NASA Science Mission Directorate
Oral History Project
Edited Oral History Transcript
Richard R. Vondrak
Interviewed by Sandra Johnson
Greenbelt, MD – 8 June 2017
Johnson: Today
is June 8th, 2017. This interview with Dr. Richard Vondrak is being
conducted for the NASA Headquarters Science Mission Directorate Oral
History Project at Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland.
The interviewer is Sandra Johnson, assisted by Rebecca Wright.
I want to thank you again for joining us today and agreeing to talk
to us. I want to start by talking about your educational background,
and how and when you first came to be interested in working for NASA.
Vondrak: Thank
you Sandra, it’s a pleasure to be here this morning. I grew
up in Chicago [Illinois]. My parents were the son and daughter of
immigrants from Central Europe. I was raised in a blue-collar neighborhood.
But I liked to read, and I used to love reading the stories of the
early explorers, particularly the polar explorers, and also a lot
of science fiction.
I was interested in history. When I got to high school I wanted to
be a history major, but then Sputnik [Russian satellite in October
1957] was launched in my freshman year in high school, and I became
very interested in science at that point. I guess you would say that
I’m a child of the space age, and that the space age really
took off when I was young. I was good at math, and the good thing
you could do for your country was to become a science or math major.
I was very interested in physics, and I decided to major in physics
in college. I was still torn a bit between history, psychology, and
ended up getting my bachelor’s degree in physics from the University
of California at Berkeley, where I met my wife Mary. When I was at
Cal I talked to the professors there and I said, “Gee, I’d
really like to go into physics for graduate school, and I’m
interested in space.” I took one of the first courses they had
in space physics that they taught at Berkeley. They said, “Go
to Rice University [Houston, Texas]. They’re just building up
a big department because the space center is going to Houston.”
Rice was getting a lot of money from NASA, still in its early days.
They had the first space science department in the country, and they
had a lot of experimental space science. So, that’s what led
me into NASA research.
When I was in graduate school I got affiliated with a professor at
Rice who had a rocket program. It was going to study the aurora, the
northern lights, and for the first time try to measure the electrical
properties of the aurora. In addition to the charged particles from
the sun that produce that beautiful northern lights, you have the
electric currents that flow along the Earth’s magnetic field
into the upper atmosphere. These electric currents produce magnetic
fluctuations on the ground, and they’re key to understanding
the processes that form the aurora borealis.
I built a rocket payload and we brought it here to Goddard in 1968,
so I’m approaching my 50th anniversary of my first trip to Goddard.
It was a little Center out in the woods here. We calibrated the rocket
here at Goddard and then brought it up to northern Canada, to Hudson’s
Bay, where NASA had a rocket range and the [U.S.] Air Force had a
rocket range. We fired the rocket over the aurora, and were able to
get enough data for my thesis—even though that was quite an
adventure, because the rocket payload didn’t work exactly as
we thought it would. I had to spend a long time sifting through the
meager amount of data before I knew I had a good measurement.
That was my first NASA science program, and that’s the history
of my educational career through my Ph.D. thesis. When I finished
my Ph.D., the theory of the aurora had been done by the group in Stockholm
[Sweden] at the Royal Institute of Technology, Professor Hannes [O.
G.] Alfvén. I had talked to the people from Sweden and I got
a postdoc [postdoctoral fellowship] there, so I went over and spent
an academic half year—one semester—at Sweden and then
came back to Houston.
Johnson: Talk
about when you came back to Houston. I was reading your resume, and
that you worked on the suprathermal ion detectors deployed on the
lunar surface for some of the Apollo missions.
Vondrak: Right.
To be very candid about the situation, I graduated in 1970 with my
Ph.D. It was a year after the first Apollo Moon landings in ’69.
The NASA funding at that point was in a sharp decrease. NASA funding
went downhill at that point, and NASA was withdrawing support from
a lot of its research activities. It was impossible to get a NASA
job. NASA was not hiring. It was very difficult even to get a postdoc
position in space research, much less a faculty position, because
the academic departments that NASA had been funding in the early ’60s—like
the ones at Rice and elsewhere in the country—NASA started withdrawing
its support from them.
One of the professors at Rice, who I knew well, he had an instrument
that had been selected for Apollo. It flew on Apollo 12, 14, and 15,
and it was called the Suprathermal Ion Detector Experiment [SIDE].
It measured, essentially, the plasma environment from around the Moon.
The Moon is exposed to the solar wind—this is the outer gases
of the Sun that are electrically charged—and they flow at very
high speed into space. These gases, called the solar wind, interact
with the Earth’s magnetic field and form what’s called
the magnetosphere, the trapped radiation belts, and the aurora. They
also interact directly with the Moon, because the Moon lacks a large
magnetic field. The purpose of our experiment, or Dr. [John W.] Freeman’s
experiment, was to measure these charged gases that come from the
Sun. It was deployed on three missions because it was viewed as a
very high priority to understand this interaction.
Dr. Freeman—when I came back from Sweden it was very fortuitous,
because he was looking for someone to be a postdoc to work with him.
Actually it was a research position, but it was what we would call
today effectively a postdoc because it was a nonfaculty position,
a research position. He needed help in understanding the observations,
and also he had a chance to go to Sweden on a sabbatical to the same
place where I came from, the Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm.
So, I basically was responsible for some of the science operations,
along with Dr. [Howard] Kent Hills, who had arrived as a postdoc a
few years before me.
That was a wonderful opportunity, because first of all I could broaden
my experience from more than just the aurora and the northern lights
and the polar atmosphere to understanding the Moon and its environment.
Also it was exciting to be part of the last three Apollo missions,
because the astronauts were going to deploy the third of our instruments
at the Apollo 15 site. I was able to participate in some of the training
activities for the Apollo 15 crew.
Then, more importantly from a personal point of view, because we were
able to monitor the exhaust gases from the Lunar Module, and also
from the activities of the astronaut on the surface with our instruments,
we were turned on for the last three missions in real time. I was
working during those missions in the Science Operations Center, also
known as the Lunar Operations Control Room. Everyone knows Mission
Control and the big screen and the banks of specialists monitoring
all the Apollo subsystems. Right around the corner, down the hallway,
was the Science Operations Center.
In this room, at one end were the geologists who were looking at their
TV screens and trying to get information up to the astronauts, and
back down about what the astronauts should do in their EVAs [Extravehicular
Activities]. At the other end of the room were the Apollo Lunar Surface
Experiments Package teams, the ALSEP teams as they were called, for
each of the instruments that were going to be deployed, and also our
instrument because we were doing this real-time monitoring. For example,
when the Lunar Module took off, we could measure the gas cloud that
was released by the Lunar Module. Even with Apollo 15, since SIDE
was right near the 15 crew when they were on the surface we could
see them open the door, and the gas coming out of the Lunar Module,
and even the gases from their life support systems.
That was a wonderful experience, and we all said, “Gee, this
is really great. It’s got to keep going.” I remember the
Apollo 17 departure from the Moon, December of ’72. Everyone
remembers July of ’69 [Apollo 11 Moon landing], but not many
people remember December of ’72 when we left the Moon for the
last time nearly 45 years ago.
I remember sitting in the control room of the Science Operations Center
with some of the other scientists, and we were saying, “Gee,
I wonder when we’re going to go back.” Some of the optimists
said, “Oh, four or five years.” Some of them were, I think
like me, more realistic. I said, “Maybe 15 or 20.” I don’t
think anyone said “never.” Some people said, “It’ll
be a couple decades.” But it’s been 45 years, and it’s
been far too long. I think future historians will wonder why there
was this long gap before we go back to this wonderful place right
next door to us.
Johnson: The
information that you were gathering then, did you have to come back
and analyze that information?
Vondrak: Oh,
yes. Not only did we do the operations, but we spent all of our time
at Rice working on reducing the data, trying to understand it. Probably
one of the things I’m most proud of in my career is that I looked
at the observations and I said, “The lunar exhaust that we see”—there
were measurements made soon after the Lunar Module left and then a
few months later, and we could see a large decrease in the exhaust
gases around the Moon.
Basically what was happening was the solar wind, as it blows past
the Moon, it picks up gases, the ionized plasma around the Moon, and
then carries it away. It’s a very rapid cleansing mechanism.
If you artificially add any gases to the lunar environment, it won’t
linger there for years or decades. It decreases with a half-life time
of about a month, the length of time it takes to photoionize these
gases and for the solar wind to pull it away.
But then what I did was I thought about it more, and I said that there’s
other planets like Mars and Venus that have dense atmospheres that
they haven’t lost that quickly. The reason is that as the atmosphere
becomes denser it becomes thicker at higher altitudes, and the solar
wind is not able to penetrate down to the surface. On Mars, for example,
it gets stopped about 60 miles up in the atmosphere. Because it cannot
penetrate to low altitudes, it cannot clean the lower altitudes. I
did a calculation that said if we take a lunar atmosphere and we increase
its density by about a factor of 1,000, then the solar wind will not
be able to go to the surface, and the atmosphere then can keep building
up.
