NASA Headquarters Oral
History Project
Edited Oral History Transcript
Simon Ramo
Interviewed by Carol Butler
Redondo Beach, California – 6 April 1999
Butler: Today
is April 6, 1999. This oral history is with Dr. Simon Ramo. This interview
is being conducted at the TRW Space Park offices in Redondo Beach,
California, by Carol Butler.
Thank you for joining us today.
Ramo: Happy
to be here.
Butler: To
start with, let's talk briefly about the initial beginnings of the
ICBM [Intercontinental Ballistic Missile] program and when you first
realized the seriousness of the program and the Russian program, what
was going on with that, and how that sparked the U.S. program.
Ramo: Well,
it was startling and sudden, out of the blue, you might say. We had
just founded the Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation. This was following a
period in which we—"we" meaning Dean Wooldridge and
I—had led the buildup at Hughes Aircraft Company. We were heavily
involved in guided missiles and a considerable amount of other electronic
high-technology efforts, all of which had been concentrated on what
was then the highest priority weapon systems project for the United
States.
This was to put ourselves in the position to defend the nation against
what was considered to be an important number-one possibility of enemy
action, and that is if the Russians came over with manned bombers
to drop H-bombs on the United States. This involved a complex system
of ground radar and then manned interceptors that would rise to destroy
those Russian bombers before they could drop any bombs. That was,
not surprisingly, the number-one project effort of the United States.
Now, imagine our surprise then during the very first week from the
founding of the Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation, where our intention had
been to go into, in a much bigger way, commercial semiconductors and
commercial computers, instead we were called back within that same
first week by the Secretary of the Air Force to sit down and listen
to what had just come in from intelligence sources, namely that the
Soviet Union was not building a fleet of manned bombers the equivalent
of our SAC, our Strategic Air Command. Maybe they had decided they
couldn't do it, really, realistically. But at any rate, they had gone
to what for them was the next phase; they'd gone to an intercontinental
ballistic missile, and they were well along on the creation of an
ICBM system.
If, indeed, they did that well before us, and threatened us with a
knockout blow on the United States, we had no defense whatsoever for
that. The multi-billion-dollar, huge program of defense against Russian
bombers by interceptor manned airplanes carrying guided missiles and
radars, all of which we were building at Hughes, we had a sort of
monopoly on that, they could destroy us in twenty minutes and the
retaliation would be very likely not of great interest to them.
Now, the intelligence information that was made available to us looked
highly credible, and that meant there was no question the Defense
Department had to mount immediately an effort to evaluate all of this,
so they put together a group of top scientific personnel with the
highest priority for their backup, and they asked the Ramo-Wooldridge
Corporation to drop any of our plans, any and all plans, and aid in
that effort.
The assessment that was made, it took a few months to make it, was
that the ICBM was a doable weapon system, and therefore we had to
take seriously that the Russians had started on that years before.
It would not be surprising that they would be well ahead of where
we might otherwise be.
We all knew, those of us in the guided missile game, all knew that
there was a little study contract at Convair [Consolidated Vultee]
Aircraft Company to examine the possibilities of an ICBM. It was mainly
on what you might call the aircraft structural aspects—what
kind of thrust would you need, how big a rocket engine or engines
would you have to have, what kind of accuracy could you expect. You
take the weight of an H-bomb as the load that you're going to carry,
and you're going to take that five or six thousand miles. There was
a listing of the problems, but it was not taken very seriously. There
was no hardware work. It was just a little study.
The Air Force was totally dominated by the idea that the only way
we would expect to drop H-bombs on the Russians, and the only way
they would expect to be able to drop them on us would be to have men
in the airplanes, and so everything was built around that.
Butler: When
you began to then realize that the ICBM was going to be the direction
to go, what did you think of the possibilities of doing it, whether
it was feasible and whether the right equipment could be built to
build it and the right materials and the guidance?
Ramo: Dominating
the thinking of the Defense Department and, I think, all the way up
above the Defense Department to General [President Dwight D.] Eisenhower
very quickly was not the technical aspects, important as they were;
it was, rather, that could we organize to do it and to do it at so
fast a pace that we could beat the Russians or at least come in very
close to them so they would have essentially no substantial period
in which they would have a threat of the size of importance that it
would be to us if they were well ahead of us and we had no chance
of being with them.
The reason I say that is I remember that during that period—we're
talking about the middle fifties—if you look back at the ten
years from the end of the war to the middle fifties, that decade,
it was taking us, to make a 10 percent improvement of anything, it
was taking us something like ten years. The procedure was so slow,
so bureaucratic, and the time it took to go through every stage of
approval on contracts, the system of judging what to do, the system
for simply making a decision as to what you want to do, what are the
requirements, what will be the military situation that you want to
apply advanced technology to, to solve, that procedure was cumbersome.
It took endless committee action.
Now, look at the ICBM for a moment. In the ICBM it was clear that
you would need rocket engines at least ten times bigger than any rocket
that we'd ever designed and constructed. You would have to have instruments
that would be ten times more accurate to sense the acceleration and,
hence, the velocity that you reach, and, hence, know that you are
directing the missile somewhere near the target, able to go 5,000
miles.
An ICBM to first approximation is a big container of fuel, rocket
engines on the bottom to bring you up to such velocity that when you
leave the atmosphere and sail off towards the target, you have such
velocity that before gravity can pull you down, you've gone 5,000
miles. In fact, when you talk about 5, 6, 7,000 miles, considering
that the Earth is round, or at least that's what we have recently
been led to believe, if you go 10 percent faster than you intended
to, you could miss the Earth entirely; you overshoot the target. You
can go into orbit. We knew that the same equipment that would land
several thousand pounds at a distant target a quarter to halfway around
the Earth would enable you to put just slightly less weight into orbit.
Now, to do that you have to have a structure that would hold the fuel
and all the instruments and, of course, the warhead that you're going
to deposit on the target, hold that all together. The structure would
have to be lighter by a factor of ten times than anything done with
airplanes. In other words, if you take the ratio of the weight that
you must carry, the fuel and everything else, to the structure that's
holding it all together, it was a ten-to-one improvement that you'd
have to have. So the question is, can you put the structure together
and make that ten-to-one improvement.
I mentioned accuracy. I should say accuracy not only of the ultimately
terminal guidance, but accuracy in control. Unlike an airplane where
you depend upon surfaces to pick up the pressures of the air and give
you forces that you can use for controlling of the direction and the
stability in flight, so you don't have it turning over and going through
crazy oscillations, in the case of the ICBM, you start out with so
little velocity. You've seen movies—everybody's seen television
shots of a missile, a big rocket taking off, and you see it first
moving up very, very slowly, a big blast of air underneath. Well,
there you have no air forces coming from your motion. You have to
swivel or control the thrust of the engines, the direction of the
thrust. It's almost like balancing a pail of water on the end of your
finger, taking it off, moving it up, keeping it balanced. Then you
go through air. You're going faster and faster into the air that has
great thickness. In that period it's a little bit like an airplane,
but you go through the speed of sound. It becomes supersonic, and
that's a different aspect of control in relationship to force that
you can generate to control the angles, the stability of the whole
craft as against the velocity.
Then you go into space, that is to say, into a region where you have
very little air, for all practical purposes, almost the same as if
you had a vacuum, and now to control that whole operation presents
a set of problems, each of which is, again, ten times or more worse
than any problem you've ever had.
Then ultimately there's the terminal accuracy. If you are going to
have the H-bomb really effective in the target, you can't miss it
terribly. You can miss it a lot more than with an ordinary small bomb,
of course, but when you're going 5,000 miles and that's a long distance,
you have to compare the amount of miss that you can tolerate on the
target against the distance that you've traveled, and this involves
a factor, again, of the order of ten times. I use ten times because
that's an order of magnitude and it just gives you an idea compared
to 10 percent changes, little tiny changes taking so long.
And then comes the matter of reentry. You're out of the air, up into
space, and you come back down. You're going at a high supersonic speed
several times the speed of sound, so you're generating a great deal
of heat. The heat would be enough to so raise the temperature of the
bomb that it would make it ineffective. You have to protect it. How
do you protect it? You can put a cover over it. Maybe it has to be
thick because you're likely to lose a good deal of that cover in the
process of the effect of the heat.
You have a problem of what you might call—I think we did call—highly
interdisciplinary physics, aerothermal chemistry, because you've got
heat, you've got the air forces, and you have the matter that makes
up the air and the material in the nose cone coming together, abrasion,
melting off, and, in general, losing material whose atoms and molecules
mix with the air. Some of the heat gets carried away, some of it gets
absorbed and will cause melting and, of course, ruination of the structure.
That was more than a factor of ten times anything being generated
before.
