NASA at 50 Oral History
Project
Edited Oral History Transcript
Robert W. Cobb
Interviewed by Sandra Johnson
Washington, DC – 20 March 2007
Johnson:
Today is March 20th, 2007. We are at NASA Headquarters in Washington,
D.C., to speak with Robert W. Cobb, the Inspector General for NASA,
for the NASA at 50 Oral History Project. The interviewer is Sandra
Johnson. In preparation for the space agency’s fiftieth anniversary,
the NASA Headquarters History Office commissioned this oral history
project to gather thoughts, experiences, and reflections from NASA’s
top managers. The information recorded today will be transcribed and
then placed in the History Archives here at NASA Headquarters, where
it can be accessed for future projects.
Can I answer any questions for you today before we begin?
Cobb:
No.
Johnson:
Thank you for providing us this time today. As Inspector General [IG]
for NASA and in accordance with the Inspector General Act of 1978,
your office conducts objective oversight of NASA programs and operations
and independently reports to the Administrator, Congress, and the
public to further the agency’s accomplishment of its mission.
If you would, please begin by briefly describing your background and
how you came to be in this position for NASA.
Cobb:
My background is as an attorney. I worked in private practice for
five years. Then I joined the government fifteen years ago. I worked
for nine years at an office called the Office of Government Ethics,
which focuses on standards of conduct, conflicts of interest, and
financial disclosure. In January of 2001 I was asked to come to work
in the White House to be the ethics counsel for the new [George W.]
Bush administration. I worked as Ethics Counsel in the Office of the
Counsel to the President under Alberto [R.] Gonzales for fifteen months
and was nominated for the position of Inspector General while I was
in the White House; was confirmed by the United States Senate; and
was appointed to the position of Inspector General in April of 2002.
Johnson:
Let’s talk about the scope of your current responsibilities
in this position and what you’re responsible for, how the office
is organized, and that sort of thing.
Cobb:
The mandate under the Inspector General Act for Inspectors General
is to root out fraud, waste, and abuse, and promote the economy and
efficiency of the agency where the Inspector General resides. That
is an extraordinarily broad mandate, and so there’s a tremendous
amount of discretion in terms of how the resources that are given
to an Inspector General Office are applied. Organizationally, we have
two fundamental business lines. One is audit, and the other is investigations.
The investigations focus primarily on violations of law, and that
includes criminal laws. So our investigative team has law enforcement
authority, pursuant to which they act as federal law enforcement officials,
conducting investigations, coordinating investigations of violations
of criminal statutes with the appropriate prosecutorial teams, which
is usually the United States Attorneys’ offices for the various
districts in which the investigations occur.
With the respect to the Office of Audits, we have responsibilities
in terms of carrying out the financial statement audit, which we use
a contractor to perform, and we do that both under the IG Act, but
also under the Chief Financial Officer’s Act. In addition, we
conduct myriad performance audits, again with respect to the broad
mandate to promote the economy and efficiency of the agency. We employ
these audits really to see where we can add value in terms of the
agency’s execution of its mission.
Johnson:
When you were working those first fifteen years for the government
and then later for Alberto Gonzales, did you have any idea that you
would want to one day work at NASA or that you would be? Had you followed
NASA and the program through the years?
Cobb:
Well, certainly, I think just as a member of the American public,
it’s [fantastic] to have an opportunity to come work [at] NASA.
I do not have a science and engineering background academically. In
fact, if there was any subject other than law that I had a background
in, it was history. [And NASA has a great history.] So from my standpoint
it was a tremendous opportunity for me to have the opportunity to
come and be associated with an agency like NASA.
Johnson:
Well, we talked about the scope of your current responsibilities.
As far as this office and the mission of this office historically,
do you have an idea or can you explain what it has been historically,
and then compare it to today’s mission and if it’s changed
any as far as the mission itself?
Cobb:
The mission hasn’t changed. I think that since the Inspector
General Act was passed in 1978 that there have been some modifications
and some additional mandates that are occasionally included in the
IG Act or in other law.
But fundamentally the objective of providing independent and objective
reviews of agency programs and operations is the thrust of it. In
part, it is an attempt under our constitutional framework to have
an internal oversight function that can report not only to the Administrator
for purposes of the benefit of the agency, and that the agency can
respond to that internal oversight, but also to provide some sunlight
and transparency into the government’s operations and the agency’s
operations to the elected officials on the [Capitol] Hill, so that
they may take such legislative and other action as appropriate in
fulfillment of their oversight responsibility.