For example, if you had a volcano or a factory or heavy traffic to
the Moon, that would build up a dense enough atmosphere to stand off
the solar wind. I made that prediction, and made that point that the
lunar atmosphere right now is very very thin, and as a result it can
be rapidly cleaned. But if we build it up by about a factor of 1,000,
then you have a transition to a different state.
I remember Dr. Freeman was very nervous about this paper because it
didn’t look like pure Apollo data analysis. He said I could
publish it by myself, and so I sent it off to Nature magazine, which
published it, which was quite nice for someone of my age to get a
paper like that published. At that point it actually had a fair amount
of notoriety, if you like. It was viewed by a lot of people as significant.
In any case, I showed that one Apollo mission basically doubled the
density of the natural atmosphere. The atmosphere is only about 10
tons of gases, the natural atmosphere, and each mission of the Apollo
Program put about 10 tons of exhaust into the lunar environment.
Johnson: That’s
interesting.
Vondrak: Yes.
That was a lot of fun, very satisfying. But I had to find a real job,
because by this point even our funding at Rice—because the Apollo
Program was over—they wanted to shut off all our instruments,
which they eventually did after a few years. That’s another
thing that I think future generations will regret, because we have
this beautiful data from the surface, like lunar seismology, lunar
moonquakes, and the lunar environment. That record starts from ’69
and ends into the late ’70s when NASA, just to save the money
required to record the data, decided to shut off all the instruments.
They were powered by small nuclear sources, so they could have operated
for decades, but NASA just lost interest, needed to save money, and
they shut them off.
We’ll eventually get more instruments like those left on the
lunar surface, but there’s going to be this 50-year gap of data.
People say, “Gee, it’s regrettable we didn’t have
a continuous record.” Because the Moon has a dynamic environment,
and it’s important when you have a dynamic environment to have
a continuous record so you can see trends, you can see variations,
understand them better. To have 10 years of data and then a gap lasting
decades is going to be hard to understand the processes. I’m
sure future scientists will say, “Why did they do that?”
Johnson: Can’t
imagine the funding would have been that hard to find.
Vondrak: It
was, it was. Actually it was running I think about $1 million a year,
and they decided to shut them off. But in any case I had to find a
real job, and fortunately a colleague of mine recommended me to Stanford
Research Institute [Menlo Park, California]. This was a group in the
Radio Physics Laboratory who was doing studies of the upper atmosphere
and the ionosphere with basically electromagnetic radio wave systems.
This was quite different than what I had done, because the rocket
payload I had for measuring the aurora were these charged particle
experiments measuring electrons and protons, and then we also had
a vector magnetometer. This Stanford group was using high-powered
radio waves for remote sensing of the aurora. SRI as it’s called,
Stanford Research Institute, operated a very advanced high-powered
radar system in northern Alaska. This was a really neat observatory,
because it was a large dish, over 100 feet in diameter, that was rapidly
steerable. It was designed to be portable, because it had been funded
by the Defense Department as part of the nuclear testing readiness
program.
Earlier the U.S. and other nations had exploded atomic bombs in the
atmosphere. There were a lot of puzzles as to what the effects of
these explosions would be on the upper atmosphere and on the ionosphere.
The ionosphere is the part of the upper atmosphere at about 100 miles
up that gets ionized or electrically charged. It affects radio wave
transmissions, so your AM radio bounces off the ionosphere. That’s
why, especially at night when the ionosphere is up higher, you can
pick up radio stations that are far away. It also affects communications
from space to Earth, and intelligence gathering systems with radio
waves from space to Earth and back.
The question was if you have a nuclear weapon exploded at high altitude
in the atmosphere, can you communicate through it, can you see through
it with radiowave techniques. There were some clues to how that may
be, but no real solutions. The U.S. had wisely decided in the early
’60s never to explode weapons in the atmosphere because of the
harmful effects on the environment and on humans. So we went to underground
testing. But Congress had said, “If any other nation does aboveground
testing, we will resume aboveground testing, and we will have to be
prepared to do that on short notice.”
So the Defense Department had paid for this very neat, elegant radar
system to be built at Stanford [University, California] on the campus
and be deployable—could be airlifted to the South Pacific on
short notice—to get the information needed to understand the
effects of nuclear devices on the upper atmosphere. Now there was
an absence of atmospheric testing—and fortunately no other country
has ever done so since the ’70s. Since France stopped and China
stopped in the early ’70s, no country has done aboveground testing.
So the radar wasn’t needed for that purpose.
But in order to understand how good the models were—and the
software, the codes for understanding weapons effects—they decided
to study the aurora. So the SRI system was moved from Stanford up
to northern Alaska to near Poker Flat where the University of Alaska
[Fairbanks]—under NASA funding—has a rocket range to study
the aurora. We were right next door. What we did was study the aurora
to measure with radio waves, remotely, all of the effects of the aurora
on the upper atmosphere, the electric currents it produces, and then
how you could study it optically from the ground. I was hired—I
wasn’t a radio wave person, but I had done this work on the
aurora. My postdoc on the Moon was irrelevant.
I spent about seven or eight years at SRI, would go up to northern
Alaska for many weeks during the winter and sometimes in the summer.
I never got tired of seeing the beautiful aurora. Because we were
near the rocket range, there were other scientists firing rockets
over the aurora, so we would make measurements in coordination with
them. There were satellite overflights for both NASA and the Air Force
and other agencies, and we’d do measurements with them. It was
very nice. I was very happy because I was able to introduce new analysis
methods and new operational methods with the radar. So, I basically
could answer some of the unsolved puzzles from my Ph.D. thesis, and
do from the ground with this system some of the things I’d hoped
to do in my Ph.D. thesis. That was very exciting.
People say, “Why do you like being a scientist?” I say,
“Well, I’ve always liked puzzles. I’m good at math,
so that’s not an obstacle. When you have something you don’t
understand and you try to understand it, the beauty of being a scientist,
the greatest joy, is when you can say, ‘Ah, now I understand
it myself. And you know what, no one else knows this, but I think
I have the answer.’” Sometimes you’re wrong. You
discover that was the wrong answer. But the best times are when you
do discover that “I know what that is” and you can persuade
other people that you’re right.
When I was at SRI—I really enjoyed those years, particularly
the opportunity to go up to northern Alaska to study the aurora, and
to other places in the Arctic. I was very happy because even though
I was very junior, I became the leader of that project. I became in
charge of their radar system.
Then the Defense Department was losing interest. They had received
all the data that they were interested in getting. So I somewhat led
the transition to funding from the National Science Foundation, where
the National Science Foundation took over support of the radar. I
worked with NSF and other scientists, the community around the country,
to get the radar moved to Greenland. That radar now sits in west central
Greenland to study the aurora at a higher magnetic latitude.
Most projects have a finite lifetime, and it’s hard for scientists
to accept that because you’ll get great funding initially, or
when you’re in your prime phase, and then the funding goes away
like it did for Apollo. But you have to be agile, and you have to
either find new ways of getting support with the same system or move
on to a different project, hopefully building on what you already
know.
I was doing really well at SRI, and working on getting funding for
the radar to move to Greenland, when some of the managers at the Lockheed
Palo Alto Research Laboratory—which was only a few miles away
from where I worked at SRI, but on the other side of the Stanford
campus—they wanted me to come work for them. This was an opportunity
to get my first supervisory position. I became the group leader in
Electrodynamic Processes in the Space Environment as it was called,
and had a small group of about 10 scientists. We were working primarily
on satellite interactions with the environment and how the upper atmosphere,
the ionosphere, and the magnetosphere affect satellites and the measurements
made by them.
There was a combination of funding for the group from the Defense
Department and other government agencies, as well as some NASA funding.
When I was at SRI I had got my first NASA research projects. I became
a participating scientist on Atmosphere Explorer and Dynamics Explorer,
two Goddard missions. I didn’t have an instrument on those missions,
but I was funded by NASA to work on analysis of data from several
instruments on each of those missions.
When I moved to Lockheed, it was a combination of management and personal
research. Then just a few years later, when the head of the whole
laboratory there, the Space Science Laboratory, was moved to a different
position, and I was selected to become the manager of that laboratory.
So this was about 1984, and I suddenly had 100 people working for
me, all of them on what we call “soft money.” I then discovered
“Well, it’s fun being a manager because you can enable
other people to do great things.” If it’s a research organization
you can still do research on your own, but you spend a lot of your
time worrying about people problems. I tell people it’s not
just 100 people, it’s that 10 of them at any time have some
serious problem. You have to sit in your office with the door closed
and work on those problems.