So we knew we had to do things like the following. First of all, we
had to create an industry that could make the devices, the rockets,
the accelerometers, the gyroscopes that could stand enormous acceleration,
high Gs. You had to figure out how to handle a structure, maybe do
it with new exotic materials. You had to solve basic physics problems.
Somehow you had to simulate the amount of heat that would be generated
into the nose cone. You could take some air, put it into high speed
in a tunnel of some kind, have an explosion that would create that
high-speed air, cause that to impinge on a target, measure the heat
being generated. You could fire a rocket maybe three or four stages
to get up to high speed, up into the sky, and then design it so that
as it falls back down it would turn over, and then fire some rockets
on the way down so when you get into thick air you generate even more
heat, and then the ICBM would measure that.
You could take some of the top theoretical physicists in the United
States and put them to work theorizing about how much heat is generated
and what might be done to remove that heat, and people that know a
good deal about fundamentals of matter to speculate on how you might
choose such materials to cover the nose cone, that it would absorb
a lot of heat as it gets heated up by the forces being generated during
reentry.
In other words, this was quite a project of tremendous dimensions.
I mentioned very briefly the need for a manufacturing industry that
would manufacture these things. It's not only that you needed a system
that would include just one missile or ten, but maybe hundreds, thousands
of them. But before you could get there, you would have to be manufacturing
a good many more parts on the way to refining the design so that all
the parts would work and have a reliability such that when put together,
the missile, upon takeoff, has a very good chance of getting to its
target, which means you have to do a lot of tests of the components.
You have to shake them. You have to put them through stresses. You
have to set up simulations so you take the pieces and you cause them
to think that in the actual missile you subject them to all the high
vibrations that you will have. For example, you put signals in and
out. You put electrical communication into action. You create a big
chamber that you evacuate so it will have the conditions of vacuum
in space, and you cause the materials to be subjected to what they
will be subjected to under those circumstances.
So you need ten, fifteen times as much equipment. You need a production
line of something that you haven't designed yet. You'd better start
working on a production line even though you don't know exactly the
details of what it will produce. Insofar as you have a pretty good
idea what kind of thing you will need, you'd better start getting
those factories ready. You need to instrument Florida and the islands
east of Florida, because you're going to have to test, and you want
to go in that direction away from the United States because it gives
you the advantage of the speed of the Earth as it turns in that direction,
and you don't want to have the missiles come back on the United States,
some parts falling back. You want to do it out into the ocean, and
you have islands out there. So we had to make a part of Florida a
high-technology test region, and that means you have to design apparatus
that would do the measuring. So you needed big teams, and they all
had to be coordinated.
Now, you can see why I say the technology clearly, of course, basically
was the dominant characteristic, but it soon presented itself in such
a way that you knew organizing to get the effort done was going to
be a bigger problem than the technology that you're trying to create.
This was made clear by the people that understood this kind of thing,
this group that had been put together. Wooldridge and I had been asked
to serve on it. The great John von Neumann, one of the great geniuses
of the century, was asked to be the chairman of that advisory committee,
and with the conclusion it could be done, provided you organized it
in an exceptional way, this went, again, right up to the top of the
government.
It required, on the part of President Eisenhower, that he recognize
that the Congress would have to be brought along, but not in a way
that has become the pattern, in a way that could be done, then, and
especially, I guess you could say, with Eisenhower as President, because
unlike the typical President, he had a position as an expert in the
military side of things, as well as a confidence in his objectivity.
He could go to two or three leading senators, the most important one
of which who was more or less the chairman of this small group, was
[Henry Martin "Scoop"] Jackson from Washington. Jackson,
because he was from the state of Washington, was often called "the
senator from Boeing," because the biggest thing in the state
of Washington having to do with the military was the Boeing Aircraft
Company.
Boeing was one of those heavily involved in manned bombers. The leaders
of the then Air Force were man-in-the-cockpit generals. It was not
natural for them to think in terms of an ICBM being a way in which
you're going to persuade the Soviet Union not to start a nuclear war,
and we did have SAC as a result, and Boeing was the principal contractor
of the airplanes making up our manned bomber force. Yet despite this,
"Scoop" Jackson, as he was called, saw right away that this
was something of unusual, unprecedented importance. This program had
to go, and it had to go in such a way as to make it successful. He
was very helpful to the President in creating a program of such secrecy
that it was understood that the rest of the Congress did not have
to know and be in on what was going on. A few members of Congress,
and they were something on the order of five, in effect, were able
to say, on a nonpartisan basis, to the rest of the Congress that this
was an important thing that had to be done and had to be kept secret.
You couldn't do that now, I don't think, politically. I'm not, of
course, an expert in this field, but I think most leaders of the newspapers
or watching the television news could be forgiven for assuming that
it would be very, very difficult to have something like that occur
today.
This program was created, then, as a really super crash program, and
General [Bernard A.] Schriever was selected as the military executive
who would be given the task of overall responsibility insofar as the
Defense Department had responsibility. He was given unprecedented
authority, and the part of the Defense Department that handles contracts
assigned a general to him, who would be able to produce the contracts.
The Secretary of the Air Force, of course, was in on it, and there
was a chain, in other words, of just a few people who could bypass
the rest of the organization. That took a bit of doing and, again,
if that had not been the case, if that organization could not have
been put together, the ICBM program would not have been a success.
Eventually, with our method of doing it, we would have had an ICBM
capability, but it would have been far later than the Soviet Union,
and the consequences of their being considered ahead in most vital
aspects of the Cold War situation, namely the ability to knock out
the other nation with an H-bomb attack without any defense against
it, would have caused them to have a prestige, a confidence, a bravado,
a position with the rest of the world that would have given us, shall
we say, great difficulty, and anything that the Soviet Union was interested
in pressing would have gone better.
Any doubt that what I'm saying is true, I'd say, was dispelled by
the reaction of the world to the Sputnik. The fact that the Russians
were the first to put something into orbit caused them to be regarded
as superior in technology all around the world, and gave them a position
that caused the United States to have to react to that, having already
reacted to the far more important thing of their possibility of ICBM
superiority.
Butler: You
mentioned Sputnik. When did you learn of Sputnik and what was your
initial reaction? At the time, did you realize how much impact that
did have on the public and the world?
Ramo: Well,
first of all, I personally had a problem or a challenge having to
do with organizing the scientific and technical team to do the job
of overall design, development of the ICBM system, to serve as the
central integrating team to make the decisions on a technical basis
and to utilize the top technical industry and the talent of those
in academe and in government laboratories, to get the top talent of
the country.
Naturally, it was obvious to me, and it is no great indication of
ingenuity or great vision on my part, that I had to consider what
would happen next. I knew the ICBM situation would go on indefinitely
for decades with improvements, 10 percent improvements and so on,
additions, and we were in a permanent contest with the Soviet Union
in that regard. But I meant what do the top unusually outstanding
scientists and engineers do next? It was very plain that what had
been talked about as evident for many years, of putting equipment
into orbit, was going to be a next step, because it would be so easy
to do. All you had to do was take out, as I said, a little of the
weight of the warhead and you could put the equipment into orbit.
If what you wanted to do was to have, in effect, a relay up in space
for communications so that you could communicate with it from a point
on the ground, then have that communication relayed back down to some
other point on Earth, you could put any two points on Earth in contact
with each other if you had a high mountain out there, a high point
for relaying it. You could use that position to observe the Earth
and to observe the universe beyond the Earth in a different and, in
many ways, superior way. You could do a better job of airline navigation
and traffic control. You could study the weather. You could even conceivably
influence the weather in time, by putting nuclear energy in the right
places at the right time. You could observe the Earth resources. You
could know when situations were developing that might cause severe
floods or impact on agriculture. You could bring television between
points on Earth. Instead of the shortwave communication where you
send your signals up to the sky and hope that they'll bounce around
against the ionized layers that exist around the Earth and come down
to Earth, you'd get high static.
Some people are alive today that remember when we used to use short
waves for the purpose of getting communication from observers and
other countries. The signal would go in and out. You'd sometimes hear
it and sometimes not. Telephony, voice communication, would not have
to be done necessarily by cables. Cables at that time appeared particularly
impractical for television.
So whether it be entertainment or research or airline navigation and
traffic control, computer-to-computer data, running the operations
of the physical world, it was clear at some time there was going to
be numerous systems of satellites in the sky affecting the society
on Earth here. Of course, for the military, observation of what was
happening, intelligence, reconnaissance, and communications for the
military was going to be important, so this was going to be an important
dimension.
So I had actually incorporated the name Space Technology Laboratories
[STL] and gotten approval from the board of directors of TRW [Thompson
Ramo Wooldridge, Inc.] to acquire land and start building some facilities
for the manufacture of spacecraft before there was a Sputnik. So it
didn't come as a great shock when the Russians put up something in
space, although I was surprised that they had chosen to do that.