So I’d say that the mission has not fundamentally changed. At
various times there are some differences in philosophy in terms of
how the mission is executed. Independence means different things [to
different people]. From my perspective, it is critically important
for us to carry out our mission to be able to credibly speak to the
issues that face NASA. That requires, for example, technical talent
in our shop; engineers, safety experts, contracting experts, information
technology experts, with people with backgrounds in those areas. That
hasn’t always been the case….
So there’s relatively minor philosophical approaches towards
how business is conducted that can change from time to time, and I
could go on and on with respect to how, similarly in the investigative
sphere, there can be emphasis on major program fraud, which is something
that we try to focus in on, as opposed to relatively petty criminal
activities. So, for example, if your metric for success is numbers
of indictments, maybe you’d focus on pursuing petty thefts of
property, and maybe you’ll get more indictments than if you
focus on major program fraud by NASA contractors, which may result
in fewer indictments but much greater recoveries, and maybe a different
type of deterrent than you’d get if you were pursuing the petty
thefts. So there’s different ways of approaching that field
as well, but the mission has fundamentally remained the same.
Johnson:
Well, you mentioned safety, and shortly after you started in 2002,
then STS-107 and the [Space Shuttle] Columbia accident happened. Since
that time we’ve returned to flight, and safety has been a focus.
How is your relationship with the Safety Office and Mission Assurance,
and how do you deal with safety up here in the Inspector General’s
Office?
Cobb:
Well, I’d say both before and after Columbia, starting out with
my confirmation hearings, I’ve emphasized the importance of
safety in connection with the value that our office could bring to
NASA. So there’s different elements of how that would play out,
and it’s very complex in the context of how we execute our mission.
We can conduct compliance audits where we focus in on whether or not
certain boxes have been checked in terms of the execution of NASA
policy and directive requirements. In those we can point to NASA’s
failure to abide its own requirements.
Sometimes those compliance audits don’t get at whether or not
there is a major, systemic problem in terms of that word culture that
is frequently used in connection with Columbia. I emphasized when
I came in as Inspector General that our safety audit staff had, in
connection with its audit of Shuttle activities, a responsibility
to communicate through me to the [NASA] Administrator whether or not
we believed, based on our audit work, that there were any impediments
to launching the Space Shuttle.
That perspective was something that was unfamiliar to the audit staff
when I arrived. [That staff had] been focused on compliance [auditing
and] felt very comfortable in connection with the scope of those particular
audits to articulate the findings that had been previously made. [They
were, however,] much more reluctant to step up to the plate and really
be responsible for articulating from our perspective whether or not
there were any such impediments. That’s something that when
I came in, as a first step prior to Columbia, I wanted to make sure
that if we thought that there was a problem, we would communicate
that to the Administrator.
Columbia resulted in a substantial redirection in resources of the
Office of Inspector General’s auditing capacity, and in investigative
functions, because there was a number of investigative matters that
resulted from debris and the theft of debris from the recovery effort.
So we dedicated some investigative resources there.
I became an observer to the activities of the Columbia Accident Investigation
Board, emphasizing that this was the most important thing that had
occurred at NASA in some time, and that the Office of Inspector General
was going to be involved in seeing how the activities of the board
and the analysis of the various issues relating to the accident [were
handled,] and that was important to me. I made a recommendation to
the Administrator that he appoint me as an observer to the board,
which he did.
But in terms of the dedication of audit resources, we wanted to—and
this reflects my overall philosophy of trying to be an impact player
in terms of making recommendations and getting into the issues that
are most significant to the management of the agency, but also to
those on the Hill with oversight responsibilities and ultimately the
American taxpayer—that we were going to dedicate resources on
how NASA was doing in connection with the Return-to-Flight activity.
Now, there was some overlap between our activities and ultimately
the Stafford-Covey board that was convened for purposes of following
up on the Columbia Accident Investigation Board’s report of
investigation and recommendations that were included there. But we
wanted to make sure, and we wanted to use some of our resources, to
try to see whether or not there were any gaps; whether there was any
additional value that we could bring to help ensure that the agency
was headed in the right direction after the Columbia accident.
In terms of ultimately why would we do that, it gets back to this
question of bringing a focus to issues relating to safety and really
aligning the resources of our office to make sure that we could get
on top of that.
At the same time that we were dedicating audit resources to Return
to Flight, there was also, as part of the Columbia accident, a notion
that there were deep cultural problems at NASA in terms of the ability
of people to raise safety issues. So we also dedicated resources to
outlining the circumstances, and this was at the same time Bryan [D.]
