NASA Headquarters Oral
History Project
Edited Oral History Transcript
Charles
F. Kennel
Interviewed by Sandra Johnson
San Diego, California – 21 October 2002
Johnson: Today
is October 21, 2002. This oral history interview with Dr. Charles
Kennel is being conducted at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography
at the University of California, San Diego for the NASA Headquarters
History Office. The interviewer is Sandra Johnson, assisted by Rebecca
Wright and Jennifer Ross-Nazzal.
I want to thank you again for taking time out of your schedule to
meet with us today.
Kennel: My
pleasure.
Johnson: For
the past thirty-five years or so you’ve worked with NASA in
a number of capacities. Can you tell us about how you first became
involved with NASA?
Kennel: Sure.
My first really good paper was to analyze NASA data on the Earth’s
radiation belts, and this paper, which I wrote with Harry [E.] Petschek
and was published in 1966, we used data from the early NASA satellites,
and my and Harry’s theoretical understanding of plasma physics
to show that plasma processes in space actually were limiting the
number of electrically charged particles that could be trapped in
the Earth’s radiation belt. So I was, from the beginning, a
space plasma physicist.
When I came to UCLA [University of California, Los Angeles] in 1967,
August 21 of ’67 I turned up, part of the recruitment deal was
a one-day-a-week consulting job that I had with, I think it was called
then, the Space Analysis Group at TRW Systems. At that point, I was
working with a gentleman named Fred Scarf, who has passed on, died
in 1988. Fred was a co-investigator measuring fluctuating electric
fields in space on spacecraft. The one that I remember was OGO 5,
which is a very pioneering spacecraft. I got an opportunity to look
at the data and reduce it in the light of theory. It was very interesting.
But Fred was deeply involved in all of the work that was required
to put a spacecraft into orbit and to build the experiment. So from
Fred I learned my first part about how space experiments get built,
and I actually consulted. You know, I watched them put the stuff together.
Then about three years later, in 1969 or ’70, one of my UCLA
colleagues came to me. His name was [William M.] Bill Kaula. He’s
also just recently passed on. Bill came to me and said that he was
on something over at JPL [NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory] called the
Science Advisory Group, and this group had been put together chaired
by Jim [James A.] Van Allen, my hero. This group had been put together
by NASA after [United States] Congress had voted down a program to
go to the outer planets called the Grand Tour. The Grand Tour was
supposed to go to all the outer planets. It was a single astronomical
opportunity that we could do it, and they voted it down.
So, the question was, what to do next, and we spent eighteen months
working on a strategy. The strategy committee was staffed by somebody
very competent, [Dr. Louis D.] Lou Friedman, who is now the president
of The Planetary Society, and it was one of the best-run committees
that I’ve ever been on. Then it was my first one, but then or
later. Over that eighteen-month period, we basically arrived at the
conception of the Voyager spacecraft, which I still think is NASA’s
greatest science experiment.
I can remember at the end of the discussion that we had, my job was
to do the radiation belt physics for Jupiter. There was a great unknown.
The Pioneers [spacecraft], actually, were going to fly into the Jovian
radiation belts. Nobody knew the intensity of the radiation. Would
they damage the spacecraft? How good were the models? Could you calculate
what the risk was? And we did all of that as part of this study. But
the real thing was to design the Voyagers.
At the end of the time, we had designed something called Mariner Jupiter-Saturn,
and there were to be two spacecraft. It was two big Mariners and they
were to go to Jupiter and Saturn. One of the key moments came when
people at the end of this said, “What about the Grand Tour?
Can’t we go onto the other planets?” So, Van Allen asked
Friedman, who was then staff director for this study, “Would
you go back and tell us what it would cost to send these out to, let
us say, Uranus and Neptune? Forget about Pluto.”
So a month later—we met, I think, once a month—Friedman
came back and said, “Well, sir, the answer to your question
was [with the usual] 99 and 44/100ths percent NASA [reliability] standard,
it will double the cost of the mission.”
So Van Allen then went back and said, “Well, suppose we were
to just put on enough consumables on the spacecraft? Suppose we were
to do that? What would it cost just to preserve the option to go to
these other planets?”
And so a month later, Friedman comes back and he says, “Ten
million dollars.”
And Van Allen looks around the table and he says, “How many
of you have been on a spacecraft that failed before its designed lifetime
if it was launched?” And nobody raised his hand. “How
many of you have been on a spacecraft that’s given useful data,
if not 100 percent complete, at twice the lifetime?” Everybody
raised his hand. He said, “That does it. We’re going to
call this Mariner Jupiter-Saturn, and we’re going to put on
the consumables, and if the spacecraft is still working as we get
past Saturn, somebody’s going to argue for an extended mission.”
And that’s exactly what happened, and it was the greatest experiment
that I’ve ever been associated with. I went to three of the
four encounters, and all working with Fred Scarf on his experiments.
At that point, early on I began to understand from JPL how NASA worked.
So then my next involvement with NASA was about five years later,
and I was on the Space Studies Board—then the Space Science
Board—and I was chairman of its Committee on Solar and Space
Physics. We developed a strategy, and I did a lot of the sort of National
Academy type of bureaucratic work for NASA and for the Academy. And
that was fine, but the really interesting debate occurred because
that was the Space Science Board that approved, on its part, that
NASA should go ahead with what’s now the Hubble Space Telescope.
There were lots of very big discussions about information policy.
The CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] wanted NASA not to fly that
experiment, because if they should turn it earthward, it would reveal
what the spy-in-the-sky satellites could do. There was a big fight
between the astronomy community and NASA over who would manage it,
and that fight ended up with the Space Telescope Science Institute
being designed as a compromise. And, once again, extremely interesting.
And basically my whole research career at UCLA was pretty much involved
with NASA space science, not earth science.
I’m going to fast-forward a lot, because you want to know how
I got to Mission to Planet Earth, too. So then the career went along
on that way. When Fred Scarf died, I ended up taking his place as
co-PI [Principal Investigator] on the Soviet Phobos Mars spacecraft,
both of which failed. I didn’t know tiddly about how to build
an instrument, but he had built it and my job was to see it through
the experimental phase. And I got to know NASA again with that.
I accompanied Noel Hinners in 1975; [he] took a group of people to
Russia to discuss a Shuttle-Salyut mission that was a follow-on to
Apollo-Soyuz, and I went on his team. So over the years I’ve
done a lot of work for NASA, all in the National Academy, NASA committee
advising sort of way. Never worked for NASA, worked with NASA.
So in about 1990 or ’91, Stan Shawhan, who was then head of
the Space Physics Division in the Office of Space Science, ran a major
study on space physics in the 1990s, and I chaired that study for
Stan. I got very rebellious, and I was very upset at that point by
the trend towards gigantism in NASA experiments. They were getting
huge and very difficult to manage, and the costs were running over.
So we actually engineered a plan in which about one-third of all the
spacecraft that would be flown would be small spacecraft. This is
important, because about two years later I was in this very office
here visiting my thesis advisor, who is [Dr. Edward A.] Ed Frieman,
and Ed was then the director of Scripps, having moved from plasma
physics. I was in this office just visiting him, student to thesis
advisor, and he asked me, “What are you up to?”
I said, “Well, you know, I worked on this study with Stan Shawhan.”
Stan tragically died, by the way. He had died of a heart attack, but
it was basically because he had diabetes. A great tragedy.
So I was talking about that and how this opportunity to implant small
spacecraft to NASA was lost. And Ed’s sitting there and I’m
getting more and more impassioned about this, and he says, “You
know, there’s a job opening up at NASA.”
And I said, “Well, what do you mean?”
And he said, “Well, I have it on good account that [Dr.] Shelby
Tilford is on his way out at NASA, and his job is open or will be
open shortly. Are you interested?”
I said, “Well—.” I had been elected to the National
Academy the year before and I was at loose ends. I didn’t know
what to do with myself anymore, because I had achieved the research
goal of my life ten years early or something. So I was looking for
something new to do, and I was asking myself the question, “Well,
how come all my friends are heads of—all my buddies are now
heading up big Space Science institutions? What’s wrong with
me?” So I said to Ed, “Yes, I guess I’m interested.”
I don’t know, a month or so later I’m in my office and
I’m working on this book, and I literally have finished this
book on the word processor and typing in the dedication and all of
that, and I get this phone call, and it was about four o’clock
in the afternoon. It was seven o’clock in Washington. It was
[Daniel S.] Dan Goldin, and he said, “Charlie, I’ve been
talking to Ed Frieman. I want you to come to Washington.”
I said, “Well, you mean to run Astrophysics or Space Science?”
But eventually [that became] [Dr. Wesley T.] Wes Huntress’ [Jr.]
job. We talked about that.
He said, “No, no, no. I want you to run Earth Science.”
“Earth Science?”
“Yes.”
I said, “We’re going to have to talk about this.”
And I said, “I’m coming to [Washington] D.C. in about
two weeks.”
There was going to be a major National Academy symposium on the changing
environment for physics, and I was actually chairing that symposium
or chairing a big part of that, at least. In any case, I said I would
slip out and go talk to him. It would have to be late-ish in the afternoon.
And this was held out at that big conference center out in Virginia.
I forget the name of it. It doesn’t really matter.
So at four o’clock, the man that I came to know as Charles came
in the black car and picked me up, and I walk out of this conference,
full attention of everybody. Here’s this limousine picking me
up, taking me off someplace. Well, it was to see Dan Goldin.