There was something that was going on at that same time called the
International Geophysical Year. The scientists concerned with fuel
physics, physics related to the Earth, were planning what was called
the IGY, the International Geophysical Year, I think is where it came
from, and one of the plans was to put up a small satellite on some
small rockets. It was a small project. The question has arisen from
some scientists that were cleared and were working on the ICBM program,
if only in a consulting capacity, and who had a great interest in
the IGY, they would naturally bring up, in classified circles, "Hey,
this would be an easy thing for the ICBM, big ICBM project. You've
got the rockets. You've got all the stuff. You've got the setup in
Florida." Tiny little side efforts, and we put up a bigger thing
with more stuff on it, get a lot more done.
This was international. I, not being primarily associated with International
Geophysical Year people, was loosely aware not only of the project
itself, but of the fact that the Soviet Union was regarded as a pretty
minor possible contributor. If I had been truly visionary and smarter
and, more especially, if others had been in the United States, they
could have reasoned as follows. The Soviet Union, working on an ICBM
and ahead of us, at least initially until we got really rolling, must
have asked themselves, "What can we do in the IGY year?"
And they possibly could have been insulted to have the rest of the
world, particularly the United States, really the leader of the IGY
program, assuming that they would have practically nothing to contribute.
It would have occurred to them that one of the things they could do
is put up something in orbit ahead of us and with substantial weight.
I need to bring up in this connection one thing that we also knew
by then from intelligence. The Soviet Union was well behind us in
the development of nuclear bombs, so that for the same kind of yield,
for the same effectiveness of a bomb, they had to assume it was going
to be heavier. If you have a heavier payload, all the way down, the
missile down to the rocket engine has to be bigger. So they were working
on an ICBM that was bigger than ours and, therefore, able to put more
weight into orbit. If you take a bigger bomb out, you could put even
more weight in it. Surely we should have figured out it would occur
to them that one thing they could do was go ahead and put something
into orbit ahead of our IGY program and show, by gosh, that they were
not inferior, they were superior.
Now, even if we had figured that out and counted on it, it is reasonable
now, looking back, to assume that our leadership, though I'm sure
did not think about this, would have assumed that the Soviet Union
putting up something into orbit, "So what? What if they put a
dog up in orbit as well on the second one? All we have to do is say,
'Well, that's not a great feat. All you do is have sloppy guidance
accuracy and overshoot a little bit and you go into orbit.' What's
the big deal?"
In fact, a more direct answer to your question, when did I learn about
it, every Saturday morning General Schriever and I—we called
it Black Saturday—used to gather in a special room that was
loaded with charts, and we'd spend three hours, nine to twelve, reviewing
every aspect of the program each Saturday, that was the Saturday mission,
what had happened during that week, what was supposed to happen during
that week, and then a lot of numbers that were generated.
We knew, for example, how many engineers were on the payroll of each
of our major contractors, and so we could look at those curves and
why would the curves show, for example, a sudden rise in the number
of people working at Company X on the program? We knew that meant
that they had just had something canceled somewhere else and they
moved those people over to the program. What were they doing with
those people? Why did they do that? What I'm saying is, we had not
only progress on tests and on flights, on difficulties that we may
have run into, technical difficulties, we had a lot of numbers showing
progress that gave us clues as to what everyone was doing and where
it was going on. That was Black Saturday. We were interrupted. I remember
a colonel coming in and giving us the information that, "The
Soviet Union has put something in orbit."
On Monday morning when I came into work, I changed the name of the
part of Ramo-Wooldridge that was doing this work, which had a nice
general title, it was called Guided Missile Research Division [GMRD].
There were a number of companies involved in guided missiles. It didn't
give away anything about what we were doing. I changed the name of
that entity, announced a new name: Space Technology Laboratories,
a name that I had incorporated in order to save the name, as I have
mentioned earlier, some years before in anticipation of space becoming
the follow-on to ICBMs.
On Wednesday, I received a call from the Deputy Secretary of Defense,
Don [Donald A.] Quarles. Charles [E.] "Engine" Wilson, the
former chairman of General Motors, was the Secretary. Don Quarles,
who was the top man from A&T, was the Deputy Secretary of Defense.
He said, "Si, I've just learned that you changed the name of
the part of TRW that is running the nation's most urgent, highest
priority, biggest program, to Space Technology Laboratories. Now,
you're a private company. I can't tell you what to do. But may I suggest
that you consider removing that new name, going back to the name that
you had? The Secretary and I have discussed this, and we have decided
that this little thing that the Russians have done, putting this little
basketball up into space, will be forgotten in two or three weeks.
It doesn't amount to anything. But you will be in the position of
appearing to have gone off and with an exaggerated impression of the
importance of this. In other words, you're off in space, and this
will hurt your position of realistic, sound management of the program."
So I said to him, "I will do just what you said. I will consider
changing the name back." I didn't say I would; I said I'd consider
it. Because the moment he said it would be forgotten in two or three
weeks, I said, "That's a big question, and I don't think that's
going to happen. But I have two or three weeks. I'll wait two or three
weeks and see if it's forgotten."
The buildup was enormous, in the world. I felt there were only two
other occasions I had experienced: [Charles A.] Lindbergh's landing
in Paris when I was a teenager, I guess, about that time, FDR's [Franklin
Delano Roosevelt’s] death, and the Sputnik, in terms of the
nation being aroused and feeling something very fundamental, something
earth-shaking, something that's going to change things in a major
way, affecting all of us, is going to take place. This was an enormous
reaction.
I never heard from the Secretary—and I saw a good deal of him
and talked to him a lot—about changing the name back. It remained
Space Technology Laboratories. [Laughter] And because we had started
and were preparing for it, we did win in the competition the first
spacecraft when NASA [National Aeronautics and Space Administration]
got put together, and decided it was time for them to put out contracts.
They chose to create an unmanned space program, and that was the Pioneer
series. That was the reaction to Sputnik that I felt.
Butler: Wonderful.
You mentioned NASA. In response to Sputnik, of course, the U.S. did
put up Explorer eventually, then moved in to creating NASA. As the
U.S. was trying to respond to Sputnik, at the time what were your
thoughts, your involvement, and then as NASA was being created, what
were your thoughts on that agency?
Ramo: Naturally,
when I mentioned that we had created Space Technology Laboratories
as an entity, then moved that name over, it was a subject of considerable
discussion among those very active in the ICBM program, that what
we had was 90 percent of what you needed to put equipment up in space.
So there was a great deal of discussion as to what would happen, how
would this program go. My favorite—naturally I remember my own
thoughts somewhat more than I remember other people's—my own
favorite prediction was that we would do, the United States, with
space something similar to what we did with regard to nuclear energy.
When World War II was over, it was clear that nuclear bombs were going
to be here to stay and were going to be an enormous factor in determining
national security policies and the development of weapon systems,
and that would be true not only of us, but other parts of the world,
notably the Soviet Union. But we didn't assign to the Defense Department
everything involving nuclear energy. In fact, with the war over, with
the idea that practical commercial applications for the good of society
that were not involved with weapons should be the dominant thing in
the minds of all of those in the public and in the Congress, who would
decide such things as budgets, the Atomic Energy Commission [AEC]
was created as an independent entity reporting to the President, and
it provided the weapons for the Defense Department, but it was seen,
you see, as a civil organization. It had high clearances because it
included the weapon system, but much was made of the peaceful civilian
applications of nuclear energy, rather than further development of
bombs, which remained highly classified. The Atomic Energy Commission,
five commissioners, one of them to be a noted scientist in nuclear
matters, there were various committees advising the AEC.
Now, looking at the ICBM program, a bit of an analogy there. The ICBM
was the application that went up into space and back down to bomb
a potential enemy, but space should be looked at by the public and
by the Congress as the nonmilitary aspects that deserved independently
government funding. So there would be a new agency.
I remember enjoining in some discussions having fun with the “hole-in-the-ground
agency.” I would make my point by saying, "Suppose the
Soviet Union had dug a hole deeper than any of our drilling for oil
wells, a big hole at that, and had gone deeper than anyone has ever
gone." There would be those who say, "You know, if you do
that, you will learn a lot about physics of the Earth, really find
out what goes on down there. Now you'd have something big enough that
you could put a man in a capsule down this hole, not just six inches
for oil wells."
Some would argue that they can mine up from underneath. It will be
a military advantage to them. The Air Force will say that the moment
you dig a big fat hole like that, air goes down in it, and it's the
Air Force's project. The Navy will say, if you go down, chances are
you're going to find water. And, of course, the Army will say, if
there's anything, that's ground-to-ground warfare. Some noted scientists
will point out that you should really do research to find out how
to dig bigger holes.
For example, some of us were inventing words like "terrajet."
You use a nuclear bomb that's controlled. By that time there was discussion
about what happens if there's a runaway effect of a nuclear reactor.