But the joy comes when you see what the organization accomplishes.
There’s only so much you can do as an individual, but by leading
an organization you benefit from the work they do. You get some satisfaction
from it. I forget who, but some baseball manager said, “The
fun of being a manager is getting credit for the home runs your players
hit.” Science management is very much like that, although scientists
tend to be introverted. They often are difficult to work with. They
have problems communicating on their own. It’s a challenge.
Johnson: I
was going to ask you, did you get any training? You were still relatively
young at that point to be managing 100 people. What type of training
did they give you?
Vondrak: As
I mentioned earlier, when I was an undergraduate I wasn’t sure
whether I wanted to be a physics major or something more people-oriented.
I took courses in psychology, interviewing, counseling, and abnormal
psychology, so I effectively had a minor in psychology. I’ve
told people that the courses I had in abnormal psychology and interviewing
and counseling were more useful to my career than the courses in quantum
mechanics or stellar evolution.
At Lockheed, one of the good things was that the company did have
a culture of having professional managers. Unlike NASA, where often
you’ll take a scientist, put them in a manager position with
very little training, and they’ll take specialists—perhaps
they’re an engineering specialist—and put them in a management
position, and sometimes these people almost resent their managerial
responsibilities. So it’s important that if you’re going
to be a manager, to view it as a professional calling, if you like,
and try to focus on what you need to do as a manager.
Lockheed sent me to various programs at the University of Santa Clara
[California], programs they’d have at corporate headquarters
where you’d spend two weeks there with other people from around
the country and get professional development in essentially managing.
Then they even sent me for a full summer to Penn State [Pennsylvania
State University] to their executive management program.
It was clear that I was doing well at Lockheed, but then I was like
50 years old and I said, “Do I really want to rise up the ladder
here at Lockheed and get further away from research?” I decided
I really liked being a scientist, and I liked being manager of a science
organization. When I was at Lockheed, I was promoted to a division
director. I had three laboratories and several hundred Ph.D.s working
for me. But I was one step above the front line, if you like, back
in mission control rather than where the action was. It was lucrative
to do that, but it wasn’t very satisfying.
Then I was told by some friends that the position of lab chief—which
was the term they used then for what we now call division directors—opened
up here at Goddard. I was encouraged to apply for that position, and
was very happy I was selected. NASA offered me the position of Chief
of the Laboratory for Extraterrestrial Physics here at Goddard. So,
I decided to come to Goddard, and I remember my bosses and mentors
at Lockheed saying what a stupid decision that was because I could
make more money, and they thought I could rise to even higher levels
at Lockheed. I actually had to take a substantial pay cut to come
out here to Goddard.
I decided I wanted to spend the rest of my career in science. Even
if it’s science management, it’s still a science position.
That’s what led me to Goddard was just that opportunity to stay
in science, and the decision that if you’ve still got 20 years
in your career you might as well do something you really enjoy.
Johnson: It
was a leap of faith, because you’re going from a corporate environment
into a federal position.
Vondrak: It
wasn’t that much of a leap of faith in that I was very familiar
with how NASA works. By that point I had been on several NASA projects,
both for project formulation teams and also Headquarters advisory
teams. For example, I spent many years on the Space Science Advisory
Committee, SScAC, which was the highest level NASA advisory committee
for science, reporting directly to Wes [Wesley T.] Huntress [Jr.]
at that time. I would come out to [NASA] Headquarters [Washington,
DC] four times a year, typically, for various advisory committee meetings
for SScAC and then some of the magnetospheric advisory committees
and other activities here.
I knew how NASA worked, I knew NASA Headquarters well. Frankly, it
was frustrating trying to help NASA from the outside, because NASA
doesn’t respond well to external advice. If you’re going
to make change at NASA or develop new things at NASA you’re
far better off working from the inside. I had a particular liability
in that I was the only non-academic scientist on SScAC. I worked for
Lockheed at the time. Even though it was Palo Alto Research Labs that
did wonderful science, we were still part of Lockheed Corporation.
And being a contractor, it was typically hard to give advice to NASA
as a contractor, because they think that you’re just looking
for work.
Johnson: That’s
true.
Vondrak: That’s
true. I thought that coming to Goddard—which I have always respected
because I know what great work is done here from a science point of
view—that being part of NASA, with a NASA badge, would help
me to be more effective in giving NASA advice, starting new programs,
starting new projects. So I came here with the objective of trying
to do that.
This worked out well, although there were challenges. The people who
worked for me in the Lab for Extraterrestrial Physics—that lab
had about 100 civil servants—were working on projects like Cassini.
The lab built the Cassini infrared spectrometer, a beautiful instrument
that’s still today measuring Saturn and all of its moons, and
other missions to the planets and to geospace, the Earth’s magnetosphere,
and the solar wind.
Those scientists were very dedicated, but they weren’t very
interested in the process of getting funding and selling things. I
came from a soft-money environment where we were always dependent
on getting funding and we were very customer-focused, to a Goddard
environment where the scientists here were more research-focused—as
a federal laboratory, I think, should be.
When I arrived, full-cost accounting was just being introduced. I
had to work with the scientists to make them more customer-focused,
where the customer is really the taxpayer, the stakeholders, NASA
Headquarters, the science community. I told them, “You have
to go down to Headquarters and talk to the people who fund your programs.”
It was difficult for many of them to accept that transition. They
had a culture of, “We are working for the government. Government
positions are not as lucrative as private industry, or academia even,
but we don’t have to worry about funding. We just work on projects
that we find important.” Some of them were very important, and
those people could find funding easily. Other people were doing the
same old thing they had done maybe even in graduate school, and they
had a very tough transition.
In any case, I went to Headquarters and I told the division directors
down there that they should look to Goddard to be their help, and
we should try to work as a stronger partnership. That was very successful.
For example, when I talked to Wes Huntress, who was the AA [Associate
Administrator] for Space Science at the time, the problem we were
having in magnetospheric physics—which was called Sun-Earth
Connections [SEC] at the time, and today is called heliophysics—was
getting new starts for new missions. Wes said we could try to devise
a program line.
I worked with some colleagues at the [Johns Hopkins University] Applied
Physics Lab [Laurel, Maryland] and with people at Headquarters, and
we started two SEC program lines called Solar Terrestrial Probes [STP]
and Living with a Star. Solar Terrestrial Probes studies the Earth’s
space environment, and Living with a Star studies the Sun and interplanetary
space. The idea of a program line is that Congress funds this continuous
line of missions and you don’t have to get a new start each
year. It’ll be funded at a continuous level. At that time, the
Solar Terrestrial Probes were about $150 million a year. It’s
probably twice that because of inflation. By working with Headquarters
and the science community, we came up with a strategy whereby we have
this continuous string of SEC missions.
The Solar Terrestrial Probes and Living with a Star programs were
modeled after the Mars Exploration Program. Earlier Mars had all these
individual missions like Viking and others, which had to get a new
start for each one. They had difficulty getting enough funding, and
that led to some of the problems they had with Mars Polar Lander and
other missions. Then they moved to a program element where they would
have constant funding, or guaranteed funding, and they could optimize
the strategy within that. I worked hard to bring those two SEC program
elements here to Goddard.
Johnson: How
long was the funding for, if the Congress approved it?
Vondrak: Congress
generally every year will say, “STP or, comparable, Mars Exploration
Program, we’re going to fund it for $300 million next year and
for the following years.” Then NASA has to, in the president’s
request, go in with what they consider to be a reasonable viable amount.
Congress can approve it without saying, “Okay, we’re going
to approve [Parker] Solar Probe Plus,” for example, the next
one in the Living with a Star line. They don’t need a new start.
The new starts typically would get stalled in Congress. So that was
a new way of doing business, and it’s been very successful and
very healthy for those communities.
In any case, the other thing I tried to do was to work with Headquarters
on their education and public outreach programs, because Wes Huntress
at the time—strongly endorsed by Ed [Edward J.] Weiler after
him, Wes’s successor—was to have a very active outreach
to the public, to educators and students. We use the umbrella name
of Education and Public Outreach, EPO. They said, “Okay, every
new mission, you have to set aside typically 2 percent of your funding
for communicating with the public and public engagement.” They
had a plan where each of the major science themes in space science—like
planetary science, and what we now call heliophysics, which was then
called Sun-Earth Connections—would have an organization that
would coordinate all of the education and public outreach activities
across the country for that discipline, and develop products, and
have events.
Jeff [Jeffrey D.] Rosendhal was the manager of that at Headquarters.
