NASA Headquarters Oral
History Project
Edited Oral History Transcript
Robert
M. Lightfoot
Interviewed by Sandra Johnson
Huntsville, Alabama – 22 June 2018
Johnson: Today
is June 22, 2018. This oral history with Robert Lightfoot is being
conducted in Huntsville, Alabama for the NASA Headquarters Oral History
Project. The interviewer is Sandra Johnson, assisted by Jennifer Ross-Nazzal.
We want to thank you again for agreeing to talk to us.
I want to start by talking about the beginning of your interest in
engineering. Let’s talk about your education and background,
and how that prepared you to work for NASA. From what I read, you’d
actually thought about going into journalism at first.
Lightfoot:
In high school I was the editor and sports editor of our newspaper,
and we won some national award. One of the schools here in the state,
if you were the editor and you had these awards, you could get a ride,
a scholarship. So, I assumed my future was in journalism. My guidance
counselor, though, saw my scores from my ACT [college admissions test]
and said, “You need to go into engineering.” I had no
idea what that meant because I had no role models.
I wasn’t from here. I wasn’t fortunate like a lot of people
from Huntsville, they lived and breathed engineering. I had no idea
what it was. Honestly—and I’ve said this a bunch of times—I
said, “I thought I was going to be driving a train.” I
thought that’s what engineers did. But that’s what started
me down that path going forward, and why I went into engineering.
Not because I had any great passion, it’s just what the test
scores said I should do.
Johnson: Your
father was an educator, is that correct?
Lightfoot:
Yes, he was a professor at the University of Montevallo [Alabama],
a little south of Birmingham down there. He taught math to start with
and then became an educator of educators. I used to see my dad in
my classrooms a lot because he was grading the student teachers that
were there, so that was always an interesting dynamic.
Johnson: Yes,
I can imagine. I heard that you described yourself as a “guinea
pig” for him more than once, I think.
Lightfoot:
Yes, he used to use me in his classes, and for Alabama Public Television.
He had a 30-minute science show that he used to do, like a Mr. Wizard
[Donald J. Herbert, children’s science television educator]
kind of thing, and so I was on there a couple times as well.
Johnson: I
bet that was quite an experience.
Lightfoot:
I just barely remember it. But I do remember him tricking me with
the beakers - the short fat beaker and the tall skinny beaker and
then the one in the middle. He’d say, “Which one had more
water?” Of course they all had the same, which was unfair. He
was just trying to show the students how people think. They think
differently from whatever their background is.
Johnson: That’s
a good lesson to carry on into your career I would imagine.
Lightfoot:
Oh, yes. My dad is my hero. He gave me all sorts of lessons. More
than I care to admit.
Johnson: When
your guidance counselor, because of your ACT scores, said, “You
need to become an engineer,” what did you do? Where did you
apply?
Lightfoot:
I went to University of Alabama [Tuscaloosa]. I probably didn’t
have much choice there. In the state of Alabama you pretty much decided
at birth whether you were going to be Alabama or Auburn [University,
Alabama]. Most of my family was Alabama, so I went there, for no other
reason than that’s where I knew I was pretty much going to go,
since maybe like one year old.
Johnson: When
you first started taking those classes that would lead you into an
engineering field, what was it like for you? Since you thought at
first you’d be driving a train.
Lightfoot:
I think the challenge with engineering school for me always—I’m
a visual and hands on learner. I’m not an academic or theoretical
learner by any means. I think my challenge was the basic classes that
you take when you first get there. They’re not engineering.
It’s math and science and electives. I didn’t get to engineering
classes, basically till my late sophomore or early junior year.
I struggled; I struggled mightily. In fact, my dad sat me down and
said, “Are you sure you want to be an engineer?” after
a couple of interesting semesters. I’ll just leave it at that,
since this is a history. I remember specifically telling him, “Dad,
I don’t even know what an engineer does.” Because I still
hadn’t had anything that taught me what an engineer does yet.
It was all calculus and physics, and I hadn’t gotten to the
engineering part yet. I would say the first two or three years were
really a struggle for me.
What changed that was between my junior and senior year I was able
to come up here and work in Huntsville. My girlfriend at the time,
who’s now my wife, is from Huntsville, and I got a job working
out at [NASA] Marshall [Space Flight Center] on one of the test stands
out there. They were getting ready to put a Space Shuttle main engine
on the stand to do testing, and I was doing something as simple as
just drawings for the test stand. I wouldn’t call it real engineering.
I was doing drawings, and really reproducing stuff from the ’60s.
This was late ’80s, so we could use it.
I’m not one of those people that wanted to be in NASA from day
one, I can’t claim that. But I got the bug, I got hooked pretty
quick. Would go to the [U.S.] Space & Rocket Center [Huntsville,
Alabama], and see the Saturn V [rocket] laying there. My dad had built
a Saturn V as a model when I was a kid, and I remember that specifically
being in the house. I knew all about the Moon program, I knew all
that stuff. But I didn’t know much else.
But for me I got hooked. All of a sudden all those academic things
became very visual to me. I saw them playing out in practice and I
began to understand. I had just taken a propulsion systems class at
the university. To see an engine packaged up and what it looks like
was like “Oh! I get it.” It was a big “aha!”
moment for me.
My senior year was just much better. I got out of there, thank God.
I tell the joke all the time that some people graduate —what
is it? Magna cum laude, summa cum laude, cum laude. My dad said I
graduated “Thank the laude,” that’s what he said.