Remember the movie or two that was made based on that. You'd get down
to China. You can't stop it. It gets hotter and hotter and keeps eating
the Earth away. Well, use that phenomena to dig a big hole and find
out what really is at the center of the Earth. Great, important scientific
project.
So you see this was a subject of great discussion, and I argued that
we ought to have a new agency for space, and if the Russians had gone
down in the Earth instead of up in the sky, we'd have a new hole-in-the-ground
agency. So we must have a space agency, because you can't let the
Air Force and the Army and the Navy interservice rivalry over space.
Well, of course, the Air Force would be given the military applications
of space, but there's a lot more to it than the military. So, NASA
should be created, and so we fully expected NASA to be created.
When NASA was created, we said, "Well, you see, we analyze this
and we're ahead of everybody. We understood it. Look what great predictors
we are." The secret, of course, of being a great predictor is
to have the knack of being able to forget any predictions that you
made that were wrong and be able to remember with great accuracy,
as I'm doing now, the predictions that you made that are right.
Butler: Absolutely.
That's the way of the great predictor. As NASA was being formed and
as Sputnik and Explorer were happening, what discussions or investigations
or studies were you involved with for the manned aspect of space?
Ramo: My own
personal involvement tended to be in what you might say goals in the
large. By this time I was getting to be, I guess, in the semi, at
least, elder statesman class. I'd been heading a big program and I
was moving along in years. I knew the leaders, whether they were in
industry or in government. I was part of the fraternity.
I was frequently invited into discussions of what we should be doing.
There were some that were extremely interested in having man in space,
sending a man to the moon, sending a man to Mars and so on. The military
never saw putting a human being in space as any real advantage. There
would be discussions of the following kind, oftentimes with people
from the media involved when it was unclassified discussions and when
it was at some large meeting of scientists and engineers with people
from the press present. Some military, some civilian, people in the
government, here and there a senator, congressman who was especially
interested, and there would be statements like the following made:
“Whoever possesses the moon controls the Earth, because it's
the high ground.” Of course, if you're on the moon, the Earth
is the high ground. In other words, it's nonsense to talk about high
ground when you deal with that kind of an assumption in the first
place, about using the heavenly bodies. Whoever controls the moon
would be able to use, say, the back of it to store ICBMs, and if you're
not up to the technology, you won't be able to do anything about those
ICBMs. You could also, of course, put the ICBMs at the bottom of the
ocean or the North Pole if you want to take places where it's difficult
to get to and handle the stuff, and requires enormous project to place
them there. You could think of things almost as silly as the moon,
without including the moon.
So there were a lot of things that didn't, shall we say, last very
much once they were analyzed a little bit. The Air Force was the dominant
of the three, four major services, depending on whether you count
the Marines or the Coast Guard along with the others, but there was
never any real interest in a practical way, because anything that
a human being could do in space for the military could be done with
apparatus far better.
If you want to look at the Earth, you don't want to depend on a human
being's eyes and have the problem of getting him up and down and keeping
him healthy. You want to put instruments that will be far superior
to eyes, whether it be radar infrared covering the range of sensing
of effects from a distance, not just the optical range suitable for
human beings. If it's a matter of listening to signals coming from
the Earth, so you know what's going on down below, again you want
to be able to pick up radio, television, radar, other signals that
the human being can't pick up anyway. Well, of course, a human being
can sit up in a space capsule and look at a screen that has all the
apparatus, but why not send the same information that goes to the
screen from the sensing instrument down to Earth? If you can put a
man up and back and stay in contact with him, of course you can send
those signals back down and let people look at a much bigger screen
together, analyze it, and make prints and do all the things you want
to do. So, to this day, to my knowledge, the Air Force has no interest
in man in space.
In a similar fashion, the scientists of the world had two barriers
to an interest in man in space. First of all, was the question of
interest in space. If you have a certain amount of funds only, a certain
amount of effort you can fund in pure research, you should put it
into those areas that deserve the highest priority. And to scientists
in general, space was just a field of interest. Nothing signaled that
it was especially blessed from up above with a priority that required
it to be put over, let's say, microbiology, where you might get a
cure for cancer. So to scientists at large, space was not a special
priority, and with most scientists it was not regarded as equal priority
to many other things that they could mention in other fields of endeavor.
To the commercial world, it's very difficult to compare the possibility
that maybe you could manufacture something in space better than you
can on Earth, and if you took return on investment, investment placed
at risk to advance technology to do things for the peacetime commercial
pursuit of civilization here on Earth, that information technology,
computers, communications, would have to rank much higher. And insofar
as space could be a factor as with communication satellites, fine.
But man in space? No.
If your interest is in research in space, what you can learn by equipment
in space, what you can learn about the formation of the universe,
particularly of the solar system, the cost of having human beings
involved, such as placing human beings on Mars, protecting those human
beings, and even putting human beings on the moon, to the scientists'
world that couldn't compare with all that you could do with instruments
and communication.
Some may recall that we actually did put a microminiaturized laboratory
about one cubic foot in size, a cube of about one foot on each side
of apparatus to search for life on Mars, it was landed there automatically,
scooped up earth automatically, analyzed the earth, it poured stuff
on to a little bit of earth there, made observations of various kinds
to chemical reactions and so on, and sent signals back. That was a
substantial program, like 100 million dollars. It would have taken
not 100 million, but 100 billion dollars to put a man up on Mars and
bring him back alive, and he would not be able to do all the things
that this instrument did, unless you accompanied him with this same
package. And you wouldn't want him to wait and come back and tell
what he learned, send the information back by radio.
So how come we did the lunar project? How come that was so important?
That, of course, was psychological. We would not have had a lunar
project, at least not at that time, if the Soviet Union hadn't put
man in space first and appeared to be ahead in the ability to place
men on the moon.
Now, at about that time, I chaired, for the CIA [Central Intelligence
Agency], a committee that met once a month. This was in the sixties,
after we had the goal to land men on the moon and bring them back
alive before the end of that decade of the sixties, and succeeded.
The principal reason for this advisory committee was to enable the
CIA to have greater confidence that their staff was doing the right
things, and analyzing from everything the kind of information we could
get, how the Russians were doing in landing men on the moon. Another
race. We must land men on the moon before the Russians.
We began to realize, as the information came in, that they had no
intention of putting a man on the moon, they had done what appeared
to many in the United States involved in these activities, the right
thing to do, and that is to put instruments on the moon, put instruments
in orbit, put instruments in the lunar landing and do various things,
sense various things, bring back information in that way.
The Soviet Union that had this spectacular, sensational set of successful
results with their initial Sputnik, including putting an astronaut
into orbit, began to run into difficulties, and they never did get
their lunar program to work. They made a number of efforts. Things
just didn't work for them. They went the way probability analysis
would suggest you might expect they would.
We, on the other hand, had spectacular results in a favorable way
after we lost three astronauts on the ground [Apollo 1 (AS-204)],
where I personally thought this was going to be typical, and we had
one spacecraft to the moon, it was Apollo 13, where we had an explosion.
We couldn't separate away the two astronauts to make their landing.
We had to use equipment that we had on board in ways that hadn't been
planned for as a possibility to bring three astronauts back alive.
But it wouldn't have been surprising to some of us had we had the
program delayed by years and stopped it a number of times because
it seemed to be dependent upon equipment whose reliability could not
be expected to serve the purposes in a way acceptable to the American
public. And as you know, as we all recall, who were involved in any
way, the three astronauts who were killed on the ground before a takeoff,
when we were using pure oxygen rather than a mixture of oxygen and
nitrogen for the gas to be breathed, and had the fire, we delayed
the program for a year or two to be sure that we had solved that particular
problem. And even more recent flights in which we did lose a number
of people in—what was the number?
Butler: The
[STS] 51-L, Challenger.
Ramo: The
Challenger. That caused a substantial disturbance and delay, and yet
it was the only one. Those craft, with several people aboard, have
gone up now many times. So they had good luck, if you can use the
word "luck" there. They had a good record of reliability
and success at first that was very impressive to those of us in the
game, that made us fear it would take us some time to attain that
degree of reliability.
Then they began to catch up with themselves, you might say. What they
were trying to do was a little bit beyond what they were prepared
to do. They were also handicapped by racing and hurrying, and we caught
up with and improved our reliability to the extent that we did it
exceedingly well.
Butler: You
mentioned the problems with the Apollo [1] fire and with Challenger
and so forth, yet the first discussions about putting man in space,
from the American program, were on the Atlas, which was intended to
be a missile, which was intended to destroy and to kill people. What
were your thoughts when the discussions were arising about putting
people on top of this and the problems in developing it and making
just the rocket as a whole? Of course, it experienced difficulties
along the way.