Dan’s apartment then was in the Watergate apartment complex,
and he wanted to meet me there. So he greets me there, and he’s
got on blue jeans, a black shirt and cowboy boots, and he’s
wearing dark glasses, inside. The dark glasses were because he was
recovering from a detached retina, and he was at home because he couldn’t
do anything at all, couldn’t even go to work. So there he was,
going absolutely crazy, but he looked like a Hollywood producer and
not the NASA Administrator. So this was my first true intimate discussion
with Dan. We sat down and passed out Coke [Coca-Cola], and about five
hours later we’d gone through everything: the need for small
spacecraft, what was happening in the Space Science program, how you
couple science to technology development, and so forth.
Then at the end of that time, he said, “I want you to eventually
be my Associate Administrator.”
And I said, “You know, this is a radical step. I’m from
outside the field. I’ve worked in a different field. I don’t
know. I’ve been in the Institute for Geophysics at UCLA and
I’ve been around these folks, but I’ve never worked in
their field.”
And he said two things. First, “You are going to have to make
some very tough decisions about downsizing the Earth Observing System.
It will be easier for you if you don’t have to do it for colleagues
that you’ve known for thirty years.” And the second thing
he said was, “This office deals with some of the most controversial
issues that NASA has.” I think he mentioned global warming,
ozone depletion, desertification. “And there is a whole group
of people in the Congress who believe that the scientists have cooked
up these problems and are crying wolf and they’re doing it to
feather their own research nests.” I’m paraphrasing a
little bit.
And I said, “Well, why me?”
And he said, “Well, you are a first-class scientist with an
impeccable pedigree.” This I remember almost word for word,
“I want the world to know that science is in charge of Mission
to Planet Earth.”
So with that kind of backing, and when the NASA Administrator says
that to you, you say, “Yes, sir. I’ll do it.” [Laughs]
So then it got very sticky, and the reason is that actually my predecessor
was very competent, Shelby Tilford, and a very good administrator,
but Dan didn’t trust him, and Shelby was resisting the downsizing
of the EOS [Earth Observing System], which looked like it was budgetarily
required. Dan and Shelby just did not get along. So Dan makes this
announcement of me as Associate Administrator, and as it would happen,
it came out on the same day that Shelby was being honored by his colleagues
for his contributions to the Global Change Research Program, which
were very great, actually, in sort of conceptualizing it.
So you can imagine what happened. The reaction was profound and very
fast, and a group of scientists from the field called [Vice President
Albert] Al Gore [Jr.] and said, “Look, this guy that Goldin
wants is not from the field, and this is too important to be left
to an amateur.” So Gore then put a halt to the nomination, and
I was in limbo for about a three-month period. I had just sort of
burned some bridges at the university. The university would have taken
me back and so forth. It was still not a good thing. So now the question
was, what to do.
So the first thing to do was to, on my part, call up all the leaders
of the field and ask them what they thought should be done. And as
I called the scientific leaders of the field, there was, in fact,
a fair degree of agreement about downsizing the multiple small spacecraft
approach and so forth. There was a fair amount of agreement about
that, not 100 percent, but there was a lot.
So then the other part of it was how could you assure the world that
there was a competent scientist at the top of Mission to Planet Earth
who knew the field. So I then suggested that we do something that
the university would do, and that is put together a little search
committee and search for the director of the Science Division, which
was a job that was then open, and that we would do a national search,
a national informal search, if you will. And then Goldin ran this
through, I guess, OSTP [Office of Science and Technology Policy],
and this was all agreed to. So then there were three people on the
search committee: Dan Goldin; [Dr. D. James] Jim Baker, who was the
NOAA [National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration] Administrator;
and then there was [Robert T.] Bob Watson, who was the OSTP Director
for Environmental Science, and former NASA person.
So then we started considering—and I was working with them full
time—we started considering the candidates, and it’s amazing
when the White House calls and says, “Would you be interested
in accepting this job?” It was the White House doing the calling.
It would be surprising the number of people that said they would be
kind of interested.
And we ended up with two candidates. One was [Dr.] Mark [R.] Abbott,
who’s now dean up at Oregon State. And we actually offered the
job to Mark, but his life position was such that he couldn’t
have spent full time at it, and it was going to be difficult. So it
finally did not work out.
But then we offered the job to [Dr. Robert C.] Bob Harriss, who did
become the Director of the Science Division. Bob is now at NCAR [National
Center for Atmospheric Research] in Colorado, and Bob was the card-carrying
first-class scientist, you know, Grade-A earth scientist. So people
then had the sense that it was okay. And by about November or December,
this conversation having taken place in Dan’s apartment in late
August of [19]’93, it looked like it was going to go through.
They talked to Gore and whoever else needed to be talked to, and then
the whole thing was confirmed.
At that point, I started getting people from Hughes [Electronics Corporation]
in Los Angeles calling me up. They wanted to talk to me right away,
and I began to discover some of the difficulties with EOSDIS [Earth
Observing System Data and Information System], which we never solved,
not on my watch.
So then I turned up in Washington [D. C.] on January 6th of 1994.
The other part of it was, before that, there was a big EOS review
that I was invited to as the Associate Administrator designee, and
this was probably in December of ’93. While I was in Washington,
Dan made sure that I did the right visits over at the White House.
So first I talked to Watson, who had been part of this, and Bob Watson
said, “Are you sure you want this job? You’re going to
have to make a lot of tough decisions.”
And I said, “Well, what do you mean?”
He said, “Well, you have to cut the program’s budget.”
You know, it was like $12 billion at that point. There’s no
way that they were going to pay for that.
So I said, “Well, okay.”
And then I went on to [Lionel Skipwith] Skip Johns, who was another
Associate Director for Science and Technology, the other part of OSTP,
and Skip basically said the same message, “You’re going
to have a very hard time here, and politically it’s going to
be quite a difficult job.”
Finally, I got to [Dr. John H.] Jack Gibbons, who was then the OSTP
director, and Jack said something totally different. He said, “Is
your wife coming with you?”
And I said, “Well, no, actually she’s got a practice in
Los Angeles. We’re going to commute.”
He said, “You know, we’ve got a lot of people like that
in OSTP, and it works for about two years. It’s kind of nice,
you know, if your kids are grown and so forth. You can fly back and
forth, romantic weekends, little vacations and so forth. You’ll
make it work. But after about two years, there will be a crisis. And
then if you can work your way through that, then you’re home
free.” Two years came and the crisis came and we worked our
way through it and we’re home free. So that was my introduction
to NASA. I then took over at Mission to Planet Earth.
The other thing that Dan did, which I thought was wonderful, was he
understood that I was a fine scientist. I was not of the field. I
had been on all sorts of Academy panels and stuff, but I had never
managed a $1.6 billion program. They engineered an IPA [Intergovernmental
Personnel Act] agreement for me, by the way, and for reasons that
I don’t quite know how they did it, but I had all the executive
authority to sign. So that even though I was an IPA, I was in charge
of all the dollars in that division, and I don’t know how they
engineered that.
So there I was managing this thing with no experience at formal management.
So what he did was he gave me two of the best damn deputies that anybody
could want. One was [William F.] Bill Townsend, and Bill is now the
deputy out at [NASA] Goddard [Space Flight Center], and Bill is a
true blue NASA engineer. He went to Virginia Tech [Virginia Polytechnic
Institute and State University], stayed for thirty years at Goddard
and finally at [NASA] Headquarters, and was as honest as the day is
long and would give you a completely objective engineering view, that
you have this option, you have that option, this is how the teams
will work together, here are the risks. And he would do all his homework,
and he was the main interface for Goddard Space Flight Center.
The other one was [Michael B.] Mike Mann, and Mike was of a different
type. He was a classic NASA management manager on the personnel side
and on the institutional side.
So I had an engineering manager and I had an institutional manager,
and basically the three of us made the decisions, not just me. The
decisions that were ours to make we made together. If it hadn’t
been for this two-deputy system, I think I couldn’t have managed.
And it worked, I thought, quite well, and my job clearly was to interface
with the science community as we worked through all the issues about
EOS.
Of course, the first thing I had to do is learn the science, and there
I was very lucky, because, you know, if you’re sitting on top
of the world’s largest environmental science program in terms
of dollars, you’d be surprised how many good scientists come
and talk to you and how many of them have to disclose not only what
they already know, but what they want to do, which is more important.
And lots of people gave me tutorials. Wherever I went, they’d
sit me down and give me special sessions on the science, and probably
after three or four months I had enough to go on. After all, there
were all those Academy committees and there were all the NASA interior
committees, all of which had scientists on them, and my job was to
interface with them and gradually figure out how to get the science
done.
The problem was a very big one. When the global warming emergency
first appeared, in some sense the country overreacted, and the first
thing they proposed was a series of six huge eighteen to twenty-four
experiment spacecraft, each taking up the full weightlifting capacity
of the Shuttle bay. And this was going to be the twelve to eighteen-billion-dollar
program to the run-out. As it turned out, those eighteen to twenty-four
experiments were proven to be very expensive to integrate. Each one
of them was basically on the edge of the state of the art in terms
of resolution, technology, a NASA special. But they couldn’t
manage the engineering. It was too complicated and the costs were
getting out of hand. And, in addition, we had an Administration that
was committed to balancing the budget, so they weren’t going
to look at that.
