NASA Headquarters Oral
History Project
Edited Oral History Transcript
Harold B. Finger
Interviewed by Kevin Rusnak
Chevy Chase, Maryland – 16 May 2002
Rusnak: Today
is May 16, 2002. This interview with Harry Finger is being conducted
in his home in Chevy Chase, Maryland, for the NASA Oral History Project.
The interviewer is Kevin Rusnak.
Thank you for inviting me into your home this morning to spend a few
hours with you.
Finger: Well,
it’s good to be with you, let me tell you. I’m pleased
to be able to talk about some of these subjects.
Rusnak: Well,
great. Well, if we can start off with, as I suggested, some of your
background that brought you into the NACA, your education, that sort
of thing.
Finger: Okay.
I was born and raised in New York City [New York]. Born in Brooklyn,
then moved to the Bronx. In fact, my family, though I can’t
remember any of it because I was just a tot, lived on Kelly Street,
which is where [current Secretary of State] Colin [L.] Powell later
was raised. So it was a mixed kind of community.
Then we moved further up into the Bronx, and I went to grade school,
and then got into an advanced school, the Townsend-Harris High School,
which was kind of a prep school for the City College of New York.
I graduated from there in 1940. I was born in ’24, so I was
sixteen when I graduated from high school.
One interesting thing is, I rode by subway downtown to where one of
the City College schools is on 23rd Street, by myself, without any
trouble or fear. My parents weren’t worried about it or anything.
Then I went to City College and went into the engineering school,
School of Engineering, and got my bachelor’s in mechanical engineering
in ’44, May of ’44.
We were at war at that time, and before I actually graduated, in anticipation
of graduation, ? I had a deferral till I graduated—I applied
for a commission in the Navy, and went through several discussions,
hearings, and some tests, ? and went to my last one, and, in my mind,
there was no question I was going to be an ensign in the Navy.
I had also applied to the NACA [National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics],
and when I came home for my last [Navy] interview, there was a telegram
there offering me a job at the Aircraft [Engine] Research [Laboratory]
in Cleveland [Ohio]. That’s not the right name; I’ll look
it up. The Aircraft Engine Research [Laboratory], I think, in Cleveland.
It was something like that. I would be then put into the Air Corps
enlisted reserve with basically no active duty, and I decided to take
that.
So in May of ’44, I started working in Cleveland. The first
thing I did there—well, I was just a young punk, learning, basically,
twenty—I was ? involved in testing German and Japanese superchargers
for their engines so we’d get a good feel for what they were
doing. But that led very quickly to testing [compressors] for jet
engines, basically, gas turbine engines.
NACA itself, Gene [Eugene] Wasielewski and others, ? [Eastman Jacobs]
and so on, had done work on developing an axial flow compressor, a
eight-stage axial flow compressor, which was really very advanced,
and we did work on that. So I got heavily involved into compressor
research with that. In fact, I found a picture that I can show you
that indicates some of that range of work, kind of an old picture
where it indicates me giving a talk. This was in ’49. This is
the axial flow compressor, and I was making a presentation.
But one of the things we talked about was how do you get broader range
to [of compressor] operation so you can go to supersonic speeds with
that, and so on, and we removed the inlet guide vanes and ran the
compressor at higher Mach numbers. And it turned out that that actually
gave us greater range. And I was involved in that, and my position
increased. I started off as just [a Mechanical Engineer and then became]
an Aeronautic[al] Research Scientist in NACA, and then kept moving
up—
[Telephone rings. Tape recorder turned off.]
Finger: But
this picture does indicate the full range of compressor and turbine
research that we were involved in, and I was in the Compressor and
Turbine Research Division. And in [‘47] it was [renamed] Lewis
Lab [Lewis Flight Propulsion Research Laboratory], named after George
W. Lewis.
Rusnak: By
the end of World War II, there was some consternation expressed over
the fact that the U.S. had kind of lagged behind in jet engine research.
Did you find then that that was the field that was receiving a lot
of emphasis because of that?
Finger: Well,
there’s no question that the British, with the [Frank] Whittle
engine, turned out the first—it was a centrifugal compressor
system. And we did tests on what was called an I-16, and I-40, as
I recall, R-16, I think we called it, somehow. But we moved to axial
flow, which has become, of course, the mainstay of jet engines. So
we advanced things at that time. I don’t think we had that feeling,
because we also tested those big centrifugal compressors with dual
entry and all of that. I’ve probably got some pictures showing
some of the test facilities, and there’s no question Lewis had
outstanding propulsion test facilities.
I might just mention, one of the areas that concerns many of us now,
and, in fact, the NASA Alumni League is working with other organizations
in a coalition, is our concern that we’re not doing enough in
aeronautics advancement today. As a result, the U.S. market share
in the world is decreasing while the European and other countries’
market share is increasing, partly because of government support for
their companies, whereas in the U.S. we have in NASA trivial aeronautics
work. It’s all listed under “aerospace” as if they
were all the same. Well, they’re not. And there are now some
hearings related to that, and there’s a commission that’s
been set up to look at the aerospace industry capability and needs
and so on. They, in fact, had a hearing yesterday.
So, anyway, I did move up in NASA, worked with some outstanding people,
and a very large number of the people that I went to school with at
City College went out to Cleveland. I’ve got another picture
that I have to make copies of to get to some of my past friends—well,
two. Here’s a picture of just a batch of us walking along. All
of those people came from City College of New York and worked in Cleveland.
Rusnak: This
is in Cleveland?
Finger: Yes,
that was in Cleveland. And this was in the office I had—this
is one of the fellows that also came from City College—in the
Compressor [and] Turbine Division. All of these went to different
places. So there was a great movement into that area. No question
about it.
So that’s where I spent a good bit of time, and really learned
a lot. I keep saying there was a real encouragement for young people
to participate with the very heads of the agency all the way through,
with open discussion, with the ability to sit and listen, but also
to raise questions, and it’s something that was just built into
me throughout my career, to encourage that for other people, but also
to use that opportunity myself. And I learned tremendously from that.
Rusnak: NACA
was somewhat famous for having a very rigorous methodology in terms
of putting out reports and the research they did. What experience
did you have with that?
Finger: Oh,
I was involved as the sole author, or one of several authors, on a
whole range of reports, the big bulk of them classified, now unclassified.
I’ve still got several of them now that are unclassified on
various of the subjects that we tested. All of that material was reported.
Although it’s not related to that early work in any way, when
we get to it, talking nuclear propulsion, I’ll give you some
of the background of a meeting I was at in Russia with a man who headed
one of the Russian institutes on nuclear propulsion. In this great
big conference room—I didn’t even know if he knew who
I was—he turned to me and he said, “Mr. Finger, we knew
what you were doing. No one gave us your reports, but we knew what
you were doing.” [Laughs] And I’ll tell you more about
that later.
But there’s no question, all of it was reported, some of it
in unclassified form. There were many open talks about it, but a big
batch of it was classified.
Rusnak: What
attention from industry did your work particularly receive?
Finger: Oh,
quite a bit. There were quite a few companies who were involved. I
think Pratt & Whitney, General Electric, a whole host of engine
companies. I was involved in the engine side of it more than anything
else, so it was the engine companies—Allison was one of the
companies at that time that was involved. We would do testing on various
components of these compressors to determine how each really performed,
and then how the whole system would perform in an actual engine.
One of the things that happens is a compressor has a certain range
of operation, and beyond that, if the angles of attack on the blades
become too wide, you get into a stall of those blades. The result
of that is a surge, unstable operation of the compressor, leading
to unstable operation of the whole engine, turbojet engine. The idea
was to try to extend that operating range as much as possible. That’s
the work we did which led to a transonic compressor concept, which
is now openly discussed.
In fact, interestingly, I found a poster, which I have someplace here,
just a few weeks ago about the Air Force Research Lab [Wright-Patterson
Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio], a poster on the wall in an exhibit
they had at the AIAA [American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics]
meeting here in Crystal City [Virginia] a month ago, which talked
about multistage transonic compressor operation. And I thought, “Wait
a minute. I was working on that forty years ago.” Or fifty years
ago. They took the poster down and gave it to me. [Laughter]
But we were way ahead, and actually jet engines were substantially
affected. So we tested engine components in these systems, but also
doing it in a way with comprehensive instrumentation and so on, through
airflow propulsion facilities where we could actually suggest what
the performance would be and how to improve it. And that’s what
we did.
Rusnak: Earlier
you had mentioned some of the differences between the British and
the Americans. What exposure did you have to what was going on in
other countries and of what utility did you find that information?
Finger: I’ll
tell you, I can’t say that I really had a lot of link to the
other countries. It was later that I got into that, but it was not
really in the aircraft side. It was later when we got into more of
the space activities in NASA.
Actually, we got to a point in Cleveland—and this is sort of
a little vignette I can tell you about—and, again, it relates
to the fact that everyone was really encouraged to work as a unit,
to work with your bosses, your leaders, and everything. I had an outstanding
division chief, and I worked in a group that had tremendous leaders.
My division chief was a guy by the name of Oscar W. Schey, S-C-H-E-Y.
Outstanding. I learned so much from him. Then there was a Bob [Robert
O.] Bullock and a Bob [Robert E.] English, and [Howard Buckner], I
don’t know, all kinds of people in the Compressor and Turbine
Division. We were encouraged, really, to talk about whatever we felt.
One time, at a picnic, after I had been involved in the compressor
and turbine research quite a bit—I got into turbine work also,
air flow conditions in turbines—at a picnic one time, Abe Silverstein
and his wife were there, and he was—I don’t know if he
was head of the lab. I think he was head of the lab at that time,
after Ray [Edward Raymond] Sharp left. Or Ray Sharp—Edward Sharp—may
still have been director. I’m not absolutely sure. But I think
Abe may have been a deputy or something like that, and I’d have
to check that. [I believe he was still Chief of Research at that time.]
It was still NACA. Standing and talking to Abe, I said, “You
know, Abe, I think we’ve made about as much gain as we’re
going to make on these axial flow compressors and turbines. I’m
ready for something new.”
And he said, “Well, I’m thinking about something, and
if I move ahead with it, I’ll get in touch with you.”
It was not very long, maybe just a few days, maybe a week, he called
me to his office, and he said, “I’m thinking of setting
up a nuclear training school.” And he pulled together a group
of people from diverse organizations, quite a few from the Compressor
and Turbine Division—Bob English, Eldon Hall, a bunch of others,
and myself. There were about twenty, I think. Incidentally, I think
that’s written up in a book already, that point, and I can refer
that to you in a moment. [Engines and Innovation by Virginia Dawson.
P. 156—NASA History Series.]
We spent all our time in class. I’d go up to the attic at night
to do work on it, homework, and so on. A guy by the name of Jim Blue—the
Nuclear Division people were the ones who really taught us. It was
the Nuclear Division in NACA at that time. I guess we spent over a
year at that. I can’t tell you the exact time.
Then, after that, I became head of a shielding group and also a group
to look at nuclear propulsion, so that led me into the nuclear field.
[Other than 6 months in school] I didn’t have formal training,
but my point is, it came out of the ability to just talk to the boss,
you might say, without any concern.
I can give you another vignette that’s kind of interesting because
things got personal, too. I mentioned Oscar Schey. I didn’t
have a car, and there was an outfit that came to Cleveland that was
going to sell cars at the cheap, you might say. They went out and
got all kinds of orders, and I didn’t have any money, so I went
to Oscar Schey, I said, “Can you loan me money to make a deposit?”
And he did. Then the word came around that they were a phony outfit,
so, fortunately, I went back and collected my deposit and paid him
back. But it’s that kind of—the relationship was there
that way. And I maintained a contact with him till he died, long after
he left NACA, long after it became NASA. He was just an outstanding
person.
I’ve maintained contact with all those people that I could.
In fact, we have reunions every two, three years. [In 2003] there’s
another one supposed to come up in Cleveland next year, of NACA.
Rusnak: Do
you think that kind of attitude was peculiar to your area or was that
kind of—
Finger: No,
it was across the board. The whole organization was encouraged that
way. The leadership in each of the organizations, first of all, they
had all worked together. A big chunk was started at Langley Field
[now Langley Research Center], Virginia, and that’s where things
grew. Out of that came the Ames [now Ames Research Center, Mountain
View, California] lab. Out of that, you might say, came the Cleveland
lab because they all [started there]—NACA Langley goes back—1915
is it, I think. Wallops Island [Virginia] was there as well, but all
the entities that became part of NACA grew out of that center. So
they all had a linkage, you might say. As a result, I think they had
all had a tendency to work similarly.
Naturally, a lot depends on personality, but we had very good leadership
in Washington as well. George Lewis was a key person for the whole
organization. Then Hugh [L.] Dryden came in and led it and became
the deputy in NASA [when T. Keith Glennan became Administrator,] so
there was a logical movement. That became the base, the foundation,
for NASA, when you get right down to it. That and JPL [Jet Propulsion
Laboratory, Pasadena, California].