Ramo: Regardless
of what each of us might have thought we would do if we were the benevolent
dictator for the United States, we could see that what the Soviet
Union had accomplished psychologically around the world, and the repercussions
of that, very negative for the United States, required that we have
a man-in-space program.
Goodness, a South American or Central American country on the verge
of going Communist, the respect for the Soviet Union increasing as
it did, could and did make oftentimes a difference between whether
they were going to go in the direction of being in the United States'
camp, relying heavily on relationship with the United States, or in
the Soviet Union camp, and whether the world would go Communist or
not was, in part, going to depend upon whether we had a man-in-space
program and could outdo the Russians in that. So we knew it was necessary.
Now, what did we have? We had equipment coming off our production
lines. The Atlas was an example. It's not the only one. There was
the Titan missile, there was the Thor missile. We had a certain amount
of weight we could put into orbit. That could include, especially
if you did a little additional boosting, a little modifications to
cater to that particular mission. It was the most reliable thing we
had, because we'd been doing a lot of testing to try to get the reliability
we needed for the ICBM program. To start from scratch and say, "This
isn't optimum," if we had it to do from scratch, we would build
a somewhat bigger missile, the Titan was somewhat bigger. It would
take a larger payload a little farther than the Atlas would. But either
one of those was a good starting point, so we took it for granted
that's what you would do, since those of us that were directing doing
the ICBM program were most knowledgeable about that apparatus we were
involved in, in providing everything about that flight, the control
of the hardware from beginning fabrication to the launch pad, and
various things about the launching in Florida.
Butler: If
the ICBM program hadn't gotten the approval and hadn't gotten the
boost when it did, and yet the Russians had gone ahead and put up
Sputnik and had their ICBM and put a man in space, what impact do
you think that would have had on America?
Ramo: Of course,
now, I'm perfectly willing to give you my thoughts. It should be understood
that I don't presume that I have the expertise, that I could be forgiven
for assuming at least I have or had access to in the case of the military
application, the ICBM program, but again I say it would not be surprising
if anyone of some reasonable intelligence, who was in discussion with
people that were anxious to write about these things, whose background
might have been history or psychology, but I think that what happened,
as we know now, is that as years changed to decades, the Soviet Union
lost its prestige, the negatives of what they were doing and how they
were doing it in the running of their world became more evident than
the positives.
They were looked upon as being wrong about the way you organize a
nation and the way you handle the relationships between a government
and its people. But they would have done better, they would have gone
further. This could have led to all kinds of difficulties. We might
have had Vietnam, Korean, Central American situations going much further
in their direction, so it would not have been possible for us to change
it without a much bigger effort, which we might not have taken on.
We might have felt that we couldn't do it.
Just as today, for example, no one assumes that we could go into China
with a military operation and tell the Chinese how to run their world.
We would have had to give up some of those marginal things. But more
importantly, you may recall that Italy, for example, was on the verge
of going Communist, a reason for the Marshall Plan. What we did in
Greece, the Soviet Union moving from the east west, might have succeeded
in. They took over Czechoslovakia and, of course, there was the uprising
in Hungary. A good part of Europe, in other words, might have gone
much more strongly into the Soviet Union camp, making it exceedingly
difficult. NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] might have been
less successful in organizing relations between the leading nations
of Western Europe and the United States to have a credible defense
against the Russians, should the Russians have decided that they wanted
to take over all of Western Europe, as [Adolf] Hitler did.
So one way to say it is, who knows what would have happened? But at
least it is reasonable to assume that what would have happened would
have been less desirable from our standpoint than what did happen.
And either we would have been caught up into situations that would
have required much greater expenditures with poor results in order
to hold our own, or else we would have moved back, become more isolationist,
and let these things happen, even as Western Europe let Hitler take
over. Britain and France did, for example, and that led them into
a situation far worse than what might have happened had they acted
earlier. We would have been prevented from taking some of the actions
that we took.
Butler: Thank
you for your thoughts on that. Luckily, it has worked out well and
America has still got a strong stand.
Ramo: Well,
it's worked out better than it might have, had the space program not
gone the way it did, which wouldn't have happened, as you said, as
you suggested, without the ICBM program.
Butler: Very
key element. Looking on that and the involvement, then, with the Mercury
Program and applying the Atlas to the Mercury Program, what was then
your interaction with NASA, as well as the military at that time?
How did that relationship evolve and what did it entail?
Ramo: As near
as I can recall, the relationship of NASA and the Air Force was a
good one. There was a clarity that in some respects might have been
surprising, between the NASA mission on the one hand and the Air Force's
mission on the other. It was far superior to the typical interservice
rivalry situations that exist today, that have always existed as long
as there's been the three services. The role, for example, of aircraft
carriers versus long-range bombers has always been, and always going
to be, probably a good example of gray areas, difficulties in trying
to define the areas, the missions of each of the services. But NASA
was nonmilitary and the Air Force is military, and that worked out
well. [Brief interruption.]
Butler: Looking
at the involvement, as we were just recently talking, with NASA and
the Air Force on the Atlas Program, to bring the Atlas up to manned
specifications and to work NASA into it and using it and launching
it, what roles did you have there? Were you involved with any training
aspects for them or the launch site, developing that?
Ramo: Well,
the large teams that we had on the apparatus itself, on being sure
that everything was in proper condition, checking everything out,
and the teams in Florida to make sure that the launch would go well,
they were placed totally at the disposal of NASA. Except for making
sure that that would happen, I personally was not on the site and
not standing there directing anything. So I had very little to do
with such details.
Butler: Were
you able to be on hand to watch a launch of the Atlas, a manned launch?
Ramo: I watched
a couple of launches. I watched the first night shot, for example.
Butler: Was
it very satisfying to be able to see what you'd been spending so much
time on come to fruition?
Ramo: Well,
of course, before that I had seen ICBM launches and I'd seen a lot
of pictures that we had taken of ICBM launches, and I'd seen pictures,
of course, of the launches of the Apollo Programs. I have to say that
what I saw with my own eyes was what I expected to see. It was not
all that surprising difference, thrilling, really.
Butler: I
guess that's good.
Ramo: Well,
if this is what you do for a living, it can't be quite the same as
it is if you're on the outside. The mystery was not very high.
Butler: And
you like it to go as you expect, because that means everything's going
well.
Ramo: Yes.
Naturally, you're always a little nervous, a little concerned, but
if you're in this kind of endeavor, you have to be prepared for disappointments
and not let it get you down. In fact, you've been improperly selected
for the task if you're the kind of a person that's going to allow
disappointment if things don't go well to dominate your decisions
and the enthusiasm of the effort.
You know, once on the Thor missile, the first missile that had a launching
to try out the launching apparatus, I had to make a decision as to
whether we would attempt to launch it. The Thor was being the intermediate-size
missile, so in some respects using the same rocket engines, but less
of them, with less fuel, smaller distance to be traversed if all went
well.
We had assembled the various pieces, important pieces of apparatus,
had shaken then, had vibrated them, had put signals on and off of
them, and subjected them to various mechanical and temperature stresses.
These things were, what should we say, worn out, they were no longer
reliable pieces of apparatus. You wouldn't expect them to work the
first time without further adjustments perhaps here and there, a change
of a little part, if all you were doing was putting them on a table
and putting them through some paces, some aspect of what they were
up to.
I thought it was important to assemble the whole shebang, hold it
down on the test bed, and fire the rocket engines and see what we
could learn, even if things would be falling apart in front of us.
And then having done that and done some tightening up and replacing
and beefing up, readjusting, reassembling, I decided we should take
the risk of letting it go. The worst that would happen would be, it
would go up for a few inches and fall back down, or it might go out
a short distance before things would come apart one way or another.
And not only that, I wanted us to subject it to additional forces
beyond what would be the ordinary ones, by which I mean give it a
direction, an order to turn severely, more than it would in the ordinary
flight. If, of course, it came down prematurely, we would have to
blow it up and be sure we were off on a trajectory where there would
be nothing underneath that might harm individuals or something of
importance in the way of apparatus underneath.
Sure enough, this missile came up and came down pretty quickly. Everyone
was disappointed, of course, even though we knew that that's what
it was very likely going to do. [Laughter] And there we were in this
specially prepared bunker with extra-thick glass, little windows to
look out, at a proper distance away and so on, and the buttons were
pushed and it fired up, which in some respects was great. Instead
of failing to fire up and finding out what had gone wrong, the rocket
engines lit up and began to exert their force. And then something
went wrong and it came back down. And coming back down, the fuel,
of course, was burned in a hurry. You could call it a semi-controlled
explosion. But it had left the pad, and there was this lull. No one
said anything for a moment. So I said, "Now we've proven it can
fly. We simply have to improve the guidance accuracy." Because,
you see, the Thor missile was supposed to go 1,500 miles. We had a
1,500-mile miss of the target. We now see what the next step is: improve
the accuracy of the guidance. [Laughter] And everybody had to laugh,
if only to be polite, I suppose.