So we had to figure out how to downsize those experiments, and I had
to figure out, as we downsize, how much of the true science—I’ve
got to be careful—how much of the science we could retrieve
and get done at a lower cost. And part of the strategy was to go to
much smaller spacecraft. A Shuttle launch is half a billion dollars,
and so if you can go to smaller spacecraft, you go to a smaller launch
vehicle, and everything scales down. In many ways it’s cheaper
and more robust to have small launches than one giant one, more robust
because if you lose one of the five, you’ve lost only 20 percent
of your science, and cheaper because of the launch and other—the
other aspect of it was that you could focus the missions’ goals
more clearly and the engineering became less complicated because they
didn’t have requirements conflict. That was a tremendous burden.
But you had to get through all of that while convincing the science
community that the project wasn’t going to hell in a handbasket,
or the policy community, that we weren’t abandoning our commitment
to key issues of global warming.
The de-scoping took place in phases, and I can’t remember them
all at the present time, how they actually unfolded, but we made first
cuts to what are now the TERRA and Aqua spacecraft, and those were
still the last big spacecraft that Office of Earth Sciences will ever
build. They are billion-dollar craft each. But they were to be launched
on an Atlas [rocket], and they are. Then we decided that we’d
go to Delta-scale launches and go to missions in the two- to four-hundred-million-dollar
range, and more of them. So at one point what had been six missions
became twenty-four, but what had been twelve to eighteen billion became
six in the run-out.
During all of this de-scoping, which was kind of relentless, every
few months there was another call to restructure the program, the
question I had at all times was two things. The political question
was, when would you arrive at a budget level that was sustainable?
And the other question was, how do you know, in a given project, when
you’ve cut enough? Because if you cut out too much, then you
lose reliability, robustness, and all of that. As the Mars Program,
the failures, subsequently indicated, that the faster, better, cheaper
philosophy had gone too far. And I was very worried about that issue,
even with Mission to Planet Earth. But I think at the end of the day,
when I left the office, the budget for the program was stabilized
and it’s remained about the same. So I think I achieved my primary
goal, which is to stabilize the budget and give the world a comprehensive
Earth Observing System of some form. I think I achieved that. I think
people will say that a good deal of the science was kept.
Some people will say, subsequent to that time, I left [Dr.] Ghassem
[R.] Asrar, my successor, several serious problems. One of them was,
I cut too much money out of—we cut too much out of the budget
for EOSDIS, the data management system, and particularly the data
acquisition system for the TERRA satellite. And Ghassem had to struggle
with the fact that we had done it too much damage, and I’m not
sure he’s appreciated all that I did, because he had to clean
up. But he’s doing just fine now.
The other thing that he did that disappointed me but may have been
the right thing to do was that we were originally going to plan three
cycles of missions to go for a nominal fifteen years, and basically
he stopped it after the first cycle. But, of course, just like Van
Allen said, these missions will stay up for much more than five years,
their nominal lifetime, and they’ll continue to give some sort
of data over a long period of time. They will gradually decline, and
in the meantime, they’ll all be up and running.
At the end of three years, my IPA was up. The university wanted me
back, and I went back to UCLA. I didn’t want to be an ordinary
professor anymore; didn’t seem like such a great job after I’d
been dealing with generals and diplomats and the whole big wide world.
And so I applied for and got the job as Executive Vice Chancellor
at UCLA, which was the number two officer there. That’s a big
operation. They’re about a three-billion-dollar-a-year university.
It was a fine job for somebody, but I had fallen so much in love with
the science that Mission to Planet Earth did and I felt so committed
to working with issues like global warming, in particular, that when
this job came up, this is a little jewel of an institution, but it
is one of the world’s leading scientific institutions in these
fields, I just took it, and I’ve never regretted it, budget
crisis or not.
I think I never would have done it without NASA. NASA changed everything.
I was an ordinary professor, very self-centered, very focused on accomplishing—you
know, “The goals of my field are my goals,” and I got
to NASA, and suddenly within a few months I had to explain to the
world why it was important to do this, convince them, that I had to
think about how science is connected to society and how science is
connected to the development of environmental policy. I had to think
about how science is financed. I had to think about the politics of
it. And it was kind of amazing. Here I was in middle age, and then
suddenly all of this information and this new way of looking at things,
all of it came in in the space of about a year. It’s just amazing
and just a complete transformation.
A good deal of it was Dan Goldin. Goldin had his fans and his detractors
within NASA. I was one of his fans. He was very rough on people, and
he was very impatient with people who resisted the direction in which
he was going, and he was very rough on people that he didn’t
think lived up to what he thought their potential was, and rough on
institutions as well that weren’t performing. But since he picked
me and I picked him, we didn’t have that problem.
My wife, a psychologist, told me one way to handle Dan Goldin is when—he
was constantly pushing for change and constantly pushing for innovation
and constantly pushing me to reduce the budget and get more science
out of it, and he would have these ideas, and a lot of people would
immediately react. They would say, “Boss, we can’t do
that.” And Ellen told me, she said, “Nuh-uh. Tell him
that you’ll study it, you’ll look at it, and that you
will look at every faster, better, cheaper idea that he has.”
And so that’s what we did. I’d bring it to my loyal engineer
and wonderful one, Bill Townsend. Townsend would call up Goddard Space
Flight Center. Goddard reported to me. Townsend would call up Goddard
Space Flight Center and say, “We’ve got another one.”
So then they would study these ideas, and the answer would come back
often—not always—“We can move in this direction.
We can go this far, but beyond this, the risk is unacceptable to us.”
So then my job was to take Bill to Dan Goldin and sit there and mediate,
and so long as Dan saw you moving in the direction that he was interested
in seeing you go, then he would relent if you said. “We can’t
go any further.” That’s the way we dealt with it. Of course,
that didn’t mean that three months later he still wasn’t
on another idea about how to cut our budget. Many of these were very
innovative and involved new technology and the assumption of risk,
and I was always attracted to the creative part of this. So I was
predisposed to hope that these ideas would work. This is my question
about when would we cut enough. Whenever Goddard sucked it up and
came back and said, “We can’t do this,” then I would
back that and just say, “We can only go so far—this now.”
So I think that for me, that was the key. Although I saw him do it
to other people, he never once raised his voice with me. Never once.
We always had a good—and we had long discussions. There were
occasions in which we would get in the NASA plane and have to go someplace,
and he’d want a four-hour discussion of where Mission to Planet
Earth was going. So I’d get on the plane with him, fly with
him once to New Mexico to give some report, fly with him back. We
had eight hours. We’d discuss the whole future of the program,
and always in a very philosophical, creative way.
So I was very pleased to work for that man. I saw him devastate other
people, saw it happen, and that was very unfortunate. But it never
happened with me. I realize, now that I’m part of the NASA Advisory
Council, that Goldin actually controlled it and was effective with
about half of NASA, and that was the science side. And his greatest
desire, I think, was to be known as a great enabler of science, and,
in fact, an innovator in science or an innovator for NASA science,
I guess the best way to say it. He’s not going to win the Nobel
Prize, but he wanted everybody to know that his greatest thing was
to make sure that good science happened at NASA. That’s what
he told me he wanted from Mission to Planet Earth, and I actually
believed him, and I had lots and lots of flexibility to put in little
dollars into good science projects. Never a question on that.
But he didn’t tame the Human Space Flight side. And to be quite
frank, with all your—I know you’re from Texas, but Johnson
[Space Center] beat him politically, and now the present Administrator
is having to deal with that issue, and it’s a tough one. Even
tougher. And there is the politics, high NASA politics and high government
politics. And we can talk about his problematical relationship with
George [W. S.] Abbey. I don’t want to say much about it, except
that it was certainly there and obvious to all of us, and I didn’t
participate very much in that.
So I think Dan did a grand job. Office of Space Science did even better
than Office of Earth Science under Goldin, added some very great programs.
We did well. We stabilized our budget. We solved a major political
problem in a very delicate area, and nobody questions that NASA should
be doing work on climate any longer. And so we did our job, and he
did a fine job with those two codes.
The other thing he did, I thought, that was truly exciting, at one
point when I became Associate Administrator I had a good friend who’s
[at] the University of Maryland. His name is [Dr.] Roald Sagdeev,
and Roald was the former Director of the Space Research Institute
in Moscow, and a major figure in science and was an immigrant and
had come to Maryland. When Roald heard I had this job, he came to
me, he said, “You know how exciting it would be if the NASA
Administrator were to hold science seminars at Headquarters? That
would really tell something about what this agency is standing for,
and you’d bring all sorts of people in from Washington to make
a big difference.”
So somewhere early in my job, Dan comes to me and France [A.] Cordova
and Wes Huntress. France was Chief Scientist and Wes Huntress was
A.A. [Associate Administrator] for [Office of] Space Science. And
he says, “I’ve got to give a major talk before the American
Geophysical Union, thousands of people, and I want to talk about an
innovative program for NASA science. I want to find a theme that will
knit together all of NASA science, the science that we do in Human
Space Flight, earth science, astronomical science.”
So we helped compose a speech for him, which he gave, a typical Goldin
speech pushing the university community to do far more, to take far
more chances with technology development and get far better data and
not be so conservative, and he laid out a vision. But then he was
still dissatisfied. He hadn’t found his theme. So I can remember—and
he talked to France Cordova that we should actually plan. He wanted
a theme.