Rusnak: So
you actually felt the effects of this leadership from the top down?
Finger: Yes.
Oh, yes. It was outstanding. And I learned so darned much from it.
I worked for real giants. No question about it.
Rusnak: What
did you pick up from them in terms of a management style or philosophy
that you took with you in later higher positions?
Finger: It
was, again, really encouraging everyone in your organization to participate.
The best example I have of that is when I became—let me think
now. I’m trying to think where that was. Well, wherever I went,
if I had a staff meeting, essentially everybody was there. Yes, I
might have special meetings with individuals, but, for example, when
I went to HUD [Department of Housing and Urban Development], everybody
was brought in. Then when I went into General Electric, and later
when I took over an energy information organization, I always invited
everyone in. In fact, one time, in the last job, in that job when
I had an energy information organization with public advertising and
everything, and emphasizing nuclear energy, the benefits of nuclear
energy, I hired an outstanding guy who came from General Motors, [and]
had done public information for them. And when I called staff meetings,
everyone was there, including secretaries, and he would leave. He
wouldn’t stay in the meeting. And I said, “Look, we’d
better have a meeting,” so we had a lunch together.
And he said, “Look, it’s a waste of time. ? [I know] what
to do.”
I said, “Look, one of the things we’re doing is going
out on public information. I want to know what all of our people think
about some of the ads we have, some of the messages we have. If any
one of them has a concern, that could very well be a public concern.
A question. I want their ideas.” And that’s what I maintained
through every job I had.
At GE, when I went into GE and had a utility engineering operation
in Schenectady [New York], as well as an energy organization in Washington
[DC], I called everyone together. That theme of encouraging people
to talk, to express themselves, to participate, I maintained all the
way through. And I still think that’s major, a major requirement
for a good organization.
Rusnak: Have
you felt that was difficult thing to maintain in some organizations?
Finger: No,
I didn’t. I must admit—now I’m going into more of
a personal view of how things have [be]come since then—I believe
that’s been undercut in recent years in government, significantly.
I really mean significantly. And, very frankly, I think within NASA
there’s a frowning—there was, at least, and with the former
Administrator [Daniel S. Goldin], who was brilliant and knows the
subject so well, and who I really think a lot of, I don’t think
he could tolerate anything that implied there might be criticism of
something he had done. And that’s contrary to everything I was
ever involved with.
I remember sitting with [HUD Secretary] George [W.] Romney in HUD
once, and he was decentralizing stuff, putting stuff [and organizations]
out into the field and so on. And at a lunch meeting, I said, “Look,
I think that’s fine to involve those people. The big question
you have left, however, is how will you know what’s going on
there and what decisions are being made, and assure that they’re
within the context that you’ve established and that you’re
emphasizing? So you want to encourage that, but it’s distant,
so how will you know?”
He said, “That’s a good question.” I mean, the encouragement
for question was there all the time. And I still believe it’s
essential. I’ve had examples with a former Administrator in
NASA where he could not tolerate a question that he felt implied a
criticism of something he had done, and he would erupt. That was totally
contrary to anything I knew. I might say I followed him at that point
and told him, “Look, you could have chewed the guy out for maybe
giving a stupid question, but you didn’t have to take it out
on everybody at the meeting.”
Rusnak: Well,
if we can get back to some of the work at Lewis.
Finger: Yes.
Rusnak: What
knowledge did you have of nuclear power, propulsion, those sort of
things, before you took this year of class?
Finger: None.
None. Well, I should tell you first, I had never done any work on
compressors and turbines even in the educational programs I had at
City College. I was working on steam engine stuff, things of that
kind. Pretty conventional things. Supercharger. Knew what it was,
what it was supposed to do to help an engine operation, but getting
down to real testing on that, analysis of that testing, getting into
really significant air flow work, I learned that on the job. The bulk
of that I learned on the job.
In the nuclear field, I really had no prior training in the nuclear
field [before the Lewis school]. I knew generally what fission was,
but that’s about where things ended. What kind of radiation
do you get out, and how do you have to match up materials in order
to establish a fissionable mix, and so on, no. That all came through
that training and exposure to it, and then being, again, exposed to
people who really knew that business, who were competent in it, like
some of the people at Los Alamos [New Mexico], or people in some of
the companies like Westinghouse that was doing work on the submarine
program—General Electric, heavily, things of that kind.
You can almost ask the same thing, “Well, how did you get involved
in HUD going from NASA?” Well, I mean, you have a concern. It
happens. When I was asked to come to HUD, we were spending a lot of
time in family groups, in groups with friends, talking about social
problems the country was facing, and to me that was really important.
But we ended up with a mix of social concerns, and working on social
issues as well as technology. That’s when I became the Assistant
Secretary for Research and Technology in HUD.
Rusnak: Tell
me about after you finished this training class. What’s the
first work that you started on?
Finger: I
did some work on shielding related to aircraft propulsion, and also
then added a piece on nuclear rocket propulsion because there was
some talk about space rockets, nuclear space rockets that had been
suggested. I think the first report on that was actually written by
Bob [Robert W.] Bussard, I think in about 1955, and NASA, you know,
wasn’t established till ’58, and the first Russian [Sputnik]
flight was before that. But, still, ’55 was when there was ?
[early] discussion of nuclear propulsion for aircraft as well as rockets.
Work was started in that area, so I got somewhat involved in that
in Cleveland, but not very much. It was more the shielding work that
I was involved in.
Rusnak: What
were some of the key issues in shielding? Was it materials or—
Finger: Materials
and design. More design for particular applications. I have to say,
at that point I was still learning, and it was more learning by actual
practice with a very small group of people. It was a subject that
I had. I didn’t have an organization for that. Maybe a couple
of people and I worked together on it, and we worked then in the Nuclear
Division [which was functionally part of Ben Pinkel’s Materials
and Thermodynamics Research Division] in NASA. Ben [Benjamin] Pinkel
was the head of that division at that time. Frank [E.] Rom was involved
in it. Still is in various ways.
Rusnak: What
did you think of the potential for nuclear power on something like
an airplane at the time?
Finger: Well,
I have to admit I was very skeptical of it. You talk about nuclear
energy when there’s range involved, or the need for very high-energy
propellant out of the fuel, but in an air-breathing engine it just
didn’t seem to me to make real good sense, because you’re
not carrying the major propellant, the air, with you, so it’s
just to heat things up. And that seems to me like you would add a
heck of a lot of weight in a reactor just to heat air [, and for limited
range].
Similarly, there was a ramjet program that was involved as well, and
I got to know the people who were working on that later. I felt that,
too, that it was air-breathing and using a reactor to heat. Aren’t
you adding a heck of a lot of weight to the system? That reactor’s
heavy, and then you have to put shielding on it, heavy shielding if
you’re having a human system. So that didn’t make sense
to me.
Now, on a missile system maybe it was better because you didn’t
need quite as much shielding, but, nevertheless, you had to have real
protection in the system. But the reactor itself was heavy as could
be. In a rocket it’s different. Where you’re carrying
a very low molecular weight propellant, and you get very high specific
impulse compared to the kerosene and things of that kind, so you can
make up for that weight difference, so you get at least double or
more thrust per pound of propellant, which is hydrogen, compared to
kerosene?.
Rusnak: Do
you have any concerns related to the environmental effects of nuclear
power on an aircraft?
Finger: Oh,
well, yes. We looked at that very carefully. In fact, it’s interesting.
Since I was very early—well, before I answer that, let me break
off a little and I’ll—
[Tape recorder
turned off.]
Finger: Aircraft.
Or did we finish that? Where were we?
Rusnak: I
had mentioned environmental concerns.
Finger: Oh,
yes, the environmental considerations. In fact, a very important point.
I found that the safety considerations—and I’m departing
a little bit; I’ll come back to the environmental considerations—were
things that we devoted a lot of attention to in the nuclear rocket
development program to the point that—and in isotope power ?
[for] space application, because I also ended up taking over an AEC
[Atomic Energy Commission] job on that while I had a joint office
job with NASA and the AEC and a separate NASA job. So the safety standards
and requirements were heavily [analyzed and] applied.
Then years later, I met somebody who was working on some of the space
power work, from JPL, and she brought me a package of safety material
that had been turned out when I was running it, and she said, “You
know, these are still the standards we apply.”
In the environmental area, the issue is clearly to avoid having the
radioactive particles, materials, or anything, getting out, and that
became a key issue related to the nuclear rocket program to the point
that at one point in the development of the program, because we had
had failures, I ruled out any further full-scale testing of a reactor
in Nevada till we went through extensive component testing and so
on, to solve the problem. I ran into serious problems with the director
of Los Alamos on that basis. He’s in one of the pictures.
I made that determination at a meeting out at what was then the Atomic
Energy Commission ? [office] out in Germantown, Maryland—we
had a meeting there—and I said, “We’re going to
have no more testing till we figure this out.” It was after
[President John F.] Kennedy. That meeting was after the Kennedy visit
to Nevada and to Los Alamos.
He [, the Los Alamos Director,] said, “If we don’t test,
the program will die.”
I said, “I’m not worried about that kind of a thing happening.
I’m worried about it dying because we keep failing.” That
was a matter of emitting fuel elements and radioactive material from
the operation. That, to me, was absolutely something we couldn’t
accept.
Now, as it turns out, even if you emit some particles in upper atmosphere,
that effect is really not only not significant, it’s so darn
small that it doesn’t count at all.
So, yes, we thought about that. But, incidentally, I also got into
some disagreement with them, and I’m busy reviewing a big [and
important] report[book] that’s being written by a Jim Dewar
on the nuclear rocket program…. When I first got into the program
in 1958, when NASA was established, and then took it over in 1961,
Los Alamos wanted to launch, at least for flight test and maybe for
missions, nuclear-propelled rockets from the ground. I took a position
against that, saying, “No. I see no place where you could safely
start that on the ground, have it hot on the ground, nuclear operation
on the ground, and then try to launch. You may fail. So where is the
safe launch site, a remote launch site that you’re willing to
sacrifice?” And I ruled that out so that when we talk about
nuclear propulsion now, it relates to in a reactor starting in orbit
so it’s already in space, and it’s cold, nonradioactive
at that point, starts up from there and goes from there.
Now, with isotope systems you can’t do that because they emit
right to begin with, so you have to build a safety system around that,
which assures that they can be contained even if they fail, even if
they fall into the ocean or on the ground or wherever. And you launch
them in such a way that they won’t fall on the ground; they’ll
fall into the ocean. We went through all of that.
But I ended up disagreeing again with Los Alamos on that [ground rocket
launch], and the general policy today is nuclear in upper stage, not
a ground launch stage [, and the use of nuclear propulsion and power
in space when it realistically enables necessary space missions].
Rusnak: It
seems with something like an upper stage, that’s where you get
the most advantage of a nuclear power anyway.
Finger: Of
course. For deep space. I get very concerned when some people say,
no—and some of the defense people talk about having a nuclear
system in orbit. I say, well, you could do that with an isotope system,
maybe, so go to high altitude, high orbital altitude, but the fact
is, solar energy’s there for as much as you want, so maybe a
little bit heavier, a little more costly, but you can keep recharging
[so] as you go into the dark period, and so on, [there is] no problem.
In fact, I was on a study where I raised a question on that same issue.
I don’t know what they’re going to do, but they’ve
talked about possible missions for the Defense Department in orbit
for isotope power units, and maybe it will make sense. I don’t
know. But for deep-space missions, for propulsion and power, you’re
going to have to have it. And for Mars missions and so on, you’re
going to have to have a nuclear reactor power system.
Rusnak: Can
you tell me what sort of work you’re doing with the Air Force
on the nuclear aircraft?
Finger: What
I was doing with them?
Rusnak: Yes.
Finger: I
really wasn’t doing anything with them. See, it turned out that
much of that work got cut back—well, I shouldn’t say that,
because the Atomic Energy Commission and the Air Force had a joint
office before NASA was established, and they were looking at both
aircraft and rocket propulsion. The rocket propulsion was in relation
to missiles, principally, and there were two labs working on it, Livermore
[Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California] and
Los Alamos. Two AEC labs, Livermore and Los Alamos. They both were
working on the rocket, and then it was decided, no, Los Alamos will
do the rocket, Livermore will do a ramjet, an air-breathing ramjet
for missile applications. It was called the Tory Reactor Program—no,
it was called the Pluto Program, but the test reactors were Tory reactors.
That’s what it was. And that program got killed after one or
two tests out in Nevada. It was after ’58. Then I was involved
with those people to some degree just to know what was going on, because
some of the lessons there related to the nuclear rocket Program succeeding
in that. But I really wasn’t involved in any of the air-breathing
work, and it died very quickly. There was clearly no benefit very
early in the game.