It’s really true from that standpoint. But after I got out of
school I went to work for Rockwell International. Actually that summer
was the summer of ’85 that I came up here and worked. Really
excited about what I was doing, totally changed the way I was looking
at the job boards at the university.
Then [Space Shuttle] Challenger [STS-51L accident] happened in January
of ’86. Job boards disappeared for obvious reasons, at least
in the areas that I wanted to work. My summer job was with Rockwell
International, and they had a Shuttle support contract, and I went
out there that summer for them. Oddly enough they ended up getting
a contract to help Return to Flight, all the activities that were
going on, and they brought me back in.
It allowed me to work Return to Flight, so I hit the ground running.
The first day I was there we were testing O-rings, if you can believe
that. Spent a year testing O-rings and being part of the redesign
effort, in the same test area that was going to be testing the main
engines that I worked on in the summer before.
After the redesign effort was over, my task got shifted over to doing
the Space Shuttle main engine testing again. We were still just activating
the facility, cranking up from where we’d done before. But again,
I was still Rockwell International at the time. Did that for a couple
years. We got the facility activated; we ran a couple of tests, again,
as a contractor.
Somewhere along the way—I started ’86, so probably ’86
or ’87—that particular program was called technology testbed.
We weren’t really testing the Space Shuttle main engine. We
were using the Space Shuttle main engine as a platform to test technologies.
I don’t know if that makes sense. But really what it was was
the Space Shuttle engine was considered a stable platform.
People were trying to do new things, and you needed that platform
to be able to test them. There were things like ultrasonic sensors.
Can you actually measure turbomachinery torque while it’s running,
can you tell rotation? A lot of the things we did operationally to
the Space Shuttle main engine, could you actually put a sensor in
so you didn’t have to do things post-test? Different ways to
do that.
The testing of the engine was very rigorous. One of the things we
did was we actually ran the engine off of an IBM [International Business
Machines Corp.] ThinkPad [laptop computer]. Just to prove that it
didn’t have to have that big controller. It was interesting
that we did that. We did shorter chill times, we did accelerated drying.
All these different operational things we were just using the engine
to do, but also a lot of technologies.
One of the ones in particular that I remember working on the most
was called optical plume anomaly detection system. What somebody’d
come up with was if you could look at the plume of the engine—which
is clear because it’s just liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen,
it’s basically steam—and see that something’s eroding
inside the engine and catch it before you have a bad day.
We had all these sensors looking at the plume. These guys had been
working this for a long time. The big challenge was false positives,
because the last thing you want to do is shut an engine down, especially
when you’re flying, with a false positive. One of the things
that I got to work on and help design was the system that squirted
liquid chromium into the engine while it was running, because chromium
is a material that is throughout the engine. The problem that the
plume anomaly people were having was calibrating. If you see a streak,
what just eroded? How much? Often you wouldn’t find it.
But we actually squirted chromium in there. Then I could go measure
how much we put in after the test and tell them. It’s hard to
do this when you’re running the engine. People get a little
bit wound up about you squirting things inside an engine while it’s
running. But they’d come along and basically at 50 seconds we’re
going to turn the system on, and 60 seconds we’ll turn it off.
You’d see a spike, and then they were able to calibrate the
spike. You could then take that number back and actually calculate
how much hardware eroded, if you were thinking about an erosion situation.
I’ll never forget one of the cool things about that particular
one. We finally got it to work. It took a while to get that to work,
because it’s hard squirting things in the engine while it’s
running. When it worked—this guy had been working on this for
20 years, this was a technology he’d been trying to develop
for 20 years.
The door to the control room is locked, and when we finally did it
and it finally worked, somebody’s pounding on the door at shutdown.
Engine shutdown, we’re going through all that. The guy comes
in, just gives me a big hug. He was so excited that we had actually
done this. But anyway, I digress.
Johnson: No,
that’s great.
Lightfoot:
For me, getting back on the engine program was a big deal. I went
back over there, started working. The NASA guys were given the job.
They decided not to let—at the time it was going to be Rocketdyne
[Division of Rockwell International], the same people that were running
the test facilities down at [NASA] Stennis [Space Center, Mississippi].
Somebody made the decision that they wanted the NASA engineers to
get the hands-on work. I thought I was actually going to be a test
conductor as a Rockwell employee, and somewhere in that transition
they decided to let NASA do that. I was kind of like, “Oh man,”
because that’s really what I wanted to do. So I stayed there
as a contractor, but the people running the tests and running the
systems were NASA guys. Good friends, we all stuck together, but I
was just supporting the test conductor there.
I think it was ’88, ’89 timeframe, again Rockwell had
a contract supporting the Shuttle program. I really wasn’t that
involved with the program, it was more the testing. We ended up going—there
was a plant out near Las Vegas [Henderson, Nevada] that blew up, ammonium
perchlorate plant. The name of the company was [PEPCON (Pacific Engineering
and Production Company of Nevada)]. They made the ammonium perchlorate,
which is the oxidizer in the solid rocket motors. The only place in
the United States that made it.
The plant blew up, so it was a pretty big deal. If you ever want to
see anything interesting, Google [internet search] the ammonium perchlorate
plant. Google the PEPCON explosion and watch what happens. There happened
to be a TV crew filming a commercial on the top of a hill when the
thing blew up, so they got it all on film. It blew out windows miles
away.
As part of the contract that we had with the Shuttle, the solid rocket
booster team came and said, “Hey you guys, we could use somebody
to go out there and help them reactivate their facility.” They
moved to Cedar City, Utah, and I went out because I’d been activating
test stands, to activate their facility. I spent about four months
out there.