So France calls us in, Wes and myself and [Dr.] Harry [C.] Holloway,
who was the A.A. for Code U [Office of Biological and Physical Research]
then, and France calls us into her office about four o’clock
in the afternoon and she says, “We’re not leaving this
office till we have a plan to get that theme.” So about ten
o’clock that evening, we had the following plan, that the Administrator
would run a series of Administrator’s Seminars at Headquarters,
that we would invite world leading scientists in from all over the
world, and we’d ask them to talk about their field and what
they thought NASA ought to do in this field.
At the end of this time, maybe once every six weeks or so, a dozen
of the seminars, at the end of this time we’d have a pretty
good education and so would he. And he committed to going to every
one. They were put on NASA TV. He actually moderated the discussions
with the scientists on stage. These were Nobel laureates and other
types of that rank, and Dan was sitting there asking them questions
about their field and where it was going.
Well, it was pretty clear that about three or four seminars in, that
he had already converged on what he thought the theme was. That was
astrobiology. We know NASA has an astrobiology program, and it is
now considered one of the more innovative things that any government
administrator’s ever done for science, which was to set up a
new discipline. And he kind of just did it, and he used his power
and the bully pulpit and the fact, actually, that France and Wes and
I and Harry were all kind of behind it.
Dan’s view was, you know, the search for life on other planets
and the ability of life to live in space, the Human Space Flights,
the preservation of life on Earth, which is Mission to Planet Earth,
all of that tied everything together. And so it did, actually, and
it was a very innovative program. This was one of the cases where
his pushing everybody to be better and to be organizing to a different
configuration actually worked. It put some money behind it, and it’s
now a going program. They got a Nobel laureate to head it up, and
it’s off and running.
The next thing that happened was that he sent us to Texas Medical
Center [Houston, Texas]. We actually thought that such an institute
[Human Space Flight] would work very well in Texas because of the
culture of Texas and its commitment to Human Space Flight and all
that. We wanted a standalone institute, but working closely with Johnson.
That was the thought that we had. Johnson said, “No, no, no.
It’s going to be like the Lunar and Planetary Sciences [Institute]
on us and we’ve got to control it.” This was not what
we had in mind, and so that idea died.
Then the next idea was—I had to recuse myself from this discussion.
The next idea was to go to [NASA] Ames [Research Center], which had
a first-class science group, and still runs the astrobiology program,
that Ames should work with Stanford [University] and [University of
California] Berkeley and build up a joint university-government center.
This is an idea a few years ahead of its time. But the then-Director
for Ames decided that he would kill this idea by overloading it and
putting 500 NASA personnel on it, when probably the right number was
about 60 from each, or 60 in total or 120, some much smaller number
of just scientists in a standalone institute. And I was pretty sure—but
I wasn’t part of the negotiation, pretty sure that that was
to head off the idea of a separately governed science institute on
Ames’ land.
Goldin finally achieved that goal for Ames when [Henry] Harry McDonald
came in, because now they have Carnegie-Mellon [University] on the
Ames campus and they have a cooperative program with UC [University
of California] Santa Cruz, and astrobiology now is being run as a
distributive science program, a dozen university participants with
its headquarters at Ames. So the issues of control got solved, not
through any effort of mine. But I thought that was one of the most
interesting things that we tried to do. That was sort of a service
that I gave as a scientist rather than as Mission to Planet Earth.
It was just helping NASA out altogether.
I don’t know, I’ve wandered. Is there a question you want
me to come back—you’ve got that list.
Johnson: Yes,
we can start going through some of these. With Mission to Planet Earth,
if you don’t mind, we can go back and just talk about the goals
and the mission of the Mission to Planet Earth and some of the more
global ramifications of the science, with the weather satellites and
the agreements that you formed with other countries. Did you have
a part in any of that?
Kennel: Yes,
that’s very interesting. NASA’s Earth-observing capacity
from spacecraft, because the spacecraft observe the whole Earth at
its surface, NASA is especially adapted to dealing with environmental
issues of a global scale, of which the granddaddy of them all, of
course, is global warming.
Much earlier than that, NASA had built, and still builds, all the
satellites for the NOAA weather system, and much of the thinking for
the Earth Observing System was to do for climate what they had done
for the weather system, which was to build a regular series of spacecraft
that come out and monitor the climate, monitor the weather.
But the Earth observing, for example, through Landsat got NASA into
some sticky issues like the assessment from space of the depletion
of the rainforest in the Amazon and in Indonesia and elsewhere. It
was one thing to make the measurement; it was another thing to do
the science and make the assessment; and it was a third thing to handle
the political ramifications of something in as touchy an area where
there were extreme statements going back and forth on either side
of the issue, from the NGOs on one side and, shall we say, mostly
the countries and the logging interests on the other, and how to steer
a course. Headquarters’ job and my job was to steer a course
that said what science says about this, in full awareness of all the
political and policy conflicts, but stick to the science. So in any
difficult times, the mantra that I use [is that] the best politics
is “good science.”
So we [NASA] did all the remote-sensing observation. There was a very
innovative satellite, TOPEX/Poseidon, which measures the surface of
the ocean to one-centimeter accuracy from an altitude of 1,300 kilometers.
Now, with that kind of accuracy, when the water warms up, it expands
a little bit, and so warm water makes a little hump on the surface
of the ocean about a centimeter or two high that you can measure.
So when the El Niño develops in the western Pacific off the
coast of Indonesia, the water is high there, and then as the El Niño
warm water propagates across the Pacific, the satellite tracks it
and predicts and also sees when it’s going to hit North and
South America, watches the warm water propagating. So there’s
very innovative work.
NASA did all the remote sensing for all the environmental problems
that remote sensing can be applied to. I’m pretty sure there
wasn’t one that they missed that was technologically within
reach. I mean, there are things that they couldn’t do, but if
they could do it, they were involved in it. So that gave us then a
role to play in every single global environmental problem: ozone depletion,
desertification, ocean circulation, global warming, atmospheric pollution.
And so it was a very important job.
But it was also the case that remote sensing alone and the provision
of all this data typically didn’t solve scientific problems.
It wasn’t an automatic solution. So that all of this data that
was being generated by the spacecraft needed to be converted into
scientific knowledge. Some of that NASA paid for. Mission to Planet
Earth had a 250-million-dollar-a-year science program, which is half
of the NSF [National Science Foundation] entire geoscience program,
and this $250 million was spent building an interdisciplinary network
of research called earth systems science, which NASA basically, and
Shelby Tilford did this—NASA actually invented this concept
of earth systems science, along with a few other people. But because
of the perspective of the spacecraft, we could see how the pieces
of the Earth fit together, and we were interested in studying the
contemporary era; that is to say, as it was fifty years ago and as
it will be fifty years from now and how all the systems interact with
one another—the Earth, the air, oceans, land, ice. And we had
satellites for each one.
But we’re [i.e., NASA] only a piece of the problem and only
a piece of the solution. There are other parts of the problem. You
had to deliver the data to people. So that meant that we needed a
very advanced system to deliver all this imagery to the users, and
that was called the EOSDIS. That program was an albatross from the
beginning. It was too ambitious. The idea of an end-to-end system
that one contractor could build was a mistake. But nonetheless, NASA
had the responsibility, which it’s gradually fulfilling, of
delivering giant amounts of data into the hands of scientific and
practical users. That was the second part of the story.
The third part of the story was that the remote-sensing data alone
and by itself, without being supplemented with data from the ground,
wasn’t going to solve the scientific problem. It’s pretty
obvious, for example, in the ocean that a satellite can see the surface,
but it can’t see ten feet below, twenty feet below, and people
who model the ocean need to know about the currents and other behavior,
temperature and so on, at depth. So you needed other measurements.
That was just to get a comprehensive picture of the science. And then
finally, you needed all this data to be analyzed by multidisciplinary
teams of scientists in general. That was an organizational problem.
So that was the scientific goal.
Now, you asked me about the international work. Clearly, the Earth
Observing System, as NASA had conceived of it, was a partnership in
which about one-third of all the data would be collected by either
the Europeans or the Japanese, and it would all be integrated together
and ideally made available to the research community and that they
would guarantee to do a piece of the job and so would the Japanese.
And all of this was coordinated through something called the Committee
on Earth Observing Satellites, which had been formed about ten years
earlier and was a group of, I think there are now eighteen countries
that do Earth observing from space, and they coordinate and they try
to make sure that they don’t both launch an identical satellite
in the same time period. If you want to do it, fill in the data gap
later. And so they originally had discussions like that, that were
just the coordination of programs. Even that was hard.
So then when I came into Mission to Planet Earth, they had got to
the stage where they actually could list every country’s program
and every instrument that would be flown, and the goals of every instrument
and the specifications. So that a person wanted to know what would
happen five or eight years from now in the field could look at this
handbook that they developed and see that the French—“Oh,
the French would be getting that data at that point,” or EOS
will get it. And, in fact, EOS was a good part, maybe half or two-thirds,
of that overall effort, if you include the foreign partners that we
had made specific agreements with.
I took a look at that, and I said to myself, you know, this is all
very wonderful, but this is the space community talking to itself,
and because I knew, and because we all knew from our EOS experience,
that that data alone would not suffice to solve scientific problems.