Rusnak: Maybe
you can say a few words on the effect of the Soviets launching Sputnik
and then the subsequent creation of NASA.
Finger: Well,
that was disturbing. There’s no question, it really was, just
because we felt, gee, we had to move ahead. To me, the remarkable
thing is how quickly the United States moved forward in establishing
a capability in that area and an organizational system for space activity,
because within NACA, although there was some rocket testing, that
was certainly not encouraged in NACA. Cleveland did a little work
like that. John [L.] Sloop and a few other people did some work in
that area, but very limited. So NACA was really not involved in that
area—I’ll come back at another point—but there’s
no question that NACA then very quickly was put into the situation
of having to work on developing the legislation for such a program,
and it was clear they were going to be proposed to be the lead of
that kind of a program.
Some of the congressional people really wanted the Atomic Energy Commission
to be given that authority. [Sen.] Clinton [P.] Anderson, I’m
pretty sure, wanted the Atomic Energy Commission to be given that
responsibility. But, anyway, I wasn’t involved in that. I never
really got into that. I was very negative on that.
Rusnak: I’d
read in one of your previous interviews that you had some involvement
in going over some of the wording of the Space Act and such.
Finger: Very
little, really. The Space Act was well set when I got into NASA. Paul
Dembling got significantly involved in that, and a few other people,
but I can’t say that I really did. No.
Rusnak: What
did then the creation of NASA from the NACA core, what effect did
that have on the work that you were doing?
Finger: Well,
the Saturday before October 1, 1958, I was in Cleveland. As far as
I was concerned, I was going to keep working there. I got a call from
Abe Silverstein, who was already spending time in Washington with
a small group of people. We were just ready to go out, and I got on
the phone and he said, “Harry, I’d like to have you come
to Washington to work in this new NASA, new space organization.
This was Saturday. I said, “Well, when do you want me to start?”
He said, “How about Monday?”
And I said, “Okay.” I didn’t know what I was going
to do or anything like it. I really didn’t. And I accepted the
job on that basis. It was fine by me.
[Tape recorder
turned off.]
Rusnak: We
were just talking about how Abe Silverstein asked you on a Saturday
to come work—
Finger: On
Monday.
Rusnak: —on
Monday.
Finger: And
every Monday morning a plane would come down from Cleveland, from
the Cleveland airport down to Washington, we’d live here for
the week, go back on Friday. Did that for a few weeks. That was in
October, and we moved here in December, that fast, all of that, and
without any question to what I was going to work on.
Now, I will tell you that when I came here, the fact is, there was
a pretty good group of people from various of the labs, from Langley—Ira
[H. A.] Abbott was over a big chunk of it. Abe was over another piece
of the organization, and he had people not only from Lewis, but from
other labs as well.
The best description I have of the room we were in, for example, is,
it was like a classroom where Abe sat at the front on one side, not
in the middle, facing all the rest of us. We had desks—about
four, as I recall—in a row, looking up at Abe. We worked together,
we lived together, we ate together, and we went looking for places
to live here together. We, I think, really developed, again, this
team concept. Here we were in the same room with our boss, you might
say, and in close association with others, and, again, there was that
freedom of discussion. Each of us ended up with assignments. We didn’t
necessarily get the assignment right away, so I ended up—I think
you have my biographical sketch—.
Rusnak: Yes.
Finger: I
ended up, as you can see, right away with an emphasis on advanced
propulsion, nuclear power and propulsion, and so on, because of the
background I had in that school that Abe had set up. And I guess that
was one of the things he wanted me to come work on.
But that led very quickly to the whole issue of how NASA would take
over that nuclear rocket work that was being conducted by the joint
office of the Air Corps and the AEC. And because the president made
the determination that that responsibility would be transferred to
NASA, that was a blow to the Air Corps, I would say, at least to the
people running it. General Keirn was over it all, but Colonel Jack
Armstrong was in it. There was Colonel Howie [Howard R.] Schmidt,
Major Ralph [S.] Decker—when we ended up with my heading the
joint office of NASA and the AEC in that area, ? [but] it was a lot
more complicated than just happening, Howie Schmidt and Ralph Decker
were moved in so we had a few Air Force working in it as well.
But the Air Corps—Jack Armstrong just didn’t like that
switch at all. No question about it. But it was, I would say, [NASA
Administrator T.] Keith Glennan who really fought ? to get that office
established as a joint NASA-AEC office, or AEC-NASA office. John [A.]
McCone was the head of the AEC, and I don’t know if he was really
deeply interested in making the switch or not. He could accept it,
I expect, either way, so it took Glennan’s persistence on it.
But it took a heck of a lot of political effort on his part, because
he had major congressional people opposed to the transfer, Clinton
Anderson especially. He, after all, represented New Mexico. Los Alamos
was there. They were already working with the Air Corps. They liked
it that way.
There were some contractors who were involved in some of the test
equipment—turbo pumps, nozzles, and so on. I think they all
felt—they couldn’t voice anything related to it, and they
knew that organization. So it took a couple of years—’61,
I think, or ’60. I can’t remember. ’60 or ’61
[August 1960] before the transfer was actually made, and I participated
in all of the discussions and all of the decisions even before that
time.
Then when the transfer was made, I was made manager of the joint AEC-NASA
Space Nuclear Propulsion Office. I still headed the NASA activities
because the AEC would handle the reactor and be involved in the engine,
but the vehicle would be NASA. Then later I got another job as heading
the isotope power work in the AEC.
My deputy in the joint office was Milt [Milton S.] Klein, who had
been working at the Argonne National Laboratory [Argonne, Illinois]
system for the AEC, so it was a joint AEC-NASA operation. I think
we established ourselves very quickly. We built a good team of people,
and worked well, I think, with all the organizations that were involved.
I can tell you that Clinton Anderson was not happy for some time,
but then it wasn’t too long before, in a couple of hearings,
he said he had been wrong. He said, “You’re doing a good
job,” in the public hearing, and I have the records to show
that. [Laughter] So it all worked out really well.
Rusnak: Why
do you think Glennan was so persistent in getting this for NASA?
Finger: Well,
I think the broad feeling that it had to be civilian. It was not going
to be a military system. And it was going to be for [space] exploration.
The aircraft business, basically, was going to be eliminated, and
even if there was aircraft application, then, again, civilian. The
military—the missiles side—really died because there were
missiles developed, chemical missiles that could do the job. And that
application died.
But the fact is the president actually had made that decision very
early, right when NASA was established. He said it was going to be
transferred. So the issue was, how do you effect the transfer? And
that’s what Glennan was charged with doing, and he did. Did
he have questions about it? His concern was, how will you be able
to launch the system? What will be the acceptance of it? Things of
that kind. The normal things, to the point that Jim Dewar then writes,
“Glennan was antagonistic to the program, and so was Dryden.”
And I said, “Heck, no, I worked in it. They weren’t. They
raised valid questions.” [Laughs]
I’ve been reviewing that thing [book]. I’ve got cases
of it. He’s been working on getting it published, and it’s
going to be published by Kentucky University Press.
Rusnak: I
was reading in Glennan’s diary that there was some opposition
to you particularly being in charge of this. Do you recall why that
was?
Finger: Well,
did he indicate the source of the opposition? Because I think, again,
it was Clinton Anderson. Part of it being that I came from Lewis.
Very specifically, there was a study that was done by RAND [Corp.]
after ? [Ben] Pinkel left Lewis and went there, and there was work
going on on nuclear propulsion at Lewis, but not related to the same
configuration that Los Alamos had picked…. It talked about tungsten
systems and so on. And RAND had come out with a somewhat negative
report on the technology that came from ? [Los Alamos], so he was
angry that this guy from Lewis, working at RAND, was leading this
study. And even when we established the joint office—related
to assuring that people worked together, I also always felt you had
to have very strong technical capability in the areas that you were
managing. I still feel that way, and I think there are some problems
occurring recently on that subject.
But as a result, I set up an [extension] office, reporting to me [in
the joint office], at Lewis to work on engine systems and technology
using the know-how within Lewis. I set up another one in New Mexico,
in Albuquerque, to work with Los Alamos [and I also set up an extension
at Nevada Test Site to link more fully to our tests there]. Later
on, when we got to a vehicle, [in my NASA role], I set up one at Marshall,
when the Marshall Space [Flight] Center [Huntsville, Alabama] became
part of NASA, to have a capability that reported to me so I would
have really solid technical know-how supporting my work.
And there’s no question that Anderson was very opposed to having
anything at Lewis involved with this because he had the notion that
they were opposed to nuclear energy and to the concept that was being
worked on. I think that had a lot to do with it. But beyond that,
I don’t think there’s any question that he favored the
Air Corps people, and he even talked about having them lead the work,
even if it was a NASA job.
Yes, they did have concern about me, and I don’t think it was
on technical grounds, but that was reversed later when Clinton Anderson
came out—and he literally said, “I was wrong in opposing
you. You’ve done a great job.” He specifically said that,
and that’s where I think the opposition was.
Rusnak: It
was nice that you got that validation from him eventually.
Finger: Oh,
well, I’ll tell you. [Laughs] It was very helpful. It was—no
question. Because it was a real worry. And it inhibited Keith Glennan
quite a bit. In fact, one time, Anderson—before I was appointed,
Anderson made a talk where he included some quite negative remarks
about me. Glennan wrote a letter to him indicating that he was in
error, that he was wrong. Of course, he didn’t respond to that,
but later he did.
Rusnak: What
can you tell me about Glennan as a man and the Administrator, and
just how he managed things?
Finger: Well,
first, you should remember that in—let me think now—[nineteen]
fifty—whenever I got my master’s degree in aeronautical
engineering, I went to night school after being in NACA. ? But I got
that from Case, and he was president of Case Institute of Technology
[Cleveland, Ohio], so he handed me that degree. So I had at least
that [very limited] contact with him. That’s all.
Again, he was a guy you could really be open with, fully open, just
like Jim [James E.] Webb later, bringing in good people, talking with
them, encouraging them to participate, and all the rest. It was a
very open situation.
I’ll never forget one big meeting that he had when we were starting
with Marshall to talk about the Saturn V vehicle for manned space
flight. That decision, you know, was made under Glennan, to start
really working on men in space, and so on, and having a vehicle capability
for that. That led to hydrogen upper stages that Von Braun wasn’t
keen on, but Abe Silverstein was because he knew hydrogen—and,
incidentally, that goes back to the fact that in NACA there was work
done on a hydrogen-propelled aircraft, and if you used hydrogen propellant,
again, that reduced the need for a nuclear capability in aircraft
propulsion. Just hydrogen fuel, you know. So it worked out very well.
So hydrogen
capability came heavily from Lewis, and the Saturn V had that upper
stage. In that big meeting in the basement of the Dolly Madison House—which
is still down there, and that’s where the Headquarters of NASA
was when it was established, and the Wilkins Building next door, and
most of us were in the Wilkins Building. I was in there. The Marshall
people were already part of NASA. There was a big discussion about
the configuration of that vehicle. I can’t say that I was a
very forward guy or anything like that. In fact, if anything, I was,
and I think I still am, a little inhibited in standing up and voicing
my view in a group, and so on. But I had no hesitation, with Glennan
at the front of that table, with a pretty darn big group from all
the labs, standing up and saying, “Look, I think you ought to
make that first stage of the Saturn V big enough in diameter so you
can anticipate having an upper stage with a nuclear rocket, and you’re
going to have to have it in large volume to take care of that low-density
hydrogen [propellant] up there. It’s going to be really large.
So I suggest you make the diameter of that first stage as big as you
can. And if you want to limit it to the [vehicle assembly] facility,
make it as high as the hook height in the place where you’re
going to build the stage.”
The next day—oh, by the way, at that time I was in another office
on Pennsylvania Avenue. NASA took over another office there. In the
elevator there, I ran into Eberhardt Rees, who was Von Braun’s
deputy, and Eberhardt said to me, “Harry, what are you trying
to do? Have a pinochle game in that vehicle?” [Laughs]
And I said, “No, you know what I’m trying to do.”
But the relationships were that way, across the board, and there was
such a real team sense that I felt in dealing with all these people,
and it didn’t matter how high you went. It was a lesson I learned
from then on ? wherever I went.
But, anyway, we worked, I think, pretty well in getting that vehicle,
the Saturn V, designed. And it was the hook height in the Michoud
[Assembly] Facility [Louisiana] that made the determination of the
diameter.
Rusnak: Glennan
was obviously only there for the first two years of NASA. When Kennedy
comes in, of course, he’s going to bring his own person in—Jim
Webb.
Finger: Right.
Rusnak: Can
you compare the two men for me and then maybe what changes the departure
of one and the introduction of the other had?