He came out here and said, “We’d like Goddard to lead
the Sun-Earth Connections activity”—it was called the
Sun-Earth Connections Education Forum—“but we also have
a group at Berkeley who would like to lead it. So can you form a partnership
with the Berkeley people?” I said, “Oh yes, I know Berkeley,
it’s a good place. I graduated from there and they have good
people.”
The challenge though was the fact that they have a different culture.
We’re a federal laboratory with scientists. Goddard has an engineering
culture. They’re an academic institution. It would involve working
with their preservice teachers, their education department, as well
as their scientists and their space science department.
In any case I said, “That’ll be fun.” We formed
a very effective group, but the fact that we were bicoastal had advantages
and disadvantages. Also the fact that they approached the goal in
different ways. I think it made us better, but there were some real
management challenges working with them. The problem I had was I wanted
some of the scientists to take on the responsibility, but the ones
who were really good didn’t want to do it, they’d rather
do other things. I ended up being the co-director with the co-director
at Berkeley, so I spent a lot of my time making sure that the partnership
was successful, and it was. We formed what we call Sun-Earth Day where
every March, at the March equinox, they have outreach to teachers
and students. We did webcasts of eclipses, webcasts from eclipses
around the world, and for the one coming up in August.
There were many other educational activities, because I do think it’s
extremely important for NASA at all levels to be devoted to education.
I was very disappointed when we had a change in command and the new
NASA Administrator said, “Oh, we’re not going to fund
any education because that’s the role of the Education Department.”
He said, “Gee, I decided to be a scientist or an engineer in
fourth grade. I was inspired by my mother. We don’t need any
significant amount of NASA funding for this.”
I don’t know if he really believes that or if he was misquoted,
but certainly I think we do great things at NASA. We are the agency
that can inspire the youth to go into technical fields and engineering,
math, and just even to have scientifically-literate lawyers. We need
lawyers who understand technology and appreciate science. You don’t
have to be a practicing scientist to be inspired by NASA. I think
it’s an important role for the Agency. Everyone in the Agency
should participate in that. I think missions need to educate the public
as to why NASA is studying Mars, or why we want to go back to the
Moon. It’s important.
Johnson: Especially
right now with some of the political atmosphere. Evidently people
still think there’s a debate about science. It’s interesting.
I think, as you said, it’s important, especially in times like
this, when NASA has to take that role.
Vondrak: You
have to be open-minded. You have to get information. You have to understand
processes, whether it’s regarding climate or pollution or extraterrestrial
resources, whatever subject might be important to society. It’s
necessary to have an understanding as to what are the issues, what
are the facts, to try to make intelligent predictions.
If you don’t fund research, you won’t know enough to even
know what’s happening today, much less be able to predict what
will happen in 50 years from now. The difficulty is you may discover
that you forced society into a state where it’s too late to
make corrective changes or it’s too late to do the right thing.
You have to have foresight. Just ignoring a subject doesn’t
provide you the opportunity for accurate foresight.
Johnson: Is
that still in place, that two percent?
Vondrak: No.
Johnson: Was
that Mike [Michael D.] Griffin that you were speaking of, the Administrator?
Vondrak: Mike
Griffin is the one to whom that quote it attributed. I hope it’s
a misquote.
Johnson: All
the Administrators had different perspectives. That’s one of
the things with NASA, they all bring something different.
Vondrak: It
was very confusing. The SMD [Science Mission Directorate], what’s
now called SMD, had formed this beautiful system whereby we had distributed
EPO activities around the nation, assisted by centralized coordinating
groups that made them more effective. NASA dismantled all that about
10 years ago. But they said, “We can’t do education and
public outreach, but you have to do communications and public engagement.”
I thought to myself, “Okay, well some of the things we do now
we cannot do in the future,” like educator workshops that were
so effective. We had to change our approach, but we still have made
significant efforts to reach the public and students.
For example, we had quickly learned that doing missionary activities,
as I called it, to schoolrooms, were very effective with the 50 students
or 25 students you talk to. But that’s a small group for the
amount of time you spend. We discovered it was far more important
to find interested teachers, bring them to Goddard, or go to where
they are, and have a one-week summer session. They would get credit
for professional development, and we would spend a whole week telling
them about lunar science, space science, whatever. Then they could
go, and they would understand the material better so they could use
it in their classroom.
We had discovered that some material we were developing for educators
they were reluctant to use because they didn’t think they were
qualified to answer questions from students. So by raising their level
of understanding, giving them a deeper knowledge, they could go to
the classroom, answer questions, work with other interested teachers.
By doing that, we could multiply the effectiveness of our programs.
Johnson: Like
you mentioned, sometimes scientists have trouble communicating. Did
you have trouble finding people to lead those workshops? Or enough
people came from an academic background that that was something they
did well?
Vondrak: We
have many skilled people who work in education and public outreach
now. They started their career in science. Most of them got through
the Master’s degree, and then for various reasons they didn’t
go on to a Ph.D. They still want to do science, and they’re
very effective at working with students and the public and educators.
These are the people who when NASA decided not to fund these programs,
they’re the ones who suffered the most. The educator workshops—it
was decided by Headquarters that that does not belong in SMD, it belongs
in the Office of Education. Then the Office of Education now may not
have continuous existence at NASA Headquarters. There’s a lot
of confusion. But at the local level—at the mission level, at
the scientist level—I still encourage people. The two percent
requirement is no longer a requirement. At one point they took away
funding from missions that had it as an identified budget, and they
consolidated it, and then it disappeared. In any case, it’s
an important activity. I tell people, “Find a way to fund it,
and do it.”
Johnson: I’ve
heard that from a couple other people that have mentioned that education
is still going to go on. It’s just not going to be, like you
said, under that title. It’s not going to be there.
Vondrak: We
have to communicate to the public. They said, “Engage the public,
communicate, but don’t educate them.”
Johnson: A
little hard to do.
Vondrak: Yes.
Anyway, I think it’s very important.
Johnson: You
were, as you said, the Lab Chief for Extraterrestrial Physics for
about 10 years. Then you moved to Program Director for the Robotic
Lunar Exploration Program.
Vondrak: Right.
What happened was I’d been here at Goddard from ’95 to
2004, I was still the Lab Chief here. We had the [Space Shuttle] Columbia
[STS-107] accident. Then to recover from the Columbia accident and
that tragedy—the effect it had on NASA was that NASA needed
to have a destination identified. The Columbia Accident Investigation
Board said, “You not only have to change the culture at NASA,
have people speak out more, but you also have to have a direction
to where NASA is headed.”
That led to President George W. Bush going to NASA Headquarters, announcing
in January of 2004 the Vision for Space Exploration, saying that “Okay,
we’re not going to keep staying in low-Earth orbit. We’ll
finish [International Space] Station, go back to the Moon, and then
on to Mars.” That was very exciting. I think all NASA employees
welcomed that. They decided that the way you go back to the Moon is
to fill in the knowledge gaps from Apollo, decide how to go back to
the Moon in a better way than Apollo, and then go on to Mars. They
quickly formed a team called the Objectives and Requirements Definition
Team, led by Johnson Space Center [Houston, Texas]. John [W.] Young
was one of the principals there.
They brought together scientists and engineers to come up with a strategy
for how you would do that, and what information is needed before you
go back to the Moon. Apollo showed you can go to the Moon, you can
visit it. But the purpose is not just to visit the Moon for a few
days, but to learn how to live and work on the Moon. I felt very pleased
personally, because I think other than Jim [James B.] Garvin—who
was at Headquarters at the time and is now at Goddard—I was
the only other Goddard scientist invited to that strategy session
in Houston. I was invited because of my experience on the Apollo Program
and the human effects on the lunar environment.
We came up with a strategy. We said, “What you need to have
is a set of very prompt robotic missions.” What they would do
would be to map the lunar environment well, search for resources,
and then also measure the radiation environment and some things that
we didn’t know concerning human effects at the Moon. The Apollo
Program was incredibly successful. I’m a big fan of Apollo.
I’ve read a lot about it, talked to many of the astronauts.
It’s incredible what the country did in just a few short years
to actually put someone on the Moon, and return those 12 people back
safely from the lunar surface.
But Apollo, those missions were clustered around the equatorial region.
They were short stays. To go back to the Moon, what you’d like
to start with are maps of the entire Moon, particularly the polar
regions. The polar regions are important because they have resources.
We expected the polar regions to have water and other volatiles. Also,
they have sunlight. The Apollo astronauts, when they landed they came
in right after sunrise, when the shadows would be long, so they could
see obstacles. The temperature was fairly benign at that point, but
if they had tried to stay longer it would have gotten very hot during
the daytime. Then, if they had stayed more than two weeks it would
be night on the Moon and it would get very cold. They would have to
depend on their battery power to stay warm all night long. If you
brought solar-powered systems, they wouldn’t have any sunlight
to charge their batteries or run their electrical system.