What was needed was an effort also to coordinate the collection of
the needed supplementary data from ground-based or in-ocean instrumentation.
And so the question was, how could you make this happen?
So what I noticed was that as part of this CEOS, Committee on Earth
Observing Satellites, planning process, the Japanese had put into
place some very ambitious plans, where on each of several major spacecraft
they had lots of space still open, and they were saying international
collaboration goes here. So they were advertising that they had a
ride available for major instruments for foreign partners. And this
was a challenge, you know, for coordination.
I used this challenge, and I went to Bob Watson, who was Director
of the Environment at OSTP, and I said, “We’ve got to
respond to this. The United States has to have a strategy for international
collaboration that goes beyond EOS.” Bob was Chair of the Committee
on the Environment and Natural Resources of the NSTC, and they made
me chair of an observations sub-panel with a large interagency group
on it from NOAA. NOAA, NASA, DOE [Department of Energy], NSF, and
Navy were the big players, but there was also EPA [Environmental Protection
Agency] and typical NSTC kind of production. We just said, “There’s
going to be another CEOS meeting in six or eight month’s time,
and we’ve got to have a white paper.”
So basically, Pierre Morel, who was then consulting with us at NASA,
and I, with some help from Lisa Shaffer, actually wrote this white
paper and, of course, had it reviewed through the interagency process,
and I delivered it on Bob Watson’s desk at OSTP, and about three
or four days afterward, before I was to leave for this CEOS meeting,
I got the approval.
This was a White House policy document, and it called for an integrated
global observing strategy in which the satellite agencies would work
with the other international groupings to try to tie together the
fairly well coordinated set of space observations with a far less
well coordinated set of ground-based observing capacity and data management.
And that now goes by the name IGOS [Integrated Global Observing Strategy].
It exists. It still exists. The various groupings from the World Meteorological
Organization, they’re talking with the satellite people. It’s
a burdensome and slow discussion because of the size of the global
effort, but at least there’s a framework of discussion in which
people from the space science, space part of the earth science world,
talk to the people who are dealing at the international coordination
level with the ground-based part.
Even if they fail to achieve tangible coordination, the existence
of this organization is an assertion of the breadth of the types of
data that you will need to make credible predictions about global
change in the future, and it’s put that broad understanding
forth at the international level. So it’s still out there. They
still have IGOS meetings, and there are IGOS partnerships. In ocean
science, I know we’re part of one.
There’s an experiment called the GODAE, the Global Ocean Data
Assimilation Experiment, in which NASA and French satellite data on
altimetry of the ocean will be combined by data that, as it turns
out, Scripps participates in collecting from little automated floats
and probes that probe the inner ocean, so we’ll have it above
and below the surface. We’ve combined the two together. And
then there will be data management and modeling to tie them together.
One day we all believe that the combination of satellites and floats
will make an operational long-term system that will monitor the health
and state of our oceans. And that’s probably the first tangible
project that the IGOS partnership develops.
It’s still to be carried out, but NOAA continues to fund the
floats part of this. NASA continued with the TOPEX/Poseidon follow-on,
the Jason spacecraft, and NASA and NOAA are talking about making altimetry
a long-term operational program for NOAA so that this kind of data
will be assured, and NOAA, at the same time, is funding the floats
and have built a big international partnership in a number of countries
to deploy these floats.
So now we have an actual experiment that coordinates space and in
situ data into the same data stream, tangible output. It all started
with a little policy paper that Bob Watson signed off on. I mean,
some of these ideas were there beforehand, but the actual political,
big political, science political emphasis, I think, came because the
White House pushed this idea.
Johnson: You
touched on, a minute ago or earlier, about the issue of global warming
and some of the hot buttons that were going on that you had to deal
with. Did you have to specifically deal with groups that were saying
what Dan Goldin told you, that scientists were just making this up
to get more money, more funding, or did you have to specifically deal
with any of those type of issues?
Kennel: I
think the more complex dealing, I had to deal with congressmen who
listened to those groups, and they would also listen to me.
But in a slightly different area I can explain a little bit how the
sensitivity works out. The Chairman of the House Science Committee
in those days was a very powerful gentleman named Robert [Smith] Walker,
who in retirement is still prominent in Republican politics. He’s
from Pennsylvania. One day NASA Goddard published a new result and
there’s a press release, and the result said that one of their
satellites had just completely reverified our understanding of ozone
depletion, it was definitely due to human activity and that you could
observe the ozone circulating and explain it with the measurements
from the Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite, UARS.
So Mr. Walker calls me in, and on the way down Dan says to me, or
before I go he says, “Is that work peer-reviewed?”
And I said, “Sure. And we didn’t do the press release
until the actual paper came out in the AGU [American Geophysical Union]
and the Journal of Geophysical Research.”
He said, “Okay.”
So I go to Mr. Walker, and he’s very nice. But then finally
he says, “Tell me about that paper.” I tell him a little
bit. And he wants to know, is it peer-reviewed.
And I said, “Yes.”
He said, “Well, I’ll tell you what my problem is. Every
time you guys publish a paper on this topic and on global warming,
about two weeks after you publish a paper I’ve got people in
my office that want me to do things that I don’t want to do,
and they’re telling me stuff and I don’t know what to
say to them.”
So the warning was unmistakable: make sure that you don’t go
out on a limb on any of these issues that you talk about published
data. And the other warning was: don’t go out making a big deal
about it; just publish it. That’s the way I interpreted it.
That didn’t stop us from writing press releases. My belief was
that if you understand something and the world needs to know it and
it’s, in your best judgment, correct, then it’s important
to get it out there, because all sorts of people are concerned and
need to know. But it did make me be very careful about being scientifically
as honest as I could be and then try to make us as honest as we could
be. And I think NASA did a pretty job, on balance.
So in the global warming area, what we had was two kinds of problems.
There was a growing consensus at that time, but not yet complete,
that humans were, in fact, involved in the global warming that is
preceding apace. At that time, I think the intergovernmental panel
on climate change was saying that there is a discernable human influence
on the climate. I think in their first report they said, you know,
“Quite frankly, it’s a very plausible hypothesis. Every
scientist will tell you that if you’re accumulating greenhouse
gases, the Earth will warm up, on balance. But if you’re looking
for specific smoking-gun data, we don’t see it.” That
was their first report.
Then the second report, which came out on my watch, during my watch
at NASA—this is a U.N. [United Nations] panel and 500 scientists,
they take two years to write these assessments—the panel came
out and said there’s a discernable human impact on climate.
And this slight change from, you know, “Quite frankly we don’t
see the evidence, but it’s highly plausible,” to, “We’re
beginning to see some evidence” created a major change in the
attitudes in the international community, less so in the United States.
Now, there were groups that were opposed to this view, and there were
two kinds. One was something called, I believe, the Global Climate
Coalition, which is the group that was funded by various industrial
contributions, and there were about ten or so scientists who were
a part of that group. Some of them were highly reputable. There was
Fred Seitz, who’s still with us. He’s ninety-five years
old, former President of the Academy. [Dr.] Ed David, a former Presidential
Science Advisor. These people were skeptics. They didn’t believe
in the scientific consensus.
The Global Climate Coalition also had second-class scientists associated
with it. Two of them stand out in my recollection: [Patrick J.] Pat
Michaels and [Dr.] S. Fred Singer. These people were on point to counter
with science, or have science arguments [against] the kinds of consensus
statements that the U.N. panel was putting out. They got equal time
in the media, and so the media, with their ethos of finding conflict,
and illuminating the issue through conflict, had amplified the opinions
of a small but vocal minority to the same level as a large but not
very vocal majority. So there’s profound conflict, and a lot
of people thought that it was junk science, and you would read this
all the time, that the kind of scientific work that’s being
done is junk.
Then the other kind of problem—so we had to cope with that by
just saying the science is not junk. And you get all sorts of people.
“Why are we spending $6 billion or all these hundreds of millions
of dollars a year on the Earth Observing System?” My answer
would always be, “So as to remove all doubts about the science.”
So then the other type of problem we had was just as tough to deal
with. There was a reputable and highly active scientist, [Dr.] Richard
[S.] Lindzen from MIT [Massachusetts Institute of Technology], who
in his own personal approach to science is a contrarian. If somebody
well known says something, he’s going to say the opposite and
think that he’s got a good chance of being right big because
of that. So he was challenging absolutely everything that the scientific
community—he was challenging every consensus statement that
would come out. And Richard was as tough to deal with as anybody else,
but I had to respect everything he said, so I listened to him and
had to balance things out internally.
Then there was a third group of people that thought that NASA was
spending far too much money on science trying to be objective about
these political hot button questions, and they were perhaps overdoing
it in that area and missing a whole lot of stuff that was much more
innovative out there, because we were sitting there trying to be honest
arbiters of this question: is there human imprint on the global climate?
And they were saying, “We’re missing a whole hell of a
lot. Besides, what does it matter? The argument is what does it matter
if human beings are creating climate change or it’s just happening
to ourselves? It’s just happening naturally. We’re living
on a very crowded planet, and the climate change now matters a lot
more to a lot more people than it did before, and it’s our job
to understand it, whatever the sources are. And there’s all
this other stuff out there that you’re neglecting.” So
you had to balance all these points of view. And, of course, it’s
a shifting colloquy, you know, it goes back and forth.