Finger: Well,
I can’t really contrast it very much. There’s no question
that Webb had a very broad-scope vision of things, and I’ll
come to that in just a minute. Maybe more than Glennan, although Glennan
had a very broad-scope vision.
Now, you have to remember the objectives weren’t as clear. When
he came in, we were going to develop a capability to do things, and
we would start with some small missions along the way, using whatever
was available wherever we could, but there was no question we wanted
to go to man in space, so we had the astronaut selection process.
Wasn’t that with Glennan? Yes. The first seven astronauts? Yes.
So he was setting direction as well as starting to try to build the
capability, but it was still darned early, and there’s no question
that it was a matter of showing the world that we had technical competence.
Webb came in, that was still the same theme, but some of the technologies
that we were moving ahead with were already there. Certainly we were
already working on the nuclear rocket, we were already working on
getting a big Saturn V vehicle, so some things were already set, but
he broadened it. For example, even though Glennan emphasized education,
Webb really emphasized education. He felt very strongly about getting
universities involved. In fact, when we ended up picking the contractor
who would be involved in building the first nuclear rocket engine,
we ended up picking Aerojet General as the overall engine contractor,
with Westinghouse as the reactor contractor. The main question I got—I
was chairman of the Evaluation Committee, let me put it that way—was,
“How are you going to use the universities?” And in everything
he did, that was a major issue, to the point that he had a person
in charge of university research activities.
Another one was, what are the technology benefits that derive in the
civilian sector? So he had a technology utilization organization that
was a very major element.
Overall management was a significant thing. He actually went out searching
for management people and key individuals that he might fit in in
various ways, even if they didn’t necessarily lead an organization.
He himself, I would say, became the major presenter on the Hill on
the broad scope of NASA’s program. He had just come in a very
short time before when at one hearing on the nuclear rocket program,
Norris Bradbury, who was the director of the laboratory back here—well,
this is Norris Bradbury and Ray Schreiber there. Came in and they
came over to our house before the hearing. The two of them were going
to be testifying, and so was I. That evening we talked over the testimony—let’s
see, Schreib is not in this. This is Seamans. But this is Bradbury
at the director, and there’s Schreib, who headed the rocket
program. They came in, and it was in that hearing—and they were
pushing the ground launch system for a test—and I indicated
to Congress that there were certain concerns that we have about that
possibility so, yes, that’s a possibility, but it’s more
likely we’ll have a chemical launch system with an upper stage.
I remember Jim Webb was standing at the side. He had just become Administrator.
Later, he asked me, “Why were you negative on that approach
to flight test? The Congress was supportive.”
I said, “Because I really don’t think it’s a sound
approach. I have great difficulty with the thought of how we would
get acceptance for that kind of a test where you launch from the ground.
We don’t know how assured we’ll be that the system would
operate effectively, and could there be emissions right there at the
test site. And then you can’t use that test site again for some
period of time till there’s a decay enough.” Things like
that, you know. He bought it, but he had that kind of question.
Later we went to hearings where, since it was a joint office, Jim
Webb and Glenn [T.] Seaborg would be testifying. One of the guys,
Sid Krasik, I remember—in that picture of the nuclear rocket
engine, an outstanding Westinghouse scientist engineer—came
up to me after the hearing, and he said, “You must have spent
a lot of time with Jim Webb on that.”
I said, “Why? I didn’t spend any special time.”
He said, “Oh, he did much better than Glenn Seaborg.”
Glenn Seaborg, Nobel Prize winner, scientist in this area. But in
terms of presenting the program, its significance, the obstacles,
the benefits, I don’t know anybody who could beat him.
Glennan did a super job in presenting all of those things as well,
but I think maybe partly because I was longer with Webb, maybe closer
to him, I felt that way. I should say, with both of them, I maintained
contact with them after they both left NASA. Although I don’t
have contact with Glennan’s wife after he passed away, I still
contact Webb’s wife after quite a few years, so I’m still
in touch with them.
Rusnak: Let’s
talk about actually you setting up the organization to run the Space
Nuclear Propulsion Office, how that worked, how functionally the AEC
and NASA worked together on this.
Finger: Oh,
really very well. Frank Pittman, who was the head of the division
in which the joint office was located in the AEC, was a pretty able
guy, and he had been there for some time. He later left, and a fellow
by the name of John Swartout came in.
In NASA it was—well, the first one—gee, I’m having
trouble pulling out the first name. Oh, gad, I know him so well. Gad.
It’s one of my elderly problems where I can picture the person
so well. I’ll probably think of it, I hope. [Abe Hyatt]
But, anyway, the first guy left. In fact, it was at a certain point
when he became head of the organization that I was in—advanced
propulsion, it was—gad, I’m having trouble pulling it
out. I came back and told Arlene, “Arlene, from now on I’m
on my own, really. There’s nobody in there who knows as much
about it as I do, so that’s an added responsibility. I’d
better be damned serious about it.”
But following that, an Air Force guy came in, General Don [R.] Ostrander
came in, and I think he was there for a couple of years anyway, a
very able guy. He headed the program, spoke a lot on nuclear rockets,
and so on. Incidentally, he came from the Defense Department and had
headed, in the Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Orion Project,
which is the bomb propulsion project. When he came—in fact,
I have the book on that—when he came, he asked NASA to take
it over, suggested that NASA take it over, and he asked me to lead
a team to go out and review the program, which I did. We had meetings
out at General Atomics. This guy, Ted Taylor, was busy working the
program, and Freeman Dyson, a top scientist, who was, and I guess
still is, at Princeton, was in charge of it, and it’s George
Dyson, his son, who wrote that book.
I came to the conclusion that it was a nonusable concept, and in the
meeting, I said, “Look, I can tell you what our report’s
going to say. We haven’t written it yet, obviously. I see no
way of testing it, actually. You may talk about testing it in flight,
but nobody is going to take the chance of putting up a system that
has not gone through extensive ground testing before you take the
risk of putting it to flight and not knowing what’ll happen.
And I know no place where you could do the ground testing. I also
know no place where you could do a launch—,” because they
were talking about ground launch, things like that. So, fundamentally,
I killed the program, and that was in about ’61 or ’62,
while Ostrander was there.
The issue kept coming up. In ’63 NASA put a little money into
it because George [E.] Mueller and some of the people on the Space
Flight thought maybe it’s worth looking at, and they wanted
to set up an organization to study nuclear propulsion and the alternatives,
and I said, “I see no reason to waste our time studying that
one.” And that’s the way it ended up. I’ve pulled
together a lot of background paper. There’s one that I can’t
find in the NASA History Office, which troubles me, and that’s
a paper that I wrote rejecting the concept. The original report. I
can’t find that report anyplace. So it may still be classified,
for all I know. But anyway, that was the situation.
So, again, we looked at various concepts. I’m not sure why I
interrupted to bring that up, what question you asked that led—
Rusnak: We
were talking about initially setting up and organizing—
Finger: Oh,
yes, oh, yes. So what I did was I actually called in people that I
knew into the original Space Nuclear Propulsion Office that I thought
could help us, as well as people who were already working for the
Air Corps AEC program, including the two Air Force people I mentioned,
and Howie Schmidt took on a lead position in that area.
Incidentally, he resents the fact that he was not named deputy to
this day. Just recently he mentioned that and implied that I was opposed
to it. I said, “Look, I had nothing to do with that. They appointed
Milt Klein. I didn’t know him at all. But the idea was, it was
going to be an AEC man and a NASA man, and you’re an Air Force
man. You were—.”
And then I called other people that I knew, like [F.] Carl Schwenk.
I’d worked with him in Cleveland, at Lewis. And there were several
others like that, that I called in and worked together. Then I set
up this extension office. I set up extensions, an extension office
in Cleveland, Albuquerque, actually one in [Jackass Flats, Nye County]
Nevada, also, for the test operations. Bob [P.] Helgeson headed that.
And later, when we went to the vehicle, at Marshall.
The Lewis office is the one that really did the oversight of the engine
work, the NERVA engine, Nuclear Engine for Rocket Vehicle Application,
is what it was. And that became a small, very active office, and I
was very reluctant to add people unless I knew I had a really significant
function for new people, so it stayed small through the whole operation.
And every one of them had major responsibility.
Rusnak: How
did the AEC people feel about NASA’s involvement here?
Finger: That
was fine. Oh, that’s where we were. I mentioned Frank Pittman,
Swartout, various other people. The relationships I had with all of
them, as far as I was concerned, was excellent. I mean, right to the
top. I mean, to the commission. Really very good. I just didn’t
feel any real problem.
Other people—later I found out that Milt Klein had had some
problem after I left. He was my deputy. He became head of the office
after I left, and apparently there was some difference in view. I
don’t know what that was, but I never had any problem of that
sort at all. None. I never felt any problem. We worked and expressed
ourselves well.
[Tape recorder
turned off.]
Rusnak: We
were talking about the organizational setup of the office.
Finger: Yes.
Incidentally, one other thing I should mention. We set up a very strong
Safety Office in it. One of the Air Force people, Ralph [S.] Decker,
headed that office, and that office, to a large extent, continued
to operate long after and across many of the nuclear applications
in space. But that was a key element in the whole operation, and even
in our tests we did major work tracking any emissions to see if there
was radioactive emission from some of the tests, where it went, how
much it was, and the thing is, we were never inhibited in testing.
All of our tests were upward firing in Nevada. We looked at the ground
below it, and so on, you had no problem going right back into those
test sites after any of the tests.
I should tell you that the big problem we had was that we did have
failures of fuel elements. We finally prepared what we thought was
the right [reactor] system design and test [just a week] before [President]
Kennedy came out [to visit the site]. [We] ran that test and the fuel
elements came out. And when Kennedy came, we really didn’t know
what the cause was, but we indicated there was a problem that we’ll
have to examine. When we examined it and I saw fuel elements come
out, it turned out that part of the problem was that a seal had been
put on the wrong end [of the reactor]. It had been put at the front
end so all the fuel elements could expand and vibrate instead of at
the back end of the reactor. That was one element of the problem,
but there were vibration problems.
Rusnak: This
was the Kiwi-B4A test?
Finger: Yes.
You’ve looked at it all. Okay.
Rusnak: Well,
we like to do our research.
Finger: And
then that’s the time I called the meeting. I called people from
Langley because of their work on vibration of aircraft frames; at
Marshall; at Lewis; Los Alamos, obviously. And I called a meeting,
and that’s when I told Norris [Bradbury]—I just made the
decision, by the way. I didn’t ask the commission or anybody
else about that decision; I just made the decision, we’re not
going to do any more [reactor] system testing till we figure out what
that problem was and till we have it solved.
I allowed just one cold-flow test, just hydrogen flowing through,
no fission process. After I ran that test and we actually saw the
vibration—I encouraged that test, and then we did component
tests—I got a letter from Norris Bradbury saying, “Look,
that was a very good test. Glad you required it, but that doesn’t
change my mind about the need for hot testing.” Something like
that.
It took a year and a half of more detailed analysis and testing before
we came to a conclusion that we had the solution, and every test after
that worked fine. Well, Kiwi-B4[D] had a [nozzle] failure, but that
was a trivial thing, and every one after that just added operating
time to the systems. We could restart and everything else with no
problem.
But before we got to that point, ? [President Kennedy] was there near
the end of the year, we were talking budget, what the next year’s
budget would be, and I remember meeting with the commission—and
this was, again, a matter of how I think you have to talk sometime,
the position you have to take. This is a five-member commission, and
they had a big conference table in the Germantown office. There were
the five commissioners, Glenn Seaborg and Jim Ramey, [Gerry Tape]
and a lot of other people that we’re still friendly with. Of
course, Glenn Seaborg died a couple of years ago—three years
ago, I think.
And here I was, alone on my side of the table, and they said, “Okay,
we’re going to the Bureau of the Budget and recommend a flight
test, present a budget for a flight test.”
And I said, “You have a problem. How do you go recommend a flight
test when we have a problem that we haven’t solved yet in the
reactor itself? We don’t have the vehicle or anything. How can
we go?” I said, “I’ve got a ground test program
that I think we should really pursue before we talk a flight test,
and let’s get ourselves into a sound position.”
And they said, “No, we’ll go for the flight test, and
if we can’t get that, then we’ll back off and go for the
ground test.”
I said, “Well, I don’t know how you go to the Bureau of
the Budget, but I don’t think you go to bargain with them.”
I remember those words, and it was spontaneous.
And they said, “No, that’s what we’ll do.”
I said, “Okay, but I want to be sure you know that I’ve
got a ground test program.”
I then went to see Jim Webb to tell him what had happened and what
my concern was, and he said, “Well, do I have to support them
when we go to the Bureau of the Budget?”