An important resource at the Moon is that if you go to the poles and
you pick a high place at the poles, the sun shines there all the time—or
nearly all the time, 98 percent of the time—so you can run solar
electric power systems. The temperature isn’t as extreme, doesn’t
have extreme variations like you have at the equator. That’s
an assured resource, and so we need to identify what parts of the
lunar poles have near continuous sunlight. The other thing we were
trying to do is to do an orbital mapping of where the resources might
be in terms of water.
The highest priority was given to a prompt robotic mission, that was
going to be called Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter [LRO], to seek out
that information about the Moon, and also carry a radiation sensor
to see how much radiation the astronauts would get. That was a concern
even during Apollo. Apollo was fortunate in that it occurred at a
time of an active sun, and there were some major solar flares, but
none of the missions was affected in any significant way by a solar
flare.
I was on that team that helped identify the strategy, and then they
said, “Okay, that will be part of the Vision, to have a prompt
orbiter followed by a lander.” Because we said it would be important
to put something on the surface to search for water, but in order
to know where to put that lander you needed the orbiter first. This
was a high-profile set of missions, and they had formed, in addition
to the HOMD, the Human Operations Mission Directorate, they formed
a separate directorate at Headquarters called the Exploration Systems
Mission Directorate, ESMD. It was led by Admiral [Craig E.] Steidle.
ESMD would be responsible for this line of robotic missions, but since
it was brand-new and they didn’t know how to do robotic missions,
they made a partnership with SMD. Ed Weiler was the AA at the time.
So the missions would be implemented by SMD with funding from ESMD.
In fact, these were measurement investigations, not science investigations,
on LRO, because ESMD did not do science. But all of the instruments
were selected to be science-quality measurements. It was going to
be high visibility, it was going to have a program director, like
the Mars Program Director, under SMD, and they needed someone to run
the program. I heard this, and so I talked to the people at Headquarters.
Orlando Figueroa was the head of the Planetary Science Division, and
he wanted me to take the job. He talked to Ed, and they called me
the very next day and said, “If you want the job, you can have
it. Come down here to Headquarters, and be the Program Director.”
I was an SES, or Senior Executive Service, so they could do that without
competition, just reassign me. It was very interesting because Al
[Alphonso V.] Diaz, who was the Center Director, didn’t want
me to leave Goddard, but I worked out a deal. I’d do it for
six months and keep my Goddard position, and then come back to Goddard.
So I went down there, and the first job was to get out the announcement
of opportunity [AO] for LRO. I worked with Jim Garvin, who was the
Mars Program Scientist at the time. We copied the AO after MRO, the
Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter, which had just come out, in order to
save a lot of time. We got the AO through Headquarters in record time
because it was the highest priority, because President Bush had said
in his speech, “We’re going to do an orbiter in the next
four years, followed by a lander.” Everyone at Headquarters
had to give it highest priority. It was tedious but very satisfying,
because we got the AO out in record time, and we got the instruments
selected in less than six months. Typically, an AO takes years to
get to the start of a program. We did it in just a few months.
What happened while the AO was out on the street was that Sean O’Keefe,
who was the NASA Administrator at the time, decided to reorganize.
He took Ed Weiler and sent him out here to Goddard, and moved Al Diaz,
to Headquarters. There was this big reshuffling that some of the people
involved found very painful. Also ESMD was growing, and they were
looking for things to manage that could be near-term successes. They
wanted to take LRO and move it closer in to their organization, away
from SMD.
Also it was clear that the Vision for Space Exploration was underfunded.
They wanted to build the Ares rocket and their launch systems, and
they were desperate for money. So they took all the forward funding
for the Robotic Lunar Exploration Program and reduced it to where
they couldn’t do anything beyond LRO. The only way they were
able to fulfill the presidential mandate to have a second mission
to land on the surface was to add to the LRO launch a sister mission
called LCROSS [Lunar Crater Observation and Sensing Satellite] that
[NASA] Ames [Research Center, Moffett Field, California] would manage
and Tony [Anthony] Colaprete of NASA Ames was responsible for, which
was a lunar impactor experiment.
It did great things. It aimed the Centaur [upper] stage [rocket] into
Cabeus Crater, measured the plume ejected from the surface with their
instruments. We also measured them with LRO, and we showed that there’s
a substantial amount of water in the lunar subsurface. So that was
very important, but it wasn’t what was originally conceived,
a soft lander. But it accomplished what the president said, and it
did wonderful science at an affordable cost.
It was clear to me at that point that the Robotic Lunar Exploration
Program [RLEP] did not have a bright future. Simultaneously, when
Ed Weiler got sent out here, he decided to reorganize Goddard, which
did not have a strong planetary division. It had planetary elements
in the Laboratory for Extraterrestrial Physics, and it also had some
elements in Earth science. He decided to organize a separate Planetary
Science Division here. Ed called me up, said, “Can you come
out and talk?” I came out and talked. He said, “I want
you to be the new Division Director here at Goddard.”
Johnson: Hard
to say no, right?
Vondrak: It
was a great opportunity. I could see that it again would be a little
bit of a managerial challenge because I’d be taking elements
from space science, elements from Earth science, trying to bring them
together in a new organization. Get people who weren’t used
to working together to work together. But it was a great opportunity,
so I immediately said yes.
Then Al Diaz, who didn’t want me to leave Goddard, now he was
at Headquarters, and he didn’t want me to leave Headquarters
until I had identified a successor. I went through a tough period
where I was trying to do the RLEP Director job at Headquarters, the
Lab Chief for Extraterrestrial Physics here, and also create the new
Planetary Science Division. Over a four-month period, I was constantly
running back and forth between Headquarters and Goddard.
In any case, that all worked out well. Goddard won an instrument,
the laser altimeter for LRO—which was actually out of the Earth
Science Division here, but then became part of my new organization—and
then also some roles in the Russian neutron detector experiment that
was looking for subsurface water.
I had no individual role on LRO for several years. The LRO spacecraft
was built here at Goddard. It was scheduled for launch by the end
of ’08 is what President Bush had said. At that point it became
clear that we weren’t going to go back to the Moon very quickly,
so it wasn’t as urgent, and there were issues with availability
of launch vehicles, so our launch slipped until June of ’09.
It was still extraordinarily fast for a planetary mission, but we
came in actually under budget and right on schedule. Launched in ’09.
In ’08, because it was such a high visibility mission, I was
asked whether I could become the project scientist on LRO. I said,
“I’d love to do that, and I’d like to be the project
scientist,” because they wanted someone more experienced who
could work through the ESMD-SMD partnership and the public interactions
to get LRO smoothly through its launch and one-year mission.
I said, “I would do that, but I cannot be the Division Director
and the LRO Project Scientist because they’re both full-time
jobs.” We worked out an arrangement where I had recruited Anne
[L.] Kinney, who had been the head of the Universe [Division] at Headquarters.
She came out here to Goddard, then I asked her to be my Deputy, which
was wonderful because she was a very experienced, very capable person.
I worked out with management here an arrangement whereby I would become
the Deputy to Anne, and Anne would be the Division Director. So we
could continue to work together, but she would have the lead role
and would do all the heavy lifting for the Division, and I would do
the heavy lifting for LRO, and that worked out very well.
I became the project scientist, and worked on getting it through all
the different approvals at Headquarters for launch. The original intention
had been a one-year mission for ESMD. They wanted all their maps,
all their measurements, the requirement was to do them in a year.
But the intention had been to see if we could convert it to a science
mission. So I had to work with SMD and prepare a proposal to convert
LRO from an ESMD measurement mission into an SMD science mission.
That led to a very interesting summer, because I thought it would
be a smooth transition, but I had to go through an incredible number
of reviews in ESMD to get the assurances that we had accomplished
the ESMD objectives, all the way through Doug [Douglas R.] Cooke,
the ESMD AA, and then persuade Ed Weiler and SMD that we were a capable
science mission even though we weren’t initiated as a science
mission, even though we weren’t initiated as a science mission.
Everyone believed that we were doing the right thing, but it was just
going through all of the requirements needed and preparing the incredible
number of charts and reviews at multiple levels to persuade everyone
that yes, we could do that transition. I think today we are the only
major mission that has made that transition between AAs and mission
directorates at Headquarters, where we moved from ESMD—now HEOMD
[Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate]—into
SMD.
With LRO, the project scientist, as you know, is responsible for the
scientific integrity of the mission. The project scientist doesn’t
have any instruments of their own typically, because for a multi-instrument
mission we have to be fair and equitable and not biased. But we have
to assure Headquarters and the relevant Center that the mission is
performing as it should and is performing at a level that is accomplishing
its objectives. We were accepted by SMD for a two-year science mission.
Since then, every two years we go through an extended science mission
proposal. Right now we’re in our third extended science mission.