But I think that in terms of the debate, the biggest problem I had
was to work with congressmen who had read the newspaper and had seen
article after article saying the science was junk. Clearly it was
not, but clearly, if you made a lot of extreme statements or alarmist
statements, you opened yourself up to going well beyond the evidence.
So you had to be extremely careful in our public statements.
Johnson: You
talked about launching on smaller and less expensive ways instead
of putting the satellites and that sort of thing on the Shuttle. But
STS-66 launched during the time that you were with Mission to Planet
Earth, and that Mission was dedicated—
Kennel: Yes.
There was 59 and there was 47, and those missions were—the one
that I think comes from me is SRTM [Shuttle Radar Topography Mission],
which is the Shuttle mission that was launched well after the work
that we did. But if I recall, I remember two missions that we did.
One is with the Shuttle imaging radar, SIR-C [Spacebourne Imaging
Radar], which I think was 47. And then there was 59 that we did, in
which we tried out a light laser altimeter and we scattered off the
atmosphere. Both of these used the capacity of the Shuttle either
to lift the huge antenna into orbit, in the case of the radar, or
to high power in the case of the laser. These were demonstration technology
experiments, and they’re expensive.
My objection was, the Shuttle only gives you seven days, in those
days. So then later after SIR-C had flown, Charles Elachi came to
us with a proposal for a reflight, another 250 million bucks to the
United States Government, less to Mission to Planet Earth, to refly
the same imaging radar with a few changes. And I said to him basically—I
was nicer than this, but the basic message was, “Haven’t
reduced all the data you’ve got yet. There’s only seven
days’ worth of data. It was a technology demonstration, and
if you claim success, then you will have done your demonstration.
If you don’t claim success, then you’ve weakened your
chance for reflight. So if there’s going to be a reflight, you’ve
got to do something new.” So then I didn’t quite know
what to do with that, since I’d been so rough on him. But I
wasn’t going to forward a simple quarter-of-a-billion-dollar
request for a reflight.
So I toss it in the hands of the National Academy of Sciences, and
they, in their wisdom, appointed [Dr.] John [H.] McElroy, a former
NOAA NESDIS [National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information
Service] Administrator and now head of the Space Studies Board. They
appointed John to chair this committee, and we and they did one thing
that was very smart, we put foreign collaborators on it, because I
was hoping that we could get a foreign collaborator to help offset
the cost of this thing.
So then JPL was put on notice and they got very creative, and they
understood that there was a big truss that was down at Johnson that
they could stick on the Shuttle, and then at the end of that truss
they could put an Italian radar transmitter. Then we had the big one
that was already on the Shuttle, and you could use this as a three-dimensional
mapper and get resolved altimetry, you know, scatter from the Earth
and get height resolved images as well as across the surface. You
get a three-dimensional image because of the binocular vision. That
was a good idea.
So then the question was how to pay for this, and it turns out that
the military had been wanting to do one of these digital topography
maps for a long time. There are obvious reasons for doing it. When
we told them that we could go to plus or minus 55 degrees North and
get most of the populated world with this, they joined the project.
So then Bill Townsend loyally put together a deal with the military,
with the Italians, and with JPL, and we flew that mission. But my
objection was that the science per unit dollar on that Shuttle mission
just as a reflight was not worth it. The demonstration that you could
do it? Yes, because that then set the way for new science. But to
just repeat it, no, sir. So we didn’t do it, and I’m sort
of proud of SRTM [Shuttle Radar Topography Mission].
In the turnout, the deal with the military proved to be problematical,
because the scientists are objecting to their classification. I guess
there have been problems with access to the data, but the data exists,
and in seven days they got a map that they didn’t think they
were going to get for another ten years.
Johnson: I
think the tape is about to run out, so let’s stop for a minute.
Kennel: Okay.
In all of these things, you know, you never know what your own role
is. It’s a huge cooperative endeavor, and especially a spacecraft
is the work of thousands of people. And so when you’re sitting
there at the top the question is: what is your role? And part of it
is certainly to express to the outside world the value of what you’re
doing and what you think you’re doing, and if you’ve got
problems, you’ve got to say that as well.
Part of it, I think, is just to make sure that at least in the people
that you talk to, that there’s been enough discussion, enough
ideas assessed and evaluated that it crystallizes out and the decision
finally becomes obvious; everybody kind of agrees that we should go
in this direction. I used to wait a little bit until I got pushed
to make the decision, and then if somebody started pushing me, “When
are you going to make this decision?” that meant they were all
ready to go and that they were all in agreement. So part of it was
timing.
Then I think the final part of it was—and it has nothing to
do with what you actually sometimes say, but that people perceive
what you stand for and they will, because they’re all interested,
will propose to that. So actually what you stand for and what your
values are ends up determining a huge amount, but it’s all very
indirect and it’s not anything that you do; it’s the way
people perceive you. Obviously you have to say things all the time,
but your values shine through, ultimately, and they do get expressed
in the program, and my values were to get more science for the dollar
and always, if I had a choice, to favor the science, and they knew
that. They could have guessed it from the beginning. Right? Just from
reading the CV [Curriculum Vitae].
Now, the interesting thing about technology was that Goldin’s
values were new technology for new science, and I think I told you
how I dealt with that. I was delighted when new technology would produce
a new capability for science. But when Goddard told me that they couldn’t
follow through or there was too much risk, I also went for getting
the data.
I think I took a middle road on the technology development, and I
certainly understood that if it were the case, that—and I can
give you another example. Take your Landsat satellites. When I got
to NASA in 1994, NASA was busy disentangling itself from a disaster
of a cooperative agreement that they had made with the Air Force to
build the next Landsat satellite. The Air Force wanted to put on an
extremely high resolution imager and NASA would put on a lower resolution
standard Landsat imagery on the same spacecraft, and the Air Force
was going to pay for a good deal of this. And they just bailed out.
So then the [later] resulting mission [cost], which was called Landsat
7, is now Landsat 7, I remember, Landsat 7 was $700 million. I don’t
know what it proved in the run-out, but that was the number I had
in my mind. In those days, the Landsat program was outside the Earth
Observing System. So suddenly NASA’s going to be asked to eat
several hundred million dollars more in cost, and yet the Landsat
user community was demanding that we continue this data stream, which
had gone on since the mid 1970s.
So Landsat 7 became a kind of albatross. It was very expensive. Landsat
5 had been run by NOAA, operated by NOAA, and Landsat 6, I believe,
failed. So there we were with 7 and $700 million dollars, practical-user
community, not a research-user community, by and large, and a great
deal of expense. So the question was how to deal with that, and we
decided to take it into the Earth Observing System and it would be
part of the Earth Observing System. That was thing number one.
Thing number two, I discovered that the technology for the Landsat
instrument had not evolved much, and so it was a big instrument. And
worse that than, it was on a gimbal that rocked back and forth like
this [indicates rocking motion with hand], so they could focus it
and frame it, and this required a big structure. Then the big structure
required a big launch vehicle, and soon you were at 700 million bucks.
And so Goldin was livid, “I’m not going to fly that damn
Landsat 7. It’s too expensive.”
And then he went to Congress and sort of talked to George [Edward]
Brown [Jr.] and several other people in Congress, and he came back
and said, “They won’t let me not fly it. The data is too
valuable.” He was a very acute politician. He listened to every
political voice and tried to balance it all out. So we had to do something,
and I didn’t know how to deal with it.
So he said, “Well, there are these people that have got very
small short focal length—.” This other thing was the camera
with long focal length. “Short focal-length cameras that will
do the same thing and they’re electronically steered. So why
don’t you look at those.” So we called in, I believe,
the Mitre Corporation, who had been doing some of these instruments,
I guess. They’d been working for the black community. So they
came in and gave us a presentation on all the advantages, that we
could go to a small spacecraft, etc., etc.
Then we went to the user community and we sort of started talking
about small spacecraft, Landsat replacement observations, and the
user community got extremely nervous, “It’s unreliable.
We don’t know how this works. You can’t prove that it’s
the same data, and my business depends on having a continuity of data.”
And it was quite clear that the user community wouldn’t have
enough faith in the system if NASA had just announced that Landsat
8 or whatever was going to be new technology. It wasn’t going
to work. They wouldn’t buy it, and half the people there were
buying their data. So the other half now wanted to use it for science.
So then there came along the New Millennium Program at JPL, and the
New Millennium Program’s purpose, it solved part of this problem
of technology demonstrations. These are specifically for technology
demonstrations, proof to the world it would work before you flew it
on a more expensive spacecraft. So the New Millennium Program came
along, and our first proposal to that was for this modern Landsat
replacement instrument. Then the idea was that the Landsat would fly
and then this New Millennium instrument would fly at approximately
the same time, and the world would compare the images. And if the
user community gained enough confidence from this inter-comparison,
then the next NASA spacecraft would be new technology.
That’s the path, I believe, that the system was on, that they
have built the Earth observing, EO-1 that’s up there, and I
don’t know how it’s working out. But that’s how,
in that particular case, we handled the “faster, better, cheaper”
requirement. And if it should work, then you are talking instead of
$700 million you’re talking $250 million to do the same job.
So it’s quite clear that new technology sometimes does bring
your cost down, but you have to get through this barrier of risk,
both real and perceived.
Johnson: One
of the other programs, I think, under your tenure, you led the development
of a coordinated educational program to increase students’ understanding
of Earth’s environment. Can you share with us some of the details
of that?