And I said, “Well, I think you should, but I want you to know
that there’s an alternate.” And, sure enough, when they
went to the Bureau of the Budget, I got a call to come over to the
Old Executive Office Building, next to the White House, to talk about
preparing a justification for the ground test program. And that’s
what we got. And that’s what we pursued. We just quit talking
flight test. We cancelled the reactor flight test system.
But it took that kind of a position, and to this day I’ve always
felt you have to be sure, pretty sure of what you’re doing.
Now, you can take risks sometimes, but not risks where you have major
problems and uncertainty. You can’t do that. You really have
to understand that you know how to solve the issue. And in this case
there had been many tests. Every one had a failure, from the very
first one. And it was presented as a great success. Well, I’ll
accept that the very first Kiwi test might be considered a success
because you had to get into use of the operating system and the test
facilities and everything else, and when “Schreib,” Schreiber,
said it was a success, I just let it ride. I didn’t press that.
Okay, you get experience. But it got to the point, when Kennedy was
there, we thought we had the solution. We thought we had it fixed.
I will also say I also took Schreiber to Livermore, where they were
doing the ramjet tests, to talk to the people there about the comparisons,
and that’s where some of the vibration problems were discussed
as well.
So it was a matter of drawing in as much capability as we could, and
that’s part of the concept that I had there and everywhere after
that, on really having in-house capability. I mentioned before that
I have a worry about NASA that way today, and, overall, government
because the emphasis in government today is to contract out, get contractors
to do the work. And I maintain that’s great, you can get really
good people, but you better be doing some of that work yourself in-house
in order to be sure you have an inherent capability to judge what’s
being done by those contractors. Because you never give away the responsibility
in a government agency. I’ve used that term a lot. You cannot
relinquish or reject the responsibility assigned to you as the head
of a government agency, or a project manager in a government agency,
or anything like that, and blame a contractor. Can’t do that.
You’ve got to maintain that capability. That usually means doing
some in-house work in that area.
That’s where I believe NACA was especially strong, and I believe,
also, why NASA was so strong to begin with. The people that led the
programs were people who had been doing work themselves, and they
went out to contractors, in many cases contractors who were not as
equipped as contractors are today because they’ve got a lot
more experience. But, nevertheless, there was an in-house capability
that was really strong, and, I believe, essential. And that’s
what I tried to do when I went to HUD, when I went to the General
Electric program, bringing in people who had knowledge in that area
and had worked in those areas in order to have some real feel for
what we were getting done.
Rusnak: That’s
like the point you had made earlier about the importance of technical
competence on the part of managers.
Finger: Absolutely.
In fact, I’ll be very frank with you. When Sean O’Keefe
was just assigned as head of NASA—and my impression of him is
really very good—my first question was, how is he going to get
somebody who’s a deputy who really is solid in the technical
side of things? Sure, he’s run major organizations—Secretary
of the Navy—he has a concept and knowledge base in some of the
technical areas, but not a deep knowledge in those areas. And it seems
to me that they’ve pulled some people together who do provide
him that technical know-how, but you still have to have more in-house
work done in NASA in order to have a sound, solid technical base on
the major issues.
And that includes at Houston. A lot of the people at Houston, let’s
face it, Bob [Robert R.] Gilruth was an outstanding technical man
who came from Langley, and I knew him, worked with him. Really solid.
And he had a team of people with him who were just that solid, and
also were not afraid of expressing themselves in any way.
And when I think even of the Apollo mission, where you had a guy from
Langley—I mean, it was going to be a direct flight up to orbit,
and so on, and you have somebody from Langley [, John Houbolt,] saying,
“I got a better way.” Speaking up. “I got a better
way.” That’s the way it was—you know, things like
that.
So you have to really look for that, and with the emphasis in this
administration right now—and, by the way, I support this administration—for
outsourcing, the term “outsourcing,” contracting out.
I say that’s great, but tell me, how are you going to maintain
your in-house capability and build it where you don’t have it?
And that’s a real concern on my part.
Rusnak: I
think that’s a concern on a lot of people’s parts, especially
as a lot of that technical capability in NASA is getting older, and
so those people retire, but they don’t have the ability to hire
new people.
Finger: That’s
right. And how do you bring new people in? How do you present them
with an enthusiasm for the work that used to be there? I mean, look,
here was this whole gang at City College that ? proposed [going] to
NACA. It was an outstanding opportunity. How do we present that today?
Because we’ve got to renew that capability. You can’t
just be a manager of a contract. That doesn’t do the job.
Rusnak: Yes,
I’ve heard from a lot of different people that when they got
out of college and sent an application to NASA, that it was the lowest
paying offer they received, but they went here anyway because there
was that enthusiasm for what was going on.
Finger: Kevin,
I looked at some old papers—I’ve got to write a memoir
on this whole program, the nuclear rocket program, for a World Space
Group [Congress] that’s going to be meeting down at Houston.
They meet various places in the world, but they’re going to
be meeting in Houston in October, so I’ll be there for that.
But I looked at some old material. When I took that job, my salary,
when I took the NACA job in May of ’44, was $2,000 a year. We
worked Saturdays so it added—I think I made $2,440 a year. Look,
I didn’t ask—of course, inflation and everything else,
that was fine at that time. It sounds damned low now. [Laughter] But
that wasn’t the issue. I didn’t ask. And when Abe said,
“Come to Washington,” I didn’t ask “What am
I going to be doing?” I find today young people talk a lot more
about—I don’t know, you may be able to attest to that—“So
what, really, will I be doing? I want to know. And where might it
take me?”
And, frankly, I see that a little in my grandson. He’s twenty-nine.
Yes, I think twenty-nine—my older grandson. When he thinks of
a job, it’s “So where am I going to go from there?”
I never thought of that. I keep saying, “Look, I don’t
worry about that; I just figured I’d do the best I could on
that job.” I would learn from that job. Maybe it would open
new things, but I would be regarded reasonably in that organization.
Maybe that would lead to something in that organization. I don’t
know. And that’s, I think, reasonable.
But people tell me things have changed today, and maybe they have.
I don’t know. I probably don’t understand it all.
I’m sorry to get into all that.
Rusnak: No, not at all. I think a lot of things have changed between
then and now, and maybe that’s just one of them. It’s
funny, because I’m amazed at how many people who joined the
NACA or NASA forty, fifty, even sixty years ago, remember to the penny
how much they made when they first started.
Finger: Well,
2440 is the number I always use, then when I saw this thing, it says
2,000. Then I got a pay increase—it didn’t include the
overtime—then I got a pay increase to 2430. [Laughs]
Rusnak: Sure
doesn’t sound like much nowadays, does it?
Finger: No,
it doesn’t. It didn’t matter. I was just getting started.
Rusnak: Yes,
there are these somewhat apocryphal stories about how people wouldn’t
cash their paychecks. They’d just leave them sitting in their
desk drawers for weeks at a time, whatever.
Finger: I’ve
heard that, yes, I’ve heard that. But as I indicated to you,
with that I still had to go borrow from my boss a deposit on a car,
which, fortunately, I didn’t lose.
Rusnak: Yes,
fortunately.
The point you were making before we went off on this tangent, got
at the heart of my next question, which was how was the technical
side of things divided up between the AEC and NASA and all the contractors?
Finger: Oh,
very clear. In fact, there was basically a memorandum of understanding
on that. The AEC had responsibility for the reactor, the Kiwi tests,
and so on, and also follow on into NERVA. And the[ir] funding was
associated with that. NASA had responsibility for the overall engine,
and application in the rocket stage, and funding for that.
The flight test work would have some joint funding depending on what
the objective of the test was. Actually, that’s all written
up. I don’t know if I have that in here. Wait a minute. Oh,
yes. [Reading] “Funding responsibilities for Kiwi-NERVA Program.
To be funded by the commission, the research, development, design,
and fabrication, testing of reactors, including both nuclear and nonnuclear
components, except the hydrogen turbo pump and nozzles.” That
responsibility, through the Kiwi tests.”
NASA had testing of the pump and nozzles and specific nonnuclear concepts.
The ground development phase and so on went to the same corps. All
parts within the pressure vessel, the reactor, was AEC. NASA had the
components and subsystems of the engines other than the reactor core
control drives. We actually had a full definition of that.
What was this? Nuclear Safety was the commission. [Reading] “Nuclear
Health and Safety in connection with the nuclear hazards of nuclear
power for space. Service work was mixed in personnel.” Mixed.
Man, how’d I pick that out so fast? Actually, I picked this
up fairly recently. I had it someplace.
There’s a broad memorandum of understanding, which was signed
by McCone and Glennan in ’60, in 1960, August of ’60.
I said ’61 before. I knew I was wrong.
That basically defines the responsibilities as well. The basic memorandum
of understanding. All that was set up.
I’m pulling all that stuff together. I’ve got it someplace,
but I’m having trouble finding it in my storage. We’ve
got a storage closet downstairs with boxes, and we have a lot of stuff
like these still in boxes, so I went to the History Office and picked
up some of that for this memoir that I’m writing, just to have
it available.
All that has changed now. The Department of Energy, now, on space
power systems, isotope power systems, they used to pay for the isotopes
and so on, when I headed that program. Now, if NASA wants a isotope
power system, the DOE is saying NASA has to pay for that. And on the
nuclear power supplies and propulsion that NASA is talking about now,
the people in DOE have told me that NASA has to provide the funds
for that. That doesn’t sound right to me somehow.
Rusnak: So
the DOE would still have the responsibility for it, but NASA is willing
to pay for it?
Finger: That’s
the implication. I’m still checking that, (because it also turns
out that Sean O’Keefe, maybe because of his Navy background)—I’m
having some e-mail discussion with Gary Bennett, who used to be in
NASA and is now out in Idaho. He’s retired but still very involved
in all of this work.
Sean O’Keefe was Secretary of the Navy, and he’s gotten
a former Navy guy to come in and handle some of the advanced propulsion
areas. I think that’s related to his familiarity with the Navy
submarine people and organization for work on the nuclear propulsion.
Now, the fact is, that group is really solid, that submarine group.
So I don’t resent at all him going there, but I wish he would
also use the DOE people who’ve been involved in that kind of
work for some time. And I hope that there’s some merger. I have
to call the DOE people to find out how it’s actually going to
work, and the NASA people. I just don’t know.
Rusnak: Yes,
I had wanted to talk about this before we had wrapped up, but maybe
now is a good time to have a little bit of discussion about the current
efforts to reinvigorate these advanced propulsion concepts.
Finger: Well,
I’m gratified by it in several ways. Just to give you an example
of some of the kind of arbitrary decision-making that existed before.
When NASA was talking about having a Pluto mission, JPL was assigned
responsibility to lay it out. The ? [administrator] passed it on to
JPL, naturally, and JPL came back with the conclusion that you had
to use nuclear propulsion to get you there. Now, you could use nuclear
power and later convert that to propulsion use, but it’s so
distant that you really had to use nuclear propulsion, otherwise it
would take extremely long to get there.
The Administrator rejected that. They went back three times, coming
back each time with nuclear propulsion before he actually accepted
it. It conveyed sort of a negative image that he saw about use of
nuclear energy, somewhere in the administration, or somewhere, and
I can’t really tell you what because I don’t know what
[his] full motivation was. I’m making an assumption, and there’s
no question about it. But I fault him, and others, not in NASA alone,
but in other agencies, who sort of make their decisions based on what
they think will be desired, accepted, approved, rather than making
the case for what the[y] feel is really necessary to do the job.
Now, maybe Sean O’Keefe has turned around and feels, “Okay,
here’s an administration where obviously nuclear energy is somewhat
accepted,” somewhat more accepted, so he can do that. But I
think it was also the science community within NASA that came back
saying, “Look, if we’re going to go out into deep space,
we can’t spend years traveling out there.” And, similarly,
if we’re going to have humans eventually go to Mars or someplace,
you’re going to have to do it [with nuclear propulsion and power].
Now, the first things are for electric propulsion, for deep-space
science, and I think they use both reactors and isotopes in that mix.
I’m not absolutely sure of that; I’m still checking on
that. But my understanding is that they’re talking about both
reactor and isotope work in that area, maybe with the first emphasis
being on isotope. They’re not talking about therm[al] propulsion,
like a nuclear rocket, yet. And my view of that is fine. Get going,
and let’s get some work started on it, because you fundamentally
have to rebuild the capability.
I mentioned earlier that in this nuclear rocket program, that program
proceeded really outstanding[ly] well to the point that we could have
run flight tests, we could have run mission tests. We had reactor
tests that went for an hour with restart, multiple starts, working
fine, well over an hour in total time, so you could have used it in
a mission. The thing is, there was no mission. So it’s sitting
there. Now my question is, if you ever wanted to rebuild it, what
is the capability you need? Because the really topnotch people who
were there are largely gone. There are a few around, some in industry,
some in Los Alamos, not working at the lab necessarily, but a couple
of these people, and other really solid technical people. I have some
know-how of it, but I think you need the really solid technical people
to do that. So I don’t think I’m as significant as they
are.