While I was out there, I got the call from NASA. I had applied for
a job at NASA and I got a call from my old NASA boss—he was
actually the boss of the engine program. They wanted me to come work
on the engine program with him. I got a call offering me a job, so
that’s how I got to NASA. Flopped over, and we had been testing
a particular engine in the test stand, just to make sure the test
stand was working, and doing some technology work.
But the real test engine built for this was Engine 3001. Its own moniker.
No other engines have a 3 in front of them. That was going to be the
technology testbed engine. When we had the instrumented turbopumps
on there, we had roughly anywhere from 1,500 to 2,000 pieces of instrumentation
when we ran the test. We’d never done anything like this, crazy
stuff. Hypodermic tubing going through the engine just so we could
measure data we’d never measured, what they call Herschel-Venturi
[tubes] in every run line.
For years they’d built a model on how the Space Shuttle main
engine works, but they’d never calibrated it, it was just a
model. So we ran this thing and calibrated that model. Just amazing.
But I ended up being the person responsible for getting that engine
out of Rocketdyne. Spent a lot of time at Canoga Park, California.
I call that my first child, Engine 3001. It sits out in front of Building
4200 at Marshall now, it’s the Space Shuttle main engine that
sits there. It’s my old baby. That was cool, and that’s
how I got back to Marshall. Stayed on that program, Lord, I guess
till it ended. There was a lot of reasons it ended.
Johnson: You
said you went to Las Vegas because you’d activated facilities
before, and that’s the facilities here at Marshall you were
talking about?
Lightfoot:
Yes, the test facilities.
Johnson: Can
you talk about the different test facilities that you worked on, and
maybe just a little bit of information about those?
Lightfoot:
Yes. I worked on several test facilities, mostly doing either small
component testing like O-rings, all the way to the big engine testing.
One of the things we were responsible for at Rockwell was writing
procedures for activating systems, but also writing procedures for
operating.
I had written several activation procedures for some of the systems.
The liquid oxygen systems, some of the pneumatic systems on the test
stand. I’d written the operating procedures as well, in other
words how we’re going to use them for a given test day. Eventually
I moved over toward writing procedures that were specifically around
the engine, procedures that we’d gotten from Stennis, because
Stennis had been running engines for years.
That set of skills, I guess if you want to call it, of being able
to take drawings and systematically check something out, but then
also about how you’re going to operate it at the end of the
day, with all the parameters that are required—that’s
what they asked us to go do. Rockwell had been doing that for the
Agency for a while.
Same kind of thing. You build a brand-new facility, it’s got
to be brought online, leak-checked. All the different things that
you would do before you get there.
Johnson: As
you mentioned, when you were still with Rockwell you were doing testing
on the O-rings. That time period at NASA at all the Centers was a
little traumatic, just because people didn’t really know how
long it was going to take to get back to flight. Can you talk about
that? Maybe your impressions of what the atmosphere at Marshall was
at that point and how it affected the work.
Lightfoot:
You know, I didn’t have the trauma that a lot of the team had,
because I was in college when Challenger happened. I didn’t
necessarily have the connection. I will tell you I understood it more
during [Space Shuttle] Columbia [STS-107 accident], because I was
there with Columbia. I didn’t get that, but what I saw was this
just incredibly focused team to get back to flight. Incredibly focused.
In some ways it was exhilarating being part of that.
I hate to say coming out of a tragedy that something was exhilarating,
but being part of a team that was really trying to accomplish something
and get back to flight. That was probably the first thing I remember
is “Man, these folks—this is a team, really focused.”
There’s been times in my career we haven’t been that focused.
People were focused. Very focused. That was what I remember the most.
People were doing just about anything they had to to get us there.
Johnson: Before
we talk a little bit more about once you started at NASA, I was just
wondering. That summer when you were working you said was your first
time in the test stand. Can you talk about that? Because obviously
we’ve never been on a test stand. Just describe what that was
like and what you saw, and what gave you that excitement to work toward
a career with propulsion.
Lightfoot:
I would say the enormity of things. The test stand we were working
on was the one where they tested the Saturn V for the first time.
So the enormity of a facility that holds down the rocket that’s
going to the Moon.
Even in my latter days in the Agency I would tell my friends at the
Cape [Canaveral, Florida], “It’s a hell of a lot harder
to hold it down than it is to let it go.” Because they get to
let them go. So when you got all that thrust and you got to hold it
down, there’s a lot of concrete. You’re walking around
150, 200 feet in the air. It’s launchpad-ish in some ways, with
a lot more infrastructure to keep things from going where they’re
not supposed to go.
The enormity of that, and realizing the history of what had happened
there, was probably what was coolest to me. I’m not a big history
buff, but I always am amazed. I’ve done so many speeches where
I always talk about standing on the shoulders of giants, and that’s
what it felt like. It’s like the ghost of the past. You just
know some cool stuff went on, and you want to be part of that. You
never think about it when you’re in the moment, that somebody
else is going to be looking back going, “It had to be really
cool.” So that was the part that struck me.
I’d played sports in high school, and knew the team aspect,
but for me it’s always been fascinating the team aspect of NASA.
Everybody’s just trying to get the job done, and the boresight
focus around that. I just wanted to be part of that. I don’t
know what else to say, that’s kind of contagious when you see
that.
Johnson: I
can imagine it is. Like you said, you did it for a while, but one
of the things I read that you had worked on was the RD-180 [rocket
engine] testing. Talk about that, and why you were working on the
RD-180 at Marshall.