Kennel: I
don’t know how successful it was. It was just sort of one of
the things that we did somewhat towards the end of my time there.
But, you know, no federal agency has enough budgetary clout, including
the Department of Education, to affect K-12 education in the U.S.
It’s an immense enterprise run by the localities. So everybody,
Department of Education, NSF, NASA, are all adding at the margin and
enriching perhaps, but it’s very difficult for them to change
the fundamentals. So the question for every agency involved, especially
just talking about science education, what can they do that adds or
subtracts or will make a difference, given resources that are infinitesimal
compared to what’s required.
So when I got to NASA, I went out to a trip to Goddard Space Flight
Center, and education’s one of our missions. So they showed
me around. And at that point, there was an elderly, about to retire,
Goddard scientist, who had a favorite high school in Maryland, and
he installed a satellite downlink station and the kids were analyzing
the data. I thought, “This is great. This is very impressive.
They’re really learning a lot.” Then I asked the following
question, “How much did we spend on this download station, and
what is the annual operating budget of the school?” And when
I discovered that NASA was showering on this school about the same
amount per student as the school district was for a limited project,
I realized that this was not sustainable. This was a very concentrated
way of spending our money, but it wasn’t going to affect many
people, and it’s a great demonstration and made an old guy feel
good. He had all the enjoyment of all these wonderful students, and
that’s all nice, but what was it accomplishing on a large scale?
So I challenged the Education Division to change and to look at this,
and they went through a strategic plan. As I recall, it was led at
that time by a fellow named Mark [A.] Pine, who was one of the wonderful
NASA employees, he’s just the truly NASA types. Mark came out
to JPL, and he’s now left NASA. But at that point, he was in
this, and they went through and they finally decided that the best
thing they could do, and this is, I think, almost a universal conclusion,
the best thing they can do is to teach teachers, and enrich their
intellectual grasp and give them curriculum materials and then they
would teach. And I think the other part of the story was that we could
teach the teachers that live near the NASA Centers, for obvious reasons,
that that could bring them in, summer programs or whatever. So I think
they started on the path of developing materials that would concentrate
on teachers, and I thought that was about the right thing to do.
Now Mr. [Sean] O’Keefe wants to find a way to spread this to
every school. “No child shall be left behind.” And the
question is, can NASA leave no child behind with its limited resources.
And I don’t know the answer to that, but that was how far we
got then. As I recall, they were going to have teacher peer-review
groups review what NASA did, which I thought was the right thing to
do. I think that may have been an innovation, at least for us, in
Mission to Planet Earth. I don’t recall all of it, but I thought
the things that came out of that plan were good and they had an appropriate
sense of humility about the difficulty of the task. And, you know,
we spent what, 20, 30 million dollars a year on it in those days.
It’s a lot of money. Small compared to a spacecraft, but still
a lot of money, but still tiny compared to the challenge.
Johnson: Currently
you serve as the chair of the NASA Advisory Council. Can you tell
us a little bit about your role there and some of the issues that
you’re dealing with?
Kennel: And
how did that happen?
Johnson: How
did that happen?
Kennel: Yes,
right. I came to Scripps. I’d been the Executive Vice Chancellor
of UCLA from ’96 to ’98. I came on at Scripps in—well,
my first full-time day on the job was April Fool’s Day in 1998.
So it had probably been here about a few months after that, and Dan
calls me up and says, “Would you like to be on the NASA Advisory
Council?”
And I said, “Yes, sir.” The NASA Administrator calls,
you do it. In fact, I had wanted to be on it. I thought I could play
an interesting role.
So [Dr.] Brad Parkinson was chair then at that point, and so I sat,
was a loyal member, and went to a number of the meetings, as many
as I could go to. And in the fullness of time, Parkinson stepped down.
His term was over. And Goldin had already said to me earlier, “Maybe
I’ll make you Chair of the NASA Advisory Council when Parkinson
steps down.” But that was not to be, because there was actually
a change of Administration, which I think was somewhat unexpected.
So Parkinson has stepped down, and there they were with a new Administration
coming in, and it was clear to everybody that Dan’s days were
numbered, but that he would have some still. They weren’t going
to get rid of a very competent NASA Administrator just like that.
They were going to take their time about it, and they had other priorities
and so forth. So there was this unspecified period of time in which
he would be the Administrator still.
Now, just before all that happened, [Dr. Daniel R.] Dan Mulville called
me up and said, “A lot of the people on the NASA Advisory Council
terms are ending and so is yours. A lot of them are rotating off,
but you’ve only served one term and you’re a lot younger
than they are. Do you want to serve another term?”
And so I said, “Well, yeah, but, you know, I believe that there’s
going to be this rotation of the NASA Administrator, and I believe
every Administrator should have the ability to choose his or her own
members of the Advisory Council.” I said, “So please go
back and relay this answer. I’ll serve if asked, but don’t
you want to just wait and bank these positions until the new Administrator
comes in?”
So about a month later, I got a phone call from Courtney Stadd, and
Courtney said, “That was a very classy answer that you gave.
I’ve checked around in the White House and so forth, and there’d
be no objective to you being interim chair. Would you serve at least
for a year till we figure out what to do with NASA?”
So I went to Courtney, and I went and had another interview with him
and I said, “You know, there’re two liabilities that I
have for this Administration that are politically sensitive. One is
the global warming issue. NASA is deeply involved in it, and I believe
it has to continue to do that, and so is Scripps. And, secondly, Scripps
is constructing your favorite spacecraft, Triana,” which was
very politically sensitive because it was traceable to an idea that
Al Gore had had, and they had called it presidential pork.
So Courtney checked all this out and said, “Oh, okay. It’s
still okay.”
And so I said, “Okay, I’ll serve.”
Then Dan Goldin came in and actually asked me, “Would you serve
as interim chair?”
I said, “Sure.” Especially since they all asked me now.
The only thing I did different was I thought the people on the Advisory
Council were so experienced, that we should have them talk more and
have NASA talk less. So I didn’t want death by viewgraph to
happen to the Advisory Council, and so I made sure there was plenty
of dialogue on the Council. As it turned out, as a result of that
and also as a result of [A. Thomas] Tom Young and the work that he
did with Sean O’Keefe when they were at OMB [Office of Management
and Budget], we had a profound influence, for good or ill, on the
course of the program and particularly on the present course that
NASA’s on with regard to completion of the [International Space]
Station.
Tom Young’s committee surfaced. Let me give you my interpretation
of what happened. The Johnson Space Flight Center, under Goldin, had
managed the Station to $2.1 billion budget. It’s a budget cap.
They could get some extra money if they needed it by eating the lunch
of the science program, but it wasn’t a very big lunch. So basically
they had to manage the $2.1 billion program. If something went wrong,
their contingency was “We’ll just delay, you know, we’ll
do it when we can.” They never, from their view, compromised
on quality; they’d just do it when they can. So their contingency
was to delay.
So somewhere towards the end of the [William Jefferson “Bill”]
Clinton Administration, I gather that somebody was testifying before
Congress, and they were asked, “How much money is there to completion?”
This is something that I think the cost to complete had never really
occurred as an instrumental management tool to Johnson. But that person
got up and said, “We’ve got about four years to go, four
times 2.1. It’s $8.4 billion.” So suddenly the number
was out there, how much money there is to complete the Station.
So, several things happened. The new President finally comes into
power. It takes a little while, as you know. And within a while, a
number is floated by somebody—we all have our suspicion who—the
number is floated that actually the cost to complete is like $13 billion.
And within a week or so of that number being floated, George Abbey
is fired as director of Johnson.
Two things happened. I think the present Administration treated that
$8.4 billion estimate or any other estimate as an actual guarantee,
a promise to the American people, whereas it wasn’t nearly that
well thought out. So they began to feel that they were double-crossed,
that NASA was pulling a fast one on this Administration, especially
when the number went to 13.1 billion.
So then I think at that point the NASA Advisory Council had this Station
management team in place through Tom Young, who’s one of the
most competent and loyal people that I’ve run across, and Tom
Young was looking at the financing of Station, the management and
so on and so forth, and Tom reached the conclusion that Johnson didn’t
manage to cost. They didn’t know what it cost. So OMB could
go and the Congress could go and one day one person would give one
number, the next day another person would give another number, both
were making back-of-the-envelope guesses based on their experience,
and there never had been a formal cost control and cost assessment
of the cost to complete the Station.
In addition, there’s a second problem. Everybody knew that if
this were a normal project, after you’d built most of your hardware,
the cost would go down. So how come the Station costs weren’t
going down? Why were we still at a $2.1 billion budget? Where is all
that money going? Who’s got it? The problem had been that it
was not managed as a closed-end project. People were badged to a Station
project. They work for Johnson Space Center and were taken in and
off the project as needed, on an as-needed basis. And, of course,
for many years the Center had operated according to this entitlement.
They expected still to get it. And the new OMB said, “No, you
shouldn’t get it, because it’s project tailing off. It’s
got a closed end, and you’ve got to tell us when it’s
going to end.”
“End? The Space Station is going to end?”
So, “The project, I mean.”
“And our phase in it will end? What do you mean?” I mean,
this was the kind of response that we were first getting.
So I think that Tom and the Administration and Sean O’Keefe,
when he was at OMB, worked out this core complete probation period
concept, which we’re now going through and it’s had some
success. But then when I got in, this is about the time I got into
the leadership role, I also realized that there was another thing
that Johnson had not thought about. It had not thought about how to
do operations, that its next responsibility was not to building it,
but to operating it. And this required a whole different cast of mind.