So you have to find a way to rebuild it. That means get people to
work in those areas again, and you’ll then be able to draw back
that knowledge base and maybe even extend it further. So I’m
gratified by this decision that’s being made and, apparently,
going to be supported.
Rusnak: Do
you know how much they’re working with the knowledge base that
you created back in your day?
Finger: No,
I don’t, really. As I mentioned, it’s not the thermal
rocket; it’s the electric side. My understanding is that they’re
working with some people, some from Lewis, who were involved—from
Glenn [Research Center], I mean now, who were involved, and also there’s
a group down at Marshall that’s involved in it. And, as I indicated,
my understanding is that Sean O’Keefe has brought in somebody
from the Navy who may have some knowledge base from the submarine
business. But I don’t know that anybody from Los Alamos, for
example, has been involved, nor the companies that have worked in
these areas. And not many of the companies have retained a reactor
capability in any of this. There’s a lot of isotope capability,
but not reactor capability. So you’d have to rebuild some of
that, and I’m not sure how they’re going to go about doing
that. And that’s another reason I have to get together with
some of the Department of Energy people on that subject, that I know
who are still there.
But at least there’s a movement in that direction, which is,
to me, very encouraging. I was delighted. I will tell you, some of
the people who worked on the nuclear rocket program are upset because
it doesn’t include thermal rockets. I said, “Look, thermal
rockets, if you were going to have humans go to Mars, yeah, that’s
what you’d want, but for science missions, electric thrust is
fine. So why not go with that to begin with? At least get back on
track somehow in building a capability. So don’t object.”
I said, “Don’t fight it.”
Rusnak: Can
you compare the relative merits and issues with the isotope systems
versus the reactors?
Finger: Well,
it depends on what thrust power level you want. There’s no question
about it. One of the problems I see today is we have to go out and
buy our plutonium, and so on, from Russia. We don’t have any.
We’ve quit work in isotopes, totally. You know, all our medical
isotopes, essentially, come from Canada. We have no isotope production
in the United States. So I think that’s another issue that has
to be addressed. We’ve got to get back to having some of our
own plutonium isotope production. Not only plutonium; I’m thinking
of medical isotopes and others. It’s a significant area, and
it’s really critical for medical treatment, but it’s also
critical if we’re going to have a significant program on isotope
power production in space. I’m not sure how much we want to
encourage Russia to be producing those fuels.
Savannah River [Site, Georgia] is objecting to some of the emphasis
on isotope, and that’s where I think there would be some. Also,
they’re shutting down some of the major reactors, like the Fast
Fuel Test Facility up in Hanford [Washington]. Things like that. And
that seems wrong to me. So, again, we have to get back to building
back that capability.
That’s a broader problem. That also relates to the aeronautics
deficiency that I mentioned, because we’re shutting down almost
all our aeronautics development capability in the U.S. In fact, if
a company like Boeing wants to do qualification testing on a new aircraft
design, they have to go to the Netherlands, because we don’t
have a wind tunnel here that’s capable of doing that.
So, anyway, I’m encouraged by that movement, and I think it
will restore some of the interest, and I think it will maybe restore
some of the university capability in that area. At least the Department
of Energy is pursuing some programs that aim at doing that. We’ve
had some discussion—actually, I’m working on a group with
the [A]AAS [Association for the Advancement of Science] that I got
invited to work on, talking about how do you restore attention to
civilian ground-based nuclear reactor power supplies. One of the issues
there is restore technical capability among young people to get back
into that business, which was a really booming one for a while. But
it’s totally dead at this point, so they don’t go into
it. And many of the test reactors at universities have been shut down
and are being shut down, so students aren’t really eager to
go into that.
Same thing with the space business. How do you rebuild that? And we’ve
got to.
Rusnak: Did
this current push for returning to these kinds of concepts come as
a surprise to you?
Finger: It
did a little bit. Yes, I didn’t know it was going to happen,
but, to me, it was always inevitable that if we were going to have
any deep-space science or human missions, we would have to go nuclear.
Pluto proved that to a large extent. So there was never any question
in my mind if NASA was going to have a major science exploration program,
you’d have to go that route.
So, from that point of view, it didn’t surprise me. It surprised
me, if anything, that it happened that quickly and visibly. It wasn’t
snuck in somewhere; it was a visible point that was made. And Sean
O’Keefe keeps emphasizing the need for technology development
on power and propulsion so we have a capability to do missions we
may want to do.
My sense of inadequacy in that is, I haven’t yet seen the real
definition of “So what, in fact, are the missions you’re
aiming at?” So you can development the technology, a technology
base, but not one that’s necessarily directly applicable in
all those cases. And you may have to make some adjustment. That might
take time. But at least let’s get the technology rolling and
maintain a strong technology [development] effort, but let’s
get to defining some of the missions more rigorously and fund them
appropriately.
Rusnak: How
different is the technology now than the last time there was a serious
effort?
Finger: Oh,
I don’t think it’s different.
Rusnak: Really?
Finger: I
really don’t think it’s much different. I think much of
the technology is going to be an extension of what was there and get
back to it. I really believe that.
Rusnak: So
in forty years there’s—in terms of that field—
Finger: Very
little was done. Really, very little was done. I saw a little bit
of work in Russia. There’s been some talk of using thermionics,
and that’s a study that I was involved in, but I don’t
see that giving any great benefit over thermoelectrics, which are
more conventional, lower temperature operating systems, so I just
think there’d be a greater tendency to use what’s closer
to available, at least to move us to a position where we know we have
a capability to do some of those science missions, and then keep advancing
the technology.
NASA, and certainly NACA, was a technology research and development
organization. In NASA we always had the Office of Advanced Research
and Technology, in addition to a vehicle development organization.
Ray [Raymond L.] Bisplinghoff followed Ostrander as head of the Office
of Advanced Research and Technology. So we had that advanced work.
The work I did was in that Office of Advanced Research and Technology.
We aimed generally at missions, not a specific one, but we looked
at various alternative missions and worked technology for it. That’s,
I think, what we have to really be sure we emphasize, and I think
that’s what Sean O’Keefe is trying to do.
Under Dan [Daniel S.] Goldin, the interesting thing is technology
was put with the mission, so the technology development work was done
only to the extent of serving the mission need; therefore, it didn’t
necessarily go to a broader advanced look. I always had a criticism
of that, even though I said, well, I want to be sure of it, and even
today, when I say, “Okay, you want that advanced technology,
but tell me what mission you want so at least you’re assured
you have some technology going toward that mission while you have
a broader scope of advanced research.” Maybe we ought to go
back to an Office of Advanced Research and Technology. But you need
to have some good feel for what you’re aiming at so you can
be sure something is pointed at that while you’re doing the
broader advanced work.
But previously the technology development was in the mission office.
Well, what was the priority? The priority was clearly on getting the
mission, not on the advanced research, and the advanced research suffered.
Rusnak: It
makes you wonder if they had kept that emphasis on advanced research
where the technology in this field, particularly, would be now.
Finger: Oh,
absolutely. In my mind there’s no question if we go back to
the nuclear rocket program, we’re going to go back to the materials
we had, to the coatings we had, and all of that. We’re going
to start back there and go from there.
Rusnak: You
mentioned just now materials and coatings. Were those two of the key
problems at the time?
Finger: Oh,
yes. Well, it’s a pretty straightforward one, which is one of
the reasons that there was some question about using tungsten. The
fuel elements we had were graphite. Graphite and hydrogen interact,
always. So you have to put a barrier in there between the graphite
and the hydrogen, and a lot of work went into that, really solid work,
and there were good systems developed that really protected the graphite
over a very extended period.
On the other hand, the tungsten has a problem in that it produces
an isotope that absorbs neutrons, so there’s a negative to tungsten
as well, even though from a tungsten-hydrogen interaction, it’s
really good. But the major tungsten isotope would absorb neutrons
so you’d have to have a bigger reactor, and so on, maybe heavier,
unless you separated out that isotope and went to enriched tungsten,
which becomes a very costly process. That’s one reason that
tungsten wasn’t necessarily the best.
The Lewis lab people, like Frank Rom and others, pushed tungsten,
always, and kept pushing it. That’s one of the elements that
I was thinking of when I referred to Clinton Anderson being opposed
to Lewis, because they were in competition, in his mind, with some
of the work going on at Los Alamos, where they were working graphite.
So the materials went down to graphite particles with coatings on
the particles, all compressed, with coatings on the fuel elements,
and things like that, in the graphite. Both have problems. And maybe
we can find other materials, but I think that’s an area where
there would be further progress made if work were reinitiated. I have
no question about it, really.
Now, we had other advanced concepts. We had gas-core reactors, where
you actually used the fuel within a gas system that was cycling circumferentially
and contained within a reflector to get to very high temperatures
and impulse, and we supported work like that. We supported a broad
range of technology at that time.
So some progress was made on that, but I think that’s nowhere
near available for an actual mission, whereas the graphite systems
are. They would be available to use, if we could [go] back to restoring
the capability, the production capability, and everything else.
Rusnak: It
sounds like more than a few things need restoring in order for this
program to actually go anywhere these days now.
Finger: Oh,
yes. Oh, yes.
Rusnak: Along
that line, you had made the point earlier that they need to define
some missions for this now. What were some of the mission definitions
that you were looking at back in the sixties?
Finger: Well,
there’s no question. The one that’s emphasized most for
human ? [exploration] is the Mars mission, and that’s the one
we were talking about heavily, Mars exploration. You get down to a
point, though, where you have a real almost conflict between the science
community and the community that says, “No, you have to develop
a much broader capability that really demonstrates the very strong
technology leadership and base in the U.S.,” and that means
talk about humans in space. Not only in a space station, but also
in exploration. So that the things you don’t anticipate you
can examine, and so on.
Maybe build a base, maybe eventually get to the point that this Bob
Zubrin keeps talking about, which is, “Sure, let’s have
people go to Mars and get fuel out of Mars to make hydrogen so you
come back with a nuclear plant using that hydrogen.” I say,
that’s real great. How do you build a hydrogen plant without
humans? Do you take it there? How do you get it operating and check
it and all that? So I’m very skeptical with him on that theme.
Fundamentally, the concept is just great, but I don’t see how
you build that and get it going. Maybe I’m too practical on
these things, I guess.
So I say, that’s okay. Have humans go there with a round-trip
capability to Mars orbit, have a nuclear system to bring them back
to Earth orbit. But at least they go then and they can really determine
what it is that the resources provide for you in Mars. You can do
that. Actually, a lot of that can be done without humans, with various
kinds of penetration systems and sample return systems, and so on.
So you can do some of that. But eventually you’re going to have
to have somebody take some kind of a production system there and try
it. How much of that can be done without humans? Maybe some. I mean,
if that’s the case, fine. Depends on what your time scale is,
again. But eventually you’re going to want to have humans go
there. That’s the whole reason for trying to get production
there. So you’re going to have to build a plant of some kind,
and that’s going to take time.
So there are a lot of issues like that, but Mars was the mission we
talked about most for the thermal rocket.
I also think that you get faster trip time with a higher thrust system
like a thermal rocket system than with an electric thruster, because
getting high power is not real easy, high electric power, even in
a reactor. You can use turbo generators, thermoelectrics, maybe eventually
thermionics, but the thermionics are going to have to operate at very
high temperatures to be effective, and I’m not sure what their
life capacity would be if they’re put within the reactor itself.
So a lot of work would have to be done.
There is a report that I was involved with, with a team that wrote
it. I will say the people who led it were people who had been involved
with a Russian Topaz thermionics system, which was imported to the
United States, but the only testing—and I saw that in Russia—it
was pretty good work, but the system that came here only underwent
nonnuclear testing, so it never got to the problems of materials compatibility
with the fuel elements and all of that. So the program was finally
killed. There was no real mission need for it.
So, again, at some point maybe some of that’ll be restarted
to see how we can make that operate. The report was put out probably
a couple of years ago. Maybe not even a couple years, maybe just a
year. I’ve got that here.
There are a lot of technologies that might come back once people really
begin to look at nuclear applications and technology.
Rusnak: First
they have to figure out those applications and find the money to support
them.
Finger: Right.
Right. But I agree with O’Keefe. You ought to have the technology
program that’s going, but I’m a little concerned that
he’s not really aiming at defining what missions are you really
talking about. So the technology base is important and valuable, but
at some point you have to identify the mission.
Rusnak: One
of the JSC people we talked to made the point that when it came to
budget cutting, one of the first things to go were the programs that
looked to the future rather than the present.
Finger: Yes,
that’s right. Always. And that’s a serious problem. I
mean, it’s hard for me to understand where the money will come
from to restore the Space Station to a really usable space research
center, which is what I’ve always referred to it as, the International
Space Research Center. Like a ground center. That’s what I’m
thinking of up there.