But this is what I mean when I say that if you've lived with the apparatus
and you've been observing enough flights and enough film of flights,
and as with going to the doctor's office and getting a check on your
heart and you see all the wiggly lines on paper, if this is what you
do, even if you get some unusual lines that indicates that you've
maybe become the discoverer of a new heart disease that never was
there before, a very experienced physician is not going to jump up
and down either from negatives or positives he observes.
Butler: Just
doing the job and seeing it gets done.
Ramo: Yes.
Butler: A
few weeks after Alan [B.] Shepard's [Jr.] flight, which was actually
on a Redstone, President [John F.] Kennedy made the announcement that
we should go to the moon by the end of the decade and bring a man
safely back to Earth. Were you involved in the buildup to that, the
discussions on that? And what was your response?
Ramo: Yes.
Well, my contact at that time on that subject was Jerry [Jerome B.]
Wiesner, who was the President's Science Advisor, Jerry Wiesner, who,
after that, became president of MIT [Massachusetts Institute of Technology]
and was one of MIT's leading professors. He was head of their big
electronics research and development laboratories that had a lot of
government contracts. He had also been, from the beginning, a member
of that committee I referred to earlier that helped make the decisions
about whether we could do the ICBM, and, if so, how to do it, and
the decision to do it.
He and those advising him, members of what was called the PSAC, the
President's Science Advisory Committee, they were very much against
the psychological PR [public relations] program, what they called
it. They correctly predicted that we would land some astronauts on
the moon and we would put the Russians to shame, and once we had done
that, there would be lack of interest and the moon program would be
stopped and never go anywhere, and that was what happened.
Now, I felt that while I understood that reasoning, that they were
overlooking the very PR thing that they'd labeled it with. It was
necessary. I had no doubt that if I were the President, I would be
influenced more by the need to show that we were superior to the Russians,
not the other way around. But that had to be done, and it would be
worth the tremendous effort and expense, and I would feel this so
essential that I wouldn't make comparisons between how many additional
hospitals you could build and how many poor people you could bring
up above the poverty level with that same money, as being the right
thing to do against the moon program. I felt it had to be done, and
you might as well accept it and get on with doing it.
I had to appear before the congressional committee that was presumably
deciding whether to fund the program that President Kennedy said he
wanted. The Congress, in the end, have to decide to foot the bill
and, hence, to make the decision to do it. Couldn't be done by the
President by edict alone. It had to be something that Congress had
passed a bill to do and provided the funds for. And I decided I would,
in my testimony, try to state what I saw as the pluses and minuses
of doing this, and I did that, and I thought I did it reasonably well.
I was not amazed when the chairman said, "Dr. Ramo, I can't tell
whether you're for it or against it." [Laughter] What he would
have preferred would have been just a simple "yes" or "no."
Do you think we should spend this money to send a man to the moon?
I had no intention of doing that. For one thing, I felt, not with
any false modesty, but in total awareness of what I could consider
myself knowledgeable about and not, I didn't think I was an expert
to decide on the political, psychological, social importance of proving
superiority in this arena.
There were many other ways in which we were clearly superior to the
Soviet Union, and including in high technology and in science, and
that this was not necessary totally, but I didn't think the public
would see it that way. And I could understand that the political leadership
of the nation should have been, at least, regarded by me as expert
in political, psychological, public relations aspects as in the space
and missile business. So I didn't want to simply say, "I can
see a lot of negatives about putting so much in the way of resources
in that direction," but on the other hand, that's overridden
by the importance of the impact on the general public of the world.
Who am I to talk about that comparison when I'm only knowledgeable
in one part of the two? So I thought I would just list the pluses
and minuses as I saw them and not try to arrive at a final decision.
I didn't attempt to explain that to the chairman. I think I must have,
as I recall, said something like, "Well, you have just the impression
of what I said." [Laughter] At least I was clear on that subject.
Butler: That's
good. Very clear.
We've talked now a little bit about various aspects of the program
and some of the ins and outs. Can we talk about some of the relationships
and some of the people you worked with? Like General Schriever, for
instance, or some of the people at NASA. Can you tell us about them
and how that all worked with the ICBM and then the transition over
to manned program?
Ramo: Well,
we were, in the United States, extremely fortunate in, I'd say, the
accident of Jim [James E.] Webb, in particular, at NASA and Bennie
Schriever, General Schriever, in the Air Force being in the positions
that they were in.
Let me comment on General Schriever first, because he was in the job
of the ICBM before the NASA was created. There were perhaps in the
Air Force, in the category of generals from one general on up, something
of the other of six or seven generals that I would say could seriously
have been considered to head this largest program that we've ever
had in the United States, a high-technology program, but with much
more than technology involved. These were people that, of course,
you'd have to first say had leadership qualities, presumably a general
has. They would have to be people that had an unusual feel for, if
not a substantial degree of expertise in high technology. They would
have to be accepted because of their personal involvement with scientists
on one project or another over a period of time, with engineering
projects, their education and their contacts and the people that they
lived with over a substantial period.
Then, of course, because of the pressure of a program of this kind,
a race that has to be won, watched by all of those above you from
the President down to the other generals and then the industry that
has to respect you, and I already mentioned the good relations and
good feel for the work of scientists and engineers, now, of that group
I'd say the best one was General Schriever, and he was available and
he was selected.
General Schriever was a cool guy. No matter what the pressure was,
no matter how intensely he might feel that something has to be done
that minute because of what he's hearing and seeing, he expressed
himself always with clarity, he didn't fall off his chair, he didn't
shout, and the effect on everyone around him was that he was a guy
in charge. Of course, I wouldn't be able to say it if I hadn't gotten
on exceedingly well with him, so we were a good pair. We respected
each other, and we saw each other virtually every day. We had our
offices set up so that we were frequently in control, and we did many
things together. We had to go on trips to meetings. We had to sit
in the same room looking at the situation, deciding what to do about
it.
And he understood the importance of the technical aspects for the
decision. When I say technical, I mean not just a pure engineering,
scientific subject like what is the best of three alternatives for
handling the reentry problem. Engineering is much more than the science
that underlies it, and you're not a successful engineer in the large,
and especially that as conspicuous in a big project involving many
people and many industrial companies, many specialists, many aspects
going from the conception right to the incorporation and the putting
in place of a complete operational capability.
It's highly interdisciplinary, not only in the sense that there are
many different aspects of science and engineering that interact with
each other, but it's interdisciplinary in the sense that the requirements,
military in this instance, requirements of a society as to what you
do, the timing, the economics, the money that would be required, the
comparing of alternatives, the relating of the overall to the pieces,
the systems engineering, the need to understand that you've got a
complex of people and machinery, human beings and apparatus, and their
interconnections, sometimes with big geographical spans, with signals
and energy and moving vehicles over substantial distances, constituting
numerous overlapping loops in which what happens in one part of the
complete system has an influence on another part, and what you must
do is succeed in making a compatible ensemble of these various pieces
that must work together.
The scheduling itself, the decisions as to how far do you go in perfection
before you go to the next step, I'd mentioned earlier that it made
sense, I thought, even to begin to learn how to launch and check out
your launching procedures and equipment facilities even before you
were ready to launch by taking whatever you could pull together, even
if it was going to fall apart on you.
So Bennie Schriever understood that kind of thing. It was inherent
in his makeup that he understood this. One could imagine a general
who said, "I'm the general, so I'm in charge. It is a military
project." One could imagine a scientist engineer type who said,
"You're in charge of little administrative details. I'm really
running this." I've heard about and I've seen that on projects
many times over my long lifetime career.
Now, Jim Webb had been a director of the budget. He was a lawyer originally.
He'd gone in the government as a budget director. He knew money and
government funding. He had been, I think, a Deputy Secretary of State,
but more than that, he happened to be an exceedingly broad individual.
He came into NASA as a second head of NASA, but he came in at the
time when NASA was changing to a really important operating organization
with the lunar landing being the big issue. And he was exceptionally
strong and just what the government needed.
We've had some good and some less than good heads of NASA. We've got
a very good one now in Mr. Dan [Daniel S.] Goldin. Some were maybe
individuals who might have been good at a different time, when there
was a different aspect, a dominance in what was required for NASA.
People have to be right for the time, as well as—I mean for
the situation they're put in. You can't just talk about an individual
in the abstract. It is a matter of matching to the task. Some individuals
who were heads of NASA were not well matched to the task at that particular
time. I think that sums up at least some of my feelings about NASA
and Air Force leadership, ICBM military leadership.
Butler: A
couple of examples of some of the people that had the strengths and
talents to get the program where it needed to be. Great.