We were launched in June of 2009. A couple weeks from now we have
our eighth anniversary of launch. We’ve been at the Moon for
almost eight years, making beautiful maps of the Moon, understanding
the scientific history of the Moon, the processes that occur on the
Moon.
Johnson: I
was reading an article and they quoted you as saying, “We’re
rewriting the textbooks by showing that the Moon is not a dead object.”
I thought that was interesting.
Vondrak: That’s
probably the most important general conclusion we’ve made of
the Moon, that it’s a dynamic body. It’s not isolated
in space. It is changing. It’s shrinking. We’ve discovered
cracks and ridges on the Moon that are globally abundant, and we can
tell the rate of shrinkage. It’s like an orange. I tell people
you take an orange or an apple, you put it out in the Sun. What happens,
it gets dried out, and it starts to shrink. It develops cracks and
ridges. That’s what the Moon is doing.
The Moon isn’t drying out. It’s always been fairly dry,
but it was hotter inside. As the interior cools it develops wrinkle
ridges that they call scarps, and cracks called graben. Geological
terms. I tell people, “It’s just cracks and ridges on
the Moon.” That’s a process that wasn’t appreciated
before LRO. But, the important thing is, first of all, we’re
making maps of the Moon. We have this beautiful laser altimeter built
at Goddard that we were concerned whether it would last six months
or a year. It’s been up there eight years. It’s still
working.
We’ve measured about 7 billion points on the Moon where we know
the elevation of each of those points, so it’s a topographic
map. It’s like when you go hiking maybe in a national park and
you get a topographic map showing the contours of elevation so you
know where the hills are, and the valleys. We know the topography
of the Moon better than we do any other object in the solar system,
even the Earth, because the Earth is about two-thirds covered with
water. The undersea portion of the Earth, the hills and valleys there
are very poorly known. On the Moon we can give you a topographic map
that has centers that are only tens of meters apart, and give you
all the contours of the Moon because of these 7 billion measured points.
The laser altimeter fires out 140 laser beams every second and measures
the returns. They go out in groups of five, then we measure all of
the length of time for the return. We can measure all of those points,
their absolute elevation and also their relative elevation, so we
can measure slopes. The Apollo missions had to land on flat areas,
because if the slope was more than about 15 degrees it would tip over.
I believe it was Apollo 15 that landed on top of a small crater, and
there was concern that its engine had been damaged when it landed
and the legs were tilted. We can give you slope maps, roughness maps.
Just incredible accuracy.
Then we have temperature maps, from a thermal infrared system. We
measure ultraviolet so we can see in the dark in the polar craters.
The craters that are in permanent darkness, we can now give you maps
of the interior. We have image maps down to 50-centimeter resolution,
typically. We flew in low over the Apollo sites, brought down the
spacecraft as close as we safely could—only 60,000 feet above
the surface, 20 kilometers—so we could image the Apollo landing
sites with very high resolution. We can see not only all the hardware,
the lunar rover, the backpacks, the ALSEP sites, take pictures of
the instruments that I worked on sitting on the lunar surface, and
we can even see the tracks they left, their footprints and the rover
tracks. It’s so satisfying to be able to do that.
We were launched in 2009, which was the fortieth anniversary of Apollo
11, and we went into orbit in early July. Naturally there was a lot
of pressure from Headquarters, “Give us an image of the Apollo
11 site.” We have to depend on the lunar rotation and the lighting
in order to get a good image. The LRO Camera is managed by Mark [S.]
Robinson, the scientist at Arizona State [University, Tempe] responsible
for the LRO Camera. They’d get the data down and they would
analyze it at night at Arizona, and first thing in the morning I’d
go to my computer and turn it on at home to see what we had from the
Moon.
I remember saying to my wife Mary, “Come see this.” This,
I believe, was the Apollo 12 site. I said, “Do you see those
lines on the surface?” I said, “Those are the astronaut
tracks.” We never expected to see them because the astronaut
footprints are too small. We can measure an object that’s like
a foot or two across, but not a shoe print.
What happens is the Moon is covered with dust, and as the astronauts
would bound across the surface—they’d almost bounce across
the surface—they would kick up this dust. It’s like walking
across a sidewalk that has a layer of snow, of dusty snow on it, fresh
snow. As you walk, you kick up some of the snow. The astronauts do
the same thing. You would see what I call their track. Not individual
footprints, but you could see the path they made as they walked across
the lunar surface. This is one of the joys of science. People at Arizona
State saw the images first, but you can say, “Gosh.” Come
to work and say, “You won’t believe what I saw this morning.”
Johnson: So
few people have had the opportunity to see that before you saw it.
Vondrak: Correct,
correct. We’ve been mapping the Moon with great detail, and
finding resources, and preparing the way. The beauty of LRO is we
have a very high data rate. The Moon is close enough, it’s not
like Mars where you can only send a little bit of data back from Mars.
The Moon is close enough that you can have a high data rate. What
was decided early in LRO, with the encouragement of Ed Weiler, the
Center Director, was to build at White Sands, New Mexico a tracking
antenna that would be just for LRO. Every time the Moon is above the
horizon in New Mexico we download an incredible amount of data.
Right now LRO has accumulated more than 750 terabytes of data. People
say, “What’s a terabyte?” You say, “Well,
a terabyte is 1,000 gigabytes.” The high density DVD that you
would use for data storage or a movie has about five gigabytes, four
and a half gigabytes, so 750 terabytes is 750,000 gigabytes. We have
the equivalent of nearly 200,000 DVDs’ worth of data.
I tell people if you wanted to put all of the LRO data on high density
DVD disks, if you took those disks—without the plastic box,
just the bare disks—and you piled them up, you’d have
a pile that would be bigger than half the Washington Monument. It’s
an incredible amount of data. More than half of the data in the Planetary
Data System is LRO data.
Because the Moon is close it’s easy to get data back, easier
than getting it from Mars or Saturn. The Moon is a wonderful neighbor.
If we wanted to explore space and being a spacefaring nation, if God
wanted us to do that he would have given us a Moon, which we have.
So the Moon is a great neighbor.
Johnson: Preserving
that data is important.
Vondrak: There’s
the Planetary Data System, which planetary science has, and we have
to make sure that the data is preserved because there’s no need
to repeat it, and also you can look for changes. One of the surprises
was that we expected to see in the LRO data changes from the Apollo
era. In fact, Mark Robinson had a project very early to look for changes
between the heritage Apollo imagery and the LRO imagery. He found
some, but it was hard because they were taken with different cameras
under different lighting conditions.
What he wisely did was set up a program where he would reimage places
we saw with our Narrow Angle Camera and reimage them under the exact
same lighting and viewing conditions, and therefore any fresh impacts
would be easily seen. The surprise was that there’s many more
impacts than had been predicted. Also, each of the impacts produces
a lot of secondary impacts.
The Moon is more dynamic than expected. Impacts are infrequent, so
you could put an outpost on the Moon and you don’t have to worry
about your dome getting punctured very often. But the number of impacts,
number of micrometeorites striking the Moon, is very abundant, it’s
very high. That’s one of the surprises in the Moon, are the
changes in the Moon. Not only the thermal contraction but also impacts,
and the fact that we had thought that volcanism on the Moon, volcanoes,
stopped a long long time ago. But in fact it may not have stopped
a long, long time ago, just a long time ago, maybe tens of millions
of years.
Johnson: We’ve
talked about technology. Definitely technology has changed since you
first were working on your Ph.D. The terabytes, and the amount of
data that is being preserved now—just the ability to get that
technology, and the technology that it takes to build the instruments
to go into space. Sometimes there’s delays of 10 to 15 years.
Talk a little bit about the technology changes with science at NASA
and how that’s affected or aided the work that’s being
done.
Vondrak: The
sensors are certainly far better than Apollo era or early NASA. The
instruments on LRO—the laser altimeter; even the Camera with
the number of pixels in the readout, the resolution; the thermal infrared;
we have a compact radar system. All of the instruments would not have
been available 40 or 50 years ago. We can make measurements in far
better ways than we ever expected, even that we didn’t expect.
Certainly not even what was practical at the time.
The other thing is the data volume and managing data volume. The data
used to be very primitive with the ALSEP experiments, when I worked
on the suprathermal ion detector. Our data came back through a teletype
machine. There were just rows of numbers, and we had poor graduate
students trying to analyze these by looking at microfiche and staring
at numbers in order to see if there were anomalies. We used strip-chart
recorders that were analog devices.
When I was an undergraduate I took a course in computing, and it was
all analog computers. We had to take essentially a circuit board and
use discrete circuit elements—no integrated circuits. We used
resistors and other circuit elements to build up what would be like
a differential equation, then run a clock and a strip chart and plot
out the voltage we got. That was the way you solved an equation using
a system like that.