But, gee, what is it going to take to prove that the system is credible
and NASA is credible, again? Which is what the review group concluded
was necessary. NASA lost its credibility, and I have to attribute
a lot of that to Houston and the way it was operating. It really wasn’t
emphasizing, recognizing, or openly emphasizing the need for funding,
because they were falling way behind in completing that system.
The second piece of it is that it concerns me that the international
community is really being left out at this point. They put a lot of
effort and a lot of work in, and, sure, some things are continuing,
but fundamentally, I’ve heard nothing really addressing their
needs and restoring any confidence on their part that they’re
still important to the program. As far as I can tell, it looks to
me as if that won’t happen until there’s a decision to
actually go ahead and try to beef up the crew capability.
I wish that when they said that there had been a commitment made,
I still wish a commitment would be made that said, “Okay, we’re
going in, we’re going to try to restore the credibility of NASA
in this area; we’re going to try to get the basic core concept
completed. When we do that, we’ll move ahead and increase the
crew size.” Commitment hasn’t been made on that. So I
worry about whether it will go at all, or will at some point somebody
say, “No, let’s not do it.” I think it’s important
to do it.
I was never a major fan of the Space Station, figuring there’s
a lot of other stuff we have to look at, too. But having gone this
far, I think we really ought to move forward with it and get research
done in space, commercial as well as noncommercial.
Rusnak: I
think you’ll find a lot of people in Houston agree with that,
but I think it’s at the higher levels that you need that kind
of commitment in order to get the funding they need.
Finger: It
needs it. You see, I think it needs it at the leadership level. I
mean, Sean O’Keefe came out of being deputy to Mitch [Mitchell
E.] Daniels [Jr.] in OMB [Office of Management and Budget]. In his
present role, I don’t think he can be that. I think he’s
got to go in and say, “Look, to really do a job, here’s
what it takes, and in order to succeed, here’s what it’s
going to take.” So let’s go with it. Don’t just
dream of the future, necessarily. Let’s get some things done
that we have now and develop the technology, pointing to potential
future things that may have benefits. So you need a whole story in
this thing, and you need that leadership.
Frankly, that’s what I found in Glennan and Webb. I remember
Jim Webb when Apollo was brought up. An estimate came in on the budget
level. He almost doubled it when he went to the Bureau of the Budget.
He boosted it. He said, “Look, I can’t be sure of it any
other way. I’ve got to go up to a larger figure. This is bare
minimum.” And he got it. And that’s what it takes, I think.
Not “How can I squeeze through?” If you want the mission
to be done, then give me some assurance. Let me have margin because
I’m not sure what I’m going to have to do. I don’t
find that leadership.
Rusnak: I
was just going to say those days seem like they were a long time ago
now.
Finger: They
are. They really are. See, Dan Goldin didn’t do that. He didn’t
go battle. He just accepted, and he accepted what he perceived would
be approved, and then praised it. Well, so, there’s a four-
or five billion-dollar overrun on the Space Station, and it’s
related. Instead of really going into battle for it. And here the
U.S. was paying for such substantial part by the Russians, in addition.
Rusnak: Paying
for the substantial part that was supposed to make the rest of it
cheaper.
Finger: Yes,
yes.
Rusnak: You
had the chance, after you’d been working on the nuclear program
for a while, to move into a different sort of experience where you
had an opportunity, I think, to change some things. Maybe you can
talk a little bit about your role as the Associate Administrator.
Finger: Well,
it was interesting how I got into that, because, basically, the line
Jim Webb gave—and these are words he used on me at least one
time and more, I expect, well, one time certainly—“How
can I make a technical man like you understand the importance of management?”
And for some reason he decided he was going to move me into management.
What the background of that was, I don’t know. I guess he thought
highly of me, and he named a few things that he would want to be included,
and it was fundamentally all the management stuff—technology
utilization, education, everything. And he said, “Do you have
concern about that?”
And I said, “Yes, I do.”
He said, “Why?”
I said, “Because you’re so involved in those yourself.
What role could I have in that?”
He said, “No, I want you to take it all.”
See, he tested me first. He tested me first by pulling me out of the
joint office job and my other jobs in NASA and AEC. I still retained
the job in AEC on isotope power, but he asked me to take a look at
our delegations of authority, the statements that were issued on authorities
of different elements of our organization, and various times those
changed. So, okay, a new delegation came out giving authority to somebody.
How that matched with the Space Act itself and the authorities assigned
in the Space Act, the first thing I came to was the conclusion—and
I remember giving it at one of the luncheons we had—he asked
me, “Well, where do you stand?”
I said, “Look, one thing is very obvious. So many of the delegations
of authorities fail to recognize that the total authority for the
agency’s activities are given to the Administrator. So authorities
and delegations are assigned without recognizing that it’s the
Administrator that has the authority.” It was almost like he
was looking for that, because that was a reinforcement of the role
of the Administrator, if anything. So we started from that.
Then various other things, and that’s when he came up with the
idea of making me head—or he must have had that idea before,
or otherwise why would he have assigned me that function. So I moved
into that role with all of the personnel office, contracting, all
the other things came under me—technology utilization, education
programs—and I also had to be in a position to approve program
plans produced by the program offices. I had to go through and give
approval of those, raise questions, and so on. That had not actually
been done in the administrative side of things before that, because
they were kind of fragmented. There was a head of administration,
but not the same role. I just got started doing it, is all I can tell
you, and relying heavily on the people who were already there, although
there was a small group that was more direct staff to me to bring
information in.
One of the early questions I had was related to communication requiring
all administrative actions being brought centrally, from out in the
field, for approval. And I raised—well, it wasn’t quite
that, it was also computerized information, and, therefore, needing
new computers and things like that. I said, “How many times
have you actually had a feedback that indicated there was some problem?”
It turned out, very few. So I said, “So you mean to say after
you did all that, the thing just died?” And, sure enough, that’s
what happened, so in many cases there was no real need for it. And
the test of time proved there was no need, so we didn’t do some
of those things that were included within it. We cut out some of the
administrative oversight function and so on, but instituted some others,
including this program review role that became very significant. So
when George Mueller wanted to move out on some new concept, you know,
yes, we had to look at it, and, to some extent, I have to say, I had
to look at it.
I haven’t thought a lot about that recently, but I did have
to do that kind of thing, and it was interesting and a real challenge
to me. I remember when I was brought up to become a fellow of the
National Academy of Public Administration, which Jim Webb really stimulated.
[Tape recorder
turned off.]
Rusnak: Talking
about being the AA for Organization and Administration. Initially
it seems your route into this was through Webb putting you on a preliminary
study, and then after that they decided to make this a permanent office,
and you got through that.
Finger: He
did. He really did that. And I think you have to recognize the emphasis
he had on management.
Let me go back to the establishment of the National Academy of Public
Administration. He became president of the American Society for Public
Administration. I think that was it. I’ve gotten this roundabout
in various ways. Apparently at one of the meetings of the board of
that group, which is an existing group, American Society for Public
Administration, [Jim Webb] said he thinks the public administration
field needs the same kind of elite recognition that’s in the
National Academy of Sciences, and therefore, he proposes establishing
a National Academy of Public Administration. And I got indication
that some of the people objected to that. And he said, “Well,
if that’s the way you feel—,” and I understand he
closed the books and started leaving, saying, in effect, “Forget
it. I’m not the one.”
But that was what stimulated the National Academy of Public Administration,
and it was then presented and chartered by the Congress, so it’s
like the National Academy of Sciences from that point of view. And
he has pursued that ever since. He was basically the founder of the
National Academy of Public Administration. And that was while he was
still in NASA, still active in NASA.
I’ve become a fellow of that, and so on. I remember giving one
talk to that ASPA group, saying, “You know, I never really thought
of myself as a public administrator, even though I was running projects
and doing work for the government,” you know? That kind of thing.
And I’m very involved with that organization on a variety of
studies, and I find it stimulating, and it keeps me very busy. There’s
a meeting tomorrow morning on an executive organization and management
panel, standing panel. Next week there’s another meeting of
a panel on human resources, public service capability. There’s
a social equity panel, which I haven’t been very active in,
but it’s also a significant one. So I stay very involved with
that. In fact, we’re going down to an annual meeting that they’re
having this year down in Charlottesville at the Boar’s Head
Inn to talk about basically new technology in public management and
administration. That’s one of the elements of it, and we’ll
be there for two, three days.
Then we’ll go down to another meeting down in Hollywood, Florida,
which there is a dual purpose for that. Arlene’s mother lives
down in Hollywood, Florida. This meeting is a meeting of the American
Nuclear Society, and it’s going to go over really examining
the future of nuclear power plants and so on, new power plants. So
I’m still involved in things like that in various ways.
Tonight I’m actually going down to a meeting at the national
Air and Space Museum. A fellow by the name of Mike ? [Neufeld] there
has discussion groups, oh, I would say, roughly, every month or so,
something like that. Today there’s somebody coming in presenting
a story about General [Leslie] Groves, the leader of the whole nuclear
rocket development program. I don’t know what this speaker’s
background is in relation to that, but apparently he’s done
some research on it. I expect I may run into some disagreement with
him, not on Groves or anything, but he’s also at the Natural
Resources Defense Council, which opposes nuclear energy use, which
is an anomaly to me, so how’s he going to present Groves’
stuff? [Laughter] So we’ll see.
So I stay involved in all those things. I’m very involved in
the energy areas, and, of course, as president of the NASA Alumni
League, I still ? [am] involved there.
Rusnak: How
did you feel about making the move to something like technical program
management, like on nuclear rockets, to this more public administration?
Finger: I
had no trouble making it. I didn’t feel anything. It was a very
broad-scope responsibility, and that concerned me to the point that
I wanted to be sure I really had solid people in each of those areas,
but that’s what I always treated anyway. I wanted to know, you
know, if I had a safety issue to handle in nuclear propulsion, that
I had somebody of ? [stature], of capability, in the safety area to
really do comprehensive examination, or at least to be able to be
discerning enough to pull responsible people together to examine it.
Or if there was an issue on testing and some of the technology, I
wanted to be sure I always had capability.
And that’s the same thing that applied here. So I handled the
budget and the personnel and, as I mentioned, the contracting and
the technology utilization programs and various of those. But in each
case, I had very strong people in those areas. And it was a matter
of consolidating those activities. And in many cases you had to get
several of them working together to really do a sound evaluation.
It couldn’t be done just as an individual. I mean, there had
to be team pull on all of that. And that’s the way we did it.
But there, there’s no question, my reporting was very directly
to the Administrator, so I was very involved in most of that work.
I guess that’s where that picture came from. That’s why
I was up in that office, right there, the Administrator’s office.
Rusnak: There’s
been some suggestion that the creation of this office at least had
some political aspect on the part of Webb to kind of reorganize how
the reporting and the power structure, I guess, within NASA Headquarters
was working. I was wondering what your thoughts on that were.
Finger: Well,
I think there’s probably some truth to that. [But not the main
reason.] The fact that I was put into a situation where if you had
the key program leaders, AAs, Associate Administrators, coming in
with plans that this administrative office would have to examine,
that we would have to review and comment on. It was a reflection of
dividing authority, or bringing others into the decision process that
was not necessarily being done up to that time, and being done on,
you might say, an equal footing. There’s no question about that.
The general counsel’s office, obviously, also always had a role,
but management didn’t necessarily. So I think by raising that,
he added another factor in the evaluation of program plans and concepts.
To tell you the truth, I can’t say that I ever really thought
of that that way, but I recognize that that is the situation. I don’t
know if that was his intent, but certainly by making that assignment
he put me in the line of approval. He put the administrative office
in the line of approval of, are there problems that come up in any
of this? Are there things you have to be cautious about? Can you,
in fact, implement based on this? And so on. And we had to look at
it on that basis. And, in fact, our review and approval was required
on each of those situations. I don’t have any hard records that
I’ve pulled out in that area. They’re harder to pull out
because they were very diverse in most situations.
But, yes, that’s there. For example, I got heavily involved
in the issue of contracting out various functions, and I remember
I really got—well, I got crosswise with a congressman from,
I think, Virginia, Porter Hardy [Jr.]. I think it was Virginia or
Georgia. I’m not sure which. Porter Hardy, who was dead set
against having any contractor brought in for management functions.
Really hard.
I had to defend some of the actions we took, but we had a clear concept
at that time, and that was, you don’t give away fundamental
decision process in that area. It’s more a mechanical check,
more a routine check. There was a provision in the Bureau of the Budget
called A-76, that said, what is an inherently government function?
Incidentally, that’s not used hardly at all today. We had to
examine contracts on the basis of that, so you couldn’t give
away really fundamental decision processes that had to be made by
government.