Ramo: Sometimes
that happens. It happened here or we would have been very much delayed
in both instances, whether it be the lunar landing on the one hand,
or the ICBM program, but especially these people were capable immediately
of coming together. As a matter of fact, now the deputy head of NASA,
George [E.] Mueller, in charge of manned space flight—everything
had to do with manned space flight—was one of our principal—for
several years. I recruited him into Ramo-Wooldridge for the ICBM program.
He was in charge of the electronics guidance, that aspect of the ICBM
program. And he was recruited by NASA as a result of conversations
between Jim Webb and me. The general who headed the Minuteman program
[General Samuel C. Phillips] became the head of the Apollo Program.
That was the case of General Schriever and Jim Webb coming together.
There was no question that the ICBM project team, so large and so
outstanding, put together, should have been used and was used in many
places. A good many of the top executives in the space industry came
out of that original ICBM team at Ramo-Wooldridge.
Butler: So
not only was the ICBM program instrumental in the technological side,
it was on the management side as well.
Ramo: And
that's as it should be. I mean, you have a very big program and its
principal people should move on to other things as you pass a certain
peak of requirement for all of them.
Butler: The
buildup, at least on the manned space program side, was to the [Apollo
11] lunar landing, as you mentioned. Do you remember where you were
and what you were doing when they actually landed on the moon for
the first time?
Ramo: Well,
I was home and watching TV.
Butler: Looking
back over your career, focusing on the ICBM program and NASA involvement,
what was the biggest challenge that you faced?
Ramo: I guess
I never thought of a single piece as being bigger than another piece.
It was especially easy for me to think in that regard, because I guess
if I have to answer the question, to answer it, it was the integration
of the whole. Everything connected to everything else, if you couldn't
constantly see everything in the context of its relationship to the
rest of it.
For example, I'm sure some who are particularly concerned with the
rocket engine would say getting the smallest weight, most thrust for
the weight of the fuel, without the rocket engine developing instability,
blowing up because of unusual strains. You had to do such things as
introduce the fuel that was being burned in what amounted to a controlled
explosion going for like 100 seconds. Such power in it, you had to
have strong control of this change from liquid to gas at such high
pressure that when allowed to escape through a nozzle, especially
shaped to accelerate that, it would come out with such high speed
that the momentum of that gas would be enough to drive, by Newton's
Law, the momentum in the other direction, to accelerate that. And
you'd have to introduce the fuel through little holes that would cool
the very metal that would otherwise get so hot, it would be cause
to fall apart under the excessive strains.
Now, they say that was such a challenge and finding ways to test it
so that we knew what was going on, and designing everything, the pumps
to pump the fuel in so that it would be as light as possible, and
rugged, able to stand the acceleration, the high Gs during the buildup
of velocity. But in my case, I had to worry about the relationship
of that part of the effort to the rest of it. For one thing, you needed
to bring them along together. There would be no point in having your
rocket engines all ready to go but have the guidance delayed. Somehow
you had to have it all come together, and that required that the timing
and the pacing be chosen correctly.
For example, if you had to handicap the rocket engines by having them
swivel, they had to be so held together that you could change their
direction so you could use this for control of velocity and counter
to instabilities if the missile, for one reason or another, began
to yaw or pitch or roll. And yet if you insisted on too much action
from the rockets, the rockets would be delayed. You'd never get them
at the time when you need them. So maybe you should do something else
to ensure that you don't have big oscillations during the flight,
which would handicap the design of the rest of the structure and some
of the control equipment.
So you had to not only see that these were compatible, each doing
its part, and ending up with a sensible, in the end, combination of
weight, distance to be traveled, and small miss distance. If you increase
the requirement for the miss distances, decide you don't want to miss
quite so badly, which presumably would require you have a bigger warhead,
which would change the weight of everything. Then if you're too severe
on that, then you put such restraints, such conditions on the control
system that it's harder to get it designed and working well within
the time allocated.
We didn't have a problem of expense, not that money was no object.
Money sometimes is an indicator of whether you can really do it at
all. If you need all the money in the world to do it, there's something
wrong and it's not going to happen because it implies too many people
doing too many things all in a short time, and you won't get it assembled
so that it's all harmoniously compatible.
Butler: That
certainly is a challenge, to bring all those aspects together and
for a program that was brand new.
Ramo: Well,
we began to call that the systems approach. Now, the word "systems"
was in the vocabulary of the layman. We speak of a transportation
system. We speak of the telephone system, electric power distribution
system, and the word "system" in that sense already implies
that it's a combination of many things and people. It's a complex
arrangement, an interconnected group of components. But systems engineering
was hardly at all properly considered as an intellectual discipline
until we began, and especially in the United States, to design systems
of such complexity and on such time schedules and with such newness
about various aspects of technology, so that you had to extend the
art greatly, you couldn't do it by kind of hit-or-miss, "Let's
connect these things together, they seem to do the job. You ought
to be able to do it." And then you find one piece doesn't work
right in compatibility with the others or, as I say, you don't have
a piece when you need it because you put conditions on it that can't
readily be met within the time scale that you've set for yourself.
So what you have to do by way of analysis and modeling, the way you
have to extend even the mathematical techniques you use, take, for
example, probability and statistical. Almost everything that you wanted
to specify and say what it is that you need was some numbers. You'd
have to put a range on it. It has to be within a certain range. Well,
even if you speak of the ultimate guidance, actually, a simple number,
you want one mile. Well, that means on the average, if you launch
a number of missiles, some will come within a half a mile of the target,
some will come one and a half miles from the target. If it averages
a mile, that's satisfactory.
Well, now, you take that band of interest to you, and you say what
determines it. One of the things that determines it, for example,
is the fact that the Earth is not a sphere, and gravity is working
on the missile all the time. You think you understand gravity enough
to put down what that does to your trajectory, but as you pass over
parts of the Earth that are bumpy, it's not a perfect sphere. Parts
of the Earth vary in density. You get variations of density. How well
do we know the variations of density of the Earth? What's the probability?
What's the variation? What's the band or what you're going to work?
You do that for every part that affects accuracy, and pretty soon
you come out with the possibilities of being anywhere from the mile
you'd like to 100 miles. What fraction will fall within the mile?
If only 1 percent does, you haven't got it.
You can see the analysis takes big computers because you've got so
many things to where everything’s depending on everything else,
so every equation you write, every mathematical equation that says
"Here is the accuracy for this piece," it depends on the
result of the other equations. If you've got simultaneous—hundreds
of simultaneous equations to solve at the same time, each in which
you put approximate probabilities, you do need a computer to do it.
You need to simulate the entire operation, for example. And the moment
you have a lot of loops of interactions, you can get some very strange
effects.
I can illustrate something that those of you who are accustomed to
hearing people talk in front of a microphone, you know every once
in a while you get this ring and squeal and terrible noise, because
you get a feedback from the speakers back into the microphone. That
goes into the amplifier and goes back out louder, which makes the
microphone feel an even bigger signal until it gets as loud as the
speakers are able to get before you blow a fuse or something.
Now imagine if you have hundreds of loops making up an ICBM system,
what you'll have in that regard. It's not just the missile itself.
We have to design the whole rest of the system, like the silos and
the system for command and control, and the system for ensuring that
you're keeping this missile safe in the silos. You don't want to have
a system that shoots down someone who tries to trespass. It might
be a deer, and you don't want to stop a launch because there's been
the possibility of a trespass.
So we had to consider a wider range of things, all of which needed
to be simulated because so very often you couldn't just write equations
for it. One of the things you couldn't do readily is write equations
for the actions of human beings in a system. So you have to set up
experimental simulated conditions and observe how the combinations
seem to work.
Butler: Quite
a challenge. What, then, was your greatest achievement or biggest
success, in your opinion?
Ramo: Well,
we did beat the Russians. We were able to know where they stood, because,
you see, when you're actually moving towards success, towards the
final proving out of the system, you're launching into space. So now
we each could observe what the others were doing. Our first launchings
from Cape Canaveral [Florida], for example, there was no question
that there were Russian ships out there watching what we were up to
and trying to record any signals that came off of our missiles to
tell us what was going on inside, to try to interpret them. Of course,
we did a great deal of coding.
We could see that we were ahead of them as they were approaching their
really good test flights. We had had higher accuracy in particular
and more longer flights with success. And remember, they had a bigger
missile. They were handicapped by not being able to design a warhead
with as high a yield per pound as we could, and that is a handicap,
because there's so many things that have to do with weight when you're
handling apparatus. Not to mention the fact that some things don't
scale, and you can't assume that a rocket engine of twice the diameter,
and that means four times the thrust, is a matter of merely scaling.
It will be just as reliable, because some aspects of stability in
cooling may not scale, may be much easier to build a smaller device.
