,
so it was a NASA job, but it was privately funded. We did it like
the private sector does. I got to work with Disney Imagineering. I
got to work with some of the best talent in NASA on the board of Space
Center Houston: John O'Neill, Bill Kelly, Hall Stall, Chuck Biggs,
just all retired now. But they were just great people and were a pleasure
to work with.
So if I look at what single thing, I guess I'd have to say Apollo
11, probably, but was Apollo 8 thrilled me. Apollo 8 was a gutsy mission,
very, very gutsy, one that they decided to do in less than eight months,
I think, and executed it in less than eight months. Apollo 13, nobody
who was involved with Apollo 13 can't say it was not a grand and glorious
day when they successfully landed. So because I was involved in Apollo,
that will probably, as time goes on, be more and more important to
me. But not to say that the recovery of STS-3 wasn't a personal challenge,
and Space Center Houston, and the memorial service, and many, many
other events that were.
I've always said, and this is certainly a true statement, I'm very
fortunate that not only do I get to read history, I helped write it.
Being in this business, you're in the news virtually every day, not
me, but the activity of the space program's in the news, and it's
part of history, and I was there.
Butler:
You certainly were, and certainly gutsy, a lot of exciting things
going on. You'd mentioned that early on that you were interested in
becoming involved with the space program if it was at all possible.
Would you ever have imagined where it would take you?
McCright:
If I'd done what now?
Butler:
Would you have imagined back when you were first wishing to become
involved with the space program, would you have imagined where you
would end up?
McCright:
No. As a matter of fact, to give you a little story about that, the
romance of the space program and the technical challenge of Apollo
was probably what drew me to it. But I was working part time for the
post office during the last summer that I went to college, and I was
sorting mail and stuff like that in the post office. While we were
sorting mail one night, somebody said, "What are you going to
do when you get out of school?"
I said, "Well, I've already accepted a job with NASA."
There was a young lady working there part time that said to me, "You're
going to go to work for NASA?"
I said, "Yes."
She said, "Do you think you'll ever be sitting at a console and
controlling a space flight?"
I said, "No, I doubt if I ever will."
She said, "I just can't imagine you ever getting involved in
that program for many, many years. It's so technically oriented and
you must have to have so much experience."
I said, "Yes." I felt like, yes, that's probably right,
because I didn't know.
Two or three months later, I was at White Sands, I was working for
Ken Gilbreath. I had been here two or three weeks, and he sent me
a copy of a memo he had written, adding my name to the signature authority
on test preparation sheets, which is the way you change a facility
and you conduct tests. He had given me the authority within three
weeks of when I went to work, to sign those documents. And I was absolutely
amazed that a green engineer would be given that kind of authority
in that short a period of time. Now, certainly there were checks and
balances there. I mean, more than one person signed them, but he had
given me the authority to sign for his office.
Throughout my career, I believe NASA has given me all the responsibility
and all the authority that I chose to accept. I'm not known for turning
much down. I think that that's just absolutely amazing that you could
do that. But if you look back on Apollo, there were a few gray heads
working on Apollo, but most of the people were very young. Most of
the people who were intimately involved with flight hardware and controlling
flights and making technical decisions about the flight were in their
late twenties. So it was really an amazing time. There are some people
my age that we'll talk about in a minute, that if you have not talked
to you should, because they were in their twenties when they made
some very critical decisions that proved to be right.
Butler:
Throughout your career were there any people that made a big influence
on you or what you were doing at the time, that you'd like to mention
on the tape?
McCright:
Yes. Ken Gilbreath made a big influence on me, because he's my first
supervisor. When he retired, I replaced him as Director of Center
Operations. I worked for him off and on for over thirty years. I didn't
work for him for fifteen of those years, but I did for the last ten
I worked for him. He was a big influence on me.
John O'Neill, who's just a great guy, was a big influence on me. Bill
Kelly was a big influence on me. Aaron Cohen. Rob Tillett was a big
influence on me, because I was detailed to him on the Pearl Program
in 1968, probably '68, for about three months over on the other side
of the hill where we were conducting landing and rendezvous radar
tests for the lunar module and command service module.
Gene [Lawrence Eugene] Lundgren, who was a former Chief of Technical
Support Office at White Sands, was a big influence on me. And an engineer
that retired, just as an engineer when I was very young and green,
named Chuck [Charles H.] Provine, who was a World War II vet. From
a technical standpoint, he helped me an awful lot. He was the kind
of guy that was very knowledgeable, but if you went to sit down and
talked to him, you had to pull it out of him to get much out of him.
I remember going to him one time and showing him some electrical power
distribution service I was working on and telling him what I was going
to do. He said, "Now, are you sure you want to do that?"
I said, "Yes, why not?"
He said, "Well, just think about it."
The more I thought about it, the more he led me to the conclusion
that if I didn't distribute the different phases through these conduits,
I'd have eddy currents between the conduits and they'd get hot. This
never occurred to me to do that. So Chuck Provine had a big technical
influence on me, too.
Once I got to JSC and got up into the deputy director position, Gene
Kranz had an influence on me. Henry [O.] Pohl, Chief of Engineering,
had a lot of influence on me. So there are many, many people that
I owe thanks to that I got to where I got the opportunity to do the
things I did.
Butler:
It certainly took a lot of good and talented people to help the whole
program come together.
McCright:
Yes. NASA is a very unique organization, as far as talent's concerned.
There continues to be, and there certainly was in the early days,
some extremely talented people.
Something you asked me in a letter about the interview process when
I came to work here.
Butler:
Yes.
McCright:
That's an interesting story. I was at college, applied to JSC, received
an offer in the mail—no, I take that back. A personnel person
from Houston called me and asked me if I would accept a job at White
Sands Test Facility, and I said, "Yes, I will." We talked
about what is it and all. He didn't know much about it, but what he
told me was enough to say, "Yes, I'll take the job." I received
a written offer in the mail. I never talked to anybody at White Sands.
I never talked to anybody technically at JSC.
When I got to White Sands, after I'd been there a while, Mr. Gilbreath
showed me a letter he wrote to personnel when they'd notified him
I was coming. He protested and said, "I don't know this person,
I've never talked to him, I have no idea if he's technically competent."
He objected to the way they hired me. I guess when he made me deputy
director of his organization, he had finally decided I was going to
be okay, I guess. [Laughter]
Butler:
I think probably so. Well, it certainly sounds like over the years
enough people thought that you were okay. It certainly panned out
well for everyone, it sounds like.
McCright:
Yes, I've had a great career.
Butler:
I'd like at this point to ask Kevin if he has any questions.
Rusnak:
I'll save mine for tomorrow.
Butler:
Okay. I want to thank you so much for sharing all this with us.
McCright:
You're welcome.
Butler:
You certainly had some interesting times.
McCright:
I give you the opportunity when you're transcribing this or thinking
about it, if you've got any other questions, call me or whatever,
and I'll be glad to give you my views on them.
Butler:
Great.
McCright:
When you talk to other people some things may come up that you want
to talk to me about, I'll certainly be happy to talk to you.
Butler:
Wonderful. You'll have a chance to review the transcript, too, so
if you think of anything at that time we can always add that in as
well.
McCright:
Okay.
[End
of interview]
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