Then when I was at Berkeley, my last semester as a senior I took one
of the first courses they offered in digital computing. Although that
used all punch cards, and we had only one computer on campus for students.
We had to go there and run the programs, turn the punch cards in,
and get the answers back much later. It was just so primitive doing
software at the time because we didn’t have the diagnostics.
My rocket experiment, I did most of the calculations on setting the
trajectory with my slide rule. Did not have an electronic calculator
because they didn’t come out until afterwards.
I tell people the invention that I found most breathtaking in my career
was the Xerox machine, because when I was in high school and as an
undergraduate you’d have to go to the library, get a book, hope
someone else hadn’t stolen the book. You’d have to wait
in line to put your name on a list to get access to the book, and
then you’d have to copy out by hand whatever you needed. I remember
at the Berkeley library when they introduced a Xerox machine that
was coin-operated, it cost like 10 cents—which is probably $1
or $2 a page nowadays—and you could actually put the book on
there and make a Xerox copy of the page.
If you can imagine a world where you didn’t have digital systems
and you didn’t have Xerox machines and you didn’t have
electronic calculators, that’s basically the technology we had.
Certainly for early science at NASA, and for the Apollo Program.
Johnson: We
put a man on the Moon using slide rules.
Vondrak: Yes.
MIT [Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge] had some beautiful
computers they used, but they were few and far between.
Johnson: And
large.
Vondrak: And
large. They weren’t distributed. They were all mainframe, so
you’d have to wait your turn in line to get to use them for
a little bit of time. Analyzing 750 terabytes of data would have been
just incredible.
My rocket experiment, I got what we say right now a few kilobytes
of data. It took me six months to sift through that to make sure that
I had made a valid measurement because of problems with the payload
and the rocket and the aurora not cooperating. So times have changed.
I tell people that they’re lucky because the tools are better,
but you still have to be clever. The one tool that people haven’t
invented is a machine that’s more clever than a human.
Johnson: Even
though they try, don’t they.
Vondrak: They
claim they have. But most of them aren’t as clever as they claim
they are.
Johnson: There
have been a lot of things—like you said, the Lunar Reconnaissance
Orbiter, the amount of work that that was able to do. There’s
a lot of things in the news also with Cassini because of the Grand
Finale and everything that’s happening there. Also a few weeks
ago Jim [James L.] Green and NASA Headquarters announced the findings
from Saturn’s moon Enceladus.
So there’s a lot of very exciting things going on right now,
with these announcements and some of the things that are coming back
and the information hopefully that’s going to come from that
last Grand Finale with Cassini. Talk about some of the information
that’s coming out, and maybe hopefully where you see that leading
to.
Vondrak: Sure.
We do have here in the Solar System Exploration Division here at Goddard
many scientists who are interested in what we call the outer solar
system, the major moons associated with Jupiter, Saturn, and distant
reaches of the solar system.
Enceladus is an exciting world, and I think the recent news you’re
speaking about just all falls under the general category that Enceladus
is a dynamic place. It’s a dynamic moon. It has vents where
there’s places that gases and liquids are flowing out of, plumes
on Enceladus. Enceladus has cracks, it may have reoriented after a
major collision. So it’s not a static world.
In my career, one of the things I find most satisfying is that when
I was young and in school and would read science books they would
just talk about Saturn and they’d say, “Okay, there’s
these little moons.” Or the Galilean moons around Jupiter, they
were just dim objects. Now we understand these dim objects as worlds
in their own right, as places. They have structure, they have dynamics.
So if we want to understand the story of Earth we have to understand
the story of the solar system and how the solar system has changed.
As recently as 10 or 15 years ago we thought that the order of the
planets and their basic location in the solar system had been static
since the solar system began. Now scientists think that there was
a gravitational interaction between Jupiter and Saturn that caused
Saturn and Uranus and Neptune to move farther out, and Uranus and
Neptune to exchange their locations in space. This resulted in a huge
upheaval to the smaller objects in the asteroid belt, in the outer
clouds of icy worlds beyond Neptune. This led to a bombardment of
the early Earth and the Moon.
One of the most important findings of the Apollo Program was that
the basins formed, some of them, soon after the Moon formed about
4.5 billion years ago. But then around 4 billion or 3.9 billion years
ago, there suddenly was a cataclysm of objects coming in and striking
the Moon and forming the face of the Moon as we see it today.
The fact that that cataclysm, or what’s called “late heavy
bombardment” of the Moon 500 million years after it was formed—that
was the first clue that there might have been some upheaval in the
outer solar system. Now scientists are saying the solar system isn’t
a static place. It’s changing, it’s evolving. That appreciation
is a real shift in the way we think about the solar system.
That’s probably going to be one of the more important durable
legacies of the Apollo Program, dating the history of the Moon, which
we could not have done by just looking at the Moon through telescopes.
We had to go there, we had to have astronauts pick up rocks, bring
rocks home, so that important information could be obtained.
Johnson: Things
change for NASA when we get new presidents and new administrators.
Of course, like you said, the soft lander for the Moon, with the [President
Barack H.] Obama [II] administration when that decision was made not
to do that. But now there’s talk that we may be going back to
the Moon again if that budget gets approved. There also seems to be
less emphasis on education again, and on Earth science, and science
in general. Talk about that for a moment and how you think that’s
going to affect NASA’s science program here at Goddard.
Vondrak: Scientists
need projects, projects cost money. Therefore if you want to do science
you need funding. I think the nation does realize that, and certainly
Congress and our executives—president, vice president—every
one of them I think has appreciated science in different ways. I think
our current administration recognizes the value of science, so I’m
confident that NASA will keep doing science.
The type of science will depend on what NASA’s destination is,
what the vision is for where NASA should be. If we’re going
to stay in Earth orbit, it’ll be a lot of physiology and life
science. If we go somewhere else, it’ll be different than that.
One of the things I’m proudest of here is something I really
don’t work in, and that’s astrobiology. When I was on
the NASA advisory committees and came here to Goddard as the Chief
of the Lab for Extraterrestrial Physics, it was clear to me that astrobiology
was an embryonic activity at NASA that would be important in the future.
So I came to Goddard and I said, “Can we do astrobiology here?”
We had a vigorous astrochemistry group that was all inorganic chemistry
and they said, “We don’t have any biologists.” The
Center didn’t want to get into lifeforms, if you like. They
were nervous about that. I could understand that.
So I said, “Well, how about organic chemistry?” The groups
here responded to that. We recruited hard. We got some exceptionally
talented biochemists who were doing astrobiology, recruited some of
them from NASA Ames, and we set up an astrobiology group here.
Paul [R.] Mahaffy, who is our Division Director now—he and the
group he was in had focused on atmospheric measurements. Paul was
wise enough to say, “We’ve got to do landed experiments
and do things where we’re actually working with chemical reactivity
and analyzing the solid surfaces.” That led to that group really
being successful in that area, so we’ve got one of the foremost
astrobiology teams in the country.
That’s an evolution of science. Under full cost accounting,
remember I told you one of the challenges was to get scientists to
do work that could be funded. I said science evolves. You don’t
want to go into an area that you’re completely ignorant of,
but if you could take your laboratory work in astrochemistry and evolve
it into one that’s doing astrobiology, you’re going to
be more successful than you would be working in an area that is not
as important to NASA.
Meeting the challenge of evolving the research is one of the most
difficult things for scientists to do, because they’ve been
successful in what they know how to do. They want to keep doing that
because they know how to do it, and there’s still questions
that interest them. But to move into a different area is important.
You do that by evolution, not by just killing what you’re doing
and starting over with something fresh.
Johnson: You
retired in 2013 technically, but you’re still working.
Vondrak: Yes.
What happened was three years ago I saw my 70th birthday coming and
I said, “I’ve got to slow down. I’m getting old,
I don’t have as much stamina as I used to. I can’t work
80 hours a week, I can only work 40.” I said, “I’ve
got to slow down.”
Plus, you’ve got to give the younger people a chance. I don’t
need to be Project Scientist forever. When I was about 68 I had a
very capable Deputy Project Scientist on LRO, John [W.] Keller. I
said, “John, why don’t we do this? You become Project
Scientist, I’ll be your Deputy. I’ll still hang around.
I’ll help you, I’ll coach you. I’ll do some of your
work for you, but you should lead the way.” It was similar to
what I did with the division directorship.
Then when I hit 70 I said to management, “I don’t really
want to keep working. I want to retire.” The answer was, “Well,
can’t you do something useful?” There was a program I
could take where I could transition into retirement by working half-time.
I signed up for that, and would only get paid for 20 hours a week.
So I cut back.