Lightfoot:
Actually NASA had nothing to do with this one. It’s actually
a very interesting story, at least to me. The Space Shuttle main engine
testing left Marshall. There’s a lot of reasons. They put stuff
down at Stennis, moved a lot of the rocket propulsion testing to Stennis
at the time. There was a lot of reasons. There were political reasons,
but there were also technical reasons from a duplication perspective.
So a lot of stuff moved down there.
We didn’t have any work, right, so what are you going to do?
At the time Lockheed Martin [Corporation] was changing their Atlas
[rocket] program to what they called the Atlas III/AR at the time.
It had a Russian engine in it, and they basically didn’t have
anywhere to test. These guys are in Denver [Colorado], they don’t
have anywhere to test.
They were looking around the country at where they could test their
engine. They had us and the guys at Rocket Ridge AFRL [Air Force Research
Laboratory] out at Edwards Air Force Base [California]—where
they used to test [North American] F-1s engine (first stage of the
Saturn V moon rocket), just like we used to test F-1s here. Big test
facilities up there. They had us all come in and give them what we
would do.
To me it was pretty innovative from a perspective of we were actually
the contractor to Lockheed, which was about the most bizarre situation
in the world. But we did it through a Space Act Agreement. They were
able to actually pay us to do the testing for them, so we went out
and had to bid on it, and that’s when I learned that for me
maybe my calling was more in an interface with others than running
tests.
I used to joke about the test area. Test areas are all fenced up pretty
big, because we always say “keep people out.” It may have
been to keep us in, because we’re a different breed out there
in the test area than most. But I was able to survive outside the
fence in that world.
We went out to Lockheed. We were almost doing a proposal, like a contractor
would to NASA. And it was terrible, by the way, I just want you to
know. After I moved up a little bit, started seeing real proposals,
I thought “Man, these Lockheed guys must have been going, ‘What
is wrong with these people?’” It was so simplistic. But
we were real, and they knew we could do it. We just might not have
been as polished as most, how about that? I’ll just leave it
at that.
We ended up doing that testing for them. They had to do it as part
of their agreement with the Department of Defense to show that they
could test the engine domestically. So we tested the engine, plus
the whole propulsion module. We put it in the same test stand where
we’d been testing Space Shuttle main engines.
It was a cool program. Then to see it fly on the Atlas later was great.
Now we’re still flying it. It’s a fantastic engine, and
it’s delivered many, many payloads for us and the Department
of Defense. To be on the front end of that was fun.
I used to—when I did the interviews back then, a long time ago—talk
about the irony of testing a Russian engine on the test stand that
we built to beat the Russians to the Moon. It was always fascinating
to me that we did that.
Johnson: History
changes, doesn’t it? It’s really interesting. You did
do testing here, and I know of course you said a lot of it moved to
Stennis. But the testing that’s done here and at Stennis—there’s
a lot of studies that NASA had to do for test criteria to protect
the environment, protect the communities around, to reduce noise,
and to reduce any impact on the local residents.
What kind of testing was done, and how did they come up with that?
Or is that anything that changed from the time they were testing early
on, like you said the Saturn V, into Shuttle or the RD-180? Did it
depend on what you were testing?
Lightfoot:
Yes, it depended very much on what you were testing. In the Apollo
days of course I wasn’t here, but the stories I would hear.
When they tested the Saturn V first stage—I want to say they
did it five or six times here, I can’t remember exactly—they
just paid insurance claims like crazy. Because you’re tearing
people’s houses up and china would fall off the walls and windows
would break.
By the time I got around to testing, we’re testing Space Shuttle
main engine, very high frequency, didn’t have the rumble like
a Saturn V would. We didn’t have any challenges with that at
all. When the RD-180 came in, because it was liquid oxygen and kerosene
like the F-1, there was a lot of concerns about the noise level. So
we did a lot of balloons. We would do things to make sure we weren’t
going to reach from a sound level outside the gates of Redstone Arsenal
[Alabama]. We did a lot to do that.
Most of it’s not the direct noise coming out of the flame bucket.
It’s more what they call—there’s a noise that goes
up and it may hit a cloud deck or even an invisible layer of something
in the atmosphere and reflect back down. When that reflection hits
the one that’s running along the ground, it almost multiplies
the decibel level that you get. They call it acoustic focusing. There
was a lot of concern about that.
We probably overthought it a little bit. I remember the first test
we ran, the guy that had helped me with all the modeling and all the
analysis of that, he actually had a noise meter and was outside the
gate in the area we were worried about. About 10 minutes after the
test my phone rings and it’s him, and he goes, “Can you
tell me when the test is going to go?” I went, “We already
ran.” It was one of those cases where I went, “Ooh God,
I wonder if our modeling was conservative,” because he didn’t
even know we ran the test.
But we did a lot of that. Really didn’t have to worry. One of
the reasons a lot of testing moved to Stennis—they had a huge
buffer zone. Stennis has an enormous amount of acreage around it intentionally
so that you don’t run into that problem. But we were concerned
because a lot of the area outside the arsenal, the direction the flame
bucket points—which is pretty much west—had been developed
residentially, and so we were a little nervous about that. But it
ended up not being a problem.
Johnson: On
days like this it wouldn’t be a good test day, is that correct,
because of the cloud cover?
Lightfoot:
No, probably not. They probably wouldn’t let us test today.
That reflection off the clouds, that’s what causes that focusing.
It can be really loud when it gets there.