And maybe that’s partly what’s instilled within me, this
concern about assuring an in-house capability in any area, because
you never relinquish your responsibility for implementation of whatever
it is that’s done. You can give away a piece, but, heck, don’t
give away a fundamental decision process to a contractor. Some of
that’s been done. I mean, I look at some of the space mission
positions where they’re out, basically, with a contractor. United
[Space Alliance (USA)] is running a major mission. Is running the
mission. What is NASA’s role in it? What is the responsibility
of NASA people in it? Much harder to tell. So I think there was an
element of that in that assignment. I think that’s the reason
for that.
He also, I think, wanted to re-enforce the authority of the Administrator
in all such decisions, and even with the key program people. Sure,
discuss it and everything else, but we’ve got to have an administrative
review of it across the board.
Rusnak: What
effect did the Apollo 1 fire have on these kinds of decisions?
Finger: Well,
I sat in on all those meetings. There’s no question about it.
I can’t say that it changed things. It was just a major problem
that we faced, and the Administrator was on top of it all the way,
as were others. Bob [Robert C.] Seamans was heavily involved, people
down at Langley were involved, a committee was set up to examine,
and so on. But I can’t say that it really affected how I worked.
I was involved in it. I sat in on those groups, but I can’t
say I was a decision maker in that process. I haven’t thought
about it. I really haven’t.
Rusnak: I
just didn’t know if that incident had brought to light any of
these organizational concerns that were addressed by the creation
of your office.
Finger: I
don’t think so, really. Well, maybe it had some role, but I
don’t know. I really don’t know. I never had that feeling
that it was that that stimulated stuff.
Rusnak: You
ended up staying in this position as AA for a couple of years.
Finger: That’s
right.
Rusnak: Why
did you decide to leave that post?
Finger: Well,
because I had a call about five o’clock one afternoon from the
new undersecretary of HUD, asking me to come over and talk to the
Secretary about joining them. It was the ’67 period, wasn’t
it?
Rusnak: 1967
to 1969, I think, is when you were the AA.
Finger: Yes.
It was in ? [‘67] that I got the call to come over and talk
to the new secretary of HUD, George Romney. I didn’t know him.
I didn’t know the undersecretary, Dick Van Duesen, and I said,
“I’m really thinking about leaving government,”
and, in fact, I had explored a couple of possibilities. One was to
go to Westinghouse and maybe head all the international activities
at Westinghouse. There was another one to—well, not General
Electric, but another company, but the principal—I was thinking
of leaving government.
I got this call, and it was during that period of turmoil in the cities—riots,
real problems—we discussed major issues related to just normal
living in the cities, L.A., Chicago, and so on. I got the call, and
they talked about two different jobs, one to head all the administrative
functions in HUD, or to head all the research, and they were going
to establish a new position of assistant secretary for research and
technology. For research; they didn’t have a hard concept of
it. And which would I prefer? And I said, “Well, I think I’d
lean to the research one, but I can’t say that I’m really
experienced in these areas.”
And they said, “Well, look, that’s okay. You’ve
done a variety of work.” So I asked if I could just think about
it a while.
They said, “Sure. Call us back.”
Well, I realized right then they never asked me my political affiliation.
Didn’t ask. And I’ve told this to a couple of people,
but not too many.
The next morning I called this Dick Van Duesen, the undersecretary,
and I said, “Look, in case I decide I do want to come over,
I don’t want things to get spoiled because you didn’t
ask me some questions that may be significant.”
He said, “Like what?”
I said, “Well, neither you nor the secretary asked me anything
about my political affiliation.”
And they said, “Well, what? What’s the problem there?”
And I said, “Well, I’ve always been registered as a Democrat.”
He said, “Where?”
I said, “Maryland.”
He said, “It doesn’t matter.” It just didn’t
matter.
I ended up deciding that—by the way, there were a lot of changes
that had been made in NASA I should point out, while I was there,
in the way things were run, the way presentations were made, the way
program proposals were made, program plans, and so on. A lot of that.
A lot. And I decided, well, okay, maybe this is a good time to make
a change, and I’m interested in some of these areas, some of
the social questions, and so on. So I decided to take that, the research
side. And that’s just the way it happened. It came out of the
blue.
I really don’t know how they learned of me. I have a hunch that
I’ve never checked out, that one of the people that had worked
in AEC, who had also worked in HUD and handled some of the administrative
functions, although not the totality of it, may have suggested me,
and I’ve never specifically asked him that question. He never
volunteered it, so I figured, “Okay, I won’t ask him.”
And I see him even now. So I have a feeling it may have come from
there that word got out, but he left HUD about that time and went
to Bureau of the Budget, I think, and he was in government a long
time after that. He went someplace else. So I decided to take that
job.
Rusnak: Do
you have any regrets leaving NASA?
Finger: Oh,
no, not a bit. It produced a much broader range of activity. I had
never lost my connection with NASA and its people and the programs
I was involved in, but there were new opportunities, new interests
that came up with it, new technology areas, major new programs on
the social side as well as the technology side, and I really am delighted
that I made that move. I should say, of course, from there it was
still the NASA connection that got me to GE, because it was Tom Paine
in NASA who went to GE and asked me to come to GE.
Rusnak: By
the time you had left NASA, had your style of management or your basic
principles changed since you first start managing people there?
Finger: Gee,
I don’t think so. I don’t know that they’ve ever
changed. [Laughs] I really don’t. I honestly don’t. I
think I’m being honest in saying no, I’ve had the same
perspective. You work with a team, with everybody. Everybody’s
got to have a role in the operation, and that I’ve encouraged
that. I’ve always worked it that way. That’s kind of a
theme, and you want to get really good people who have a real capability
in those functions.
Incidentally, when I went to HUD, one of the first things I did when
we got to talking building technology and so on—well, before
that even, when I was in the AEC. When I took over the AEC isotope
power job, when I had the three jobs, in AEC, a joint office, and
NASA, the AEC job, I wanted an organization that would help me on
the isotope power development, and I went to Sandia [National Laboratory]
and got a group set up there to be an arm of mine in the technology
of isotope power units. The same concept that I’d gone along
with all along.
When I came to HUD, I looked for a building technology capability,
and it turned out the National Bureau of Standards, now the National
Institute of Standards and Technology, had some people who had worked
on building technology, and I set up an office there to serve as an
arm of mine, because one of the things we went to work on in HUD very
early was what was called Operation Breakthrough, a major program
to develop new technology, new production methods, for housing, to
try to reduce the core costs and improve quality. And I needed capability
in that area. I actually lined up with some of the unions as well
in that process. In fact, we had major meetings with the unions talking
about that Operation Breakthrough.
Now, Operation Breakthrough had technology elements as well as building
sample communities of mixed income housing, trying to provide a social
mix of people in sample communities. So here I was again, technology
and the social issues very significantly there. We built several sample
communities around the United States, in Michigan, near Atlanta, in
Georgia. We tried to build one in California—Sacramento—Phoenix
[Arizona], various places.
We tried to build one in Delaware, New Castle, Delaware, and the governor
had proposed a site. We got proposals from various locations. The
governor proposed a site. When we picked it, there was an uproar in
that community. Automatically, if it was government coming in, it
had to be public housing. They didn’t want public housing. So
we finally backed out of that site.
While I’m talking to you, I’m thinking, did we ever build
one in Houston? I can’t recall. I’ll have to check that.
I can’t recall. It’s out of my head right now. [No we
did not]
But anyway, so we moved forward on that kind of a program and I had
to build an organization, and the way I built it was the same way
I’d built it before, looking for technical arms in those areas
wherever I could find it.
The last thing I started was a program called Housing Allowance Experimental
Program. One of the issues was, are we better off building housing
for the poor, or giving them money to improve their housing situation.
So we started this program, Housing Allowance Experimental Program,
where, in sample communities, we gave people money and tried to measure
what did they do with the money. Who would manage such a program?
We had local housing authorities or other government groups within
the cities or states. And would it generate new housing construction
on its own?
The interesting thing is—I left probably two years after that,
a year or two after that program got started—the program ran
for ten years, with detailed data evaluation all along the way, and
it became the base for a major housing program called the Section
VIII program, where they provide vouchers or certificates. Certificates,
you can use the money given on a certificate in a particular housing
unit that they’ve previously approved as acceptable. So it is
a boon to a developer who wants to have some assurance of the income.
A voucher is one that people can use it any way they want. Things
like that.
There was a whole variety of things that we worked on in that program,
but one of the elements was developing new technology. And, again,
as I mentioned, we built sample communities with a mixture of technologies,
but with that also a mixture of social makeup in the area to see how
it would work.
I keep saying, one of these days—I haven’t done it—I’d
like to go back and visit each of those sites to see how they’re
operating, contrasted with the problems that were very apparent then
in public housing, which were really serious.
In fact, at that time we were destroying public housing, like out
in St. Louis, the Pruitt-Igoe Project, we destroyed because it was
a total social failure, with criminal acts and so on. I remember being
out there once and I was being led around the area, and as we passed
the entrance to the [unclear], I said, “Wait a minute. Let’s
not go by here. Let’s go in there.”
The guy who was escorting me said, “We’re not going in
there without an armed guard.” In public housing. High-rise
public housing. Things like that.
And in Chicago? Awful. And yet Chicago’s a city made up of such
a mixture of people and uses and everything. I don’t know. There’s
some of that, I expect, still exists, but some day I may—I keep
saying I’d like to go back and revisit the sites. I’ll
have to look it all up and see if Houston is on the list of one of
the sites. It was that kind of a variety of things.
I, by the way, kept Tom [Thomas O.] Paine involved. I even kept Jim
Webb involved in some of the things I was working on and considering.
I goofed one time, seriously, because one of the Appropriations Committee
chairmen proposed a site for Operation Breakthrough, and instead of
his site, we selected another one in his state, and somehow in the
press release I emphasized that site, the competitive site. Well,
he wanted to eliminate the whole budget as a result.
So I talked to Jim Webb and I said, “Look, can I go to the chairman
of the whole committee and indicate that this is a problem?”
And he said, “I’ll tell you, Harry, I know the chairman.
I’ll just mention it to him.”
And I said, “I think I want to send a letter to this congressman
to apologize for what I did.”
He said, “That’ll only hurt you more.”
I went to him for advice, and we ended up getting the money we needed
for the program, for the one site anyway.
Okay. Anything else on that?
Rusnak: Actually,
I think we’ve covered most of the topics that I had brought
with us. We’re getting close to the end of this tape, but I
don’t know if there’s anything else you want to talk about
before we wrap it up today.
Finger: Well,
the one thing is the move to GE, because that was a dramatic one,
and very important for me in getting into a whole area of energy use.
It came shortly before the major oil crisis grew, where I was told
to head a utility engineering operation in Schenectady, as well as
setting up a center for energy systems, to really do energy studies,
with GE feeling that was an important area.
Reg [Reginald] Jones was the chairman at that time, and Tom Paine
headed the utilities side of the business, and so he brought me to
GE, and I went with that and I was really very happy about that.
Shortly after that, he made me the—well, there was another person
who came in, and I was made the head of strategic planning for the
utility business, and continued for some time in that role. And I
have to say, if we have this apartment, it’s because I went
to GE.
Then from there, partly because of people I had met in the energy
business, I was asked to come to head a new organization on informing
the public on energy systems and specifically nuclear energy power
plants and their benefits, and trying to stimulate investment in nuclear
energy power plants. That was the U.S. Council for Energy Awareness,
which I stayed in for quite a while and, I think, did very well there,
as well with major international interfaces in the energy area, and
that’s what got me heavily into the energy business generally.
So it was a broad scope of things. Fundamentally, I still stayed involved
in all of those things that I ever worked on, in various ways. I try
to stay informed on them, but I have to say it gets damned tough when
you’re not really directly working on it, so it’s a matter
of reading as much as possible, going to meetings, and going to hearings
up on the Hill frequently.
For example, this morning there was one that was postponed from the
fourteenth to today on the waste site, Yucca Mountain Waste Site,
which I’m very interested in and involved in to some degree
in evaluation and so on. So I stick with all those things. Yes, it’s
been fabulous being in all these things.
Rusnak: You’ve
certainly had an interesting variety of areas to cover of subject
matter. It’s amazing.
Finger: It
is. It really is. I can’t say what is my primary role. I have
difficulty saying that. It’s being involved in major issues
that confront us in many ways, and that’s the way I view it
as well as just talking very strongly about the benefits of the space
program, which is not one of those major issues that confronts us.
Energy is. Housing and community development issues are, and so on.
And broad public management I think is a big issue. Space, to me it’s
very important, so I want to stick with that and be involved.
Rusnak: My
tape’s about to run out, so we at least need to stop here for
a second.
Finger: Okay.
[End
of interview]
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