O’Connor and the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance was
also focused on this issue from his perspective. But we were examining,
in effect, how issues should be raised to superiors, what are people’s
rights associated with bringing whistle-blower type activities, and
we published some guidance to NASA employees that can be utilized
in connection with those types of issues.
In addition we dedicated both audit and investigative resources to
running down a great number of whistle-blower type concerns, where
people had issues that they were raising they thought that the agency
should focus in on a certain issue, or that they weren’t being
listened to in connection with a position that they had, and we dedicated
substantial resources to looking at that.
So I’d say both before and after Columbia and to the current
day, a substantial portion of our resources are dedicated to safety
and mission success. I’ll give another example. Both before
and after Columbia and before I was here there would be any number
of allegations that contractors had provided the agency substandard
parts, parts not in conformity with the contract, things that were
purchased or manufactured not in accordance with specifications. We
investigate these types of serious safety complaints and pursue them
rigorously.
Another similar type of investigative action involves false certifications,
where there’s hardware or software that has failed certain testing
at a contractor, subcontractor level, and then subsequently is represented
as having passed those tests. That’s the type of thing that
we dedicate substantial resources [to] and, unfortunately, [we] have
had substantial prosecutorial success in bringing about convictions
of people who have defrauded NASA and the taxpayer in what represents
a threat to safety.
Notably, in connection with those investigations, when we get allegations
of product substitution, false certification of testing, that’s
the type of thing that we would notify the appropriate folks within
the agency to ensure that there are not ongoing safety issues in connection
with products, so that we are assured of the safe, or as safe as reasonably
possible, execution of the mission.
So those are some of the types of safety focuses that we have in the
Office of Inspector General.
Johnson:
You mentioned the resources and how much has been devoted to safety,
and even when you were first appointed it seemed to be part of your
vision for this office. If we can talk about that a little bit, about
your strategic vision and how you would like to shape the Office of
Inspector General and the things that you would like to focus on,
and whether the budget that you have allows you to do things you’d
like to do; and if you had all the money that you wanted for this
office, what you might do with it.
Cobb:
Well, I think that, in terms of strategic vision, that I’ve
already talked about some of the basic concepts. We’ve got a
very broad mandate to promote the economy and efficiency of the agency
as well as root out fraud, waste, and abuse. So to me—and maybe
sports analogies are not ideal to use, but I’ll use one in any
event. We have an opportunity to be a free safety for the agency and
independently roam and pick those areas that we think are most important
for our dedication of resources, so that we can assist the agency
and bring value to the agency in terms of helping the agency execute
its mission. It’s probably no more complex than that in terms
of what the vision is.
In terms of whether or not, and it sounds like part of your question
was directed at my sense of whether or not we have the resources that
are sufficient to execute that vision. I think that we do, and we
have. It’s very challenging, especially at an agency that has
such technological skill, for us to weigh in on many of these technological
issues and how the agency can do better. As a practical result of
that, much of our focus is on how the agency institutionally manages
its resources. I’d say a great deal of our most significant
contribution on the audit side relate to institutional management
issues and how the agency can utilize the resources that it has to
most effectively carry out the mission.
Johnson:
You mentioned earlier, and I was going to follow up with that, about
reporting to Congress. How often do you do that? Is that a set time
that you do it, or is it just as it’s needed?
Cobb:
Under the Inspector General Act there’s a semiannual report
that our office issues, and so that’s the primary vehicle. That’s
the statutory vehicle pursuant to which we conduct our reporting both
to the agency and to Congress. As a practical matter, your question
remarked “as needed,” that is also a manner of communication,
so that if, for example, we know that a committee or subcommittee
that conducts oversight on NASA is interested in a particular issue,
we will communicate with them about our body of work that addresses
that issue, so it again is enabled to conduct the oversight responsibilities
that it needs to.
There are certain other things that relate to the law enforcement
and criminal investigations. That’s the kind of thing that we’re
very sensitive [to], and it may, in fact, if there’s a grand
jury, be illegal for us to be communicating to others about what is
ongoing in connection with a criminal investigation. So there are
things that we feel comfortable communicating both to the agency and
to the Hill, and there are other things that we are not comfortable
communicating.
I’d say that from my perspective there are many issues that
we refer to management and we inform management of that don’t
warrant an investigation or don’t warrant a full audit, or we
may have preliminary insight to some issue that we think management
would benefit from that we will communicate, that doesn’t rise
to an importance level that it be communicated to Congress.