Johnson: That’s
interesting. You moved pretty quickly. As you said, you got the job
with NASA to be the program manager for that project. Then you moved
to deputy division chief for the Propulsion Test Division in ’98.
Talk about what you did as that, then after that you went to Stennis
where most of the testing was done.
Lightfoot:
Yes, the opportunity to move up to be the deputy—I’d been
a team lead. The deputy division chief came open. The person that
was in the division chief job called me and said, “Would you
please apply for the deputy?”
All that really was was I had the entire test area instead of just—when
we were doing the Space Shuttle main engine testing and the Russian
engine testing—we did some other testing too by the way out
there, but that’s what I was mostly involved in. That was called
the West Test Area. Where I did the O-ring testing was called the
East Test Area. So it was two different areas, basically one side
of the road or the other. When I became the deputy division chief
I had both. Both fell under my responsibility, so helping the division
chief run that.
He asked me if I would apply. Well, several people asked me if I would
apply so I was like, “Well, I’ll move up and do that job.”
It was my first step into management, if you want to call it that.
Other than being a team leader, that was the thing I did.
Johnson: At
the time was it an easy step into management? You said you had noticed
that you were good at communicating with people.
Lightfoot:
There’s a story in there. When I was running technology tests,
even though I was a test conductor at some point I got pulled up to
be the program manager of technology testbed. I came up to do that.
When I say up—I got out of the test area, there was another
building.
So I was sitting in there, and we actually needed to run a test. All
my test conductors were on leave, it was the end of the year. I still
thought I could do the test, right, even though I was in a management
position. I am absolutely positive my ego got in the way. I said,
“I’ll go run the test.” I went back, and it wasn’t
very long into the countdown I realized this was a mistake because
I had not been following along as closely because I was the program
manager. I was worried about other stuff at the time.
It worked out fine. The engine test went fine, everything went fine;
my team was going to take care of me. Luckily nothing popped up. I’m
not sure that if anything had popped up it’d have been a problem,
but it was very clear to me that was my last test. Even when I took
that position, that position was always a one-year rotation. I always
figured I would go back and test.
I remember going back home that night and telling my wife. I said,
“That was my last test.” It was pretty emotional too,
because I love testing. But I knew it was wrong, and I probably should
have not run the test. I probably should have let somebody else and
let me just be their backup. But I love running tests, so that was
part of it.
That was my first foray into realizing that I wasn’t going to
be in the technical side anymore, that I felt more comfortable on
the other side. What I found, again, with the RD-180 stuff was I could
actually help my team get work. I had the ability to actually go out
and get more work for the test area than actually doing the work.
When you take that step—my buddies in this field have had to
make that decision, when you go from the technical part to the management
part. In some ways it’s depressing, and in other ways you see
how you play it out in a different way. You bring your skill set.
Johnson: You
have to figure out what your skills are and use those skills the best
way you can.
Lightfoot:
Yes.
Johnson: You
had that background in communications because of the interest in journalism
early on. Maybe that helped you communicate a little bit better.
Lightfoot:
Maybe, I think maybe it helped. I think most of my advantage there
was just my mom and dad, my dad in particular.
I worked at a summer camp in college before I had that job. I worked
at a summer camp and I was the story guy. They called it the “hike
dude.” The hike dude had to tell stories because the kids would
get tired. Bunch of fourth, fifth, and sixth graders you’re
taking around all over this place. You’re doing campouts, you
got to tell all the ghost stories. I had to tell all the stories,
and I was the storyteller. It teaches you a way to tell a story that
brings people in.
People have told me there’s an authenticity that comes with
that, there’s an approachability that comes with that when you
share those stories. I think that was innate for me for whatever reason,
I can’t explain why. I would say that was innate, and probably
one of the reasons that my writing was okay from a journalism perspective.
I don’t know what came first, but most of it was my dad probably.
My dad was a pretty sharp guy but you wouldn’t know it. He was
just laid-back, but he could tell lots of stories.
Johnson: Communications
is important, especially as you mentioned the engineers, the fencing
maybe to keep them in. Not all engineers can communicate as well as
others, so it’s probably a good thing that you could.
You did go to Stennis and you became the chief of the propulsion test
operations. Do you want to talk about that move to Stennis? Did you
physically move, your whole family move?
Lightfoot:
Yes, yes. My wife is a native Huntsvillian, fourth generation, and
the first time she’d been out of this town. We moved down there.
My daughters were first grade and third grade at the time, so it was
uprooting them. We did that, we moved down there.
The opportunity was that I could get back into testing. The testing
up here was getting less and less. In some ways, though—Marshall
was developing a lot of propulsion hardware and they needed a place
to test it. I think, bluntly, I’ve always been a bridgebuilder
in my career. So what I wanted to do was build a bridge between Stennis
and Marshall.
When I went down there you could look at it two ways. You could say,
“Okay, he went to Stennis, he’s a traitor.” And
if you were at Stennis you could say, “He’s a spy.”
However you want to look at it, but my goal was to get the two teams
together. Me and one of my other friends down at Stennis—probably
couldn’t even do this today—but we rented a bus, a big
bus, and we came up here to Marshall, and we picked up all the propulsion
developers. It’s a six-hour drive from here to Stennis. Guy’s
name is Mike [Michael C.] Dawson. Me and Mike Dawson sat up at the
front of that bus and took questions from the propulsion developers
the whole trip. Then we toured them around the site down there, showed
them what we were doing for them and what we could do for them in
the future.