When you’re building something and you’re an engineer,
you ought to be in complete control. No mistakes. Zero tolerance.
And they did very well by that. But now you’re operating a hotel
and you’re bringing in scientists and you’ve got thousands
more constituents than you ever had before, who want to use this thing,
who don’t know how to use it. And a completely different philosophy
of management was required, openness and not the control, and they
hadn’t thought about the transition.
But one of the reasons they hadn’t thought about the transition
was that NASA had been creatively unclear about what the goals of
the Space Station are or should be. Are they exploration? Advancement
of the human spirit? Preparing for the Mars trip? Doing good science?
Which are they? International collaboration? That’s fine, when
you advocate the problem in 1985, the reason we wanted to build a
space station. But in 2002 Johnson should have had some sense we’ll
put so many dollars on international, so many dollars on the educational
mission, this is how we’re going to do it, and this is how we’re
going to operate. No clear idea. And a good deal of that comes because
we, NASA, the science community, all the stakeholders, the system
chose not to define clear initial goals for the Station. If it lasts
for fifty years, as I expect it will, we’ll accomplish all of
them. But if it only lasts for the next five, what are the ones that
you’re going to put your money into first?
So the Young panel said science has got to be the primary goal. The
science community is saying, “There’s no way that we’re
going to get a $33 billion charge to our account. The science isn’t
good enough for that.” That’s probably true, but it is
also true that given that the Station exists, science could be a very
good first use of it. And so we’ve gone through this remap exercise,
which tried to define scientific goals, tossed out a lot of bad ones
and left in about half the original program goals as being reasonable
for Station, made the extreme point that if you can’t go beyond
U.S. core complete, you might as well forget about the science.
I think that is a generally held view on the NASA Advisory Council.
Certainly Tom Young believes that if we stick with core complete,
the program goes into a death spiral, because there isn’t enough
capacity, astronaut capacity, to do the interesting things that would
justify the continued expenditure on it. Even the 10 or 20 percent,
if they’re going to spend 500 million a year keeping it up there,
not the 2.1 to build it but the 500 million, 500 million dollars is
a lot of money, and you’ve got to find a reason. People have
to understand the reasons why you’re spending it. More than
that, at some point it’s going to be up there and people are
going to say, “Why did we build it?”
There’s a whole bunch of reasons why we built it, but there
isn’t one that’s sticking in the public mind. So, beyond
the definition of the science goals, which could well define a good
initial phase, the really truly inspirational reasons why you should
do Station are not clearly articulated in a simple way and they are
not held in the public mind. You don’t have a “faster,
better, cheaper” mantra for the Station, something that simple
that everybody says, “Oh, that’s why we’re doing
it.” You know, it could be it’s for all the world. But
they haven’t thought yet at that level, and it’s because
we, they, haven’t got a clear idea of how the goals all work
together, what the priorities are, and when we’ll accomplish
them.
So that’s where the NASA Advisory Council is right now, and
the biggest threat of all, I believe, to NASA is the fact that we’ll
have this wonderful achievement up there that nobody will understand
why we built it. That would be terrible. So, somebody’s got
to have a little courage. Somebody’s got to start talking about
things. One of the main reasons of having it up there is it’s
not entirely clear that astronauts can live a long time in space without
running into serious problems. Should we actually be thinking of sending
them out into space for five years at a time? Will they come back
able to walk? Will they have any bones left? I mean, there are serious
medical problems that emerge with long-term space flight that need
to be looked at.
In my view, the NASA macho is so strong that they do not want to admit
that there might be a problem with achieving these wonderful goals
of going to Mars or whatever they have set out there. So there’s
a serious issue there. A research step, a biomedical step, a science
step. How long can human beings carry out complex activity in space
for a long period of time and what do they need to do it? It’s
an issue.
OMB, under the Clinton Administration, said, “Never talk to
us about Mars. It’s too expensive. We’re never going to
go there in your or my lifetime, and we do not want to see it as a
precursory goal. We don’t want to see anything portrayed as
leading to Mars exploration, because we are not committed to it.”
And I think that right now the present story is like that. But on
the other hand, fifty or a hundred years from now, we may be talking
about mining the asteroids. We may be talking about a lot of things
for sustainability reasons as well as just human exploration reasons.
So I think it’s important for our culture now to answer the
question, can you live a long time in space and what does it take?
So that’s the main reason for doing it. Is it worth $33 billion
when we’re fighting a war on terrorism, and when it only costs
$2 billion to do the [Human] Genome Project and, and, and. There’s
no answer to those questions. But if we could, over the next few years,
clarify the goals of the Station, then it would help. It will require
a major new attention by Johnson Space Center on philosophical things,
its relationship with the broad global society on, you know, really
understanding what it means to promote international collaboration
beyond a group of a few thousand engineers, because soon that thing’s
going to belong to the world. And if the NASA Advisory Council can
play any role in making this change of viewpoint, then we will have
done our job, at least done the job that one little council of twenty
people or thirty people can do, if we can just push it a little bit.
Johnson: Well,
I think we’ve kept you past the time we said we would.
Kennel: Well,
is there anything more that you’re dying to ask or are you just
dying? [Laughter]
Johnson: No,
not at all. I thought I’d ask Rebecca and Jennifer.
Wright: I
have one question, speaking of the Station. As a scientist, but now
as Chair of the Advisory Council, how do you feel that the cancellation
of the CRV [Crew Return Vehicle] to enable more residents on the Station
will affect long-term science projects?
Kennel: Obviously
not well. You mean the CRV?
Wright: The
crew rescue vehicle.
Kennel: Yes,
the best solution, of course, would be to have a specific crew rescue
vehicle. But this is another area where courage could be applied.
I’d look at it this way. We don’t talk about the risks
of being launched on the Shuttle. We don’t know what they are.
We know that if you have a conventional launch vehicle, about one
in fifty fails. And the Shuttle, being nonconventional, is much more
reliable than that, and it could be one in a hundred, one in two hundred,
one in three hundred per launch. Who knows? But it’s definitely
highly risky. So just getting up there, the astronaut accepts a certain
amount of risk.
Now, if something goes wrong up there, the question is, are they willing—there
are two questions. If they spend six months up there and you look
at the failure rate and so forth of subsystems and whatever happens,
how long does it take them in orbit to accumulate as much risk from
the in-orbit occupation and de-orbit as they had on the launch? Okay?
So that’s some number. Secondly, they’re all brave people.
They’re willing. They’re going to do it. They’re
like the original explorers. And they’re not like your average
person on the street who’s very risk-averse.
So the other thing is, are there other strategies? Can you have a
safe haven? Should you perhaps keep a Shuttle ready to go to bring
them down and accept the risk that there’s a couple of days’
delay while they’re up there, and, you know, accept the risk
that there won’t be a completely immediate catastrophic failure?
So I think that there’s a middle ground in there in which we
look for solutions that don’t require five or six billion dollars,
but mitigate the current situation and ask how much risk do you accumulate
with that mitigation strategy. Do the absolute best you can and then
just ask them to accept a risk comparable to what they’re already
doing.
I don’t know whether that all works out in an engineering sense,
but I do think that the astronauts are very courageous people. I’ve
never met one that isn’t. They will accept the risk. I think
that our sense of risk is very different now than it was prior to
9/11 [September 11, 2001]. We wanted to fight an entire war without
a casualty in 1998. But now we’ve got 3,000 of them. So that
people’s acceptance of risk, perception of risk, may be different
now.
Again, it gets back to the inspiration of the goals. I think if society
were to see that this was for some really higher goal of society,
then, of course, society would accept the risk that the astronauts
are willing already to accept. So I think there’s some room
in there. Of course, technologically it would be better, much more
secure, I think, to have your own vehicle. But I haven’t seen
the alternate strategies for how to mitigate in the absence of the
CRV.
Wright: Do
you have anything, Jennifer?
Ross-Nazzal:
I don’t think so.
Wright: Through
your career, is there any one thing that stands out in your mind that
you feel is your greatest accomplishment in dealing with NASA? Obviously
your career with NASA isn’t quite over yet, or your dealings
with NASA.
Kennel: Oh,
I guess the thing that I point to is the first thing I got on, just
the Science Advisory Group, the small role that as a young scientist
I learned to play in the planning of the Voyager, that great experiment.
That gave me the greatest pleasure as a scientist.
And then I think later on it was just the incredible personal growth
that occurred in about a one-year time. I had to learn how to deal
with Congress and the Defense Department and the White House and a
big bureaucracy, and learned how to manage. What I used to say to
people was that I got a master’s in business administration
from Dan Goldin and a master’s in public policy from the U.S.
Congress all in one year.
So it was the complete change in growth that I couldn’t run
this, couldn’t take responsibility for a major scientific institution
until I had done that, and I hadn’t realized until after the
fact how well I was supported, and they understood exactly. It’s
a good organization. They understood exactly, actually, what to do
with me, and the two deputies were there for a very good reason, and
it was just wonderful. Nobody else had two deputies. I was lucky.
And that was because they understood what my shortcomings were, and
they wanted to capture whatever scientific strengths I could bring.
Johnson: We
thank you for talking with us today.
Kennel: Thank
you.
[End
of interview]