I’d say philosophically—and this is something I haven’t
mentioned, but it’s worth talking about—from my perspective
in connection with the manner in which we can best add value to the
agency, it’s to provide insight to problems as early as we possibly
can. That’s challenging, because everyone likes to wait until
the ink is dry on the report and it’s not going to be subject
to any subsequent revision before reporting. But in terms of allowing
the agency to take remedial action as early as it possibly can, sometimes
you can’t wait for a report to be finally inked to communicate
that there’s serious issues that need to be addressed.
The philosophy, as I’ve articulated in other fora, is sometimes
if there’s an accident or a failure of the agency, it’s
not that difficult to come in after an accident or problem has occurred
and deconstruct what it was that caused that problem. Many times when
you do that you’re coming in and you’re telling the agency
what it already knows, because it knows after the fact what it was
that caused the problem.
From an example from the home front, when my children are waving their
hand around a glass of milk, one might say, “Stop waving your
hand around the glass of milk, or you will knock it over,” which
is a way of preventing a problem, as opposed to conducting an audit
after the hand has hit the glass and knocked it over and you have
spilt milk, and coming back and reporting at that point that waving
the hand around the glass of milk is not particularly helpful in terms
of saving the agency from that particular problem, although it may
be useful from a lessons learned standpoint….
So that’s a philosophical approach that I have. If, to the extent
we can, we can come and say, “Don’t wave your hand around
a glass of milk, or it will get knocked over and you will have a problem,”
that’s a much more effective and value-added way of doing business,
and we try very hard to do that.
Johnson:
Since we’ve had a recent change in Congress, and you’ve
worked both with a Republican-controlled Congress and now a Democratic-controlled
Congress, does that have any effect on your office and in your dealings
with the Administration or Congress?
Cobb:
It’s not going to have any effect as far as I can tell in terms
of the deployment of our resources. I’ve already outlined for
you in general terms what we consider to be important and how we deploy
our resources to get after those types of things.
…Of course, we’re very sensitive to congressional requests.
If we receive a request that we deploy resources in connection with
a particular issue that the elected officials believe is important,
we’re going to consider that very closely. Obviously, those
elected officials, they believe that it’s warranted that we
deploy our resources in a certain way, and we’re going to listen
to that very closely, but ultimately make the decision ourselves on
what our responsibilities are and how best to deploy those resources.
Johnson:
Let’s talk about NASA’s impact on society. You are a recent
member of the NASA family, and so you’ve been on both sides
now. What do you feel is the impact that NASA’s had on our society
in the past and possibly for the future?
Cobb:
Well, I’ve been here for five years, or almost five years, and
in the scope of the tenure of many NASA employees, that is a short
period of time. From my perspective, and why, when the opportunity
to come work at NASA was offered to me—NASA represents the most
exciting agency in the executive branch. It is a technological leader.
It’s a leader in terms of what is possible, what can stretch
the human imagination and skill and execution of missions that are
civil oriented rather than defense oriented. From that standpoint,
I think that to the American people and to the world, NASA represents
a place where the dreams of exploration can be executed, and that
is, more than anything else, I think, the great value that NASA brings
to society.
Johnson:
And you feel that’s the most important role that NASA has for
this nation?
Cobb:
I think that it is. Quite obviously part of that overall mission of
exploration involves not only the [human] exploration of space but
scientific exploration; [for example collecting information that could
provide insight on] global warming, for example, is part of that mission,
learning, in terms of scientific exploration, there’s any number
of endeavors that mankind can devise to fulfill its need to explore
[and learn]. Again, I think that that’s what NASA represents,
that opportunity, and I couldn’t be more pleased to be a part
of it.
Johnson:
What do you feel that is the relative importance of human exploration
and robotic exploration in NASA?
Cobb:
Well, there’s great debates on what the relative merit of scientific
exploration, human exploration, robotic exploration, and they all
mix and match in various ways and overlap. I have debates within my
own mind as to—I’d say one extreme on the human exploration
side, you’ll have a person like John (W.) Young articulate that
there’s never been a successful one-planet species, and that’s
sort of a thought-provoker. [Of course, there is much exploration
with the potential for great scientific return which can be done robotically
that cannot be done at this point in time with humans. And there is
exploration that could be done with humans, but is so much cheaper
or involves so much less risk to use robots than conducting the exploration
with humans that conducting the activity robotically makes best sense.]
From my perspective, the point of human space flight is human space
flight, to put humans into space and to have them explore—to
put humans into harm’s way to advance this notion that humankind
is not static, that we’re not just ants. We’re going to
explore, and I think I would agree with many who would believe that
that is the essence of humanity, that we continue to explore and look
outward rather than be content with a static manner of being. [So
there is a great balancing of factors to be done in making the trades
between robotic and human exploration.]