Most of them knew me. So it was okay, wasn’t terrible. But at
the end of the day the goal here was “Look, we got to work together,
so let’s try to do this.” I think that night we had a
shrimp boil or crawfish boil depending what season it was, I can’t
remember. Had them all over and did that, and sent them back the next
day.
I’ll never forget one of the guys out at Marshall wrote a trip
report that got shared with me and said, “We’re at the
shrimp boil and one of the Stennis guys says, ‘I got to leave.
My kid has a soccer game.’ Kind of hard to be mad at people
that are dealing with the same stuff I’m dealing with, because
I’m missing a soccer game.” So that was pretty cool, it
worked out well from that standpoint.
But for me the cool thing was I went down there in operations. They
were trying to activate new facilities that they had basically been
given. These are high pressure, these are just incredible facilities,
and they were having trouble with the activation part. A couple of
people at Marshall actually said, “Hey Robert, the propulsion
test job is coming open. Operations job is coming open.”
That job was held by somebody you probably have talked to, a guy named
Bill [William W.] Parsons. Parsons had that job, and he went to Houston
to work for Mr. [George W. S.] Abbey. When he did that, that job came
open. I didn’t know Bill Parsons. I go down there, I take the
job, and I’ll never forget—they open the job up. [L.]
Boyce Mix was the boss, and then Roy [S. Estess] of course was Center
Director.
I had to go interview with Roy, who ended up becoming my mentor. I
get emotional thinking about Roy, just because he passed too soon.
Just a great, great man. Oh my goodness, great, great man. We went
back and forth. He had Mark [K.] Craig interview me. It was one of
the most bizarre things I’ve ever been in in my life. They ended
up selecting me. I felt very fortunate for that reason, and I got
to learn from him over time.
But I got down there. It was really just activate these facilities
they’d been given, from an overall perspective for the nation.
It was hard, that was really hard. I had operations. My counterpart
was Rick [Richard J.] Gilbrech, who’s now the Center Director
at Stennis. Rick was running engineering design and I had operations.
We were trying to get all this done moving forward.
That was the move. The first move, as we did that. And I had a blast.
Ultimately, I moved up. Boyce Mix retired and I moved up into that
position to run the whole, what they call, Propulsion Test Directorate.
To be honest with you, I was in my dream job. That was 2001, 2002,
and I was kind of done. I was pretty happy, 38 years old, I think,
if I remember correctly. Man, life was good.
Then we lost Columbia. That was a game changer for a lot of people,
a life changer for a lot of people obviously. Crew’s families
for sure. But that was what probably started the whole next set of
steps that went on.
Johnson: Let’s
talk about that day that the Columbia accident happened. Talk about
where you were and what you did right after that and what transpired
immediately following it.
Lightfoot:
I was at home, Saturday morning. I remember it very well. It was the
last flight planned that was going to come over the United States
coming home. I lived in Mandeville, Louisiana, which is on the north
side of Lake Pontchartrain. They told us, “You’ll be able
to see the Shuttle coming home.”
I’d never seen a Shuttle coming home, so I thought that’d
be kind of cool. So I took my two daughters and we went down to the
lakefront and we were there with a couple of sheriffs and sheriff
deputies because the sonic booms they knew might get people spun up.
Everybody said you’d be able to see it. Then they said, “But
you never know.”
We sat there on the lakefront. This was before cell phones, this was
before all that stuff. I’m sitting there on the lakefront and
I’m looking at my watch. I’m going, “Ah, I guess
we just missed it, we just must have missed it.” Climb back
in the car, we went to Burger King [restaurant] to get the kids breakfast.
I remember that very well.
I walked into the house, and we just come bebopping in the house and
my wife looks at me. She says, “You don’t know, do you?”
Because she didn’t go. I get goosebumps just thinking about
this. The TV is on and it’s the infamous debris picture because
that’s all they really had to run as they talked about it. I
said, “God, I don’t know what to do. I’m just going
to go to the office.” Did like what everybody else did.
Bill Parsons was the Center Director at the time, he’d come
back to Stennis by then. Most of the senior management team, we just
kind of—I don’t know. If I remember correctly, I took
a shower. I remember my youngest daughter, coming up—she may
have been third grade by then—she goes, “Dad, what does
this mean?” I remember saying, “I think things are going
to be a little different for a little while. I really don’t
know.”
I got in the car and headed out to Stennis and we just all got together,
“What can we do?” Stennis is such a smaller part of that
whole family. A lot of helplessness really, honestly, with “What
do you do, what happened, how did it happen,” all that sort
of thing. We went through the same process everybody else did, I’m
sure, from the overall process. Then Parsons got pulled over, [NASA
Administrator Sean] O’Keefe asked him to come run the Shuttle
Program. When was that? I want to say April, maybe May, he moved on
over there.
Mike [Michael U. “Rudi”] Rudolphi was the acting Center
Director at Stennis at the time. I think Rudi followed Dave [David
A.] King up to West Texas at some point. To sync it back to what I
said earlier, when I said I was in the job that I wanted. I remember
Rudi coming in my office. This was May, I want to say it was May of
2003.
I had my feet up on my desk. I was just sitting there looking at a
status report. I was pretty good. He walks in and says, “Hey,
what do you want to be when you grow up?” This is a famous thing
that Mike Rudolphi would say, “What do you want to be when you
grow up?” You knew when he asked you that question you should
not answer. You should never answer.
But for some reason in the back of my head I made some comment, “You
know, I’ve been in this Agency this long and I’ve never
been to [NASA] Headquarters [Washington, DC]. So Headquarters might
not be a bad thing.”