That was a three-year program, so I did that for three years. Then
last summer when I hit 73, I retired completely, but I’m an
emeritus scientist. What an emeritus is, it means you’re a voluntary
civil servant. The division provides me with an office and a computer
and a badge, and I get to come to work whenever I want. I work on
research papers and I help advise, coach, mentor, whatever.
Johnson: The
best of both worlds. You get to retire and still do work.
Vondrak: And
my wife loves it. When I was working half-time, I’d go to work
every morning and say, “I’ll come home right after lunch.”
Then naturally my wife would call me and tell me I’m late for
dinner. I worked it out so I come to work only on Tuesday, Wednesday,
and Thursday, unless there’s a strong reason to come in on a
Monday or Friday. So I’m here three days a week. I have four-day
weekends, and I’m very happy.
I think I’m still useful. It’s fun, I get to work on fun
things. I’ve always been a fan of the Arctic explorers, the
polar explorers, and so I’m really happy that in my career I’ve
gotten to all of the high latitude places in the Arctic. I’ve
been to the geographic South Pole doing research.
I made a trip to the north magnetic pole for part of an educational
video we made on the Earth’s magnetic field. I said to the producer,
“What we should do to explain the magnetic field is measure
the magnetic field here in Washington, and you discover it’s
tilted by about 45 degrees. Then go further north, and then go to
the magnetic pole where it’s pointed straight down.” We
did that, and that was a great field trip. Nice educational video.
People tell me they like it.
That got me reading more carefully on all the searches for the north
magnetic pole. It turns out Roald [E. G.] Amundsen, who went to the
South Pole—his first trip was the Northwest Passage. He looked
for the north magnetic pole and he couldn’t find it because
it seemed to be moving. It turns out the north magnetic pole right
now is almost at the geographic North Pole and is headed towards Siberia.
I started reading into why that is, and talking to the magnetics experts
here, and then also reading Amundsen’s diary. I’ve just
finished an academic research paper for an academic Society for the
History of Discoveries. The title is “Roald Amundsen’s
Difficult Search for the Elusive North Magnetic Pole,” and explaining
why he had such a difficult time. That’s just a fun project.
It’s a history project, but it involves understanding why the
Earth’s magnetic field is changing. The historians and biographers
who have written about Amundsen have said, “For obscure reasons
he wasn’t able to find it.” Now I think I’ve written
a paper that sheds more light and explains, and solves that historical
puzzle. Something he never appreciated, and most historians didn’t
realize, that the pole is in motion, both every day and on an annual
basis.
Johnson: It
goes back to what you said. When you were a child, those first books
that you read were with explorers, and got you interested in science
and math.
Vondrak: Right.
Science fiction, history books. Now you have a career where you live
it rather than reading about it.
Johnson: That’s
exciting, that is very exciting. I was going to ask you, just to close,
if you look back over your career, is there anything you’d consider
as your biggest challenge with your career with NASA?
Vondrak: The
biggest challenges, aside from the research, is working with people.
Science management involves people. Scientists are people. They’re
human, they have problems.
Then also the other challenge is selling projects, funding. I’ve
been associated with many projects that were beautiful ideas, proposals
that we worked very hard on, that weren’t funded. Now when NASA
has a call for missions they’ll typically get 35 very complicated,
well-thought-out, mature, very compelling proposals, and they’ll
fund one or two.
On a research grant, the success ratio is about 10 percent. Maybe
20 percent if the program is well-funded. Most scientists here have
to write five proposals a year and hope one gets funded. There’s
an abundance of good things that can be done. You have to find the
right way to get them funded.
I guess the individual science that I’m most happy with is the
work I did on understanding the polar upper atmosphere, the aurora,
the electrical connections in the aurora to the Earth’s magnetosphere.
That was, I think, very satisfying. I used innovative techniques,
found ways to make the measurements I needed. With Apollo, I think
it was making the connection between Apollo exhaust and the way the
Moon loses its atmosphere. I think that was important.
Then after Lunar Prospector discovered water on the Moon, or indications
of water, they thought it was due to comets. I recruited a really
fine postdoc to come here and she and I developed a model for how
the solar wind interacts with the Moon. We could actually calculate
how much water originates from solar wind hydrogen interacting with
the lunar oxygen in the subsurface, and then migrating to the poles,
and could show that the solar wind is actually a substantial source
of water in the permanently shadowed regions at the poles. I think
that was a very significant contribution, and still used as a standard
model.
In your career if you can do three or four things like that that say,
“That’s really been fun and that’s been important,”
that’s what I enjoy and what I feel proud of.
Johnson: Was
there any project or any work that you did, anything in particular
that we haven’t talked about that maybe you wanted to mention
before we go, or anything you wanted to add?
Vondrak: You
mentioned technology, and I think one of the aspects of NASA that
I find a bit frustrating is that in its youth NASA was a very innovative
agency and could take on new work, develop new approaches. Now it’s
gotten very conservative, it doesn’t want to do anything unless
there’s almost no risk.
If you’re doing technology or if you’re trying to push
the frontier, you have to accept failure. When humans are involved,
you don’t want to lose life or harm anyone. But for robotic
systems, or even systems that don’t directly affect humans,
you should be able to try something new that may not work. Now when
you write a proposal you’ve got to almost guarantee success.
For example, I’ve been working on concepts for using tethers
in space. People don’t realize in the Gemini Program, one of
the Gemini crew rendezvoused with the upper stage, they hooked a line
to it. They separated out by several hundred feet and they spun around
to get artificial gravity. That was the last time NASA got excited
about a tether mission. People tried that on Shuttle, using an electrodynamic
tether, but that, due to workmanship issues, failed. The first one
was a failure. The reflight was successful, but NASA just did not
want to do it again. You can make measurements around the Moon using
tethers that would enable low-altitude measurements that aren’t
possible because of the irregular gravity field.
You have a terrible time persuading engineers at Goddard and anyone
to say that yes, we’re willing to take that risk and try it.
They say, “Something like that, it’s not in our toolbox.
We don’t want to try it.” NASA needs a way to have some
fraction of its activity, part of its portfolio, doing things that
are truly innovative.
When SpaceX [Space Exploration Technologies Corp.] does innovative
launches, I applaud. I feel really good about it. I say, “NASA
could have been doing this 20 years ago.” But no one at NASA
engineering or NASA management I think would have been willing to
take the risk. SpaceX failed many times before they were able to bring
their boosters back to the Cape [Canaveral, Florida] or to their barge.
They’re now using it as part of their toolbox.
Johnson: It’s
almost like the commercial companies accept that risk, whereas NASA
has become so risk-averse because of accidents. If NASA fails, then
it’s political. It’s all these things that happen.
Vondrak: That’s
right, you’re exactly right. That’s why NASA management
doesn’t want to do that, because they say, “Even if a
little rocket fails it’ll make the front page of the [Washington]
Post [newspaper].” You don’t want to have NASA on the
front page of the Post associated with something that didn’t
work.
SpaceX, their motivation is to make money, or to push the frontier.
So they’re willing to accept that because they want to distinguish
themselves from their competitors. NASA doesn’t have that as
part of our culture, and I would like to see NASA have some element
of it. If you’re putting people on the [International] Space
Station they’ve got to stay alive, you’re not going to
take risk. But if it’s a robotic spacecraft or something else,
you’ve got to be pushing the envelope.
Johnson: If
there’s anything else—or you have your list there, just
make sure we haven’t left anything off.
Vondrak: Last
night I looked at those questions and I said, “How do I make
sure I don’t overlook something?”
The only other comment perhaps is that you have to, in your career,
be willing to try new things and not have them all succeed. Not only
do not all your proposals succeed, but I’ve been associated
with missions where we worked very, very hard to get something done,
and then the spacecraft died or the rocket blew up. That’s very
disappointing, but you have to be able to be resilient and keep trying
and not get totally discouraged.
There’s been another thing that pushed the envelope—solar
power satellites. In the early ’70s when the U.S. had to face
an energy shortage for the first time, I worked hard on developing
concepts for solar power satellites. I was on a Department of Energy
panel for looking at upper atmospheric effects of solar power satellites.
I think they should be part of our tool kit for solving our energy
needs.
I’m still appalled that NASA doesn’t have a technology
office, or some office working on concepts for getting power from
space and beaming it back to Earth. We should be doing that, NASA
is the right agency to be doing that. There’s no significant
activity in that area.
That’s something that maybe our children or grandchildren will
shake their head and say, “Why did NASA lose their interest
in doing it, which they had in the ’70s?” We had a solar
power satellite activity at NASA, and it’s just gone. It should
be in our toolbox. If we want to be resilient as a society we have
to have more ways of accomplishing our needs.
Johnson: That’s
very true.
Vondrak: Thank
you very much.
Johnson: Thank
you for taking your time to talk to us for the project, we appreciate
it.
[End
of interview]
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