As you scale up, to get the strength requires—well, I'll give
you a simple example. If you have twice as thick a wall as you've
got twice the pressure in a bigger rocket, you can't necessarily put
holes through it for the fuel to enter and provide cooling on the
inner surface, because the holes may tend to stop up as a result of
the high pressure upon burning of the fuel pushing back out of the
hole, bucking the pump for a longer distance. So that doesn't scale.
So in a same sense, the difficulty of designing a 100-story building
is not just twice a fifty-story building. It may be four times. So
they had some handicaps as they moved towards testing, and we had
missiles ready to fire with H-bombs as an operational capability before
they did. It took them quite a little while to catch up.
The program's secrecy was so successful, relatively speaking, even
when you include the test program, that when President Kennedy ran
for office and Bob [Robert S.] McNamara was his choice for Secretary
of Defense, there was discussion, you remember, of a missile gap of
the Russians. What Senator Kennedy knew, and he was not thoroughly
briefed until after he became the President, or President-elect, I
should say, he came with McNamara. I gave a briefing on the ICBM in
Los Angeles [California]. McNamara, after listening to what we had
to say with our charts and so on, we went into considerable detail,
he said, "There is a missile gap, but it's in the opposite direction
of what we thought."
See, they were aware of the fact that the Russians had done the beginning
of the ICBM first, that we had a wrong conclusion that the ICBM was
for many, many years away, it was much too unlikely to be created
in the next several years, that the way to do it was with manned bombers.
The intelligence reports that we'd gotten that caused the setup of
the whole program was, by that time, known to President-elect Kennedy.
Bob McNamara was president of Ford Motor Company. He was not in the
fraternity at all. So when they found out about it, that was the end
of the missile gap. The missile gap was in our favor.
So I'd say beating the Russians to operational capability stood out
as the most satisfying thing.
Butler: And
that's definitely on the aspects of national security and for the
future of the space program, too, because it did give us that foundation.
Looking at the future and reflecting on the past, what do you see
as the relative roles between the industry, between the government,
civil, military, and how that's going to evolve?
Ramo: Well,
one part I think is very easy, and it relates the past to the future,
I think, very well. I mean by that that what we've done in the past
seems to have been pretty much the right thing to do, as we see the
future. NASA's role is research—I'll get back to that in a moment—research
that isn't primarily tied to either commercial or a military application,
but to understand best what you can do with apparatus in space and
see that insofar as it's worthwhile doing for new things that will
be important to the society, you need to develop apparatus and techniques
and get on with doing that development.
The military has the military applications, clearly. The military
applications can sometimes be such that the inherent technology can
be used by NASA for its research purposes that may have to do with
understanding the universe and the Earth, and has little to do with
the military application per se, but the military application may
give rise to technology that can be used. And the same thing goes
in the other direction. NASA, with work going on at JPL [Jet Propulsion
Laboratory], will extend our ability to sense, to get information
out in space, and to bring it back, and that is important also to
what the military is after, using space for apparatus that will get
information.
I believe there will be, in the foreseeable future—I was going
to say in the near future—in the foreseeable future, no applications
for man in space either for commercial purposes or to the military.
Man in space, if it has a purpose in research, then I think it has
to be pitted for what we learn, for the amount of money spent, against
other research projects. There is nothing today special about man
in space in research as compared with unmanned spacecraft, for example.
You simply ask yourself what it is you're trying to understand.
There's one thing you can only understand, and it has to do with science
and research, by putting man in space: that is, how man reacts to
space. But as to why you are interested in that, you're interested
in it because you're interested in everything about man and you're
interested in everything about the universe. It's always conceivable,
if you understand man better because of putting him in the unusual
environment of space, then you can compare what you hope to learn,
useful to society there against doing other things with the same amount
of money. And in that regard, I think there's a question as to what
will happen to the man-in-space program versus time because of the
competition of other ways to use money to learn things.
The idea that ultimately, because it's there, Mars is there, we must
have a colony on Mars, well, we've had human beings get to the North
Pole, we've never created a colony there as a result. Once we had
human beings at the North Pole, that was it. One can imagine some
projects of research that will require man in space that don't have
to do with understanding man, understanding human beings.
If we want to explore the universe to an extent beyond what we can
do with today's apparatus, then well beyond such things as the Hubble
Telescope, where you put apparatus in space to look out at the universe,
and what you can do from a mountaintop in Hawaii, as with the Keck
larger, much larger telescopes, if you could put apparatus to observe
the universe on the other side of the moon, you have a very, very
stable platform there. You could build bigger telescopes or telescopes
with bigger distances between them, coordinating them so you have
the advantage of the base, of looking at the universe from two points,
separated, and deduce some of what you would learn if you had a telescope
that was as big as the distance between them.
Earth is not a very good place to go much beyond, if at all, the two
Keck telescopes, because you have the air, the turbulence, in the
way. You can do some things to cut down the effect of turbulence.
Putting a telescope in space, a still bigger one, you have a great
handicap in what you can do in a platform that you keep in space,
rotating around the world, having it turning to lock onto a target
and stay on it for a matter of many minutes, in fact, even hours.
If you're going to assemble apparatus on the moon, you're going to
have to have men to do it. You can do a great deal of robotry in the
process, but you've got to have men to do it. That isn't an example
of a research project, but comparing that with other research projects
here on Earth, we're entering a period not only of understanding the
subtle distinctions between animate, living, and inanimate molecules,
understanding the genes, the human race, understanding DNA and RNA,
with the potential of curing most diseases and even affecting aging,
those promises are so overwhelmingly attractive, and some of them
appear imminent, if only properly supported, and that means it's more
important to have Ph.D.'s in microbiology than Ph.D.'s in manned space
flight and its basic science, so the competition's going to be enormous.
Then what's happening on the computer, synthetic intelligence front,
the ability to extend man's intellect by artificially created intelligence,
what can be accomplished by the combination of human beings and electronic
apparatus is moving so rapidly and has such an effect on a society,
that again the consequences of that are bound to usurp a good deal
of the resources of the country.
Now, the commercial applications of space as a result of this—and
I've already mentioned half a dozen—dozens of reasons why apparatus
in space will pay off in improving the operations of our society,
transportation and communications and the effect of everything, doing
research, physicians being able to consult files and get information
from around the world with the touch of fingers on buttons, the effect
on every activity of man is so great in the expanded utilization of
information technology that already we have or are moving towards
a trillion dollars of gross world product that comes from that area
of endeavor. Now, that commercial work, which doesn't belong in the
government, we're not talking about the military part, which does,
we're not talking about the long-term research about the universe,
which belongs in NASA, in the government.
But when industry is that big, is moving so fast, and is out into
the border between what is known and what is not known, it puts pressure
on the government to put its research and development behind that.
Among other things, there's always national competition, even though
we're moving towards a one-world affair. The one-world influence of
corporations being international, so they're not best thought of alone
as being evidence of national and parochial interests, that international
impression will be felt on all countries to spend their research budgets
on things that will cause those programs to move along, because there
will be more people and interest in jobs depending on those so that's
where the political pressure will come.
So I'm suggesting that while you can find reasons for man-in-space
programs as being part of the research of NASA, and it will be NASA
and not either military or commercial, industrial, private enterprise,
it will be suffering always in the amount of funding available for
it against the competition for the same resources.
Butler: I
think you were good at predicting things back in the past for what
would happen, so it'll be interesting to see if everything follows
through for the future.
Ramo: Well,
now that I'm moving into the last part of the century and my life
has started fairly early in the century, and it seems to be moving
towards the very end of this century, during this period I have seen
and felt, because at a very early age I began to sense the impact
of scientific advance and technology. That's why I went into the field.
But we had electricity. We began to create the electrification of
the nation before the century. We had automobiles before the century
occurred, but in this century, think of it. We've learned how to put
human beings, within a few hours, almost anywhere on Earth that we
want to, people and things. We can communicate between any two points
on Earth. We have added three-dimensional activities—space,
airplanes, air transportation—to the two-dimensional society
we previously were limited to on Earth.
And it would appear that the next century, if you look at it, if this
is the technological society century, this is the technological century.
We had technology before, but, after all, we had fire and the invention
of the wheel in the centuries before. But 99 percent of all the significant
influences on society, right down to the negative ones, I mean, we've
learned how to destroy the entire civilization in twenty minutes if
we don't learn how to live together. We've got a real challenge.
So in the next century we can already predict what's happening and
understanding everything from the body at large to the brain, and
relating the manmade brains to the artificial brains, which can really
affect the life process. The changes, of course, will be enormous,
and so I don't hesitate to predict these enormous changes, because
it will take another ten, twenty years. If someone comes up to me
and says, "Si Ramo," twenty years from now, "boy, were
you wrong in your predictions, I'll be perfectly happy about it, as
long as I can still understand the question or the claim.
Butler: I
think it's an exciting future to look forward to, and I thank you
for sharing your exciting past with us.
Ramo: Very
good.
[End
of Interview]