He goes, “Yeah,” and we talked about some other stuff
and he left. He came back about two hours later and he had this really
sheepish look on his face and said, “Hey, you got to get on
a plane tomorrow. You got an interview in DC.”
I’m like, “Oh Lord, what have I done?” I remember
telling my wife all this. She’s like, “What?” I
go up there, and I’d never been to NASA Headquarters in my entire
career. I go to Headquarters, I had to find it. Go in to interview
with Mike [Michael C.] Kostelnik, who was the Deputy Associate Administrator
for [International Space] Station and Shuttle. He had Station and
he had Shuttle underneath him.
The person that was running Shuttle at the time was a guy named Parker
Counts, who used to be here at Marshall, and Parker was retiring.
He didn’t tell me that, by the way. And the person that was
running Station for him was Mark [L.] Uhran. You may know who Mark
Uhran is. Mark was doing that, so looking for his counterpart to run
Station.
I remember it was a fascinating interview. Kostelnik, who was a former
two-star general in the Air Force, could not believe I’d never
been at Headquarters. Because in his mind that was Pentagon, and how
could you become a general officer—an SES [Senior Executive
Service] is kind of a general officer equivalent over there. “How
could you become that and not have come to Headquarters?”
By the way, also I’m not naive enough—I was not the first
choice to do that job. I knew they were looking for somebody to go
do it, I wasn’t the first on anybody’s list. So we went
down that path. It was actually very interesting. I was thinking “Man,
do you really want me to come up here?” It felt that way in
a lot of ways.
Then I walked in to see Bill [William F.] Readdy, who was running—it
was Code M at the time [Space Operations Mission Directorate]. Reads
had some sage advice for me as well about it, which was trying to
give me an indication of what the DC environment was. “Whew.”
He tried to help me.
I went to see Lynn [F. H.] Cline, who was his deputy. She was the
deputy and Lynn was awesome. She was very encouraging and said, “Look,
you’ll get used to the pace, you’ll get used to all this.
We really could use the help.” I somehow know that I said yes.
I don’t really know how, but I did. I said yes, and uprooted
the family again. I went up there for about a year before they came
up though because we were traveling, we were all over the place for
Return to Flight.
Bill Parsons had actually called. Bill, who I’d gotten to know
very well of course since that time. Parsons was pretty much—he
said, “Look, I need a friend in DC. I need somebody I know.”
We talked every morning and he would yell at me. Get it out of his
system, that’s what he used to say. I used to laugh at him saying,
“All right, get it out of your system, just go ahead and yell.”
He and Kostelnik had an interesting relationship. I was in between
them all the time. But it worked, it all worked. We got back to flight.
The first big job we had was getting the Return to Flight implementation
plan written after the CAIB [Columbia Accident Investigation Board]
report was dropped. That was fascinating.
I learned—I met so many just amazing people. Because you got
to remember I had just been doing Space Shuttle main engine stuff
and I really didn’t have responsibility for that. Marshall had
that. We were just doing the testing, we were just bringing and running
engines. My involvement with the Space Shuttle Program was actually
pretty small. Very minimal actually, just from Space Shuttle.
Part of this whole thing for me that was so exciting, so interesting,
was I got to meet some amazing people. I hate like hell that it was
because of the accident, but I wouldn’t give back the relationships
I got, the people I got to know. Bob [Robert D.] Cabana, Ellen
Ochoa, Terry [Terrence W.] Wilcutt—all these different people
that I worked with for the rest of my career.
That relationship was forged in trying to get back to flight and really
just doing it the right way. I met some just amazing people, people
that I think are just heroes for how we got back to flight. Would
have never had that opportunity, I don’t think. I could have
been still sitting there with my feet on my desk running tests, which
is where I thought I’d be.
I did that for a couple years and I learned a lot about DC. I think
my bio [biography] sometimes says I was leading the Return to Flight
efforts. I didn’t have anything to do with Return to Flight
efforts. Unless you talk about the political piece, and briefing OMB
[Office of Management and Budget] and briefing the [Capitol] Hill.
Johnson: Let’s
talk about that a little bit, because you were an engineer and you
liked testing and you felt like you were in the right place. You’d
been at Marshall and Stennis. Now you’re at Headquarters and
having to deal with OMB and you’re having to deal with congresspeople.
Lightfoot:
And Headquarters themselves, by the way.
Johnson: And
Headquarters themselves, which is completely different.
Lightfoot:
It’s different to any Center.
Johnson: Just
talk about that transition for you.
Lightfoot:
You know, you just fall back on the same stuff you learned as a test
guy. I’ve always said that testing is probably the ultimate
systems engineering job. Every piece of hardware that shows up, it’s
usually behind schedule, it’s usually over budget. It’s
not where it’s supposed to be and they want you to pull some
miracle to get it all done. That’s what test guys do, that’s
what you do. You’re ultimately the integrator of all these different
things.
I felt like when I was in DC, I just had a different set of systems.
When I work on an engine, you’ve got lines, you’ve got
valves, you’ve got ducts, you’ve got turbomachinery. Those
are the systems that you’re trying to put together. In DC you’ve
got the Hill, you’ve got OMB, you’ve got GAO [General
Accounting Office], you’ve got the IG [Inspector General]. You’ve
just got different systems. You’ve got to figure out how to
make those all work together, work for you.
It was just really interesting to learn the different way of thinking.
I remember one particular meeting on the Hill. We were giving an update
on where we were. This one guy, we were talking about something—I
don’t even remember what the topic was—but he was clearly
not happy with the way we were going.