Johnson:
Well, through NASA’s history there have been many opportunities
to learn lessons because of tragedies or accidents or other instances
that have happened, both technically and organizationally. What do
you feel are the lessons learned based on your experience with NASA
or based on what you know about its history?
Cobb:
Well, a couple of things. First, that complacency is something to
be avoided; to constantly be critical and to ask questions of ourselves
in terms of how are we doing at all times. There’s the Gene
[Eugene F.] Kranz comment to be “tough and competent.”
But also I’d say as part of that, that notion of what is toughness
and what is competence, is to continually ask the difficult questions
of what are we doing, why are we doing it, and how are we doing it,
to ensure ourselves that we are not being complacent in connection
with our execution of the overall mission.
From another standpoint I think that in terms of preservation of the
taxpayers’ resources in carrying out the mission as effectively
and efficiently as the agency can, I think that there’s some
inherent challenges to managing these overall mission objectives,
in terms of the manner in which the agency is organized, that just
presents challenges. One is obviously the geography and having centers
dispersed around the country.
The other is in making sure that the institutional functions of the
agency, such as financial management, information technology, security,
contract management, that these things are properly aligned with the
missions, and that the missions are fully integrated with those institutional
requirements which are important for purposes of preserving the public
fisc. So that’s more down in the weeds in terms of challenge
to any NASA management, but is important in terms of the ability to
accomplish the overall mission, because if, for example, the Congress
or the American people believe that NASA can’t conduct its lofty
missions effectively and efficiently, the agency’s ability to
do that would be at risk.
Johnson:
You mentioned earlier the culture after Columbia and the questions
about the culture. What is your perception of the NASA culture?
Cobb:
That’s an extremely difficult question, and it gets to what
is a culture, and a culture, I guess, in terms of this question, is
how do people feel about the execution of the mission, and is the
agency fully dedicated to maximize the benefit that it gets from the
taxpayer in terms of executing the mission.
I’d say there’s a lot of different cultures. I’d
say, overall, there’s a culture of people wanting to do what
they think is right by the taxpayer in executing their vision of what
NASA should be doing. So people are passionate. I think there’s
a culture—and this may be another way of saying what I’m
saying—there’s a culture of passion about the business.
The problem with that is that people have different passions, and
those passions conflict in terms of the battle for resources to effectuate
those visions and that passion. So to an extent there isn’t
a single, unified culture. There isn’t a single, unified vision
for each person in terms of what should be done. What there is, is
there’s the President’s vision as implemented by the Administrators
at NASA, and that vision gets coordinated with the laws of the United
States, the Congress as the elected officials, so that people down
the chain of command don’t always get what they want in connection
with how the mission is executed.
So I think the fundamental point, and it’s positive, is that
there’s a culture of great passion, talent, experience, smarts,
at NASA, and there’s great challenges in taking that passion
and coordinating it and having it executed from the mission standpoint.
Johnson:
If a young person came to you today and said that they were considering
a career with NASA, either in the technical field or possibly your
field, what would you say to them?
Cobb:
Well, from my standpoint this is not a hypothetical that hasn’t
occurred. There are a number of people who have contacted me and indicated
that they are a college student, or he or she is a college student,
or a parent of that college student, or a friend of a friend of a
friend of a college student who has a particular expertise that might
fit in with NASA. I couldn’t encourage them more to come and
join the NASA team, in part because I think that, one, I’m a
big fan of government service, but, two, I don’t think there’s
a better place to come and learn and make contributions towards the
advancement of these things that are really so great.
Johnson:
Well, is there anything that we haven’t talked about today that
you’d like to add for this project?
Cobb:
Probably. I just express my thanks for your coming and talking to
me. I’d say that I’m a big fan of not only of the agency
but the role of the Office of Inspector General and the importance
of it in terms of being able to step back and look at agency operations
and provide advice and counsel as to whether or not, from the independent
perspective that the office has, in whether the agency is proceeding
down the right track. I think it’s an invaluable tool, and I
also think, from the investigative side, it’s an absolutely
necessary tool, because unfortunately there are those who will either
breach the public trust or will defraud the United States and the
taxpayer in connection with the spending of taxpayers’ money.
So I’d say that would be it.
Johnson:
I appreciate you talking with us today.
Cobb:
Okay.
Johnson:
Thank you.
Cobb:
Thank you.
[End
of interview]