He was a staffer for one of the [congressional] reps[representatives].
I want to be really clear, especially with this being an oral history.
Staffers are just worked to death, oh my God. I don’t know how
they keep up with everything that their individual members [of Congress]
have to deal with. They get me one hour a month maybe, or one hour
a quarter.
So now I’m expecting him to remember exactly what I told him
last time. “You’re supposed to know everything, what’s
wrong with you?” But I remember this one particular staffer
said, “Well, I don’t know if my member is going to vote
for you to fly if that’s what you’re doing.”
I looked at him and I went, “Your member doesn’t get a
vote. That’s not the way this works, I don’t understand.”
But the guy was probably 24, 25 years old. He didn’t mean it
in a bad way, he was just concerned about what we were doing. I remember
thinking, “This is fascinating.”
I can remember a particular staffer I gave a briefing once, General
Kostelnik didn’t come. He sent me to do the briefing, and the
staffer just yelled at me for five minutes about “Why is General
Kostelnik not here.” I’m thinking “Wow.” The
first time that happened—because I’ll get to the second
time in a minute.
The first time that happened I kind of took it personally like, “Wow,
I can brief this, it’s no big deal.” The second time I
went back was like a month later, and again I hadn’t seen this
person at all. Walk in, same thing. Yells at me, “Why is Kostelnik
not here?” I remember thinking—it just clicked, “Ah,
this is theater.” It’s as much theater as it is—has
to make the point in front of everybody else in the room that they
requested that the general be there.
Once I realized that, I developed a pretty good relationship with
all those folks. A really good relationship actually. My relationship
with folks on the Hill was probably better than what I had with the
White House. But I didn’t really have that much interaction
with the White House. Some with OMB when we were talking budgets,
but that was about it from that standpoint.
Later I had plenty interaction with OMB and the White House, when
I got up there in ’12. But I did that for a couple years, and
I had promised Readdy I would stay till the first flight. Didn’t
realize it was going to be that long before we got back to flight.
That’s the way that worked.
Johnson: While
you were there, President George W. Bush, his Vision for Space Exploration
was announced, which was going to close out the Shuttle that you’d
been working on and change the direction. The first of many we’ve
had since then, but let’s just talk about that period and when
that announcement was made and the direction that he wanted to go
in closing out the Shuttle Program and how that was handled, especially
working in the area that you were working in at the time.
Lightfoot:
Clearly it affected us. What I got asked to do immediately was be
the guy to start doing transition and retirement planning. If you
remember, we were still trying to do Return to Flight, and so 2010
was so far away. To me it just seemed like forever away. I’m
like, “Okay, whatever.”
But we can start talking about where all our property is, “What
does it actually mean to transition out?” Because even in the
Shuttle Program we still had stuff left over from Apollo that we were
carrying. So I put a small team together to start doing transition
and retirement planning. Dorothy [S.] Rasco, Karen [D.] Lucht, Ruth
[G. Caserta] Gardner, Loraine [M.] Shafer—a whole bunch. All
these good folks that came in and helped me.
We put a pretty good plan in place. We executed it for the next six
years, and we actually executed it pretty well. Frankly, the Shuttle—when
we retired it, we got property off the books. We did it in a pretty
good way, I thought. I was really proud of the team executing it.
Dorothy took over from me later when I went on to do the jobs here
at Marshall. She tweaked it quite a bit based on what we were learning,
and she’d done some stuff like that before at Palmdale [California,
assembly facility] for the last Orbiter.
I think we were so focused on Return to Flight and announcing the
retirement—part of it, probably deep down inside we thought
that was actually saving it. That we were going to be able to finish
out the manifest, get the Station built. Without that people might
have said, “Golly.” It seemed like that was now the Shuttle’s
mission, this was it.
It kind of gave it a final mission. I mean, you saw that. You saw
in 2011 when we flew the last time, the amount of people that walked
with [Space Shuttle] Atlantis back to the OPF [Orbiter Processing
Facility] that knew that was their last day. It’s an incredible
dedicated workforce surrounding it. That’s what’s drawn
me to this the whole time, watching these teams just do what they
do.
But I don’t remember thinking much one way or the other, other
than “That’s a long way away.” I think we can compartmentalize
that way, a lot of us do. It was 2004 I think when he made the big
announcement. I remember thinking, “Six years, wow.” Six
years ago was 1998, I was in Marshall Space Flight Center. I wasn’t
even at Stennis yet. I was thinking, “That’s a long time
from now, and we got Return to Flight right in our face.” It
was interesting, very interesting.
Johnson: I
would think it would have been an interesting time, since you were,
like you said, working on Return to Flight and then having to think
about canceling the program at some point. One of the things I saw,
while you were there you worked on the technical and budgetary oversight.
Lightfoot:
The whole time we were doing Shuttle Return to Flight, the Shuttle
had a certain budget that was already appropriated to it, so what
was going to be the delta [difference] because of the Return to Flight
activities that were going on? Having to build those budgets and go
to OMB and the Hill and defend them was part of that. Again, I’ll
just say it was just part of that learning curve of being in Washington,
DC.
Honestly, what you saw was a tremendous amount of support. People
really wanted us to get back to flight. I will say that there was
never any question about that. There was a lot of question about our
ability to predict how much it was going to cost and when we were
going to do it. That was probably the bigger thing. That was just
hard, it was just hard.
Johnson: This
would probably be a good place to stop because after that you returned,
you went back to Marshall.
Lightfoot:
That’s fine.
Johnson: All
right, I appreciate it.
[End
of interview]
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